



Friendship and Empire

Roman Diplomacy and Imperialism in the
Middle Republic (353–146 BC)

PAUL J. BURTON

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FRIENDSHIP AND EMPIRE

In this bold new interpretation of the origins of ancient Rome's overseas empire, Dr. Burton charts the impact of the psychology, language, and gesture associated with the ancient Roman concept of *amicitia*, or "friendship." The book challenges the prevailing orthodox Cold War-era Realist interpretation of Roman imperialism, and argues that language and ideals contributed just as much to Roman empire-building as military muscle. Using an International Relations Constructivist theoretical framework, Dr. Burton replaces the modern scholarly fiction of a Roman empire built on networks of foreign clients and client states with an interpretation grounded firmly in the discursive habits of the ancient texts themselves. The results better account for the peculiar rhythms of Rome's earliest period of overseas expansion – brief periods of vigorous military and diplomatic activity, such as the rolling back of Seleucid power from Asia Minor and Greece in 192–188 BC, followed by long periods of inactivity and unconcern.

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Preface

This study was originally conceived and written as a Ph.D. dissertation in the relative comfort and security of post-Cold War 1990s United States (US) of America. From that vantage point it seemed that after a few missteps (in northern Iraq, Somalia, and Rwanda), the US seemed to be settling into its new role as “Globo-cop,” enforcing the consensual will of the international community and adopting suitably internationalist diplomatic positions, particularly in the rapidly disintegrating former Yugoslavia.

As a preliminary version of this study was under consideration by the editors of the ancient history journal *Klio*, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11) on the World Trade Center in New York City, on the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia, and in a field near Shanksville, Pennsylvania occurred. As a part-time resident of both the Washington, D.C. area and Pennsylvania at the time, these events made a great impression on me, and guided the revision of my dissertation more firmly down a theoretical path to which I had already been inclining by the summer of 2001: International Relations (IR) Constructivism. My belief was that IR Realism – the dominant paradigm in foreign-policy circles as well as in Political Science departments in academia – had exerted a debilitating effect on inquiry into past empires, states, and state systems, and its inability to predict or account for the internal breakup of the Soviet Union and its satellite empire in Europe only added to that conviction. The change of tone and discourse in the way politicians and diplomats spoke about the world under the Clinton administration also compelled me to think more about the constructive power of language and ideas.

The horrors that followed the initial horror of 9/11 – a US administration that seemed determined to replace the enormous fund of goodwill poured forth by the international community towards the United States with an equally large fund of anti-American feeling after taking the ill-fated decision to shift the front line of the “Global War on Terror(ism)” from Afghanistan to Iraq; the revelations that the US leadership had approved of unspeakable

acts of torture in black sites, prisons, and US bases all over the world; the daily perversion of language by US politicians and their speechwriters and spokespeople, and the cowed and passive absorption of these distortions by the press that reported on them – all of this confirmed my initial suspicion that language and ideas exert a significant autonomous impact on how we construct global realities.

The final version of my study of Roman international relations in the Middle Republic has occupied an eventful fifteen years not just in my life but in the lives of my friends and family as well as internationally. The project owes the most, as a glance at my bibliography will show, to my Ph.D. supervisor in the Department of History at the University of Maryland at College Park, Professor Arthur M. Eckstein. The loss of his life-partner Jeannie Rutenburg in 2009 was a devastating blow; she was a great mentor and a seminal influence in my early academic life, and much of what appears here bears the stamp of our long conversations as the research and writing of the dissertation progressed.

This project would have never seen the light of day without the loving encouragement of my friends and family. Unfortunately, my mother passed away before my book appeared; at many crucial stages in my research career, she was instrumental in helping me keep body and soul together. My father, too, has been an inspiration, as always. I thank my wife, Jessica Dietrich, and my two wonderful children, Harper and Eliot, for being so understanding of my needs and preoccupations, generous with their time, and always present and eager with their love. Finally, thanks are especially owed to those who endured long conversations about my work, and even read portions of it and provided insightful feedback. Special thanks must go to Jane Dietrich, an outstanding mother-in-law and superb editor who spent a good deal of her time on her visit to us in Australia not playing with her new grandson, but reading the entire manuscript end-to-end.

Canberra, Australia

Abbreviations

Abbreviated references generally follow the conventions of *The Oxford Classical Dictionary*, eds. S. Hornblower and A. Spawforth, rev. 3rd edn., Oxford 2003.

In addition, the following are used:

cos.	consul
mag.eq.	magister equitum
pr.	praetor
tr. pl.	tribunus plebis
OLD	<i>Oxford Latin Dictionary</i> , ed. P.G.W. Glare, rev. repr., Oxford 2004.

Discourse, International Relations, and International Relations theory

THE NATURE OF ROMAN REPUBLICAN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

The history of Rome's interstate relations began, in Roman national mythology, with a striking example of the interplay between what can be loosely termed "domestic" and "international" *amicitia*. According to Livy, when Aeneas first arrived on Italian shores and entered the aboriginal kingdom of Latinus, the two leaders immediately established friendly relations. Latinus "by extending his right hand [to Aeneas], sanctified the good faith of the friendship that would be" (*dextra data fidem futurae amicitiae sanxisse*). The two then added a domestic treaty (*foedus*) to the public one, says Livy, when Latinus gave Aeneas his daughter in marriage (Livy 1.1.8–9; cf. Dion. Hal. 1.59.1–2).

A millennium later, again according to Livy, the Numidian chieftain Masinissa traveled from his kingdom in North Africa to Spain in order to meet the Roman commander P. Cornelius Scipio (the future Africanus) in person and shake his hand (*Numida cum ipso utique congredi Scipione uolebat atque eius dextra fidem sancire*). The two leaders met and Masinissa, whose admiration for Scipio was already well established because of the Roman's great accomplishments (*ceperat iam ante Numidam ex fama rerum gestarum admiratio uiri*), was awestruck by his majesty, manliness, and military bearing (*maiestas . . . uirilis uere ac militaris*). For his part, Scipio was impressed by the Numidian commander's youthful high spirit and courage (*ipse iuuenis specimen animi prae se ferret*). Masinissa told Scipio of his eagerness to perform a kindness (*beneficium*) for both Scipio and the Roman people since the Roman commander had recently returned to him his nephew, whom the Romans had earlier captured in battle against the Carthaginians and their allies; now that the gods had provided him the opportunity, said Masinissa, no other foreigner would prove as energetic or helpful to Scipio and the Roman people than himself. The two commanders then exchanged pledges of loyalty (*fide data acceptaque*)

and Scipio allowed Masinissa to plunder the surrounding fields, so that he should not return to his kingdom empty-handed (Livy 28.35; cf. App. *Hisp.* 37).

These anecdotes, to which many more could be added, demonstrate the pervasiveness of the discursive and physical vocabulary of *amicitia* in the Roman literary tradition. Nor is this simply a figment of the Roman historiographical imagination: numerous Roman coins and frescoes depicting the physical aspects of establishing international friendship survive, and several extant inscriptions attest to international *amicitia* as historical fact, as do the famous early treaties between Rome and Carthage, which the second-century BC Greek historian Polybius famously transcribes in the third book of his universal history.¹ In a field rife with controversy, one incontrovertible fact about Roman international relations during the Middle Republic stands out: while the Romans struck relatively few extra-Italian formal and binding treaties of alliance during this period,² and repeatedly exhibited a marked reluctance to enter into such pacts, they entered into literally hundreds of informal pacts of friendship during this same time.³ *Amicitia* was the primary means by which the Roman state enmeshed itself in the affairs of other states during the first phase of Republican transmarine imperial expansion, thus laying the groundwork for a large and enduring world empire. The language of friendship, moreover, was the chief discursive framework whereby the Romans constructed their relationships with their international partners overseas. Despite this, however, international *amicitia* has yet to receive the scholarly attention it deserves.⁴ The focus, traditionally, has been on Rome's foreign *clientela*.

¹ Pictorial representations: Hölkeskamp 2000: 240–48; inscriptions (Republican examples): *Syll.*³ 591 (Lampsacus and Massilia, 196/195 BC); *IG* 11.4.756 (Delos, ca. 192); *Syll.*³ 646 (Thisbae, 170); *SEG* 16.255 (Achaean League, ca. 170); Carthaginian treaties: Polyb. 3.22 (509), 3.24 (ca. 348).

² Nine in the Greek East, one with the Jews (Gruen 1984: 13–53, 731–51), and three in Sicily (Sicilian Tauromenium, perhaps Netum, and Messana) (Pinzone 1978: 353–79). Later treaties include those with the Greek Lycian League (46 BC; discussion: S. Mitchell 2005), Cnidus (45; Blümel 1992), Mytilene (25; *RDGE* 26d–e; Ferrary 1990: 231–35), and Spanish Gades (Brunt 1982; Gruen 1984: 29–30; Rich 2008: 57, 60).

³ Sixty-seven (or perhaps fifty-two) in Sicily during the first year of the First Punic War alone: Diod. Sic. 23.4.1 (67 BC); Eutrop. 2.19 (52); cf. Polyb. 1.16.3; Zonar. 8.9; below, Chapter 3, pp. 134–36.

⁴ Exceptional is Gruen 1984: 54–95, but his main concern is to demonstrate the connection between Roman *amicitia* and Greek φιλία. Altay Coskun and Heinz Heinen have recently undertaken a major research project entitled “Roms auswärtige Freunde,” dealing principally with the Late Republic and Early Empire, and focusing on the Black Sea region, but the results are only beginning to appear (for a preview, see Coskun and Heinen 2004; as of this writing, two edited volumes have appeared, Coskun [ed.] 2005; Coskun [ed.] 2008, as well as a study of the extension and withdrawal of Roman citizenship rights, Coskun 2009). Burton 2003 is a distillation of the view presented here. Friendship in ancient Greek international relations has lately received greater attention: L.G. Mitchell 1997a; 1997b; Low 2007.

This study seeks to rectify this oversight, and in particular to explore the interconnections between the meanings and dynamics of Roman interpersonal and international friendship. It will offer alternative interpretative paradigms to those current in the study of Roman international relations, in particular outlining a processual theory of friendship-exchange dynamics, in addition to examining and documenting Rome's international relations using the theoretical framework of International Relations (IR) Constructivism. The purpose of the remainder of this introductory chapter is to account for why scholars have traditionally overlooked the *amicitia* language used by the ancient sources themselves to describe Rome's Republican-era international relationships, and to suggest reasons why the predominant IR Realist and Neorealist readings of Roman diplomacy and imperialism may profitably be supplemented or altered in order to accommodate the apparent power and importance of the ancient discursive frameworks and mentalities that underlay ancient diplomatic interactions.

FOREIGN CLIENTELA AND INTERNATIONAL AMICITIA

In 1958, Ernst Badian published his brilliant and enormously influential study of Roman imperialism and diplomacy, *Foreign Clientelae*. The most significant and enduring contribution of Badian's book is its successful replacement of the traditional legalistic interpretations of Roman international relations with one that emphasizes the informality and morally grounded nature of these ties. Badian writes: "The relationship presided over by [the goddess] Fides [sc. *clientela*] is of a moral and political rather than a legal kind: where there are legal foundations, it is the superstructure that is the realm of Fides . . . that matters."⁵ Badian's concept of Roman interstate *clientela* built on the work of Theodor Mommsen, Percy Cooper Sands, and Matthias Gelzer,⁶ all of whom used the language of clientship ("client kingdoms," "client states," etc.) in order to describe Rome's international partners, despite the ancient sources' overwhelming preference for *amicitia* terminology. For Badian, the *ipsissima verba* of the sources themselves was less important than what he believed to be the undeniable political reality at the heart of Roman foreign relations: because, in Badian's view, interpersonal *clientelae* "comprise relationships admittedly between superior and inferior," while *amicitiae* were "typical of relationships between equals,"⁷ and because Rome's relations with other

⁵ Badian 1958a: 11.

⁶ Cf. Mommsen 1887: 65–66, 667–68, 652, 717–18; Sands 1908; Gelzer 1969: 86–101.

⁷ Badian 1958a: 11.

Mediterranean states were by definition asymmetrical, many having been established in the context of war, and some even constituted through *deditio*, or the complete surrender of foreign states to Roman commanders, *clientela*, as a “habit of mind and a philosophy of society,”⁸ was the more precise social analogue than *amicitia*, and thus more worthy of study in order to gain a proper understanding of Roman international relations.

In Badian’s view, the explanatory power of *clientela* gains momentum as Rome’s power increased over the course of the second century BC and into the Late Republic, when no credible challengers to Rome’s predominance in the Mediterranean world remained; *amici*, *amicitia*, and the language of equality in international relations had simply become by then polite euphemisms for the language of dependence, including *cliens*, *patrocinium*, and *clientela*. “By the second century (and perhaps earlier),” Badian argues, “there is . . . no question of equality: just as, in private usage within Rome, ‘amicus’ can . . . be a polite term for an inferior (or, conversely, a superior) – i.e. a client or patron – , so in the wider sphere, where there are no equals left to Rome as a great power – or to a Roman senator as an individual – , *amicitia* necessarily becomes another term for clientship.”⁹ And again: *clientela* “was probably the way in which educated Romans in the second century considered the relations of Rome with at least some other states: the avoidance of the term in official documents may be due to a desire to spare their feelings.”¹⁰

Badian’s book sparked controversy and debate from the very beginning. Two of his conclusions are not in dispute: first, that Rome’s relationships with extra-Italian states were largely informal and extra-legal, the expectations and obligations arising from them being governed by morality (*fides*) rather than law; and second, that the foreign *clientelae* of individual Roman aristocrats played an increasingly important role in the domestic political life of Rome over the course of the last two centuries of the Roman Republic. However, Badian’s corollary notion that the Roman state *as a state* exercised a patronal role over these foreign communities, analogous to the patronal role assumed by the “Roman senator as an individual” or the victorious Roman general over defeated communities, has been variously criticized.¹¹ Scholars have long taken exception to the previously noted

⁸ Badian 1958a: 42 n. 2. ⁹ Badian 1958a: 12–13.

¹⁰ Badian 1958a: 6–7; cf. Sands 1908: 8 (“Rome seems to have been careful not to offend her dependents by laying stress upon their subordination”).

¹¹ Although Badian himself was careful to distinguish the (literal) patronage exercised by individual Romans over foreign communities and the (metaphorical) patronage exercised by the Roman state (cf. Badian 1958a: 156–57), the overall thrust of his thesis encourages a distorting conceptual slippage

problem that the *clientela* analogy ignores the *amicitia* language of Roman interstate relations that the sources themselves use (and thus attempts to make the metaphorical, literal, and the literal, mere euphemism); it further misrepresents the extent to which the uniquely Roman concept of *clientela* was misunderstood by Rome's international partners; it fails to define *clientela* adequately or to distinguish it with precision from other informal social relationships, including *amicitia*; it exaggerates the inferior status of Rome's international partners and the constraints on their freedom to act; and it confuses the end point (Roman supremacy) with the process of Rome's gradual acquisition of power over its international competitors.¹²

Despite the accumulation of legitimate criticism of the patronal aspect of Badian's thesis, the notion that the Roman state as a state exercised a form of patronage over other states, conceptualized as clients, remains a fixture of modern scholarship. Badian himself has occasionally reasserted its validity (with some qualification and clarification),¹³ it has never lacked for serious scholarly support,¹⁴ and its continued influence is apparent in the ubiquity of such terms as "client state" and "client kingdom" in textbooks of Roman history.¹⁵

The present study is concerned less with restating the criticisms of this aspect of Badian's thesis than with shifting the discussion of Roman imperialism and diplomacy in the Middle Republic to new discursive ground: international *amicitia*, or "friendship" (rather than foreign *clientelae*), will be the focus, Roman diplomatic methods and style (rather than the nature of Roman imperialism), the emphasis. The position adopted here, broadly speaking, is that greater understanding of the nature of international relations in the crucial third and second centuries BC in the Mediterranean

between the two; see Eilers 2002: 186–89; Burton 2003: 351 n. 90. For the patronage of individual Roman senators and commanders over foreign individuals and communities, see Harmand 1957: 5–116 (with the distinction Badian draws fully blurred at 20–21); Gelzer 1969: 86–101; Gruen 1984: 162–72; Ferrary 1988: 117–32; 1991; 1997; Eilers 2002.

¹² Bleicken 1964; Dahlheim 1968: 2–3; Lintott 1981: 61–62; Braund 1984: 7, 23, 29–30 n. 1, 185; Sherwin-White 1984: 52; Gruen 1984: 158–200; Ferrary 1988: 118; Rich 1989; Nörr 1989: 69–70, 81, 84–85; Lintott 1993: 33–34; Ferrary 1997: 113–17; Eilers 2002: 186–89; Burton 2003; Eckstein 2008: 43–45. For a summary of these and other criticisms, see Coskun and Heinen 2004: 52–57.

¹³ Badian 1968: 14, 93 n. 1; Badian 1983: 408 ("it is useful to see Rome's developed foreign policy as patronal"), 412 (qualification: "not . . . all foreign states were regarded in the light of clients. It would obviously imply that in the case of states manifestly weaker than, and dependent on, Rome, and in their case only").

¹⁴ Dahlheim 1968: 269–74 (*amicitia* becomes *clientela* after Pydna in 168 BC); Errington 1971; Wallace-Hadrill 1989: 74–75; Rich 1989 (an "attempt to defend and reformulate" Badian's thesis); Coskun 2005: 1–9 (with minor reservations). Other references in Eckstein 2008: 44 n. 64.

¹⁵ Cf. Le Glay et al. 2009: 93; Sidebottom 2007: 4, 10, 26. This is in spite of the attempt of Braund 1984 to replace Sands' (see n. 10) notion of "client princes" with that of "friendly kings."

world – its particular stresses, strains, uncertainties, and dangers – can be arrived at only by examining Roman diplomatic concepts on their own terms, and by maintaining the focus of analysis on the prevailing discourse of friendship that emerges from the ancient sources themselves.¹⁶ One of the basic aims, in other words, will be to do for *amicitia* what Badian did for *clientela*: to ground the application of its international relations analogue in a comprehensive understanding of its operation and ideology in Roman domestic life. In addition, just as Badian himself attempted to free the study of Roman international relations from the rigidities of traditional legalistic interpretations, so this study endeavors to replace the similarly constraining Roman *clientela* paradigm for Roman international relations with the more flexible *amicitia* model.

CONTEXTUALIZING THE DEBATE: THE IMPACT OF REALISM AND THE REALM OF LANGUAGE

Another purpose of this study is to anchor the analysis of Roman interstate relations in the conceptual frameworks developed by scholars in the Political Science discipline of International Relations (IR) during the second half of the twentieth century. Despite IR's long-established status as an academic discipline in its own right, it was many years before ancient historians began to avail themselves of its insights. The major studies of Roman imperialism under the Republic by William Harris and Erich Gruen in the 1970s and 1980s were informed by various early theorists of imperialism, which they both studied and to which they both refer, albeit briefly, in their works.¹⁷ In the 2000s Arthur Eckstein was the first to apply thoroughly and consistently the language and concepts of IR Realist theory to the international environment of the Hellenistic Mediterranean.¹⁸ On the Greek side, Polly Low grounded her study of Classical Greek international relations in a post-positivist, post-Realist framework.¹⁹ Low urges a

¹⁶ On this approach, cf. now the important “biography” of the terms *imperium* and *provincia*, Richardson 2008: esp. 7–8: “in order to understand Roman imperialism and the Roman Empire, it is necessary to grasp what the Romans thought they were doing as well as what they did. The best, perhaps the only way of doing this is to examine the language they used to describe that empire.”

¹⁷ Harris 1979: 259–60 (an “Additional Note” on Joseph Schumpeter); Gruen 1984: 3–5 (on John Hobson, V.I. Lenin, and Schumpeter – a mere two pages of text in a book of 730 pages, excluding backmatter).

¹⁸ Eckstein 2006; 2008. Kallet-Marx 1995a also cites IR theory, but only intermittently (cf. 3, 11, 29, 337). Although my intellectual debts to Eckstein will be clear in what follows, our theoretical approaches are poles apart (Eckstein characterizes himself as an “offensive” Realist: Eckstein 2006: 6–7 n. 9). A short account of our interpretative disagreements has recently appeared in the pages of *International History Review*: Burton 2009; Eckstein 2009.

¹⁹ Low 2007.

greater critical understanding of the discursive contexts in which historians of ancient international relations do their work, and suggests that the predominantly Realist readings of the ancient evidence of the twentieth century were driven more by contemporary modes of thinking about international relations than by an objective appreciation of what the ancient evidence actually says.²⁰

Low's insight is well taken. A significant part of the reason that the foreign *clientela* thesis continues to resonate with scholars of Roman interstate relations may indeed have to do with the prevailing IR *mentalité* of the period when it was first formulated and found its most lasting expression. As a study of imperial power and its exercise, *Foreign Clientelae* was a product of its time. Written well into the post-Second World War period, as the era of the old European empires was ending (expiring abruptly, at Suez, in 1956), and just before the first serious crises of the Cold War were about to flare up (Sputnik, the Cuban missile crisis), Badian's book was perforce influenced by the IR Realist paradigms that dominated contemporary debates about Cold War international relations. Thus, for example, Badian likens Rome's demand in 200 BC that Philip V of Macedon not wage war on the Greeks to a doctrine of containment, in that it resembles "present-day demands that certain powers should stop their policy of aggression [in an attempt] to confine the powers concerned to their frontiers of several hundred years ago."²¹ Badian also characterizes the Roman redistribution of seized Seleucid land in Asia Minor to the kingdom of Pergamum and the island republic of Rhodes following the defeat of the Seleucid king Antiochus III as an attempt to create a "balance of power" in the region.²² The important article on the diplomatic stand-off between Rome and Antiochus III during the 190s BC, which Badian was working on at the time *Foreign Clientelae* appeared, was subtitled, significantly, "A Study in Cold War."²³ As will be seen shortly, Badian's attitude towards the language of the sources for Roman international relations may have been unconsciously (or subconsciously) informed by the predominant patterns of thought and discursive practices and strategies of the Cold War era.

The attractions of IR Realism for ancient historians in particular should occasion no surprise. The Realist approach, after all, was alleged to have its roots in antiquity in the work of Thucydides, "the founding father of realism."²⁴ Shortly after the end of the Second World War, political scientists and the politicians who listened to them began to discern in

²⁰ Low 2007: 30, 31. ²¹ Badian 1958a: 67. ²² Badian 1958a: 104–05, III. ²³ Badian 1959.

²⁴ Nye 1988: 235. Rahe 1995/1996: 105–17 and Low 2007: 2, 4, 19–21, summarize the intellectual history of this idea.

the harsh new bipolar world of US–Soviet antagonism significant parallels with Thucydides’ analysis of the similarly bipolar Aegean world of the fifth century BC, which was comparably dominated by two (regional) super-powers (Athens and Sparta), each supported by its own (unequal) alliance system (the Delian League and the Peloponnesian League respectively).²⁵ Realists highlighted such maxims of supposedly Thucydidean *Realpolitik* as “might makes right” and “the strong do what they will, the weak suffer what they must” in order to lend their theories an aura of ancient authority and timelessness.²⁶ Thucydidean analysis was everywhere deployed and regarded as prophetic of the new realities of the Cold War international environment, in which the US and its NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) allies sought security and protected their own interests against the similarly self-interested and security-conscious Soviet bloc. By this time theoretical Realism had become so well entrenched that its status as the cornerstone of American foreign policy was practically unassailable. It was under Realism’s sway that George Kennan, first as US ambassador to Moscow and then as chief policymaker at the State Department in the post-Second World War years, developed the influential “containment doctrine” and a balance-of-power conception of US–Soviet relations that remained the *idées fixes* of American policymaking – and American IR studies – from the 1940s right through to the Nixon and Reagan eras.²⁷

Dissatisfied with “classical” Realism of the Thucydidean type, and its focus on human nature and state-level (“unit-attribute”) factors, some scholars of international relations began looking for deeper patterns in the mechanics of interstate phenomena and to develop theoretical approaches to their field of study based more on systems and structures. The first great

²⁵ For an extended comparative analysis by a Political Scientist, see Fleiss 1966. Connor 1984: 1–2, a Classicist, provides an interesting, first-person reminiscence on the apparent relevance of Thucydides in the 1950s Cold War environment (citing Secretary of State George Marshall’s 1947 Cold War–Peloponnesian War comparison). In the same era, Sir Ronald Syme noted, “war and disturbance . . . bring men to Thucydides in different ages, for recognition, instruction, and grim comfort” (Syme 2002: 52, a book that first appeared in 1964 but was based on lectures delivered in Berkeley in 1959).

²⁶ In recent times, Thucydides’ status as Realism’s founding father has come under increasing criticism by ancient historians and international relations scholars alike: Connor 1984; Garst 1989; Bosworth 1993; Bagby 1994; Rahe 1995/1996; Crane 1998; Morrison 2000; Bagby 2000; Lebow 2001; 2003: 41, 57, 65–167; Welch 2003; Low 2007: 4–6, 19–22, 222–33; Lebow 2008: 12. Doyle 1991 and Eckstein 2006: 49, 52 are reassertions of Thucydides’ Realist credentials, but see also Eckstein 2003, a critique of Political Scientists who cannot read Greek, and thus have been misled by faulty English translations of Thucydides.

²⁷ See Kennan’s infamous “long telegram” to Washington (published under the pseudonym “X”): X 1947. On American IR studies after the Second World War, see now Low 2007: 13–14; Lebow 2008: 19–26.

theoretical statement of this so-called “Neorealist” approach was Kenneth Waltz’s *Theory of International Politics*.²⁸ In this work, Waltz argues that the state of the world is determined not by individual state actors but by deeper structures inherent in the international system, that states are self-regarding, security-seeking entities competing in a harsh and brutal international system, which itself is devoid of any effective international law or the means to enforce it, and is thus characterized by a formal state of brutal anarchy. In this system self-help is the only recourse for the self-regarding, security-seeking state (since no state behaves altruistically, or selflessly, in its pursuit of power), and the price of weakness is destruction. Thus weak states cluster around more powerful (and mutually antagonistic and mistrustful) imperial metropolises, whose conflicts are fought out on the weaker periphery. Succinctly, “the state among states . . . conducts its affairs in the brooding shadow of violence. Because some states may at any time use force, all states must be prepared to do so – or live at the mercy of their militarily more vigorous neighbors.”²⁹

The significance, for the present purposes, of Neorealism’s denial of explanatory power to unit-level factors (or “nonstructural supplementary variables”³⁰) is that such factors as ideas, ideals, and, most importantly, the language of international diplomacy – how states converse with, think about, and describe each other – are alleged to have only a minimal impact on the structure of the international system. Language is subordinated to the larger project – survival – and becomes meaningless or euphemistic in proportion. According to Waltz, because the stakes of the US–Soviet antagonism of the Cold War were so high (nuclear annihilation being one possible outcome of the competition), “ideology,” including language, “was subordinated to interest in the policies of America and Russia [and] ideology became a prop to national policy.” Superpower behavior, furthermore, bore little relationship to the language used by both sides.³¹

This is the intellectual background against which the foreign *clientela* thesis must be read. The peculiarly dangerous conditions of the Cold War era with its ever-present threat of nuclear annihilation resulted in an extremely slippery discursive environment, one in which “doublespeak” – saying one thing while meaning another – became habitual, almost instinctive practice. The immediate post-1945 period witnessed, on an unprecedented scale, a pervasive and cynical manipulation of language and

²⁸ Waltz 1979.

²⁹ Waltz 1979: 102; cf. Sterling 1974: 336 (quoted in Eckstein 2006: 15; 2008: 9, 232 n. 6): “states must meet the demands of the political eco-system or court annihilation.”

³⁰ Eckstein 2006: 68 and n. 130 (citing Christensen 1993: 333). ³¹ Waltz 1979: 172–73.

its meaning(s) by policymakers, the press, and IR academics. It is therefore unsurprising that the most famous modern statement of the deleterious effect of warfare and politics on language, George Orwell's "Politics and the English Language," appeared during the early days of the Cold War. In this essay, Orwell connects the unprecedented perversion of language to the unprecedented threats to human security:

In our time political speech and writing are largely the defense of the indefensible. Things like the continuance of British rule in India, the Russian purges and deportations, the dropping of the atom bombs on Japan, can indeed be defended, but only by arguments which are too brutal for most people to face, and which do not square with the professed aims of political parties. Thus political language has to consist largely of euphemism, question-begging and sheer cloudy vagueness. Defenseless villages are bombarded from the air, the inhabitants driven out into the countryside, the cattle machine-gunned, the huts set on fire with incendiary bullets: this is called *pacification*. Millions of peasants are robbed of their farms and sent trudging along the roads with no more than they can carry: this is called *transfer of population* or *rectification of frontiers*. People are imprisoned for years without trial, or shot in the back of the neck or sent to die of scurvy in Arctic lumber camps: this is called *elimination of unreliable elements*. Such phraseology is needed if one wants to name things without calling up mental pictures of them.

The logic of Orwell's conclusion is irresistible: modern political language "is designed to make lies sound truthful and murder respectable, and to give an appearance of solidity to pure wind."³²

This is not to say that the degradation of language was unique to the Cold War era. So Thucydides famously wrote of the civil *stasis* at Corcyra in 427 BC:

καὶ τὴν εἰωθυῖαν ἀξίωσιν τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐς τὰ ἔργα ἀντήλλαξαν τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ. τόλμα μὲν γὰρ ἀλόγιστος ἀνδρεία φιλέταιρος ἐνομίσθην, μέλλησις δὲ προθυμῆς δειλία εὐπρεπής, τὸ δὲ σῶφρον τοῦ ἀνάνδρου πρόσχημα, καὶ τὸ πρὸς ἅπαν ξυνητὸν ἐπὶ πᾶν ἄργον· τὸ δ᾽ ἐμπλήκτως ὁξὺ ἀνδρὸς μοῖρα προσετέθη, ἀσφαλεία δὲ τὸ ἐπιβουλεύσασθαι ἀποτροπῆς πρόφασις εὐλογος.

The Corcyreans altered the usual meaning of words in relation to the facts at will. Thoughtless aggression was called partisan courage; cautious delay, cowardice veiled under a fine name; moderation, a cloak for unmanliness; an ability to see all sides of an issue, an unfitness to act on any; fanatical passion became the attribute of manliness; plotting to secure one's own safety, a reasonable pretext for betraying one's own party. (Thuc. 3.82.4)

³² Orwell 1970: 166 (emphasis in the original) and 170.

Language has unduly suffered in more recent times as well. The Vietnam War saw the invention of “collateral damage” to describe the slaughter of non-combatants and destruction of their property, and “friendly fire” to describe the accidental destruction of one’s own forces; in the Balkan conflicts of the 1990s genocide became “ethnic cleansing”; and over the course of the first decade of the US-led “war on terror,” torture has become “enhanced interrogation techniques”; undisclosed locations where torture takes place, “black sites”; prisoners of war, “enemy combatants”; mercenaries, “contract” or “security workers”; and a schedule or timetable for withdrawal (or better, “redeployment”), an “aspirational time horizon.” In an essay exploring the impact of recent US-led wars on political language, David Bromwich, consciously echoing Orwell, notes that euphemistic language has become uncontrollably self-reinforcing and deliberately self-deceptive: “behind the façade of a history falsified by language, the painful particulars of war are lost [and] apologists of violence, by means of euphemism, come to believe what they hear themselves say.”³³

The evidence seems to suggest that the incidence of euphemistic political language tends to rise during times of political and international stress and anxiety, regardless of historical context. But this is not to say that all particular responses to crises should be historicized into insignificance; so, for example, the differences between Thucydides’ world and our own are simply too great to permit direct comparison. Robert Gilpin identifies three such differences: “the impact of nuclear weapons on the superpower rivalry, the conservative behavior of both protagonists [in the Cold War], and the structure of the international system itself,” which had fewer neutrals and non-players in the ancient world than in the modern;³⁴ Arthur Eckstein adds to this list “good diplomacy on both sides” in the case of the Cold War – which was conspicuously absent more often than not in antiquity;³⁵ and, of course, in the particular case of the Peloponnesian War, at least two major “hot” wars accompanied the polarization of Greece around the fifth-century Spartan and Athenian hegemonies.

It is thus hard to avoid the conclusion that, despite similarities to other crisis periods in human history, the Cold War was a uniquely troubled period because of the clear and ever-present threat of nuclear annihilation; political language, correspondingly, deteriorated to an unprecedented degree. A Cold War-era handbook of euphemisms notes, “since the beginning of the nuclear age, vast efforts have been devoted to disguising the

³³ Bromwich 2008: 28. Cf. C. Johnson 2004: 28, 300; 2006: 24–25, 120–21. ³⁴ Gilpin 1991: 46–48.

³⁵ Eckstein 2008: 316 n. 33.

almost unbearable threat of human annihilation. Such efforts have raised euphemism to new heights.”³⁶ And in 1973 an official in the Nixon administration remarked on how arms experts and military planners “insulate themselves from the potential implications of their labors by layers of dehumanizing abstraction and bland metaphors”; thus the well-known Cold War-era euphemism for nuclear annihilation – “mutually assured destruction” or MAD – could not reasonably be called “mutually assured genocide” since, according to the same official, the latter term “would reveal the truth too starkly.”³⁷

Hindsight has shown that more than any other era that preceded it, the Cold War witnessed political rhetorics so fraught and so carefully hedged and opaque, largely for reasons of staving off nuclear annihilation but also in the interest of shielding one’s conscience against the consequences of modern warfare, that euphemism became transformed from mere political artifice into a subconscious exercise in willful self-deception:

Rhetoric [was] a generative principle of Cold War politics. Rhetoric was not something added on or peripheral to or substituting for the “real” issues. No, rhetoric was *the* issue; it constituted the central substance that required serious attention if the Cold War was to remain cold and rhetoric was to continue to be used in place of instruments of death . . . [L]anguage . . . [did] not so much describe reality as constitute that reality.³⁸

Language, in other words, was held hostage to the overwhelming fear of the possibility of nuclear annihilation, and thus came to resemble, in terms of its inability to confront or describe reality, Americans’ continuing faith in fallout shelters well into the 1980s, long after scientists had developed convincing models of an apocalyptic “nuclear winter” that must follow a nuclear exchange, or the Reagan (and later Bush II) administration’s commitment to a space-based missile defense shield (the “Strategic Defense Initiative” [SDI], popularly known as “Star Wars”), despite its repeated failures during initial tests.³⁹

Daniel Deudney has described this connection between such dysfunctional discourses and irrational acts during the Cold War as a “superstructural incoherence,” when “actors [found] themselves increasingly compelled by circumstances to say one thing while doing another . . . embrac[ing] schizoid beliefs and doctrines or irrational doctrines that rationalize discordance.”⁴⁰ Although the enemy “Other” was

³⁶ Neaman and Silver 1983: 286; cf. Lebow 2003: 17.

³⁷ Iklé 1973: 280–81 (cited in Wander 1997: 172–73).

³⁸ Medhurst [et al.] 1997: xiv–xv (emphasis in the original).

³⁹ For a critique of “Star Wars” by a Classicist, see Ober 1991.

⁴⁰ Deudney 1997: 116.

described and denigrated according to traditional categories (cultural, social, racial, religious) and for the traditional purposes (primarily to dehumanize), the possibility of “massive retaliation” in a nuclear exchange, resulting in the indiscriminate slaughter of men, women, and children, resulted in a more intensely euphemistic discourse than either Thucydides or even George Orwell could have conceived.⁴¹

To return to Badian. The treatment of the Latin discourse of international relations in *Foreign Clientelae* – *clientela* as a literalized metaphor and *amicitia* as mere euphemism – may thus be regarded as typical of its time and place, and perhaps of the temperament of the author.⁴² Related to this, and as his commitment to Cold War models of geopolitics, balancing, and containment in his writings reveals, Badian fully absorbed the IR Realist paradigms that predominated political and academic discourse in the second half of the twentieth century. The conformity of his thesis to the prevailing geopolitical reality, as it was then construed, allowed Badian simply to assume the accuracy of his interpretation without actually systematically arguing for it. In this, he was adhering to the pattern of thought described in an IR classic of the Cold War era, Grant Hugo’s *Appearance and Reality in International Relations*. Hugo observes that “practical men employ [abstractions] because of their convenience: they are symbols intended to signify readily comprehensible contractions of processes of reasoning it would be tedious and superfluous to elaborate.”⁴³

Foreign Clientelae likewise assumes that Roman politicians conducted themselves as twentieth-century cold warriors – using euphemistic language to spare the feelings of the weak and powerless, to deceive their fellow Roman citizens, and perhaps to shield themselves from the awful consequences for others of their behavior: “we must make a good deal of allowance . . . for human self-deception,” Badian wrote of Roman diplomatic language in 1983.⁴⁴ But his rosy view of the gentlemanly, polite Romans, horrified and guilt-ridden by their own violence and destructiveness, is plainly counterintuitive – in addition to being flatly contradicted by the evidence. Badian well knows how unpleasant the Romans could be in diplomatic parleys: “officious haughtiness,” “ineptitude” and ultimatums “delivered in the tactless and hectoring way in which great powers

⁴¹ Wander 1997: 171–72.

⁴² For an extended critique of Badian’s “euphemism theory,” see Burton 2003: 341–42; discussion: Williams 2008: 38–39.

⁴³ Hugo 1970: 131. ⁴⁴ Badian 1983: 413.

will address the small” were the order of the day.⁴⁵ Relevant here too are Cicero’s observations about status and the performance of favors in the Roman domestic context:

at qui se locupletes, honoratos, beatos putant, ii ne obligari quidem beneficio uolunt; qui etiam beneficium se dedisse arbitrabantur, cum ipsi quamuis magnum aliquod acceperint, atque etiam a se aut postulari aut exspectari aliquid suspicantur, patrocínio uero se usos aut clientes appellari mortis instar putant.

Those men who adjudge themselves rich, covered with honors, and happy do not wish to be put under obligation by any act of kindness, and think that they have also performed a favor when they themselves have received some great one, and even suspect that something is either demanded or expected from them, for they think it almost death to experience dependence or to be called clients. (*Off.* 2.69)⁴⁶

In their interpersonal relationships, the Romans evidently did not resort to polite euphemism to cover up status differences: if a man inadvertently slipped into clientage by accepting favors he knew he could not repay, he would be called a client by others, including his benefactor. The same must be true in the international sphere: because the Romans called their international partners *amici*, as the overwhelming majority of the source texts indicate, they must have thought of them and treated them as such. As Craig Williams has recently observed:

labels like *amicus* [were] socially meaningful acts: publicly identifying someone as an *amicus* made it so in a socially effective way, regardless of the actual dynamics of the relationship or the intentions or emotions involved. To this extent, use of the word was a type of performative utterance. Similarly, applying the label *amicus populi Romani* to a foreign leader or people made it so: the parties so designated were *amici populi Romani* in the most meaningful sense (namely, in terms of public representation), regardless of how they or the Roman Senate actually behaved toward one another behind the scenes, and independently of their motivation or private feelings.⁴⁷

The broader implication of this conclusion is that diplomatic discourse, instead of being dismissed as “mere” discourse, should be assigned a more active and constitutive role in the epistemologies of international systems. Medhurst’s observation, quoted above, that “language . . . [did] not

⁴⁵ Badian 1958a: 89–90. See also Linderski 1995: esp. 456 (Rome appeared as “an overbearing, self-assured, and unpleasant power”); Jehne 2009 (on the Romans’ “undiplomatic” treatment of Italian diplomats in the second century BC); Brennan 2009 (on failed embassies to Rome). On the primitive nature of ancient “compellence diplomacy,” see Eckstein 2006: 58–72, 97–99, 121, 178, 217; 2008: 12–15, with examples at 40, 69, 277–78, 290, 314 n. 26, 316 n. 36.

⁴⁶ Discussion: Lendon 2001: 71; Eilers 2002: 15–16; Burton 2003: 340, 342.

⁴⁷ Williams 2008: 40, although if by “private feelings” Williams means that the senate may have thought of their *amici* as something other than what they called them, then we disagree.

so much describe reality as constitute that reality” during the Cold War points in this direction, and owes much to the IR Constructivist school. In what remains of this introduction, a critique of the IR Realists’ attitude to language will be offered, as well as an attempt to explain the relationship of the present work to Constructivist theory as it has developed over the past two decades.

SOME CRITIQUES OF IR REALISM

The theoretical flaws of IR Realism have long been recognized. Critics interested in subverting the Realist thesis entirely have trained their fire principally on its epistemological foundations and assumptions; thus it has been argued that the elegance and economy of Realism’s parsimonious explanation of the world, which is asserted by its practitioners as its chief virtue, is so general and reductive as to render the theory merely descriptive rather than explanatory.⁴⁸ But to paraphrase one of these critics, the IR Constructivist Alexander Wendt, the present study has no stake in throwing the Realist baby out with the Realist bathwater. Rather, as this section is intended to highlight, a few aspects of the Realist critique that directly impinge on the discourse and ideologies of international relations require further explanation and amplification.

One aspect of the epistemological critique of Realism that merits attention is Realism’s well-known radical determinism. Whether one assumes a Hobbesian “state of nature” driving all towards war with all, as the classical Realists do, or the structural anarchy of the international system in which self-interested states are undifferentiated “functionally similar units,” mere epiphenomena of no real consequence, and for whom “security is the highest end,” as the Neorealists do,⁴⁹ the result is overly simple in terms of causation, and disregards the myriad contingent factors that affect decision-making both within and between states.⁵⁰ “History is frozen,” in

⁴⁸ Cf. Cohen 1973: 75–80, who defends Realist systemic theory against charges of being too narrow, too broad, and too shallow as an explanation. Waltz 1979: 69–70, defends systemic theories against critics who brand them “static” and “empty” as, rather, “elegant” and “powerful” in that they “help to explain some big, important, and enduring patterns.” For a typical Constructivist response, see Wendt 1999: 17–18.

⁴⁹ Waltz 1979: 75, 126 (the quotations), 20–37 (a critique of “reductionist” unit-level theories).

⁵⁰ Grieco 1997: 171–72, 181–84; Evangelista 1997. For an extended, practical example of the impact of unit attributes, see Gaddis 1997 (esp. 9: the Soviet Union was simply “a gargantuan extension of [Stalin’s] pathologically suspicious personality”). Note that classical Realists allow more room for domestic political considerations (i.e., unit-level phenomena) in international relations: Lebow 2003: 258–64; Low 2007: 24 n. 71 (the key text is Carr 1946: 235–36: “it is an unreal kind of realism which ignores the element of [domestic] morality in any world order . . . The fatal dualism

other words.⁵¹ It can of course be argued that generalization or simplification of myriad contingent factors is what good theory is supposed to do; after all, Keynes's macroeconomic *General Theory* would be analytically too unwieldy without its particular assumptions about economic behavior at the micro level. The point of comparison with macroeconomic theory here is not accidental: the theory of the rational consumer provided part of the inspiration behind the guiding assumption of the "security-seeking state actor" in much of modern IR theory. But just as theoretical developments in economics since Keynes have compelled economists to reexamine and modify some of their most basic assumptions, IR Realists, their critics argue, should follow suit. The great IR pioneer Hans Morgenthau recognized early on that although the rational-actor assumption was necessary for theoretical analysis, it was by no means "descriptively accurate."⁵² More recently, Robert Keohane has warned that students of international politics "should be wary of becoming too attached to the assumptions of neoclassical economics [in IR] systemic models based on maximizing assumptions."⁵³ Pierre Bourdieu's critique of the rational-actor hypothesis has emerged from his extensive research into exchanges and practices in primitive societies: "teleological description," as all rational-actor-based theory is fated to be, is "naïve [since] real agents only very exceptionally possess the complete information, and the skill to appreciate it, that rational action would presuppose."⁵⁴

The rational *homo oeconomicus* assumption, in sum, is too analytically significant a variable and as such must be heavily qualified, if not always in economic theory, then certainly more often in IR theory. States are not functionally similar, individual, economic decision-making units, but aggregations of peoples with shared histories, values, and beliefs about themselves and the world. Short-term decisions by states often have little to do with the purported all-encompassing security-seeking motive; other factors – prestige, honor, altruism, morality, emotion, and so on, which Richard Ned Lebow has recently assimilated to the ancient Greek concept of "the spirit," *ὁ θυμός* – may be more important driving forces behind state decision-making at any given moment.⁵⁵ In the context of

of politics will always keep considerations of [domestic] morality entangled with considerations of power"). Not even Neorealists can deny the importance of unit-level factors; cf. Waltz 1979: 175: "causes at both the national and the international level make the world more or less peaceful and stable."

⁵¹ Garst 1989: 24 n. 24 (a critique of Waltz's dependence on "law-like regularities").

⁵² Morgenthau 1966: 5; discussion: Keohane 1986a: 11. ⁵³ Keohane 1986a: 13.

⁵⁴ Bourdieu 1990: 61, 63; similarly Ashley 1986: 291.

⁵⁵ Lebow 2008; Burton 2010 (a review of Lebow).

international relations, purely rational decision-making (whether driven by profit-maximizing or security-seeking) may indeed be the exception rather than the rule. After careful consideration of the evidence from antiquity to the present, Lebow has argued that cooperation, not self-interest, “may be close to the norm at every level of human interaction from inter-personal to international,” and that “if humanity has a default condition, it may be concord.”⁵⁶ Mark Kauppi, from his knowledge of modern IR theory and his research on the Peloponnesian War, has concluded, as might be expected, that the situations with which IR scholars are most clearly concerned – escalation of hostilities, the outbreak of war, and attempts to avoid it – are hardly the circumstances in which rational decision-making can be expected: “extreme emotional stress or unavoidable cognitive processes” may supervene to generate a less predictable outcome.⁵⁷ Where system-level effects are concerned, as John Lewis Gaddis points out, “actions taken *within units* . . . shape capabilities [and thus] also *affect structures*” – the obvious example being Soviet policy after 1985.⁵⁸

Contingent factors such as the moral and psychological dispositions of aggregations of individuals may thus have more explanatory force than Realists are willing to credit. Another aspect of the critique of Realism that deserves emphasis in this context involves Realism’s own internal discursive practices. Scholars have remarked upon the deeply gendered and “hard-nosed”⁵⁹ nature of Realist discourse, which imparts an air of authority and “scientific tough-mindedness” to their analyses.⁶⁰ At the same time, Realist critiques tend to be dismissive of other, “softer” theories of the Idealist school, which emphasize international cooperation and interdependence. Thus Miles Kahler has observed that Idealists “have been caricatured as airy and naive proponents of the League of Nations, oblivious to the underlying and persistent realities of power and, above all, as amateurs rather than scholars.”⁶¹ The intemperance of Realist language may be a by-product of its intellectual heritage in *Geopolitik* theorizing in Germany between the two world wars – a heritage that includes, most notoriously, Adolf Hitler’s *Mein Kampf*.⁶² The triumph of the Realist paradigm in academia has played its part as well: “in an academic context in which Realism was left as a sole and unopposed power, the development of the

⁵⁶ Lebow 2003: 311, 367, 330–54 (a thorough critique of theories based on rational-choice assumptions and individual self-interest).

⁵⁷ Kauppi 1991: 117; cf. Raymond 1997: 233–34: “people do not always act like rational calculators. They can be driven by emotions ranging from love to hate, often disregarding considerations of self-interest.”

⁵⁸ Gaddis 1992/1993: 34 (emphasis in the original). ⁵⁹ Lebow 2003: 392.

⁶⁰ Ashley 1986: 300 n. 17; Gaddis 1992/1993: 7. ⁶¹ Kahler 1997: 23. ⁶² Deudney 1997: 95–96.

idea of a heroic feud against the misguided forces of Idealism begins to look like a classic case of 'Other' construction."⁶³ Empire-building with theory, pen, and paper is apparently not that dissimilar, in terms of its discursive strategies, to the methods used by imperialists to construct the "Enemy."

This "hard-nosed" discursive strategy of IR Realism, combined with its self-assured analytical parsimony and outsized assumptions, produces (to coin a phrase) the "Realist shrug," a form of argument that absolves itself from the burden of proof by simply asserting that "we might not like it . . . but this is the world that is."⁶⁴ Richard Ashley argues, for example, that Neorealism is a species of "positivist structuralism" that shuts down political debate by denying the variety of historical experience and that "social learning and creative change [are] possible"; as ideology, Neorealism "anticipates, legitimizes, and orients a totalitarian project of global proportions: the rationalization of global politics."⁶⁵ Similarly, James Der Derian has criticized Realism's "radical choice [and] game theoretic" assumptions as "acts of theoretical enclosure and political neutralization."⁶⁶ Neorealism, argues Dan Deudney, has shrugged off any responsibility to understand system change, "magisterially purport[ing itself] to be a largely complete or routinized science."⁶⁷ It is the frustration with this closing down of debate among post-structuralist IR thinkers that has led to the development of the only theoretically coherent response to IR Realism, IR Constructivism.

CONSTRUCTIVISM

The real-world impetus for the development of IR Constructivism was the failure of Realism and other IR models to predict the fall of the Soviet Union and the trajectory of the post-Soviet breakup;⁶⁸ the epistemological inspiration was provided by the "linguistic turn" that entered all areas of academia via cultural studies at roughly the same time.⁶⁹ Like traditional liberal IR Idealist theory, Constructivism focuses on forces within the international system that compel states towards cooperation rather than division, and on the importance of shared ideas and discourse as opposed to the traditional materialist concerns of IR Realism, such as power and interest. IR Constructivists, led chiefly by Alexander Wendt, have argued

⁶³ Low 2007: 22–23. ⁶⁴ Ashley 1986: 286. ⁶⁵ Ashley 1986: 258.

⁶⁶ Der Derian 1997: 62. ⁶⁷ Deudney 1997: 92.

⁶⁸ Cf. Gaddis 1992/1993: esp. 18: "One might as well have relied upon stargazers, readers of entrails, and other 'pre-scientific' methods for all the good our 'scientific' methods did." For a different view, see Waltz 2000; Mearsheimer 1994/1995: 45–46. For the events of the 1990s as an important catalyst for new, post-Realist theorizing, see Wendt 1999: 4; Low 2007: 14; Eckstein 2006: 32–33.

⁶⁹ Cf. Beer and Hariman 1996; Eckstein 2006: 31–32.

that language and “ideas,” defined broadly as “identity, ideology, discourse, culture,” and “norms,”⁷⁰ matter just as much (if not more) than sheer power and self-interest in shaping the structure of the international system.

IR Constructivists regard the international system as a social construction shaped by discursive practices; indeed, the guiding Neorealist assumption about the structure of the international system (that “self-help” and “self-interest” are the norm) is itself mere discourse, and so cannot be taken as given. Thus, as Wendt titles his important 1992 article, “anarchy is what states make of it,”⁷¹ that is, some anarchies (leaderless orders) can be more benign than others.⁷² So an international system characterized by violent anarchy is merely a function of the language traditionally used to describe that system (terms like “self-help” and “self-interest,” or indeed “mutually assured destruction” and “ethnic cleansing”), which itself is redolent of selfishness and brutality. Because language and ideas play important roles in constructing reality, the harsh anarchy of the Neorealist international system cannot simply be assumed to exist in some objectively true sense, but is a function of how states discuss (and divide) the world. “The language with which we describe a concept or a policy,” writes one diplomatic historian, “shapes our understanding and feelings about that concept or policy, often without our being completely cognizant of the process.”⁷³ For this same reason, IR Constructivists are optimistic that the international system characterized by violent, conflictual anarchy can be reconfigured and transformed by sheer act of will on the part of one or more of its constituent large states into a “pluralistic collective-security community.”⁷⁴ As Richard Ned Lebow has recently argued, “changes in the identities of enough important actors can transform the character of the international system.”⁷⁵

⁷⁰ Wendt 1999: 92, 142. ⁷¹ Wendt 1992.

⁷² For a “cooperative” as opposed to a “competitive” security system, both of which are possible under formal anarchy, see Wendt 1992: 400–01. Wendt 1999: 249 also notes that “anarchy as such is an empty vessel and has no intrinsic logic,” so “multiple logics” are possible; that is, anarchy can accommodate the logics of “enemy, rival, and friend” (247). For IR theorists, the term “anarchy” means “lacking a leader” rather than “chaos” and “disorder” in common parlance; in this their usage is closer in meaning to the term’s semantic root, Greek ἀν-αρχή, which typically means “lack of a leader” (LSJ, s.v.): Low 2007: 25 n. 75; cf. Mearsheimer 1994/1995: 10.

⁷³ Costigliola 1997: 164.

⁷⁴ Wendt 1999: 228, 299–307; cf. Wendt 1992: 404–07 (a theoretical example) and 419–22; 1999: 76, 129, 314, 363, 375 (the practical example of Mikhail Gorbachev’s “New Thinking” policy, on which see now also Lebow 2008: 457). Lebow 1994: 269–73 argues that such a community has in fact been in existence amongst the member states of NATO and others (including Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, and Japan) since 1945, during which time “there have been no wars or war-threatening crises between its members” (269).

⁷⁵ Lebow 2008: 442.

Constructivist theory, in its purest form, has been criticized on various grounds. Two premises that have proved especially problematic – “the problem of other minds,” and (again to coin a phrase) “the problem of other times” – can perhaps account for Constructivism’s failure to dislodge Realist orthodoxy.⁷⁶ IR Realists argue that their violent (that is, worst-case) anarchy is largely a function of State A’s lack of knowledge of State B’s intentions and attitudes (“the uncertainty principle”) and, at a more basic level, its inability to know or control future contingency.⁷⁷ IR Constructivism, it is argued, is inherently backward looking in its theoretical orientation, in that it assumes that states make decisions strictly on the basis of past (shared) experiences with other states without attempting to predict how these others will behave when circumstances change. IR Realism, on the other hand, is predominantly forward looking in that its main purpose is to attempt to predict the future state of play in the international system by making broad assumptions about how states behave under fairly predictable conditions of violent anarchy.⁷⁸

The Constructivist response to these critiques is best summarized by Constructivism’s leading theorist, Alexander Wendt:

contemporary states have been interacting for dozens, even hundreds of years, during which they have accumulated considerable knowledge about each other’s interests . . . , grievances and ambitions . . . [and] styles of dispute resolution . . . None of this knowledge is perfect or complete, but neither is it wholly unreliable or irrelevant . . . States will always be prudent, and sometimes worst-case assumptions are warranted, but prudence does not mean they will (or should) throw experience to the wind. History matters.⁷⁹

Wendt recognizes, however, that Constructivism in its purest form is as much of a *reductio ad absurdum* as the caricature of Realism that sometimes emerges from its fiercest epistemological critiques. The core Constructivist insight – that ideas and language matter – should be credited with explanatory power without necessarily replacing Realism with Constructivism *in toto* as the functional basis of the international system. Wendt himself, in fact, is reluctant to “throw the systemic theory baby out with the Neorealist

⁷⁶ The passing of the international optimism of the 1990s and the new American vulnerability after September 11, 2001 may also have played a part in undermining Constructivism.

⁷⁷ Cf. Waltz 1979: 92: “in pursuit of its security no state will act with perfect knowledge and wisdom,” and 186–87 on the “security dilemma,” in which “states, *unsure of one another’s intentions*, arm for the sake of security and in doing so set a vicious circle in motion” (emphasis added). The “uncertainty principle”: Morgenthau 1966: 208.

⁷⁸ Copeland 2000 provides a useful summary of these and other aspects of the Realist–Constructivist debate.

⁷⁹ Wendt 1999: 108–09; cf. 222–23, 281; Gaddis 1992/1993: 16 (with other analyses cited in n. 54), 38.

bathwater”;⁸⁰ rather, he urges that his thesis is a “bridge” or “via media” between Neorealist and dogmatic Constructivist theorizing, and that in a world in which the sovereign state seems to be the dominant mode of international existence for the foreseeable future, “there should continue to be a place for theories of anarchic interstate politics, alongside other forms of international theory; to that extent,” Wendt concludes, “I am a statist and a realist.”⁸¹

Likewise the Neorealist Kenneth Waltz sometimes employs a species of Constructivist argumentation *avant la lettre*; at one point he even asserts, “what we think of as reality is itself an elaborate conception constructed and reconstructed through the ages.”⁸² Richard Ned Lebow has argued that the allegedly prototypical Realist Thucydides “is *both* a realist and a constructivist,” and on this basis asserts, “realism and constructivism are thus equally germane to the study of international relations.”⁸³ The ancient historian Arthur Eckstein, whose works on Roman imperialism during the Republic adopt a strongly Realist position, also favors an ecumenical approach: “causes at the level of individual units and causes at the level of the international system . . . in fact interact to produce large international outcomes . . . [T]he attributes of the states influence the system, the attributes of the system influence the states, and *all* attributes simultaneously and synergistically influence one another.”⁸⁴ Elsewhere Eckstein argues that because “no international systems theorist denies that international outcomes are significantly affected by the internal culture of polities,”⁸⁵ it is necessary to adopt a “layered approach” – an approach that is indeed evident in the ancient sources Eckstein studies.⁸⁶ The theoretical position taken in this study, as in its predecessor,⁸⁷ is a “modified” IR Constructivism, one that attributes explanatory force to both the international discursive and ideational practices that pure Constructivism emphasizes as well as such factors as self-interest and fear that dominate Realist epistemologies in the construction of the international system. The key difference is that I

⁸⁰ Wendt 1999: 17.

⁸¹ Wendt 1992: 394, 424; cf. Wendt 1999: 1–2, advocating a “moderate” or “thin” Constructivism; “via media”: Wendt 1999: 40, 90, 178. Lebow 2008: 3 n. 7 suggests that Wendt is more “a social liberal” than a Constructivist.

⁸² Waltz 1979: 5.

⁸³ Lebow 2003: 166–67 (emphasis in the original) (a reiteration of Lebow 2001: 559).

⁸⁴ Eckstein 2006: 186–87 (emphasis in the original).

⁸⁵ Eckstein 2006: 185; cf. Eckstein 2008: 228–29: “even the staunchest of system-level theorists admits the role of unit culture and unit-level analysis for our understanding of the reactions of states to systemic crisis” (citing Waltz 1979: 76–77; 122).

⁸⁶ Eckstein 2006: 77 (cf. 257, 261, etc.); Eckstein 2008: 230–31, 255.

⁸⁷ Burton 2003: esp. 350.

regard these factors as primarily discursive rather than descriptive phenomena: they cannot be held to exist objectively outside the realm of discourse or to affect system structures independent of discourse.

Constructivism, then, while perhaps unable to account for the structure of the international system on its own, can certainly contribute to a far more nuanced understanding of the process of interaction between states within the system, as well as to a more complex understanding of state actors in terms of their interests, identities, and behaviors.⁸⁸ A crucial component of the Constructivist outlook is its tendency to anthropomorphize states as agents – states “*really are* agents” – that function (and are described) as “actors with more or less human qualities.”⁸⁹ This occasions no surprise for the ancient historian. James Morrison has demonstrated that anthropomorphism permeates Thucydides’ conception of interstate relations.⁹⁰ Lynette Mitchell has also observed that the ancient Greek *polis*, through its imitation of interpersonal relations, came to resemble a “corporate citizen.”⁹¹ Polly Low has gone further and recently suggested that the reason the Greeks failed to develop a unified theory of International Relations was precisely because of their natural inclination to anthropomorphize state behavior; the ancients thus took an intellectual shortcut of sorts.⁹² Jon Lendon, in his study of honor codes in the Roman empire, observes that “the key to understanding relations between man and city in the ancient world is the realization that cities were fully anthropomorphized: [cities] were thought to act just as humans did.”⁹³

Interstate analogies with domestic relationships – Badian’s foreign *clientela* and the present study’s interstate *amicitia*, to take only two examples – reflect the fact that ancient international relations originally grew out of such interpersonal relationships as “guest-friendship” (*xenia* in Greek, *hospitium* in Latin), so in fact “dealings with foreigners were an extension of domestic relations.”⁹⁴ The anthropomorphizing of interstate relations means that room must be made for unit-level factors and interests such as prestige, honor, altruism, morality, and emotion which, as was seen earlier, Richard Ned Lebow has assimilated to the ancient Greek concept of “the spirit,” *ὁ θυμός*.⁹⁵ This is especially important in the study of ancient Roman international relations whose basis was, after all, *fides*, the quintessential moral bond in Roman domestic relationships.

⁸⁸ Wendt 1992: 394; see Wendt 1999: 313–69, for a more complete discussion.

⁸⁹ Wendt 1992: 397 n. 21; 1999: 10 (whence the quotation; emphasis in the original), 193–245 (a chapter-length exploration of the state as actor); Lebow 2008: 116, 158 registers skepticism on this point.

⁹⁰ Morrison 1994. ⁹¹ L.G. Mitchell 1997a: 22–23. ⁹² Low 2007: 40–54, 129–74.

⁹³ Lendon 2001: 80. ⁹⁴ Lebow 2001: 558. ⁹⁵ Lebow 2008: above, p. 16.

The impact of Roman *fides* on the ancient Mediterranean international system, so it has recently been argued, was transformative and system-altering. Thomas Madden, a historian of the Crusades and author of a recent comparative study of modern American and ancient Roman Republican imperialism, suggests that Roman *fides* and the Roman “reputation for fair-dealing and trustworthiness” created a new imperial paradigm, the hegemonic “empire of trust,” which replaced the older, more brutal paradigm of the “empire of conquest.”⁹⁶ By the 180s BC, according to Arthur Eckstein, the Romans had replaced the violent anarchy of the perpetually warring Hellenistic successor states with a stable, unipolar, hegemonic system; they achieved this largely through an exceptional ability to mobilize second-tier powers, to assemble durable, broad coalitions from a position of leadership rather than one of command, to balance and coordinate their own interests with those of their allies, and, perhaps most importantly, to make good on their promise to evacuate Roman troops and leave the Greeks to their own devices once major threats to Rome’s eastern security interests subsided.⁹⁷

Unit-level factors such as morality and altruism, therefore, must be part of the analysis. Part of “the poverty of Neorealism” is its failure to give analytical weight to these factors, as has been seen.⁹⁸ Just as most Realist epistemologies cannot account for the deterrent historical example of the Nazi Holocaust in shaping the almost universal aversion to state-sponsored genocide after the Second World War, or for why membership in NATO or the EU (European Union) is predicated upon a commitment to a set of shared political values (human rights, free markets, and political freedom), or for the mushrooming of cooperative international institutions in the post-Cold War period,⁹⁹ so too has Neorealism been unable explain the massive upsurge in pro-American sentiment after September 11, 2001 – even in places where it would be least expected (*nous sommes tous américains*, “we are all Americans now,” proclaimed the French newspaper *Le Monde* on September 12, 2001) – or the subsequent (and proportionate) obliteration of this fund of goodwill after the US declared a preemptive war on Iraq in March 2003.¹⁰⁰ One could also argue that the brief moment of international consensus in the 1990s felt decidedly different from the

⁹⁶ Madden 2008: esp. 84. ⁹⁷ Eckstein 2008: 342–81. ⁹⁸ Cf. Wendt 1999: 16.

⁹⁹ In 1909, there were 37 such institutions; in 1951, 123; and in 1986, 337: Weber 1997: 231.

¹⁰⁰ See Lebow 2008: 459: the war in Iraq “transformed the United States from a country for which there was enormous sympathy in the aftermath of the terrorist attack of 9.11 into an overextended, intensely disliked, quasi-pariah.”

era of American unilateralism in the first decade of the twenty-first century, and that the very different discursive practices of diplomats in these two periods are, in part, responsible for the creation of two very different international environments. In sum, intangible ideas, ideals, discourses, and norms have affected and shaped the international environment just as much as – if not more than – sheer security-seeking has in the past sixty years.¹⁰¹ “What keeps the United States from conquering the Bahamas, or Nigeria from seizing Togo, or Australia from occupying Vanuatu?,” asks Alexander Wendt. His response deserves serious consideration: “Clearly, power is not the issue . . . I have no interest in exploiting my friends, not because of the relative costs and benefits of such an action but because they are my friends.”¹⁰² The idea of friendship in constructing the contemporary international system, in other words, is not at issue; what matters is how and by whom that idea is constructed, that is, whose discourse and whose interpretation of the international situation is predominant across the system.

CONSTRUCTIVISM, FRIENDSHIP, AND ROMAN INTERSTATE RELATIONS

So how can IR Constructivist insights help us to think about Roman diplomacy and imperialism during the Republic? Most of our knowledge of Rome is mediated through texts, many of which are highly rhetorical and thickly padded with literary tropes, invented speeches, and a strongly moralizing aspect. Rather than regard these phenomena as inconveniences, problems to be solved, or layers of obfuscation to be penetrated and discarded in the search for true facts or history *wie es eigentlich gewesen*, I will treat the texts and their prevailing discourses as important artifacts in and of themselves that can help rather than hinder the investigation into the ancient Greek and Roman construction of reality. The language that ancient diplomats use in these texts and their authors’ discursive constructions of international relations are in themselves important clues as to how

¹⁰¹ Cf. Weber 1997: 235: “[international] relationships are built not only on the distribution of capabilities but also on ideas, norms, and habits.” On norms in particular, see Raymond 1997; Donnelly 2006: 146–49 (on normative “standards of civilization” used to classify “outlaw states”), 152–53 (on the normative construction of Great Power status).

¹⁰² Wendt 1992: 415; 1999: 289–90 on the “Bahamas Problem.” Note too Madden 2008: 143: “As a purely military matter, the United States has the capacity to destroy Venezuela or Spain or any other home of anti-Americanism with ease. Yet it does not do so, nor would it ever come into the collective heads of Americans to do such a thing . . . [Critics of US power] trust so completely in the United States’ responsible use of power that they literally stake their lives on it.”

the Romans and their international partners constructed their world. I am of course not arguing for a naïve acceptance of everything the sources tell us as historical fact, or even as historically significant, but for a recognition that their discursive constructions of reality are important evidence for how the Romans thought about, talked about, and constructed their world. However inimical to modern Political Science approaches these sometimes non-rational representations of reality may seem, they have not been created by ancient authors *ex nihilo*, but must be a reflection of the political and ideological mind-set of ancient diplomats and politicians – the main audiences for their historical works.

The friendship paradigm was the key concept in the construction of ancient interstate relations. But ancient international friendship, like friendship in contemporary international relations, has been “undertheorized in social theory” for several reasons: because international enmity is a more pressing problem; because anthropomorphizing a state relationship may go too far in the case of international friends; and because the discourse of friendship in international relations is often cynically interpreted as “cheap talk.” But the reality and seemingly deep meaning of friendship structures in the international sphere, not just in the modern world but in antiquity as well, would seem to demand “[systematic thinking] about the nature and consequences of friendship in international politics.”¹⁰³ This study attempts to do precisely this in order to account for Rome’s extraordinary success as an international power during the third and second centuries BC.

Chapter 2 will consider the evidence for the study of friendship between individuals. It begins by proposing a definition of friendship and introducing the concept of processual analysis. Ancient and modern theoretical analyses of friendship are then discussed in tandem in three sections, each dealing with one of the three phases of friendship – its beginning, perpetuation over time through exchanges, and its dissolution. The chapter concludes with a pair of anecdotes that demonstrate the historical salience of the theory of the transition from interpersonal to international friendship, the significance of the dynamic interplay of these related phenomena in the Roman context, and the explanatory power of the processual method of relationship analysis. The resulting “processual model of friendship interaction” forms the analytical basis for the study of Roman international *amicitia* that follows in subsequent chapters.

¹⁰³ Wendt 1999: 298.

Chapters 3–5 form the empirical heart of the analysis. In accordance with the processual model developed in Chapter 2, Chapter 3 discusses the different methods of establishing international friendship with Rome, with a special focus on the role of *fides* in Roman interstate relations; Chapter 4 examines the exchanges of favors and services, both material and symbolic, through the lens of the structural–anthropological notion of the gift (*le don*); finally, Chapter 5 attempts to account for the deterioration of Roman interstate relations in the mid-second century by analyzing individual friendship breakdowns in the sociological and moral terms established in Chapter 2.

Finally, a word about what this study is not about. Its focus is not on the motives behind, or the nature of, Roman imperialism – that is, whether Roman imperialism was inherently or predominantly defensive or aggressive, annexationist or hegemonic; nor is its purpose to explain why the Romans alone were ultimately successful in carving out a stable unipolar hegemony with themselves at the center.¹⁰⁴ As John Richardson has recently shown, the Romans had no language to describe territorial empire as such in the Republican period; *imperium* was merely the power or responsibility conferred on an officeholder to enable him to carry out a specific task, and *provincia* was the task itself, which, although sometimes taking place in a specific geographical location outside Italy, rarely referred to a permanent Roman-administered zone. The overwhelmingly abstract “language that [the Romans] used to describe what they were doing [i.e., *imperium* and *provincia*] did not refer or even relate to annexation or colonization . . . but to control of what others did, brought about by the exercise of Roman power and supported by Roman military might.”¹⁰⁵

The question of the nature of Roman imperialism cannot be avoided entirely, however; the interpretation of *amicitia* adopted in Chapter 2 certainly has implications for the debate, and the discussion in Chapter 5 in particular will tackle such matters as assigning responsibility for starting wars and passing judgment on Roman conduct towards their international *amici*. But the primary concern here is to illuminate and account for Rome’s diplomatic style and methods and to show how these were both shaped by and contributed to shaping the Mediterranean international system.

¹⁰⁴ The terms of the contemporary debate were set by Harris 1979, from which has flowed over the past three decades a whole series of responses from other prominent scholars: Sherwin-White 1980 (a lengthy review of Harris 1979); North 1981 (a response to Harris 1979 and Sherwin-White 1980); Harris 1982 (a collection of responses to Harris 1979); Gruen 1984; Sherwin-White 1984: esp. 1–57; Eckstein 1987a; Rich 1993; Kallet-Marx 1995a; Eckstein 2006; 2008; Yakobsen 2009.

¹⁰⁵ Richardson 2008: ch. 2 (on the third to early first centuries BC), 62 (the quote), ch. 3 (on the Late Republican period).

The methodology is similar to John Richardson's in that it prioritizes the language of *amicitia* and the meaning(s) assigned to it by the Romans themselves over modern scholarly concerns and opinion.

A related concern is to attempt to account for the inconsistent rhythm of Roman imperial expansion – chaotic periods of muscular intervention followed by curious lulls of interest. Sometimes, as Peter Brunt observed, “Rome’s reactions to the possibility of a threat resembled those of a nervous tiger, disturbed when feeding.”¹⁰⁶ But at other times, as Erich Gruen’s work shows,¹⁰⁷ Roman behavior lapsed into passivity and seeming unconcern with the larger world surrounding Italy, sometimes for decades at a time (most of the 180s and 160s–150s BC being prominent examples). The only constant seems to be Roman opportunism – either to avoid imperial entanglements, or to welcome them. The diplomatic relationship that best and most flexibly accommodated the nature of Roman diplomatic engagement and imperial interest, which waxed and waned according to Rome’s ever-changing national-security and foreign-policy concerns was, I will argue here, informal *amicitia*. The Mediterranean international environment was chaotic and brutal, and Rome had to be tough just to survive in it. But, as this study will argue, Rome also had to be diplomatically flexible and pliant enough to maintain a focus on its own unique set of concerns closer to home while simultaneously absorbing the stresses and strains that frequently rippled through the international system.

¹⁰⁶ Brunt 1978: 177.

¹⁰⁷ Gruen 1984: *passim*.

Friendship practices and processes

DEFINING FRIENDSHIP: THE PROCESSUAL APPROACH

Human beings, as Aristotle famously defined them, are political (that is to say social) animals,¹ and as such, practice some sort of friendship “in every community.”² The ubiquity and varieties of friendship across time and across human populations perhaps explain the difficulty in defining precisely what the relationship is and entails. The following definition attempts to encompass the most commonly encountered descriptions of friendship in the relevant ancient and modern literature:

Friendship is a voluntary and achieved, informal and extra-institutional human relationship secured by bonds of personal trust and affection between partners, and is based on mutual similarity and complementarity of needs, temperament, and status.

Although definitions have the virtue of providing analytical focus for the study of complex human phenomena and the evidence for it, they are far too general and static to capture accurately the variety and multiplicity of human experience; a dynamic, multilayered, and multidimensional description is needed. The “practical logic” approach of Pierre Bourdieu points in this direction:

To restore practice to its practical truth, we must . . . reintroduce time into the theoretical representation of a practice which, being temporally structured, is intrinsically defined by its *tempo*.³

¹ Arist. *Pol.* 1253a2: ὁ ἄνθρωπος φύσει πολιτικὸν ζῷον. Note too Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1097b11: φύσει πολιτικὸν ὁ ἄνθρωπος, where friends (τοῖς φίλοις) are specifically cited as an evidence of man’s political nature.

² Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1159b26–27: ἐν ἀπάσῃ γὰρ κοινωνίᾳ δοκεῖ τι . . . εἶναι . . . φιλία; recognized by modern friendship researchers: DuBois 1974: 15–32; Brenton 1974: 14–16; Parlee 1979: 113; Reohr 1991: 1. There are exceptions, however: La Gaipa 1981: 74. Derrida 2005: 70 is skeptical about the existence of true friendship, regarding it as a mere discursive construct and an artifact of (Greek) authoritarian discourse.

³ Bourdieu 1977: 8 (emphasis in the original); cf. Bourdieu 1990: 81: “because it is entirely immersed in the current of time, practice is inseparable from temporality, not only because it is played out in time, but also because it plays strategically with time and especially with tempo”; 98–111 (a general discussion).

Practice [i.e., that which unfolds in time] has a logic which is not that of the logician. This has to be acknowledged in order to avoid asking of it more logic than it can give, thereby condemning oneself either to wring incoherences out of it or to thrust a forced coherence upon it.⁴

Bourdieu advocates a processual approach to studying friendship, a method which, while accepting that some linear and synchronized (“monothetic”) analysis (that is, a definition) is necessary, at the same time attempts to capture “meanings that are produced and used polythetically, not only one after another, but one by one, step by step.”⁵ Only a processual model can minimize (rather than eliminate – an unachievable goal) the distorting “theorization effect”⁶ of conventional synchronic analysis, and capture in a theoretical representation some portion of the complexity of the authentic lived experience of participating in human relationships across time.⁷ Such has been the guiding principle of this study, and accounts for the structure and organization of this and subsequent chapters.

A processual approach has the further advantage of being a more congenial sociological analogue to IR Constructivism, which, as Alexander Wendt observes, “share[s] a cognitive, intersubjective concept of process in which identities and interests are endogenous to interaction, rather than a rationalist-behavioral [i.e., an IR Realist] one in which they are exogenous.”⁸ As Richard Ned Lebow has recently observed, “a general theory of international relations must be more a theory of process than of structure” because “the truth [is] that social life, and our understandings of it, are, and must always be, in a state of flux.”⁹ In fact, structure and process are inextricably linked: “structure has no existence or causal powers apart from process.”¹⁰ Moreover, just as the processualist’s chief criticism of behaviorist analysis is that it “reduces . . . agents to the status of automata or inert bodies moved by obscure mechanisms towards ends of which they are unaware,”¹¹ so IR Constructivism, as was seen in the previous chapter, accuses Neorealists of relying too heavily on models and definitions that genericize unit attributes into utter insignificance, usually via the rational-actor assumption. Constructivists attribute significant explanatory force to

⁴ Bourdieu 1990: 82: “that which unfolds in time”, 86; cf. 81: “the shift from the practical scheme to the theoretical schema, constructed after the event, from practical sense to the theoretical model . . . lets slip everything that makes the temporal reality of practice in process . . . Science has a time which is not that of practice [and] tends to ignore time and so to detemporalize practice.”

⁵ Bourdieu 1990: 83–84. ⁶ Bourdieu 1990: 86.

⁷ Cf. Bourdieu 1990: 92: “Probably the only way to give an account of the practical coherence of practices and works is to construct generative models which reproduce in their own terms the logic from which that coherence is generated.” For a similar approach advocated by sociologists, see Allan 1989: 44–46; Fehr 1996: esp. 6.

⁸ Wendt 1992: 394. ⁹ Lebow 2008: 54, 59.

¹⁰ Wendt 1992: 395.

¹¹ Bourdieu 1990: 99.

the process of “social learning” that individual states experience through encounters with each other: those that flexibly adapt their interests and identities to others – those who learn, in other words – are better equipped to survive.¹² In Neorealist theory, by contrast, “the term ‘process’ plays a largely pejorative role”:¹³ there is no learning and no variation in state behavior, and therefore no need to adjust interests and identities, since the structure of the international system alone (or at least to a degree that renders the active influence of unit-level factors utterly insignificant) determines conduct. Succinctly: “Rationalis[m] . . . reduces process to dynamics of behavioral interaction among exogenously constituted actors”; “process,” by contrast, “can generate cooperative behavior.”¹⁴

When states behave according to Realist logics, they collectively acquiesce to the Realist paradigm of violent anarchy, and no change for the better can possibly occur. When states behave like Constructivists and nurture a dialectical process of state interaction, by contrast, collective, cooperative, and transforming behavior can result. Regardless of the initial (usually self-interested) motivation for collaboration, over time partner states begin to construct a common identity, to engage in other-oriented and even altruistic behavior as they learn to behave as “we” rather than “us and them.”¹⁵ As Lebow has recently argued, “realist approaches to foreign affairs helped bring about and justify [fear-based] worlds”; a Constructivist epistemology, by contrast, “provide[s] leaders with the conceptions they need to grasp the potential and the feasibility of bringing about positive change in the nature of international politics,” such that fear and sheer military power that is its basis will decrease in the foreign-policy calculus of states.¹⁶

One final defense of the processual approach, particularly as it relates to human relationships, takes the form of a cautionary tale. Some years ago, Richard Saller attempted to provide a precise, cross-cultural definition of patronage in order to “draw the distinction” between it and other interpersonal relationships such as friendship. Saller defined patronage as reciprocal, personal, “of some duration,” and asymmetrical (in terms of the status of the agents and the nature of goods and services exchanged).¹⁷ The first two adjectives undeniably pertain to patronage, but neither is exclusive

¹² Wendt 1999: 324–36; cf. Gaddis 1992/1993: 16 (with other analyses cited in n. 54), 38.

¹³ Wendt 1999: 100; cf. Gaddis 1992/1993: 38: a key “weakness [of Neorealism] is the tendency to treat time as a dimension – like length, width, and depth – but not as a process. Structuralists see time as a scale against which to measure events, but they pay little attention to the fact that the passage of time, in and of itself, also shapes events.”

¹⁴ Wendt 1992: 392.

¹⁵ Wendt 1999: 241–42.

¹⁶ Lebow 2008: 502.

¹⁷ Saller 1982: 1; 1989: 49.

to it: friendship (or even mere collegiality and acquaintanceship) could also be so characterized. Recognizing the imprecision of Saller's definition, Paul Millett supplemented it with the term "extra-legal."¹⁸ However, this too fails to disambiguate patronage from other social relationships since "extra-legal" can (indeed must) describe friendship as well, to take the most pertinent example, and may in fact exaggerate the informality of Roman *clientela*.¹⁹ That leaves asymmetry as the only distinguishing mark of patronage, but as Claude Eilers has recently recognized, "the problem with [Saller's] definition is where to stop. All friendship would become patronage, except when it involves equals. Does this mean that Atticus was a client of Cicero?"²⁰ To state it thus is to point out the absurdity of the claim, and, as will be seen shortly, Cicero and many others knew and experienced unequal friendships, and there is good theoretical ground for suspecting that asymmetrical friendship may even be the norm in practice.²¹

"In practice" brings us back to Bourdieu's emphasis on the temporal aspect of practical logic. Positing rigid, static definitions, as Saller does in the case of patronage, tends toward "cognitive closure" rather than enriching the understanding of complex human relationships. If T.P. Wiseman is correct that the focus must be on "who does what [to whom], and when, and where,"²² then no amount of linear, synchronized, and "monothetic" analysis can capture a relationship's essence. Hence this study, while generally adhering to the definition of friendship provided above, attempts to present the evidence supporting that definition, where possible, in a processual manner.

¹⁸ Millett 1989: 15–16.

¹⁹ *Clientela* may have been subject to formal, legal constraints. The Twelve Tables reputedly contained a law that mandated that a patron be sacrificed to the gods if he defrauds a client (*patronus, si clienti fraudem fecerit, sacer esto*: Serv. *Aen.* 6.109). The authenticity of this law has been questioned by some (Drummond 1989: 90; Brunt 1988a: 402 [the law is "suspect"], 409–10 [the law is "quite apocryphal"]), but has been equally strongly defended by others (Rouland 1979: 157–64; Saller 1989: 50 [the rules of *clientela* "had some legal content"]). Other laws governing *clientela* were on the books: Paul. *Dig.* 47.2.90 (on theft by a client from a patron); Ulp. *Dig.* 7.8.21 and Paul. *Dig.* 7.8.3 (on the exemption of clients from laws of *usus*); see Eilers 2002: 10–11, 184 for discussion. Caldelli 2001; Ricci 2001 attempt to show that Roman *amicitia* was in some sense formal, heritable, and subject to *iura amicitiae*, but the inscriptional evidence they cite is not conclusive or perhaps even typical.

²⁰ Eilers 2002: 6–7.

²¹ Few will agree with the desperate solution of Verboven 2002: 11, 62 to "consider the patron–client bond as a form of *amicitia*."

²² T.P. Wiseman 1982: 28; cf. Eilers 2002: 8, on the importance of the context and prior experience of a relationship, upon which its definition must depend.

The modern theoretical framework adopted here is developed primarily from social anthropology and sociology, although contemporary philosophy, social psychology, and communications theory have made important contributions as well. The principal theoretical description of Roman practice comes mainly from Cicero's *Laelius de Amicitia*, a work of the mid-40s BC but whose dramatic setting is 129 BC, shortly after the death of Scipio Aemilianus, that is, only slightly later than the terminal point of the period under consideration in this study. The *De Amicitia*, as will be seen, is both a highly personal and a deeply political work that draws heavily on the conservative Roman (that is, optimate) political tradition with which Cicero, Scipio Aemilianus, and the latter's best friend (and the dialogue's chief interlocutor), Laelius, were intimately associated. It might thus be assumed that the treatise's description of friendship is hardly representative of the experience of most Romans. Moreover, it is difficult to determine the extent to which Cicero's observations represent authentically Middle-Republican elite thinking. However, as I have argued elsewhere,²³ there are good grounds for optimism on both counts. Cicero's strong assertions of the authenticity of the "Laelian" (and thus, Middle-Republican) content of the dialogue cannot be dismissed as merely conventional or generic; they are in fact inherently plausible given the intensive training in mnemonics that career orators like Cicero and his teacher (and transmitter of the dialogue) Q. Mucius Scaevola typically underwent as part of their formal education in rhetoric. While perhaps not a transcript of what Laelius actually said, it is a fairly accurate representation of the main ideas Laelius attempted to put forward in 129 BC.

The description of friendship in the *De Amicitia*, moreover, manifests striking correspondences to how friendship is portrayed in the authentically Middle-Republican popular comedies of the Roman playwright Plautus. So, for example, both authors stress the importance of candor in friendship, but are keenly aware that speaking frankly is a double-edged sword: Cicero's Laelius urges that advice and reproach should be provided without harshness or insult and received with kindness (*De Am.* 88, 89); similarly, both Megaronides and Callicles in Plautus' *Trinummus* advocate plain speaking between friends (*Trin.* 23–27, 91–96), but the former regards giving advice as a "thankless task" (*immoene . . . facinus*: *Trin.* 24), while the latter grows increasingly defensive and hostile under Megaronides' candid criticisms.²⁴

One final methodological point: the ancient and modern material will be here analyzed synchronically under the different topic headings within the

²³ Burton 2007.

²⁴ Burton 2004: 225–28, 213 n. 18 for a list of these and other correspondences.

processual framework in order to highlight the rough correspondences – and significant differences – in ancient and modern epistemologies and practices of friendship. If the discussion privileges the similarities then it is only so that modern experience may illuminate and amplify the comparatively sparse evidence for Roman practice. By no means do I wish to give the false impression that the Romans were “just like us” – a position too often adopted by popular works of Roman history and television documentaries today. Roman attitudes and prejudices, to say nothing of the intensely hierarchical nature of Roman society, are anathema to modern liberal-democratic (primarily “western”) sensibilities.²⁵ Roman friendship, therefore, is bound to manifest crucial differences as well, and these will be duly noted throughout. The ancient evidence for friendship, in addition, is largely a cultural artifact of a privileged (male) elite that could afford the time for such things as contemplative philosophy – and is thus at a significant remove from the experience of our own times. So, for example, the modern philosopher James Grunebaum has recently pointed out that the ancient ideal of the friendship of virtue, in which (always male) friends spend all their time together in virtuous pursuits, differs sharply from friendship as it is practiced by most people today: “unlike Aristotle’s nonworking, aristocratic virtue friends,” Grunebaum argues, “busy people with jobs, school, and family can remain friends” without the need for constant intercourse.²⁶ The result is as important as it is unexpected: modern friends are more likely to sustain their relationships through the intimate exchange of personal feelings and thoughts than ancient aristocratic friends, for whom shared activities substituted for real emotional intimacy. On the other hand, modern social networking sites on the internet are transforming the meaning of “friend” in ways the Romans could not possibly understand. The following analysis will strive to keep the “otherness” of the Roman experience of friendship in perspective.

FRIENDSHIP AS A VOLUNTARY AND ACHIEVED RELATIONSHIP

Conventional wisdom has it that “you can choose your friends, but you can’t choose your family”; or, in social-scientific language, friendship is a voluntary and achieved relationship (one that involves choice and will) as opposed to an ascribed relationship (one that lacks choice and is assigned),

²⁵ Cf. Williams 2008: 42: “We are not Romans and can never speak or think entirely like them”; Lendon 2001: 26–27, 29: “the strange, cold genius of the Romans.”

²⁶ Grunebaum 2003: 18.

such as kinship.²⁷ Although the will to have friends is not completely unconstrained, free choice (or, more precisely, self-determination) appears to be absolute and unfettered by external forces. The freedom to exercise choice, as I have suggested elsewhere, is one of the *loci* of difference between friendship and patronage.²⁸ In the latter case, although the option to initiate the relationship may belong to the inferior party,²⁹ once the relationship is established, invariably “the interpretation of the client’s obligations rest[s] largely with [the patron],” and “the client accepts the patron’s right to determine ever anew the form and content of the actual exchanges.”³⁰ Potential friends, by contrast, are for the most part free to befriend whomever they like, and once having established contact, can choose to reciprocate or not, or make decisions about the extent and the nature of reciprocation, the intensity of affection, the level of contact, when to disengage, and so on.

Modern research has also been concerned with the process of friendship achievement, the beginnings of which have been appealingly entitled “the reconnaissance dance” by Miriam Rodin.³¹ When individuals first encounter one another in an open, unconstrained environment, they immediately begin to search for some mutual common ground, particularly in terms of their attitudes and values. This initial sounding out of a potential friend takes place at a fairly superficial level, and the search for deeper personality similarities and a broader *Weltanschauung* come only at a later point, when more intimacy (through more frequent contact) has taken place.³² But even though these earliest stages of friendship engagement are for the most part based on circumstantial factors such as physical appearance and proximity, sociability and openness, and frequency of interaction in a particular context,³³ almost immediately – sometimes within the first

²⁷ Wolf 1966: 10; DuBois 1974: 16–17; Eisenstadt 1974: 139; Block 1980: 209; La Gaipa 1981: 83; Reisman 1981: 218; Bell 1981: 10–11; Eisenstadt and Roniger 1984: 16; Solano 1986: 236; Reohr 1991: 32; Rawlins 1992: 11; Fehr 1996: 7; Werking 1997: 7, 17; Konstan 1997: 1.

²⁸ Burton 2003: 347–48; the other two are level of affect and breadth of asymmetry (discussed below, p. 66).

²⁹ This is obviously culturally determined and context-specific, and the Roman case alone manifests a significant amount of variety. So the Syracusans on their own initiative petitioned for the patronage of M. Claudius Marcellus in 210 BC (Livy 26.32.8; cf. Plut. *Marc.* 23.6; Val. Max. 4.1.7), but Romulus was supposed to have ordered all Roman citizens to enter into the patron–client relationship (although clients were able to choose their patrons: Dion. Hal. 2.9.2). And of course *clientela* was hereditary, which removed the power of choice from an initiating client’s descendants, as C. Marius learned to his chagrin when C. Herennius exercised the hereditary patronal prerogative of the Herennii over the Marii even after Marius had attained high office (Plut. *Mar.* 5.4).

³⁰ Eisenstadt and Roniger 1984: 64, 249. ³¹ Rodin 1984: 38.

³² Duck 1973 48; 1983: 59–87; Miell and Duck 1986: 129–43. On similarity-seeking in particular, see Milardo 1986: 145; Perlman and Fehr 1986: 22–23; Fehr 1996: 98.

³³ Reisman 1979: 62, 68, 73; Hays 1984: 91; Rodin 1984: 38; Berg and Clark 1986: 107; Furnham 1989: 102–05; Fehr 1996: 44–62.

hour of contact³⁴ – potential friends are already searching for correspondences to their deepest needs, desires, experiences, and opinions, and on this basis may even begin to feel the first stirrings of affection.³⁵ These tentative first steps are taken during polite conversation when the potential friends mutually disclose a modest amount of personal information and explore each other's views by pursuing lines of inquiry incidental to the conversation and asking fairly innocuous leading questions.³⁶ Friendship begins to form when sufficient grounds (usually measured in terms of similarity of affect, opinions, and values) are discovered for further contact.

Fortunately a sufficient amount of ancient evidence for the process of beginning friendship survives to permit a fairly close comparison with modern findings. The difference between ascribed and achieved relationships was apparently less clearly defined in Classical antiquity generally than it is today. The ancient Greek notion of *φιλία*, for example, which is usually fairly loosely translated as “friendship,” actually had a much broader semantic range, encompassing kinship and civic relationships in addition to the sorts of relationship that are now thought of as friendships.³⁷ The precise meaning of *φίλος*, conventionally translated as “friend,” is even more elusive: in Homer it is used adjectivally to indicate affection (“dear,” thus *φίλος ξείνος* “dear stranger”: *Il.* 6.224) or possession (“one's own,” thus, *φίλα γυῖα*, “my own limbs”: *Il.* 13.85).³⁸ The *Iliad* also raises for the first time the problem of sexual relations in friendship, for the intensely close friendship of Achilles and Patroclus in the poem may indeed have an erotic dimension.³⁹ Plato further muddies the waters in the *Lysis*, a dialogue whose subject is “what is a friend” (*ὅ τι ἔστιν ὁ φίλος*: 223b9): Socrates

³⁴ Berg and Clark 1986: 111. ³⁵ Berg and Clark 1986: 119; cf. Brenton 1974: 119.

³⁶ Examples at Hays 1984: 91; cf. Fehr 1996: 63–64; Grunebaum 2003: 16, 19–20, 25 (citing Thomas 1993: 55).

³⁷ Kinship and civic relationships: Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1159b25–1162a33; *Eth. Eud.* 1242a–b. On the Greeks' broad application of the term *φιλία*, see Dugas 1976: 2; Nussbaum 1986: 328 and n. 354; Easterling 1989: 11; Prior 1991: 172; Annas 1993: 223; Adkins 1996: 232; Konstan 1996: 71, 74–78; Konstan 1997: 1–3, 9, 56; L.G. Mitchell 1997a: 1–21; 1997b: 32.

³⁸ Adkins 1963: 31; Fraisse 1974: 35; Hooker 1987: 44; Robinson 1990: 97–108; von Reden 1995: 45–57; Fitzgerald 1996: 15. The substantive *φίλος*, “friend,” appears later and, like *φιλία*, refers to kinship and other associations as well as to friendships as conventionally understood. Konstan 1996: 71, 73–77, 81; 1997: 9, 43, 53–56 has tried to deny this, but L.G. Mitchell 1997a: 1–21 and 1997b: 30–32 shows that *οἱ φίλοι* is used frequently in the texts to refer to hangers-on and flatterers, fellow citizens, as well as family members and close personal friends.

³⁹ Controversial since antiquity: Aeschin. *In Tim.* 142; Pl. *Symp.* 180a; Xen. *Symp.* 8.31 (discussion: Dover 1978: 196–99; Halperin 1990: 75–87). Arguments *pro*: Hutter 1978: 67–68; Clarke 1978; *contra*: Dugas 1976: 115, 117; Barrett 1981; Easterling 1989: 18–20; Konstan 1997: 38. In Homer, the two heroes refer to each other primarily as “dear companions,” *φίλοι ἑταῖροι*: *Il.* 9.205; 11.616 (Achilles); 17.642; 18.80; 22.390; 23.178; 24.591 (Patroclus).

simply subsumes ἔρως, “(chiefly sexual) love,” under φιλία, going so far as to suggest that ἔρως is even the motivating force behind φιλία.

For the Romans, the semantic range of *amicitia* and *amicus* was not nearly so broad, and their distinction between achieved and ascribed relationships was much closer to our own. So Laelius in Cicero’s *De Amicitia*:

Ita natos esse nos, ut inter omnes esset societas quaedam, maior autem ut quisque proxime accedere; itaque ciues potiores quam peregrini, propinqui quam alieni; cum his enim amicitiam natura ipsa peperit. Sed ea non satis habet firmitatis; namque hoc praestat amicitia propinquitati, quod ex propinquitate beneuolentia tolli potest, ex amicitia non potest; sublata enim beneuolentia amicitiae nomen tollitur, propinquitatis manet.

The human condition is such that amongst us all there is a certain kind of alliance that is stronger the closer each individual is to us; so fellow citizens are of more account than foreigners, and relations than strangers; for with these nature itself has created friendship. But these lack sufficient stability; for friendship surpasses kinship in this respect, that kindness can be removed from kinship whereas it cannot be removed from friendship; for if kindness is removed the name of friendship disappears as well, while that of kinship remains. (*De Am.* 19)

Although Cicero’s specific point about the stability of friendship is debatable (and perhaps incorrect: see below),⁴⁰ and he complicates matters by introducing the citizen/foreigner dichotomy for the sake of comparison, his basic point is clear: “you can choose your friends, but you can’t choose your family.” It could of course be argued that friend and kinsman are not mutually exclusive (or jointly exhaustive) categories; after all, Achilles and Patroclus are kinsmen. Cicero’s point, though, is that regardless of the level of friendly affect between kinsmen, that tie – *societas* – can never be broken. With friendship, on the other hand, *societas* is always a matter of choice, and it is this power of self-definition and self-determination that is one of the hallmarks of friendship, ancient and modern.⁴¹

Cicero’s *De Amicitia* also includes an account of the practical logics of friendship formation. Laelius observes that friendship begins when one encounters *uirtus* in another similar to one’s own. Love (*amor*) then grows and is strengthened as a result of the partners exchanging favors or gifts (*beneficia*), looking out for each other’s interests (*studia*), and building up familiarity (*consuetudo*); these elements, added to “the initial stirring of the mind and of love” (*illum primum motum animi et amoris*) – an almost Epicurean touch here – result in “an admirable greatness of goodwill that

⁴⁰ A similar argument appears at Val. Max. 4.7 *init.*

⁴¹ Burton 2003: 347–48; cf. Brunt 1988a: 395.

blazes forth" (*admirabilis quaedam exardescit benevolentiae magnitudo: De Am. 29*).

Laelius' notion that friendship begins with a recognition of *uirtus* similar to one's own resembles the search for common ground (in terms of attitudes, opinions, and values) during the "reconnaissance dance" phase of beginning friendship in modern western society. Laelius speaks from experience: the beginning of his own friendship with Scipio Aemilianus was triggered by his admiration of Scipio's virtue and Scipio's admiration of his character (*eius uirtutis . . . meis moribus: De Am. 30*). Cicero's speaker summarizes: men who long for virtue naturally incline towards it, and through association (*usu*) with those they have begun to love (*diligere coeperunt*), engage in an "honorable competition" (*honesta certatio: De Am. 32*).

Laelius also introduces the notion of a friendship test during this phase.⁴² Knowing that the goodwill of friends tends to "blaze forth" (*exardescit*) rather suddenly and indiscriminately, and that the process of friendship formation runs ahead of judgment, removing the chance to test the waters (*praecurrit amicitia iudicium, tollitque experiendi potestatem: De Am. 62*), Laelius advises that the wise man should "check as he would a chariot the first burst of kindness whereby we can test the character of our friends as one tries out a team of horses" (*est igitur prudentis sustinere ut currum, sic impetum benevolentiae, quo utamur quasi equis temptatis, sic amicitia aliqua parte periclitatis moribus amicorum: De Am. 63*). To do this Laelius suggests entrusting potential friends with large or small amounts of money (*parua pecunia . . . magna*), depending on circumstances, or with honors, offices, commands, power, and resources (*honores, magistratus, imperia, potestates, opes: De Am. 63*), and to note how they use these amenities, especially in situations where using them could conflict with the demands of friendship.

Thus Cicero's advice on and processual description of friendship formation resembles to a high degree the findings of contemporary research on the topic as well as the practical experience of most people today. The evidence accumulated here, moreover, shows that the voluntary and achieved nature of friendship – ancient and modern – activates a set of behaviors and responses, including the mechanism of choice, unique to friendship

⁴² This advice may have come from a lost treatise on friendship by Theophrastus, who advocated judging friends before making them (fr. 74 W [Plut. *De Frat. Amor.* 8.482b]: οὐ φιλοῦντα δεῖ κρίνειν, ἀλλὰ κρίναντα φιλεῖν, "one must not test one who is already loved, but love one who has already been tested"), a sentiment alluded to by Laelius at *De Am.* 85: *cum iudicaris diligere oportet, non cum dilexeris iudicare* ("you must love after you have tested, not test after you have loved"); discussion: Hommel 1955: 322; Swoboda 1988: 78; Powell 1990: 113 with further references (to which add Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1156b25–33; *Eth. Eud.* 1237b13–1238a10).

and distinct from those encountered in overtly dependent relationships such as those between parent and child and patron and client.

FRIENDSHIP AS AN INFORMAL AND TRUST-DEPENDENT RELATIONSHIP

As a voluntary association – one that involves free will and choice – friendship is primarily a privately negotiated tie,⁴³ and, in most cultures (including the ancient Roman and Greek), it is often one of the few human relationships that are not mediated by institutional laws or exogenous rules.⁴⁴ On the other hand, the choice of friends is never completely unfettered by such concerns as kinship obligations, social class, age, gender, marital status, occupation, and geography.⁴⁵ But these pale into insignificance next to the constraints exercised by what Pierre Bourdieu calls the *habitus* of society – normative sanctions established by consensus over a long period of time. According to Bourdieu, the *habitus* encompasses:

systems of durable, transposable *dispositions*, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles of the generation and structuring of practices and representations which can be objectively “regulated” and “regular” without in any way being the product of obedience to rules, objectively adapted to their goals without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of the operations necessary to attain them and, being all this, collectively orchestrated without being the product of the orchestrating action of a conductor.⁴⁶

These embedded, unconscious regulators of social practice are simultaneously “a product of history [and] generated by history, . . . the active presence of [the] past” that instills in social actors, more durably than exogenous formal rules ever could, standards of “correct” practice and behavior.⁴⁷ The *habitus* is arguably operative in all friendships: no friendship is

⁴³ Paine 1974: 124; Brenton 1974: 21–22; Parlee 1979: 43; Bell 1981: 10; J.P. Wiseman 1986: 192; Reohr 1991: 11; Werking 1997: 18.

⁴⁴ Exceptions are to be found mainly in primitive societies: Brain 1976: 19 (on the “arranged friendships” of the Bangwa of Cameroon), 21 (on the friendship divorce ritual of the Chinaulteco Indians of South America); Reisman 1979: 81–83; Reohr 1991: 21–22 (following Brain).

⁴⁵ Allan 1989: 33–44; cf. Leyton 1974: 104 (social class and kinship); Eisenstadt 1974: 139; Eisenstadt and Roniger 1984: 17 (following Leyton); Brenton 1974: 113 (age); Brain 1976: 20.

⁴⁶ Bourdieu 1977: 72 = 1990: 53 (emphasis in the original); Bourdieu 1977: 57, 78 (*habitus* is “the durably installed generative principle of regulated improvisations”), 59 (“the *habitus* is . . . immanent law, *lex insita*, inscribed in bodies by identical histories”).

⁴⁷ Bourdieu 1977: 72; 1990: 54 (whence the quotations), 56 (“the *habitus* – embodied history, internalised as a second nature and so forgotten as history – is the active presence of the whole past of which it is the product”). Practical analyses of the effects of social constraints: DuBois 1974: 17; Argyle and Henderson 1985: 83; J.P. Wiseman 1986: 204; Reohr 1991: 1; Werking 1997: 7, 18.

a closed system (that is, one that is mediated only by internal rules of conduct, or “relational practices”⁴⁸) because its very existence depends on it being publicized;⁴⁹ public performance, in turn, compels the actors to conform to normative expectations of friendship. For a friendship to exist, a relationship must be seen to be operating in various behavioral modes, which in turn assist the relationship to slip into socially ascribed roles in perception and in reality.⁵⁰ The power exerted by the *habitus* within friendship results in a paradox: as a relationship strongly subject to normative constraints, friendship “amounts to a kind of institutionalized non-institution”;⁵¹ or, in Bourdieu’s terms quoted earlier, friendship is “objectively ‘regulated’ and ‘regular’ without in any way being the product of obedience to rules, . . . collectively orchestrated without being the product of the orchestrating action of a conductor.”

Perhaps the most important normative expectation of personal friendships across cultures and across time is that friends must trust each other, as comparative scholarly research and popular surveys alike reveal.⁵² In the absence of any formal constraints (such as juridical law), friendship relies on a culturally shared notion of a compact of trust for its practice and efficacy. The social anthropologist Elliott Leyton has distinguished relations between kin and affines on the one hand, which are constrained by “jural and structural obligations,” from friendship on the other, which has only “mutual expectations.”⁵³ Thus, at least in modern society, friendship is a somewhat more fragile bond than other, institutionally constrained relationships.⁵⁴ This is why friendship can often generate insecurity and anxiety. When an individual takes the decision to befriend someone else in more meaningful ways than those performed during the “reconnaissance dance,” personal security and status are at stake: to entrust oneself to another is to sacrifice some measure of personal autonomy, with no guarantee of a qualitatively similar trust being returned. For Derrida, the risk is

⁴⁸ Werking 1997: 7.

⁴⁹ Reisman 1979: 93; Reisman 1981: 206; Duck 1983: 26–27. In the ancient context, Sen. *Ben.* 2.23.1: *quomodo danti in tantum producenda notitia est muneris sui, in quantum delectatura est, cui datur, ita accipienti adhibenda contio est* (“as the giver should add only that amount of publicity for his gift as will be pleasing to the receiver, so the receiver must gather together a public meeting [in order to publicize it]”).

⁵⁰ DuBois 1974: 17.

⁵¹ Paine 1974: 128; Eisenstadt 1974: 142–43; Werking 1997: 17 (the latter two following Paine).

⁵² Almost 90% of 40,000 respondents in a survey conducted by *Psychology Today* in 1979 ranked trust as the most important quality of friends and friendship: Parlee 1979: 43, 49, 50. Other surveys: Bell 1981: 16; Reisman 1979: 98 (the example of a 7-year-old boy who begins his definition of friendship by mentioning trust).

⁵³ Leyton 1974: 100.

⁵⁴ J.P. Wiseman 1986: 192; Reohr 1991: 11, 31–32; Fehr 1996: 183, 197.

clear: in making friends, “I must trust the other more than myself . . . [My success] depends more on the other than on myself.”⁵⁵ Perhaps, as Kant suggested, it is more human to *mistrust* others than to trust them.⁵⁶ Deep feelings of vulnerability, particularly in the early stages, are common in personal friendships.

The importance of trust, Latin *fides*, in a range of Roman legal, religious, interpersonal, and international relationships is clear from the surviving ancient literature. In the *De Officiis*, Cicero calls *fides* the “foundation of justice” (*fundamentum autem est iustitiae fides*: *Off.* 1.23). For Laelius in the *De Amicitia*, *fides* is “the foundation of that stability and constancy which we seek in friendship” (*firmamentum autem stabilitatis constantiaeque est, eius quam in amicitia quaerimus, fides*: *De Am.* 65). For the Romans generally, the term *fides* seems to have covered a wide range of meanings, from the legalistic, almost amoral sense of “guarantee” to the morally charged “trust,” “good faith,” and “promise,” as well as the overtly sacred “oath” (and Fides, of course, was a goddess in her own right with her own cult worship at Rome).⁵⁷ Which meaning has priority is controversial, although Richard Heinze long ago succeeded in overturning Eduard Fraenkel’s notion that *fides* originally meant “guarantee in the widest sense” and lacked any religious overtones. For Heinze, *fides* can also signify “the quality in humans that turns one’s bond or obligation, entered into with another, into a moral obligation, and thus establishes the trust of the other.”⁵⁸

Pierre Boyancé later took Heinze’s definition a step further and argued for the absolute priority of the moral and religious meanings of *fides*.⁵⁹ According to Boyancé, *fides* means “fidelity to one’s duties, and especially to one’s formal obligations,” signifying the accord between one’s words and one’s actions as sanctioned by the gods, confirmed by a sacred oath, and symbolized in the shaking of right hands. *Fides* is “the moral foundation of the Roman order,” and the antiquity of the cult of the goddess Fides (founded, according to Roman tradition, by Rome’s second king Numa Pompilius) may also confirm the priority of the religious meaning

⁵⁵ Derrida 2005: 195.

⁵⁶ Kant 1991: 214: “A constraint, a mistrust of others, rests upon all of us, so that we withhold something [from our friends].” Other quotations and discussion at Grunebaum 2003: 17, 100, 137–38.

⁵⁷ “Guarantee”: Fraenkel 1916; “trust,” “good faith,” and “promise”: Hellegouarc’h 1963: 24, 30; Freyburger 1986: 33–34; Hölkeskamp 2000: 225–26, 230–31; “oath”: Boyancé 1964; goddess Fides: *RE* 6: 2281–86; Boyancé 1964: 423–24; Nörr 1989: 110; Hölkeskamp 2000: 227–29; religious overtones generally: Badian 1958a: 1–2; Brunt 1965: 7; Rouland 1979: 104–05.

⁵⁸ Heinze 1929: esp. 149 (whence the quotation); Badian 1958a: 2 (following Heinze).

⁵⁹ Boyancé 1964.

of *fides*.⁶⁰ The handshake, moreover, and the association of *fides* with the right hand (*dextra*) have a proto-Indo-European root (**bhīdh-/*bhoidh-*, “to command,” “to persuade,” “to trust”) that carries a distinctly sacred meaning.⁶¹ When a Roman pledged his *fides* and extended his right hand, he was aware of the enormous and awesome significance of the act – and the terrible retribution the gods could exact if he violated his oath. Indeed, the Romans believed that non-performance of an act sworn to by a sacred oath of *fides* was not even expiable.⁶²

But how to distinguish the quality of friendship *fides* from that which obtains between parent and child, god and man, or patron and client? The *fides* of patrons towards their clients, and vice versa, and the *fides* of friends closely resemble each other; thus the divinely ordained social sanction against betraying the trust of friends is of a piece with the law of the Twelve Tables that made the patron who defrauded his client *sacer*, an outlaw and potential sacrifice to the gods (above, n. 19). Here, then, is a case where T.P. Wiseman’s aforementioned test of “who does what [to whom], and when, and where” – and for what purpose – may usefully apply: the quality of *fides* in a given informal relationship on its own cannot tell us what the relationship is; this can only be determined experientially or, for those outside the relationship, through processually analyzing the relationship’s particular dynamics. Unfortunately, the nature of the ancient evidence rarely permits such close and detailed analysis.

On the other hand, closely associated with trust – indeed its oral manifestation – is candor, a measure of the frankness and openness with which the relationship is conducted. For the exogenous observer, the quality and level of candor can and often does provide clues to the correct identification of a relationship.⁶³ In the ancient sources, the level of candor in a personal relationship is a marker of its intimacy. So, to take the most obvious examples, friendship is usually distinguished by each partner’s ability to criticize freely, sometimes harshly, and to disclose sensitive personal information.⁶⁴ In processual terms, intimacy increases along with candor,⁶⁵ especially early

⁶⁰ Boyancé 1964: 419 (the quotation), 423–24 (the goddess Fides); cf. Clark 2007: 62–63. Numa’s foundation: Livy 1.24.4–5; cf. Dion. Hal. 2.75.3; Plut. *Num.* 16.1; Flor. 1.2.3. According to another tradition, Rhome, daughter of Ascanius and granddaughter of Aeneas, was the founder: Agathocles in Festus 328L.

⁶¹ The handshake and right hand: *RE* 6: 2282 (with references); Boyancé 1964: 425; Freyburger 1986: 136–41; Nörr 1989: 36–39, 113–14; Höllkeskamp 2000: 228, 231–32, 240–41; Clark 2007: 168–69.

⁶² Rouland 1979: 105.

⁶³ Burton 2003: 345–46; on candor’s relationship to trust in particular, see Duck 1983: 69–70.

⁶⁴ Bell 1981: 19; Rawlins 1992: 22, 133; Fehr 1996: 87 (freedom to criticize); DuBois 1974: 26; Perlman and Fehr 1986: 22 (mutual intimate self-disclosure).

⁶⁵ Walster et al. 1978: 147; Duck 1983: 67; Reohr 1991: 27; Fehr 1996: 35, 83.

on during the “reconnaissance dance” phase of the relationship, as has been seen.

For the Romans *fides* was virtually synonymous with candor, which is probably why Cicero discusses *fides* and frank speech (*simplices sermones*) in the same section of his treatise on friendship (*De Am.* 65–66) and elsewhere asserts that the *fides* of friends depends on the exchange of frank advice and criticism amicably offered and accepted in a spirit of goodwill (*ut et utilitas in amicitia et fides retineatur . . . et monendi amici saepe sunt et obiurgandi, et haec accipienda amice cum beneuole fiunt. De Am.* 88). In the *De Officiis*, moreover, Cicero defines *fides* as “truth and constancy of words and agreements” (*fides, id est dictorum conuentorumque constantia et ueritas . . . : Off.* 1.23).⁶⁶ The reverse is also true: “dissimulation,” the opposite of candor, “destroys that truth without which friendship cannot survive” (*simulatio . . . delet . . . ueritatem sine qua nomen amicitiae ualere non potest. De Am.* 92); similarly, “unless you behold an open heart and show your own, there is no loyalty, no certainty” (*nisi . . . apertum pectus uideas tuumque ostendas, nihil fidum, nihil exploratum: De Am.* 97). Laelius further instructs his listeners:

consilium uero dare audeamus libere, plurimum in amicitia amicorum bene suadentium ualeat auctoritas, eaque et adhibeatur ad monendum, non modo aperte, sed etiam acriter, si res postulabit, et adhibitae pareatur.

Let us dare to give good counsel frankly, in friendship let the authority of those friends who give good advice be especially influential, and let that authority both be called upon when advising not only with frankness, but even with harshness if the circumstances warrant, and be followed when offered. (*De Am.* 44)

et monere et moneri proprium est uerae amicitiae, et alterum libere facere, non aspere, alterum patienter accipere, non repugnanter.

It is characteristic of friendship both to give and receive advice and, on the one hand, to give it candidly but not harshly, and on the other hand, to accept it patiently but not reluctantly. (*De Am.* 91)

A more complete list of what constitutes candor appears in Cicero’s *De Officiis*: “counsel, conversation, encouragement, consolation, and yes, sometimes even reproaches” (*consilia, sermones, cohortationes, consolationes, interdum etiam obiurgationes: Off.* 1.58).

Such mutual freedom of expression is, of course, not typical of *clientela*. According to Ernst Badian, “the patron would advise . . . his clients; . . . the

⁶⁶ Discussion: Freyburger 1986: 134. For other sources and scholarship, see Habinek 1990; Burton 2004: 224–25 n. 42.

interpretation [of his own obligations] depended on himself,”⁶⁷ while “the client had no business to offer arbitration to the patron” – his only role was to offer “nothing but unquestioning support” and to express his gratitude.⁶⁸ According to Peter White, clients may have had “access and responsibilities to an important person,” but they did not enjoy “the give-and-take of real intimacy.”⁶⁹ David Konstan contrasts the dependence of the *clientela* relationship with *amicitia*’s “personal bond of mutual frankness and allegiance.”⁷⁰ The conclusion is inescapable: clients enjoyed few privileges of intimacy; they typically sought (and were expected to take) the advice of their patrons, and were certainly in no position to offer advice themselves or to criticize their patrons. The quality of *fides* obtaining between a Roman patron and his client was thus quite different from that which bound friends together.

Two concluding anecdotes serve to reinforce the point. The first is from Plutarch’s *Life of Cato the Elder*:

[ὁ Κάτων] καταβαίνων, ὥσπερ εἰώθει, μετὰ φίλων εἰς ἀγορὰν Σαλώνιον τινα τῶν ὑπογεγραμματοευκτόων αὐτῷ παρόντα καὶ συμπροπέμποντα μεγάλη φωνῇ προσαγορεύσας ἠρώτησεν, εἰ τὸ θυγάτριον συνήρμοκε νυμφίῳ· τοῦ δ’ ἀνθρώπου φήσαντος, ὥς οὐδὲ μέλλει μὴ προτερον ἐκείνῳ κοινωσάμενος· “Καὶ μὴν ἐγὼ σοι,” φησὶν, “εὖρηκα κηδεστήν ἐπιτήδειον, εἰ μὴ νῆ Διὰ τὰ τῆς ἡλικίας δυσχεραίνονται· τᾶλλα γὰρ οὐ μεμπτός ἐστι, σφόδρα δὲ πρεσβύτης.” ὥς οὖν ὁ Σαλῳιος ἐκέλευσε ταῦτα φροντίζειν καὶ διδόναι τὴν κόρην ᾧ προαιρεῖται, πελάτιν οὔσαν αὐτοῦ καὶ δεομένην τῆς ἐκείνου κηδεμονίας, οὐδεμίαν ὁ Κάτων ἀναβολὴν ποιησάμενος αὐτὸς ἔφη τὴν παρθένον αἰτεῖν ἑαυτῷ. καὶ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον, ὥς εἰκός, ὁ λόγος ἐξέπληξε τὸν ἀνθρώπον, πόρρω μὲν γάμου τὸν Κάτωνα, πόρρω δ’ αὐτὸν οἰκίας ὑπατικῆς καὶ θριαμβικῶν κηδευμάτων τιθέμενον· σπουδῇ δὲ χρώμενον ὁρῶν ἄσμενος ἐδέξατο, καὶ καταβάντες εὐθὺς εἰς ἀγορὰν ἐποιοῦντο τὴν ἐγγύην.

One day as he was going down to the forum with his friends, as was his custom, Cato called out in a loud voice to a certain Salonius, who had been one of his undersecretaries and was then nearby, and asked him if he had found a husband for his daughter. When Salonius answered that he had not and did not intend on doing so without first consulting Cato, the latter replied, “Then I have found a suitable son-in-law for you, unless indeed you should disapprove of his age. In other respects he is faultless, but he is a very old man.” When Salonius asked Cato to take the matter in hand and give his daughter to the man he chose, since she was his dependent and needed his care, Cato responded without further ado that he wanted the girl for himself. At first, as was natural, this answer astounded the man, who considered Cato far past marriage and himself far beneath a house of consular

⁶⁷ Badian 1958a: 62 (similarly 54, 115, 152; 1983: 411, 413).

⁶⁸ Badian 1958a: 100–01; cf. 1983: 413. ⁶⁹ P. White 1993: 30. ⁷⁰ Konstan 1995: 336.

rank and full of triumphal honors. But seeing that Cato was serious, Saloni-
us accepted gladly, and as soon as they reached the forum they made a formal pledge
of betrothal. (Plut. *Cat. Mai.* 24.2–4)⁷¹

The second passage is the famous long fragment of the Roman poet Ennius
describing the “Good Companion”:

Haece locutus uocat quocum bene saepe libenter
Mensam sermonesque suos rerumque suarum
Consilium partit, magnam quom lassus diei
Partem fuisset de summis rebus regundis
Consilio indu foro lato sanctoque senatu;
Quoi res audacter magnas paruasque iocumque
Eloqueretur †et cuncta† malaque et bona dictu
Euomeret, si qui uellet tutoque locaret;
Quocum multa uolup
 gaudia clamque palamque;
Ingenium quoi nulla malum sententia suadet
Ut faceret facinus leuis aut mala: doctus, fidelis,
Suauis homo, iucundus, suo contentus, beatus,
Scitus, secunda loquens in tempore, commodus, uerbum
Paucum, multa tenens antiqua, sepulta uestutas
Quae facit, et mores ueteresque nouosque †tenentem
Multorum ueterum leges diuomque hominumque
Prudentem qui dicta loquiue tacereue posset:
Hunc inter pugnas compellat Seruilius sic:

Saying this, he calls upon a man with whom he often at his pleasure shares his
table and conversation as well as his counsel on his private affairs, exhausted from
having spent the greater part of his day conducting great affairs of state in the broad
forum and the hallowed senate; he spoke freely to this man on matters great and
small, as well as telling jokes, but also blurting out things good and bad to say, if he
wished, and storing them safely; with this man [there was] much pleasure . . . joys
private and public; his character no fleeting evil thought can persuade to do an
evil deed; a learned, faithful, and pleasant man, delightful, content in himself,

⁷¹ Plutarch probably does not intend the reader to count Saloni-
us among the number of Cato’s friends
with whom (μετὰ φίλων) Cato goes down to the forum since the author also describes Saloni-
us as ὑπογεγραμμοστευκώτων, conventionally translated as “undersecretary,” implying, at the very
least, some relationship of dependence, perhaps *clientela*. The latter is also indicated at Plut. *Comp.*
Arist. et Cat. Mai. 6.1, where Saloni-
us is called an “underling” (ὑπερέτων). Note too that Saloni-
us’ daughter is called Cato’s πελάτις – a standard Greek term for “dependent” or, in Roman contexts,
“client” (LSJ, s.v.). In any case Gell. *NA* 13.20.8 calls Saloni-
us Cato’s *cliens*, and at Sen. *Controv.*
7.6.17, he is Cato’s *colonus*, “farmhand.” Thus in the Plutarch passage Saloni-
us must be regarded as
one of Cato’s *clientes* performing the *deductio* to the forum instead of one of his close friends, who
probably would have been walking closer to Cato. This reconstruction of the relative distance of
Cato’s *amici* from his *clientes* may find proof in the fact that Cato had to shout to Saloni-
us “in a
loud voice” (μεγάλη φωνῇ προσαγορεύσας) to get his attention.

happy, clever, saying the right thing at the right time, affable, a man of few words, knowing many old things which the passage of time has buried, customs old and new, and laws of many ancient gods and men, knowing when to speak and when to keep silent on things said; this man, in between battles, Servilius addressed thus . . . (Enn. *Ann.* frs. 268–286 S)

Regardless of the actual identity of the “Good Companion” described in this passage – Aulus Gellius, the source of the fragment, has it on the authority of the grammarian L. Aelius Stilo that, despite its overt subject matter (an unnamed friend of, most likely, Cn. Servilius Geminus [cos. 217 BC]), it is meant to be a self-portrait of Ennius himself in his relationship with M. Fulvius Nobilior (*NA* 12.4.4)⁷² – the passage’s significance surely lies in its description of a loving and candid relationship – a friendship, in other words. The great man of affairs (Servilius) can have a meaningful discussion with his companion in any mode, from discussing high politics to telling dirty jokes, and the companion can offer well-chosen and well-timed words of wisdom in an affable, open, and confident spirit. Indeed, even if Gellius had not identified the relationship Ennius describes as a friendship – albeit with a man superior in birth and fortune (*amicum esse conveniat hominis genere et fortuna superioris*: Gell. *NA* 12.4.1; cf. 12.4.3: *amicitias*) – it would have been readily identifiable as such from the intimacy the poet describes.⁷³ The contrast with the Plutarch passage could not be clearer: in the latter, Salonius’ role as Cato’s client is to listen to the great man’s advice, to not make decisions without consulting him, to leave, as Salonius himself says, all decisions about himself and his family in Cato’s hands, and to speak only when spoken to. Although both relationships are asymmetrical, the level of candor within each can serve to identify that relationship more precisely: Cato’s with Salonius is *clientela*, Nobilior’s with Ennius (or Servilius’ with his unnamed companion) is *amicitia*. The quality of *fides*, as manifest in the level of candor in each, is distinctly different, and gives us vital clues as to the true nature of the relationships.

⁷² Skutsch 1985: 447–48 identifies the Servilius of the passage as the consul of 217 rather than P. Servilius Geminus (cos. I 252 BC, cos. II 248 BC); *contra*: Badian 1972: 174–77, 180. Badian 1972: 180–83 vigorously defends Stilo’s assertion that the “Good Companion” is an Ennian self-portrait, as does Skutsch 1985: 450. Gruen 1990: 112; Goldberg 1995: 122 are more circumspect. Full bibliography on this question: Gruen 1990: 112 n. 158.

⁷³ Indeed, according to Seneca (*Ben.* 6.29), candid conversation, such as Servilius’ companion offers, is precisely the sort of return an inferior friend should make to his superior: *quam multa sunt, per quae, quidquid debemus, reddere etiam felicibus possumus! Fidele consilium, assidua conuersatio, sermo comis et sine adulatione iucundus, aures, si deliberari uelit, diligentes, tutae, si credere, conuictus familiaritas* (“how many are the ways through which we can make a return – even to the well-off – for whatever we owe! Loyal counsel, attentive intercourse, friendly and pleasant conversation without flattery, attentive and safe ears if he wishes to seek advice, and if he wishes to entrust confidences, friendly intimacy”). On unequal friendship, see further below, pp. 63–75.

SIMILARITY AND DIFFERENCE

The driving force behind friendship formation is the search for similarity and difference. On the one hand, modern research confirms the conventional wisdom, well known since at least the time of Pythagoras, that the good friend should be a second self.⁷⁴ People are attracted to, and want to be friends with, people who are similar to themselves in terms of tastes, attitudes, personality, and morality.⁷⁵ Both anthropologists and psychologists have attributed this to the innate desire for value-reinforcement: affection flows towards those whose views and ideals are similar, and who affirm and thus validate our own self-image, belief system, or set of opinions.⁷⁶ Researchers have also found, however, that difference, or complementarity, is equally important in friendship formation: we seek in others the qualities, attributes, and resources that we ourselves lack. This is perhaps due to the primal human survival instinct and the related ideal of self-sufficiency: we tend to be drawn towards those who can offer us those things in which we ourselves are deficient.⁷⁷ Thus friendships are based primarily on similarity and complementarity, or, to use the categories established long ago by the anthropologist Eric Wolf, friendships are simultaneously “expressive” and “instrumental,” the former term referring to the intimacy and affection individuals feel towards those who are similar, and the latter term embracing all the complementary services friends perform for one another.⁷⁸

As the Pythagorean cliché of the second self shows, the ancients were certainly familiar with the similarity-seeking aspect of friendship formation. Cicero’s *De Amicitia* translates the Pythagorean ἄλλος ἐγώ variously as *exemplar sui* (*De Am.* 23) and *alter idem* (*De Am.* 80). “For mankind it is natural,” Cicero suggests, “that the man who both loves himself and seeks out another with whose soul he might mingle his own [does so] in such a way as almost to create one out of two” (*in homine fit natura, qui et se*

⁷⁴ Pythagoras: φίλος ἐστὶν ἄλλος ἐγώ (cited in Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1166a31–32; cf. Diog. Laert. 8.10).

⁷⁵ Lewis 1993: 41; Duck 1973: 46; Brenton 1974: 37–38, 115–16; Paine 1974: 119; Reisman 1979: 72; Porter and Tomaselli 1989: 2; Furnham 1989: 103–04; Fehr 1996: 97; R. White 1999: esp. 29 (where the term used for “similarity” is “solidarity”). Contrast “attraction theory,” which argues that attraction is only towards those who are able to reward or are somehow associated with rewarding: Perlman and Fehr 1986: 11; Furnham 1989: 104–05; Fehr 1996: 22.

⁷⁶ Wolf 1966: 10; Brain 1976: 131; Brenton 1974: 37–38; Duck 1983: 27; Rubin 1985: 40, 54.

⁷⁷ Reohr 1991: 69; Brain 1976: 124; R. White 1999: esp. 30 (where the term used for “complementarity” is “alterity”). The primordial need for others was recognized by Kant: Grunebaum 2003: 49.

⁷⁸ Wolf 1966: 1–22. Wolf, however, regarded expressive and instrumental friendships as mutually exclusive categories. Eisenstadt 1974: 140; Paine 1974: 118 (followed by Brenton 1974: 170; Rawlins 1992: 18–19) argue that expressiveness and instrumentality overlap in all friendships.

ipse diligit, et alterum anquirat cuius animum ita cum suo misceat ut efficiat paene unum ex duobus: De Am. 81); similarly, “the power of friendship is in its ability to make, as it were, one soul out of many” (*amicitiae uis [est] in eo ut unus quasi animus fiat ex pluribus: De Am. 92*). Cicero also describes the process by which similarity is discovered:

A natura mihi uidetur potius quam ab indigentia orta amicitia, applicatione magis animi cum quodam sensu amandi quam cogitatione quantum illa res utilitatis esset habitura . . . sensus exstitit amoris, si aliquem nacti sumus cuius cum moribus et natura congruamus quod in eo quasi lumen aliquod probitatis et uirtutis perspicere uideamur.

It seems to me that friendship arises from nature rather than from need, and more by an inclination of the mind together with a feeling of loving than from a calculation of how much utility that friendship will have . . . There exists a feeling of love when we have found someone whose character and nature are agreeable to our own since in him we seem to see a lamp, as it were, of propriety and virtue. (*De Am. 27*)⁷⁹

Elsewhere in the treatise, friendship – or rather the power of friendship – is defined as the greatest total and complete consensus and sharing of wishes, interests, counsels, opinions (*id in quo omnis uis est amicitiae, uoluntatum studiorum sententiarum summa consensio: De Am. 15*; *omnium rerum consiliorum uoluntatum sine ulla exceptione communitas: De Am. 61*). As noted earlier in the context of the discussion of candor, in the *De Officiis* Cicero asserts that “there especially flourish in friendships a life lived in common, counsel, conversation, encouragement, consolation, and yes, sometimes even reproaches” (*uita autem uictusque communis, consilia, sermones, cohortationes, consolationes, interdum etiam obiurgationes in amicitiis uigent maxime: Off. 1.58*).

This emphasis on similarity that is measured primarily in terms of character, virtue, propriety, loving, the mind, and so on reflects the “expressive” side of the friendship equation, and although the “instrumental” side is not absent from Cicero’s typology (see below), there is an underlying assumption (as in all idealizing, male-authored elite texts on friendship in antiquity) that the only true friendships are those that are based on similarity of virtue. “Without virtue friendship cannot exist at all” (*nec sine uirtute amicitia esse ullo pacto potest: De Am. 21*), says Laelius, and it is understood that true friendship is the prerogative of *boni*, “good men” – in other words, the Laeliiuses and Scipios (and Ciceros, of course) of the world. The point is made repeatedly in the *De Amicitia*:

⁷⁹ Cf. *De Am.* 48, 50, 82; *Cic. Off.* 1.55–56.

nisi in bonis amicitiam esse non posse

amicitiam nisi inter bonos esse non posse

friendship cannot exist except among good men. (*De Am.* 18, 65)

Needless to say, according to these criteria lower-class friendships and cross-status friendships cannot count as true friendships, nor of course can cross-gender friendships and friendships between women – in other words, the sorts of friendship that are most commonly experienced today and probably amongst the non-elite classes in antiquity as well.

A *reductio ad absurdum* (more accurately, an *eleuatio ad nihilum*) looms for Cicero – as for all ancient thinkers – in these stringent qualifications for true friendship: to what extent are virtue friendships achievable in reality? The purpose of the *De Amicitia*, Cicero/Laelius tells us, is to act as an antidote to the treatises “of certain learned men, written in pompous language,” whose *exempla* of good friends “are nowhere at all to be found” (*quidam docti, uerborum magnificentia . . . omnino nusquam reperiuntur. De Am.* 21), and of the sophists, whose invidious and obscure definition of friendship serves no purpose (*sibi habeant sapientiae nomen et inuidiosum et obscurum: De Am.* 18). Cicero’s treatise aspires to describe a practical friendship of *uirtus*, in common usage and as encountered in everyday life (*communem utilitatem . . . in usu uitaeque communi: De Am.* 18; *eis amicis . . . quos nouit uita communis: De Am.* 38). The *De Amicitia* is thus designed as a corrective to the epistemological vanishing points represented by, for example, the virtue friendships of Plato and Aristotle, or the perfect friendship of the Stoic sages.⁸⁰ The examples Cicero provides at various points, however, show the sorts of friend he has in mind: the Republican heroes of the Pyrrhic War period C. Fabricius Luscinus, M’. Curius, Ti. Coruncanius and Q. Aemilius Papus (*De Am.* 18, 38), and the great, politically respectable Romans of the second century BC Aemilius Paullus, Cato the Elder, Scipio Aemilianus, the great orators Sulpicius Gallus and Furius Philus, P. Scipio Nasica, the elder Ti. Gracchus (Aemilianus’ father-in-law), P. Rupilius, Sp. Mummius, Q. Tubero, P. Rutilius Rufus, A. Verginius, C. Fannius, Q. Mucius Scaevola the Augur – and Laelius himself, of course. The *exempla* Cicero chooses threaten to elevate his brand of friendship “as encountered in common usage and everyday life” to the unattainable virtue friendship of the Greek philosophers.

⁸⁰ Pl. *Lys.* 214c–d; Arist. *Eth. Eud.* 1235a; *Eth. Nic.* 1157a16; Diog. Laert. 7.124; cf. Sen. *Ep.* 35 and *Ben.* 7.12.2.

This tension between the practical and the ideal is compounded by Cicero's assessment of the relative merits of utility- and *uirtus*-based friendships:

Saepissime . . . mihi de amicitia cogitanti maxime illud considerandum uideri solet, utrum propter imbecillitatem atque inopiam desiderata sit amicitia, ut dandis recipiendisque meritis quod quisque minus per se ipse posset, id acciperet ab alio uicissimque redderet, an esset hoc quidem proprium amicitiae, sed antiquior et pulchrior et magis a natura ipsa profecta alia causa. Amor enim, ex quo amicitia nominata est, princeps est ad beneuolentiam coniungendam. Nam utilitates quidem etiam ab eis percipiuntur saepe, qui simulatione amicitiae coluntur et obseruantur temporis causa; in amicitia autem nihil fictum, nihil simulatum est et, quidquid est, id est uerum et uoluntarium.

Quite often when I reflect on friendship this question in particular usually seems to merit consideration, whether men require friendship out of weakness and need, so that by giving and receiving favors one might receive from another that which he cannot get for himself and repay the other in turn, or whether, though this indeed may be a characteristic of friendship, there is another cause, older and more beautiful and arising more from nature itself. For love (*amor*), from which friendship (*amicitia*) takes its name, is the chief creator of goodwill. For there are indeed practical advantages often obtained from those who through a pretense of friendship are cultivated and respected to suit the occasion; but in friendship there is nothing false, nothing simulated, and whatever there is is authentic and voluntary. (*De Am.* 26)

The rhetorical sleight of hand Cicero performs here is twofold: first, he denies that utility-seeking plays any role in friendship formation – friendship arises from love (*amor*) rather than from “weakness and need” (*imbecillitatem atque inopiam*) or “indigence or utility” (*nulla indigentia, nulla utilitate [amicitia] quaesita*: *De Am.* 100); and second, he argues that utility-based relationships – which he elsewhere labels “vulgar friendships” (*uulgares amicitias*: *De Am.* 76) – should not be considered friendships at all because they are inherently false. Elsewhere he claims, “if utility cements us together in friendships, its removal would dissolve them utterly” (*si utilitas amicitias conglutinaret, eadem commutata dissolueret*: *De Am.* 32). But at the same time Cicero cannot deny, as the passage quoted above reveals, that the exchange of favors is somehow “characteristic of friendship” (*amicitiae proprium*). Cicero's Laelius invokes his famous friendship with Scipio Aemilianus: although their attraction to each other was based on mutual admiration for each other's virtue and character (*ego admiratione quadam uirtutis [Scipionis], ille uicissim opinione fortasse nonnulla quam de meis moribus habebat, me dilexit*: *De Am.* 30), he nevertheless admits that

his virtuous *amicitia* with Scipio at the same time yielded many and great advantages; but, Laelius hastens to add, it was not from hope of these that they began to love each other (*quamquam utilitates multae et magnae consecutae sunt, non sunt tamen ab earum spe causae diligendi profectae*: *De Am.* 30). The paradigmatic friendship of Aemilianus and Laelius suggests that utility, at least as Cicero perceives it, is not present at or causative of the formation of virtue friendship but follows only after the virtue friendship is established via love (*amor*).

No such distinction is made, however, in a closely related passage from Cicero's *De Officiis*:

Nihil autem est amabilius nec copulatius, quam morum similitudo bonorum; in quibus enim eadem studia sunt, eadem uoluntates, in iis fit, ut aequae quisque altero delectetur ac se ipso, efficiturque id, quod Pythagoras uult in amicitia, ut unus fiat ex pluribus. Magna etiam illa communitas est, quae conficitur ex beneficiis ultro et citro datis acceptis, quae et mutua et grata dum sunt, inter quos ea sunt firma deuinciuntur societate.

There is nothing more lovable or intimate than the similarity of the character of good men, for they have the same interests and wishes, and as a consequence each one loves the other as much as himself and brings about what Pythagoras wanted in friendship, that one is made from several. Also great is that bond which is created from the mutual exchange of favors, which so long as they are mutual and appreciated, those among whom they are exchanged are bound by a firm connection. (*Off.* 1.56)

This would seem to suggest that the similarity of good men, measured in terms of interests and wishes, and the mutual exchange of favors are, in fact, equally important – and perhaps coeval – in friendship. Cicero certainly does not imply in this passage that one is of greater importance than or prior to the other.

Cicero's epistemological confusion, like that of other ancient thinkers, is a product of his elite perspective, as his denigration of the non-virtue friendships as “vulgar” shows.⁸¹ He is thus forced into arguing the counter-intuitive proposition that utility-seeking in friendship has nothing to do with the human need for security and self-sufficiency:

Nec uerum est quod dicitur a quibusdam propter necessitatem uitae, quod ea, quae natura desideraret, consequi sine aliis atque efficere non possemus, idcirco initam esse cum hominibus communitatem et societatem.

⁸¹ For a critique of Aristotle's similarly elitist denigration of the friendships of utility and pleasure, see Grunebaum 2003: 58–71.

It is not true, as is said by certain men, that the community and association of human beings were created because of the needs of life, because those things which nature requires we could not secure and achieve without others. (*Off.* 1.158)

sed plerique peruerse, ne dicam impudenter, habere talem amicum uolunt quales ipsi esse non possunt, quaque ipsi non tribuunt amicis, haec ab eis desiderant.

The majority of men perversely, not to say shamelessly, want a friend to be such as they themselves cannot be and require from those what they themselves cannot give to their friends. (*De Am.* 82)

ut enim quisque sibi plurimum confidit, et ut quisque maxime uirtute et sapientia sic munitus est ut nullo egeat, suaque omnia in se ipso posita iudicet, ita in amicitiiis expendis colendisque maxime excellit . . . sic amicitiam non spe mercedis adducti, sed quod omnis eius fructus in ipso amore inest.

Just as each man relies mostly on himself and as each is especially fortified with virtue and wisdom so that he needs nobody else and judges everything he has to be within himself, so he excels in seeking out and cultivating friendships . . . So we judge that friendship is to be sought out not out of hope for gain but because all of its profit is in love itself. (*De Am.* 30–31)

Further distortion arises, as the last passage indicates, from the ancient (and to some extent modern) distinction between love and utility. This distinction is largely illusory, for the mutual exchange of intimacy, love, and affection is no different, in terms of its fulfillment of human needs and desires, from other, more material exchanges.⁸² Cicero's inconsistency and confusion on this point is perhaps best seen, once again, in Laelius' characterization of his paradigmatic *amicitia* with Scipio Aemilianus: on the one hand, Laelius says, Scipio had no need of him and vice versa (*Africanus indigens mei? Minime hercule, ac ne ego quidem illius: De Am.* 30); but, it turns out, Scipio at least needed Laelius' advice and help: "for how could our affections have grown if Scipio had never needed my counsel and help at home and abroad?" (*ubi enim studia nostra uiguissent, si numquam consilio, numquam opera nostra nec domi nec militiae Scipio eguisset?: De Am.* 51).

No ancient author, Cicero included, managed successfully to resolve the epistemological tension created by the early philosophical segregation of

⁸² Cf. Sen. *Ben.* 3.9, where material favors are compared with such services as giving useful advice, preventing suicides from achieving their end, providing consolation, tending and caring for the sick, and so on. Cf. Verboven 2002: 44: "from a normative point of view affection and utility coincide in the institution of friendship as it emerges in the Greek and Roman world." Also Grunebaum 2003: 20: intimate self-disclosure has "instrumental value," since it can accomplish such ends as a "correction of erroneous beliefs," and "a release of some discomforting psychological pressure of a burdened heart."

the idealized friendship of virtue from the less-than-ideal types of friendship based on utility. Modern scholars have for the most part abandoned such value judgments and accepted the commonsense proposition that all true friendships are formed and perpetuated through a combination of similarity- and utility-seeking.⁸³ The philosopher Michael Slote has argued that the ancient association of utility friendship with exploitation was overstated since utility friends are utility “satisficers” rather than utility maximizers; “utility friends,” James Grunebaum explains, “do not have to squeeze every drop of advantage out of their relation, thus their goodwill for each other need not be tested or destroyed by an unending quest for ever-greater benefit.”⁸⁴ It might also be questioned how analytically useful the “similarity”/“complementarity” dichotomy really is in terms of practice. Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of “symbolic capital” certainly points in this direction. According to Bourdieu, non-economic exchanges (that is, exchanges of social, cultural, and symbolic capital) in pre-capitalist societies forge stronger and more durable bonds than commercial transactions or contracts.⁸⁵ Symbolic capital consists primarily of those intangible gifts friends habitually exchange, such as prestige and honor, but can be extended to encompass exchanges of feelings of love, virtuous conduct, and mutual affirmation of beliefs and opinions as well. Slote’s “satisficing” utility friends and Bourdieu’s symbolic capital can thus show the way out of the epistemological trap set by the ancient ideal of the virtuous friendship.

What Cicero/Laelius tried to do in the *De Amicitia*, unsuccessfully, and at the cost of some intellectual consistency, was to identify *as* friendship the non-material exchanges (symbolic capital) that in part *constitute* friendship, thus confusing, in philosophical terms, the basis of friendship with its object;⁸⁶ this, in turn, allowed him to draw a sharper distinction between virtue friendships and “vulgar” utility friendships. Cicero, of course, well knew that men of his class frequently exchanged material goods, money, and low-interest or interest-free loans,⁸⁷ but the prejudices of his class, time, and place prevented him from seeing that such utilitarian exchanges are

⁸³ Cf., e.g., Williams 2008: 34: “in Roman terms the two motivations for entering into and maintaining a friendship [love or utility] were not incompatible; relationships given the label *amicitia* could aim at either one or both.”

⁸⁴ Grunebaum 2003: 64–65 (citing Slote 2001: 12).

⁸⁵ Cf. Bourdieu 1990: 112: “symbolic labour aim[s] . . . , through the sincere fiction of a disinterested exchange, . . . at transforming arbitrary relations of exploitation . . . into durable relations.” On symbolic capital more generally see Bourdieu 1977: 171–83; 1990: 112–21.

⁸⁶ For the distinction, see Grunebaum 2003: esp. 32.

⁸⁷ Dixon 1993: 457, 460–63; Verboven 2002: 71–181.

constitutive of all friendships, including the vaunted friendship of virtue. He also failed to recognize that “symbolic properties . . . are nothing other than material properties when perceived and appreciated in their mutual relationships, that is, as distinctive properties”⁸⁸ – in other words, that expressive and instrumental exchanges amount in practice to the same thing, and both play an equally important role in the formation and sustenance of friendship over the long term. Complementarity and similarity are mutually reinforcing and to some extent overlapping drivers of all friendships rather than signifiers of discrete and mutually incompatible categories of friendship.

THE END OF FRIENDSHIP: BREAKDOWN AND DISSOLUTION

Roman friendship, particularly in the international sphere, is most often on show in the breach, which is why the entire final chapter of this study is devoted to the breakdown and dissolution of Rome’s friendships with other states. It is worth examining these two distinct but overlapping processes here as well, despite their being strictly speaking outside the limits of the definition adopted above, since together they form an integral part of the processual examination of the relationship.

It will occasion no surprise that friendships most commonly end because of environmental factors, especially in modern industrial and post-industrial societies where geographical mobility is frequently a fact of life. Thus one popular survey finds that the most common cause of the end of friendship is long-distance relocation by one of the friends.⁸⁹ However, non-environmental factors also play a significant role in friendship breakdown, and these are usually measured in terms of changing interests and levels of empathy, and are expressed in terms of relationship drift. One partner in a friendship, for example, may simply become bored with the relationship as it stands, or perceive himself or his interests becoming so dissimilar to his friend’s that he invests increasingly less time and energy in the friendship, while his partner remains content with the *status quo*.⁹⁰ The most frequently cited cause of friendship breakdown, however, is betrayal of trust.⁹¹ This makes sense, of course, since trust is the only sanctioning

⁸⁸ Bourdieu 1990: 135; cf. L.G. Mitchell 1997a: 8–9: “affection acts itself as a medium of exchange,” so in the ancient Greek case, “there was often no distinction between affective and utilitarian relationships, or at least for the most part this kind of distinction was inconsequential.”

⁸⁹ Parlee 1979: 50; cf. Brenton 1974: 25–27; Duck 1981: 19; Fehr 1996: 187. Contrast Grunebaum 2003: 18, who argues that intense friendships can be maintained across large distances in the modern world.

⁹⁰ Bell 1981: 89–90; Duck 1984: 5; Rodin 1984: 46; Fehr 1996: 193. ⁹¹ Parlee 1979: 50.

bond in the relationship, and, as has been shown, is inherently unstable because it is largely unregulated and unsupported by other, exogenous sanctions.

The end of friendship occurs in two distinct but interrelated and overlapping stages – the breakdown, or decline, stage, and the final dissolution, or breakup.⁹² Breakdowns may unfold gradually, when one of the partners becomes increasingly dissatisfied with the relationship or indifferent to it; as the relationship disintegrates, verbal disagreements over the purpose of the relationship and its protocols often occur.⁹³ Then, as the dissatisfied friend's perception of the friendship changes, and his perceived costs in terms of time, effort, and material investment are no longer balanced by his perceived rewards, he begins the process of active disengagement.⁹⁴

The gradual ramping down of relationship commitment, however, is far less common than the sudden breakdown of friendship, which is usually triggered by an act which appears to one party to violate the internal "rules" of the friendship; if the grievance is not confronted and redressed, dissolution quickly follows. Grievances are most commonly constructed as "betrayals of trust" regardless of the specific nature of the offense which, studies show, most often include jealousy and/or intolerance of third parties, betraying confidences to third parties, increasing competitiveness between partners, reluctance to provide material or emotional assistance, public criticism of partners, "nagging," and failure to disclose and increase intimacy at a level consonant with the perceived closeness of the relationship.⁹⁵

The dissolution phase, though often occurring simultaneously with friendship breakdown, requires separate analysis because its processes can be quite distinct. Once breakdown has occurred, sometimes attempts are made to repair the friendship, usually through a "state of the relationship address" in which all differences are brought into the open, confronted, solved, or mediated by third parties.⁹⁶ But even if the perceived violation is repaired and dissolution avoided, typically the result is unsatisfying to one or both of the friends concerned.⁹⁷ Indeed, some surveys conducted in this area strongly suggest that conscious attempts to save a friendship

⁹² Duck 1981: 1; 1984: 2–3. ⁹³ Duck 1981: 14.

⁹⁴ Duck 1981: 21–22; 1984: 18; Rodin 1984: 46; M.P. Johnson 1984: 54–57.

⁹⁵ Argyle and Henderson 1985: 78, Fehr 1996: 180. ⁹⁶ Fehr 1996: 183–84.

⁹⁷ Davis and Todd 1985: 33 report one survey that shows that 87% of the friendships that were violated were quickly terminated, and of the remaining repaired friendships, only 30% of the respondents were completely satisfied with the solution.

may hasten its demise.⁹⁸ The friends may feel compelled to discuss their relationship openly and candidly in this phase – sometimes before a third party – and to renegotiate a new cost/benefit structure and a new set of “rules” for the relationship. Such confrontations are always awkward: it is never an easy or comfortable task to autopsy a relationship or to explore its (often utilitarian) foundations and structure in such frank terms. A previously close friendship simply may not be able to withstand the strain of this process. Indeed, the normative sanctions governing friendship practices strongly discourage formal articulation of “the rules,”⁹⁹ and totting up the balance of trade in favors, although always carried out at a subconscious level, is generally regarded as being antithetical to the spirit of friendship.¹⁰⁰ Perhaps not surprisingly, then, most friends simply do not bother with attempts at reconciliation and move on to the dissolution phase shortly after a breakdown occurs.

Regardless of how quickly the initial breakup occurred, dissolution in modern western societies tends to be gradual: a “sudden death” ending with no further contact is considerably less common than gradual withdrawal and disengagement.¹⁰¹ The methods of indirect dissolution can include withdrawal, where the disengaging friend avoids contact and intimacy; “pseudo-de-escalation,” which occurs when the disengaging friend informs his partner that he wants to reduce closeness; and, most cruelly (and least commonly), “cost escalation,” when, in order to hasten dissolution, the disengaging friend forces her partner to “pay” more (to perform more favors, to invest more time and effort in fulfilling the needs of the disengaging friend, and so on).¹⁰² The dissolution phase can be conflicted (that is, hostile) or negotiated (that is, amicable), but the latter usually prevails

⁹⁸ Bell 1981: 24, but cf. Fehr 1996: 165 for a different result. The discrepancy may be accounted for by changes in relationship management between the early 1980s and the mid-1990s, or, as is more likely, by methodological problems inherent in sociological surveying techniques: Dickens and Perlman 1981: 92.

⁹⁹ Bell 1981: 12; Werking 1997: 18.

¹⁰⁰ On the taboo against keeping accounts of favors, see La Gaipa 1981: 80; Duck 1983: 84; J.P. Wiseman 1986: 204–05; Allan 1989: 22; Reohr 1991: 90; Rawlins 1992: 19; and in the ancient context, Cic. *De Am.* 27, 58; Sen. *Ben.* 1.1.9, 2.3. Accounts, however, are always kept, if only subconsciously: Leyton 1974: 100; La Gaipa 1981: 80; Perlman and Fehr 1986: 34 (with some misgivings at 31); Allan 1989: 20; Reohr 1991: 89 (but contradicted at 53: exchanges “are usually not weighted and calculated”); Rawlins 1992: 19; cf. Cic. *Off.* 1.59 (where being “good calculators of duties,” *boni ratiocinatores officiorum*, is desirable). The phenomenon is best encapsulated by Bourdieu 1990: 112: “the giver’s undeclared calculation has to reckon with the receiver’s undeclared calculation, and hence satisfy his expectations without appearing to know what they are.”

¹⁰¹ Bell 1981: 25; cf. 89, on the two modes; rarity of “sudden death” ending: Baxter 1985: 256; Fehr 1996: 197.

¹⁰² Baxter 1985: 247; cf. Duck 1984: 20; Perlman and Fehr 1986: 23; Fehr 1996: 198–99.

in modern western society. So, for example, friends who are breaking up usually feel reluctant to engage in mutual public recrimination or to betray strict confidences revealed when the relationship was healthy.¹⁰³ This is perhaps because of practical societal norms (*habitus*) that discourage such behavior: disengaging friends know that a “bad breakup,” if publicized, makes them appear less attractive to others as potential friends.¹⁰⁴ Research shows, accordingly, that disengaging friends commonly maintain the façade of friendship while looking for a graceful way to exit the relationship.¹⁰⁵ Even during what Steve Duck has called the “grave-dressing” phase of the relationship,¹⁰⁶ when contact ceases, the friendship is officially over, and the friends publicly discuss with others how the relationship ended, certain rules of etiquette mandate putting the best face on the breakup and result in both ex-friends disseminating a simplified and generally milder version of the event. Disengaging friends may even collaborate on the “story of the breakup.”¹⁰⁷

Friendship breakdown in the Roman context seems to follow similar patterns, but with one striking difference: whereas modern friendships usually follow a pattern of abrupt breakdown followed by gradual dissolution, the ancient evidence suggests that among the Romans breakdown and dissolution were equally abrupt and almost simultaneous. The difference may be explained by the fact that the best-known broken friendships among the Romans had important political as well as emotional consequences. So the paradigm case in the *De Amicitia*, and the incident that prompted Q. Mucius Scaevola to recall for Cicero and his friends Laelius’ discussion of friendship, is the sudden and dramatic split between close *amici* Q. Pompeius Rufus, consul in 88 BC, and a tribune of that year, P. Sulpicius, over the reassignment of the command against Mithridates from Sulla to Marius. The breakup of Sulpicius and Pompeius, while no doubt traumatic on a personal level, was also bound up with the intense loyalties and factional struggles of the period, and in Cicero’s mind at least, played a major role in precipitating the civil war that broke out shortly thereafter. After the split, Pompeius’ son was killed in violent street-fighting while Sulpicius himself was put to death soon after Sulla marched on Rome to take back his command by force.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰³ Baxter 1985: 249, 255; Duck 1984: 2; cf. 7–8. ¹⁰⁴ La Gaipa 1984: 193.

¹⁰⁵ Bell 1981: 26; Fehr 1996: 164–65. ¹⁰⁶ Duck 1984: 14.

¹⁰⁷ Duck 1984: 24–27; La Gaipa 1984: 194.

¹⁰⁸ On the dispute between Pompeius and Sulpicius, see Livy *Per.* 77; Plut. *Sull.* 8; *Mar.* 34; App. *B Civ.* 1.55; on its historical significance for Cicero, see *De or.* 3.11; cf. *Cat.* 3.24; *Har. resp.* 41, 43; *Var.* 23; *Phil.* 8.7. Discussion: Burton 2007: 14.

Although it took place in extreme circumstances, in terms of its process this breakup seems to have been fairly typical. In the *De Amicitia* Laelius laments the speed with which most friendships end in his experience: “when some offense arises,” he says, “we suddenly break our friendships in mid-course” (*repente in media cursu amicitias exorta aliqua offensione dirumpimus*: *De Am.* 85). On the other hand, Laelius seems relatively uninterested in the social and psychological reasons for why this was so. Although Roman *amicitia* shares with modern friendship intense emotional attachment and structural reliance solely on trust (*fides*), both of which may suffice to explain friendship’s volatility, what distinguishes Roman from contemporary society in particular, and thus the character of Roman *amicitia*, is the self-help nature of Roman society and, especially amongst the political elite, the resemblance of social relations to “a zero-sum competition for honor,” as Susan Mattern-Parkes puts it.¹⁰⁹ Roman society was an honor and shame culture *par excellence* where the slightest affront to a man’s *dignitas*, often delivered in public, was deemed worthy of swift and, at minimum, proportional retribution. In some cases, then, *amicitiae* could become *inimicitiae* quite suddenly and often in politically fraught circumstances. So Laelius recognizes situations where “an intolerable injury flares up, so that it is neither right nor honorable nor even possible that estrangement or separation not be effected immediately” (*quaedam admodum intolerabilis iniuria exarserit, ut neque rectum neque honestum sit nec fieri possit ut non statim alienatio disiunctioque facienda sit*: *De Am.* 76).¹¹⁰

Seneca’s treatise *De Ira* offers further insight. As Mattern-Parkes has argued, although Seneca in this text disapproves of and argues against the utility of anger, revenge, and feud, “the fact that he needs to do so is evidence that the type of anger he describes is prominent in his society” – particularly amongst social peers (friends and enemies) within the ruling elite.¹¹¹ Seneca suggests in the *De Ira* and elsewhere that the *iniuriae* that *inimici* inflict on each other are the inverse of the *beneficia* that *amici* perform for each other.¹¹² As with *beneficia*, the public nature of inflicting

¹⁰⁹ Mattern-Parkes 2001: 177. On Roman conceptions of honor, see Lendon 2001; Barton 2001: esp. ch. 4 (88–130), for a discussion of humiliation and shame, and the destabilizing political competitiveness among the Roman aristocracy during the Late Republic and Early Empire.

¹¹⁰ On the pervasiveness of this sort of behaviour, see Epstein 1987: 1; Lendon 2001: 50–51; Brunt 1965: 12–13 registers doubt.

¹¹¹ Mattern-Parkes 2001: 176.

¹¹² *De Ira* 2.32.1: *non enim ut in beneficiis honestum est merita meritis repensare, ita iniurias iniuriis* (“it is not honorable to repay injuries with injuries, as it is in the case of benefits, to repay favors with favors”) (other passages at Mattern-Parkes 2001: 183, whence this translation). Even clearer is Sen. *Ben.* 3.22.3 (reiterated at *Ben.* 4.15.1, 5.7.6): *inter se contraria sunt beneficium et iniuria* (“opposites of each other are benefit and injury”).

iniuriae “in a culture where the public communication of deference or contempt [was] very important”¹¹³ only intensified the need for a swift and proportional response: “do you condemn a friend on the spot,” Seneca asks rhetorically (anticipating, with obvious disapproval, a response in the affirmative), “do you grow angry before you hear his response, before you question him, before he is allowed to know his accuser or the charge?” (*De Ira* 2.29.3). A hostile public act, committed in a moment of anger, often gave rise to the escalation of the feud, thus setting in motion the inverse dynamic of Cicero’s friendly *honesta certatio*, or Seneca’s “most honorable rivalry of mutually conquering benefits” (*honestissimam contentionem beneficiis beneficia uincendi*: *Ben.* 1.4.4).¹¹⁴ Amongst the ruling elite of Rome revenge was seen as a good thing, and aristocrats regarded public displays of righteous anger towards a traitor as expressions of the *magnitudo animi* of a big man.¹¹⁵ The most notorious instance of such behavior, in the Roman context, was the later Roman emperors’ practice of “renouncing friendship” (*amicitiam renuntiare*), the retaliatory “shutting someone out of one’s house” (*interdicere domo*), which, Robert Rogers has suggested, had its origins in the aristocratic feuds of the Late Republic.¹¹⁶ This is precisely the dynamic encountered in the story discussed earlier of the breakup of the consul and tribune of 88 BC.

The causes of friendship breakdown in the Roman context, like the non-environmental factors in modern western society mentioned before, are usually expressed in the texts in terms of changing interests and declining levels of empathy, but with a stronger emphasis on the moral aspects of the problem, as indeed would be expected of elite-authored ethical-philosophical treatises. At various points in the *De Amicitia* Cicero mentions as causes of friendship breakdown changes or differences in character and interests (*disparis . . . mores disparia studia*: *De Am.* 74; *aut morum aut studiorum commutatio*: *De Am.* 77); military command,

¹¹³ Mattern-Parkes 2001: 180.

¹¹⁴ Feud escalation: Mattern-Parkes 2001: 182 (using Pierre Bourdieu’s model of competitive gift exchange, on which, see below, pp. 64–67); cf. Barton 2001: 85–86. Cicero’s *honesta certatio*: above, p. 37, and below, p. 67.

¹¹⁵ Mattern-Parkes 2001: 180 (citing Seneca’s interlocutor’s comment at *De Ira* 2.32.1: *at enim ira habet aliquem uoluptatem et dulce est dolorem reddere* [“anger contains a certain pleasure and it is sweet to avenge insult”]), 185 (citing Seneca’s response at *De Ira* 2.32.3: *magni animi est iniurias despicere* [“it is the part of a great spirit to ignore injury”]); cf. Epstein 1987: 2–3 (discussing the relationship between prestige and emotionalism), 37 (on escalation), 19–26 (on the connection between the pursuit of *gloria* and the pursuit of *inimicitiae* at Rome). Lebow 2008: 130 also remarks on the ancient desirability of revenge, citing Aristotle’s quotation of Hom. *Il.* 18.109 that revenge is sweeter than the honeycomb dripping with sweetness (Arist. *Rh.* 1370b11–12).

¹¹⁶ Rogers 1959: 227, followed by Epstein 1987: 4; Yardley 1981: 65–67.

power, and success (*imperio potestate prosperis rebus: De Am. 54*); adversity and old age (*aduersis rebus . . . aetate ingrauescente: De Am. 33*); competition for a woman's hand in marriage or some advantage in which only one party at a time may be successful (*contentione uel uxoriae conditionis vel commodi alicuius, quod idem adipisci uterque non posset: De Am. 34*); amongst the rich, competition for office and glory, and amongst more common folk, lust for money (*in plerisque pecuniae cupiditatem in optimis quibusque honoris certamen et gloriae: De Am. 34*); and requests for wrongdoing, which issue in mutual recrimination over the rules of friendship and destruction of intimacy (*quod rectum non esset postularetur . . . ius . . . amicitiae . . . arguerentur . . . familiaritates extinguere solere: De Am. 35 and 35–44 passim*). All these may be subsumed under the heading "betrayals of trust": the inverse of Cicero's formulation that "the foundation of that stability and constancy which we seek in friendship is trust" (*firmamentum autem stabilitatis constantiaeque est, eius quam in amicitia quaerimus, fides: De Am. 65*) is, precisely, "nothing is constant that is disloyal" (*nihil est enim stabile quod infidum est*), and "in friendship [there is] nothing false or simulated" (*in amicitia . . . ne quid fictum sit neue simulatum: De Am. 65*).

The *De Amicitia*'s particular emphasis on the moral aspects of friendship breakdown is attributable not only to the generic tradition to which it belongs, but also to the highly politicized outlook of its author(s). In this regard, it might be worth digressing momentarily to discuss the special emphasis Cicero places on the "dishonorable request" (*quod rectum non esset postularetur*) in cases where the interests of friends and the interests of state are in direct conflict. Laelius' declaration, "there is no excuse for transgression [even] if you have transgressed for the sake of a friend" (*nulla est igitur excusatio peccati si amici causa peccaueris*), and his "law of friendship" (*lex amicitiae: De Am. 40, 44*), "we should not ask for dishonorable things nor do them when asked" (*neque rogemus res turpis nec faciamus rogati: De Am. 40*), arise directly from his discussion of the famous comment of Blossius of Cumae, philosopher and *amicus* of the revolutionary tribune Tiberius Gracchus, that he would have followed Tiberius in all things, up to and including the burning of the Capitol, had Tiberius requested it (*De Am. 37*). True to their political orientation, Laelius/Cicero abhor such distortions of *fides*, characterizing Blossius' comment as typical of the *temeritas* and *furor* of Gracchus.¹¹⁷ Refusing dishonorable requests by

¹¹⁷ On Blossius' role in the *De Amicitia* and the structural importance of Cicero's "law of friendship" for the dialogue as a whole, see Prost 2008; Blossius is also discussed by de Franchis 2008: 47–49, 56–60.

friends was to have a long history in the Roman conservative political tradition. Valerius Maximus recounts a famous *mot* of the Roman orator and politician Publius Rutilius Rufus (cos. 105 BC):

cum amici cuiusdam iniustae rogationi resisteret, atque is per summam indignationem dixisset “quid ergo mihi [inquit] opus est amicitia tua, si quod rogo non facis?” respondit “immo quid mihi tua, si propter te aliquid inhoneste facturus sum?”

When a certain friend of Rutilius asked him for an unjust favor, Rutilius refused to do it, and his friend with great indignation said “what good is your friendship to me, if you don’t do what I ask?” Rutilius responded “on the contrary, what good is your friendship to me if I should do something dishonorable for you?” (Val. Max. 6.4.4)

The condemnation of friends who would seek dishonorable political favors seems typical of the optimate moral tradition as represented by Laelius and Cicero in the *De Amicitia*.

What is truly remarkable about Cicero’s discussion of the dishonorable request, however, is the exception that is made for the sake of political expediency, particularly when, the reader of the treatise is led to assume, the claims of friendship stand in the way of a desirable political outcome:

si qua fortuna acciderit ut minus iustae amicorum uoluntates adiuuandae sint in quibus eorum aut caput agatur aut fama, declinandum de uia sit, modo ne summa turpitudine sequatur.

If by chance it turns out that one must assist in the less than just desires of our friends when either their life or reputation is at stake, we must depart from the correct path provided no extreme disgrace follow. (*De Am.* 61)

Laelius is willing to make allowances for disgraceful requests providing that reputation does not suffer and the (political) cause is sufficiently just. He may have in mind the brutal suppression of Tiberius Gracchus and his supporters by members of Gracchus’ own family and friends, including his cousin, Scipio Nasica, and Scipio Aemilianus, his cousin by adoption and brother-in-law. The comment no doubt also had particular resonance for Cicero in the aftermath of the assassination of Julius Caesar by a band of conspirators headed by his closest *amici*, which some scholars suggest is the event that prompted the composition of the *De Amicitia* in the first place.¹¹⁸ Whatever the specific association, however, what deserves

¹¹⁸ Sources and discussion: Burton 2007: 15 n. 10 (to which add Lintott 2008: 362; Prost 2008: 16–18, 26). Griffin 1997: 87–91, 97–100 and Konstan 1997: 131–35 argue more generally that the increasing difficulty of balancing conflicting interests in the Late Republic prompted the *De Amicitia*’s

emphasis here is that this is the only place in the extant text of the *De Amicitia* where an outright contradiction appears. The contradiction was recognized in antiquity: Aulus Gellius thought it arose from a misreading or an imperfect distillation of Theophrastus' treatise on friendship (Gell. *NA* 1.3.10–21). Although it is true, as Gilbert Meilaender notes of this apparent contradiction, that “it is the mark of a serious intellect to countenance some inconsistency,”¹¹⁹ here it is perhaps more accurate to say that the political orientation of Cicero or Laelius got the better of him.¹²⁰

Thus the discussion of the breakdown of friendship in the Roman context is dominated by the concerns of elite, politically engaged authors such as Laelius, Cicero, Valerius Maximus, and Seneca the younger. These concerns limit the extent to which the breakdown of Roman *amicitia* is directly comparable to the experience of the majority of people today. If the suddenness with which friendship breakdown occurred in Roman society resembles contemporary experience somewhat, the aftermath of a breach, characterized by passion, vengeance, and occasional violence, is decidedly different.

In terms of the process of friendship dissolution, Laelius follows the advice of Cato the Elder: “one should pick apart the seam rather than tear it asunder” (*dissuendae magis quam discindendae*; compare *Off.* 1.120: *amicitias . . . magis decere . . . diluere quam repente praecidere* [“friendships should be dissolved rather than hastily broken off”]); put another way, “friendships should seem to have burned out of their own accord rather than stamped out” (*extinctae potius amicitiae quam oppressae esse uideantur*; *De Am.* 76). The frequency with which such advice is encountered in the ancient sources is probably a good indication of its general absence in practice – much like Seneca's strictures against being quick to anger and revenge, as was seen earlier. Not even Cicero himself, the transmitter of Cato's advice, can deny the usefulness of the “sudden death” paradigm of friendship dissolution: when some intolerable injury arises, he says, the only right, honorable, and possible course is to make a sudden and

composition. On the conflict between obligations to one's *philoï* and those to the state in the Greek context, see L.G. Mitchell 1997a: 178–91; 1997b: 37. On the “dark side” of friendship from a modern philosophical perspective, see Grunebaum 2003: 11, 34, 75–76. On the acceptability of the occasional expedient but dishonorable request in contemporary Indian culture, see Grunebaum 2003: 27, 98.

¹¹⁹ Meilaender 1981: 82.

¹²⁰ Cf. Lintott 2008: 366: “As a whole the *De Amicitia* is an exposition of Cicero's republican values . . . Free and honest friendship is to be combined with, and if necessary subordinated to, optimate political opinions.”

immediate break (*quaedam admodum intolerabilis iniuria exarserit, ut neque rectum neque honestum sit nec fieri possit ut non statim alienatio disiunctioque facienda sit: De Am. 76*).

This exception notwithstanding, given the idealizing tendencies of the treatise, it is perhaps not surprising that the *De Amicitia* is full of advice on how to try to salvage friendships, or at least to “de-escalate” them in a seemly fashion. The paradigm case, also no surprise, is Scipio Aemilianus, who once asked his protégé Q. Pompeius not to run for the consulship of 141 BC but to throw his support behind Laelius instead; Pompeius did this for a while, but at the last minute announced his own candidacy, thus ruining Laelius’ chances. Laelius lost the election, and Scipio broke off his friendship with Pompeius, but, says Laelius, in a way that was tactful and moderate and without bitterness (*grauiter ac moderate et offensione animi non acerba: De Am. 77*).¹²¹

The contrast with the breakup of Sulpicius Rufus and Pompeius Rufus in 88 BC, discussed earlier, could not be clearer. Ideally one should try to reconcile when friendship breaks down or takes a turn for the worse: a bad friendship must be endured rather than serve as an excuse for enmity (*ferendum id. . . potius quam inimicitarum tempus cogitandum: De Am. 60*), and friendships we have outgrown, like those formed in childhood, should not be cast aside but rather redefined as we get older (*neglegendi quidem non sunt, sed alio quodam modo aestimandi: De Am. 74*). Even when former friends have become our enemies, we must tolerate their arguments, slanders, and insults for the sake of the old friendship (*iurgia maledicta contumeliae. . . si tolerabiles erunt, ferendae sunt, et hic honos ueteri amicitiae tribuendus: De Am. 78*). Appearances must be maintained even in the “grave-dressing” phase of the relationship: we must take care that the friendship not appear to have ended, much less that enmity has arisen (*cauendum erit ne non solum amicitiae depositae, sed etiam inimicitiae susceptae: De Am. 77*), and that it be regarded as having burned out of its own accord instead of being stamped out (*extinctae potius amicitiae quam oppressae esse uideantur: De Am. 78*). The impression created here is that the author of the *De Amicitia* (along with Seneca in the *De Ira*) harbored deep anxieties about the destructiveness of *inimicitiae* in public life – to the extent that the Roman state itself was frequently endangered – and so sought to mitigate its power through such advice. But the fact that this

¹²¹ Cf. also Plut. *Apophtheg. Scip. Min.* 8; Cic. *Tusc.* 5.54. Discussion: Astin 1967a: 85, 121–22, 311–12; Brunt 1965: 11–12.

advice receives emphasis is probably an indication of the failure of members of the political elite to follow it in practice.

For the Romans, friendships ended for a variety of reasons, the most important of which was change of interests or perceived change of *mores*. Ruptures were often sudden and, in relationships amongst the ruling class at least, dramatic in their process and consequences. The process of friendship dissolution was ideally slow and gradual, but more typically abrupt and concurrent with the beginning of bitter enmity.

CONCLUSION: FRIENDSHIP, THE GIFT, AND INEQUALITY

As noted in the previous chapter, the epistemological trap that Ernst Badian fell into when formulating his *Foreign Clientelae* thesis was his assumption that *clientela* “comprise[s] relationships admittedly between superior and inferior [while *amicitia* was] typical of relationships between equals.”¹²² This final section in this chapter attempts to show that this is in fact an unsustainable distinction, given the nature of friendship as a gift-exchange-based relationship.

Despite the widespread theoretical assertion that equality is an essential marker of friendship,¹²³ some popular surveys indicate that at best only a tiny minority subscribes to this view in practice.¹²⁴ Dan McAdams, a motivational psychologist, has divided friendships into “communal” and “agentic” styles, suggesting that communal friendships are characterized by, amongst other things, a willingness and tendency to surrender control by the partners, while the friends in an agentic partnership typically use the friendship as an opportunity for self-promotion and display, primarily through other-directed benefactions. Agentic friends confer benefits on their friends competitively, which, depending on the friendship style of those partners, can embed and perpetuate inequality over the lifetime of the relationship.¹²⁵ Such partnerships can be just as fulfilling as communal friendships and are always characterized as friendships rather than a relationship of dependency, such as patronage. And although some pairs

¹²² Badian 1958a: 11. Coskun 2008a: 16–17 is a restatement of Badian’s view.

¹²³ Brain 1976: 20; La Gaipa 1981: 82; Reisman 1981: 207; Bell 1981: 10; Duck 1983: 108–09; Allan 1989: 20; Reohr 1991: 25, 41; Rawlins 1992: 11; Thomas 1993: 54; Fehr 1996: 16, 28; Werking 1997: 7, 17.

¹²⁴ Reisman 1981: 98–100, 102–04 (0%); Davis and Todd 1985: 21 (16%).

¹²⁵ McAdams 1985: 92–94, followed by Rawlins 1992: 140–41, 167. A similar model is proposed by J. Mills and M.S. Clark, who divide relationships into “communal” and “exchange” types: Perlman and Fehr 1986: 33–34. L.G. Mitchell 1997a calls agentic gift-giving practices among the ancient Greeks “incremental giving.”

of friends may choose equalization strategies in order to attenuate asymmetries (by implicitly “keeping accounts” or creating an “artificial world” of psychological equity),¹²⁶ others are content to construct the relationship internally and practice it publicly as friendship without any sustained attempts to achieve equilibrium. Such relationships are usually neither incidentally nor temporarily unequal but fundamentally so, as when, for example, one partner can trust the other more because of a preexisting psychological disposition to do so.¹²⁷ Even more crucial inequalities, involving exchange of power, social status, native ability, and so on, can exist indefinitely without the friendship ever really slipping into dependence, or being acknowledged as doing so.¹²⁸

Even more significant than instances of agentic friendship, however, is the structural asymmetry that must obtain in all friendships by virtue of their basis in gift exchange. This is where a processual approach can add nuance and precision to an assessment of a dynamic relationship such as friendship. Gift-exchange-based relationships cannot exist without reciprocal exchange, not so much because gifts fulfill needs and desires (what might usefully be called their “objective purpose”), but because they symbolize and advertise the friendship itself both to the partners and to the outside world (their “subjective purpose”). This is why gifts are often intangible rather than material.¹²⁹ In order to perpetuate friendship, moreover, such exchanges cannot simply be “one-offs,” but must recur constantly, forming a chain of self-perpetuating reciprocal acts. So, according to Pierre Bourdieu:

if it is not to constitute an insult, the counter-gift must be deferred and different, because the immediate return of an exactly identical object clearly amounts to a refusal (i.e., the return of the same object). Thus gift-exchange is opposed to swapping, which . . . telescopes gift and counter-gift into the same instant. It is

¹²⁶ Keeping accounts: above and n. 100; “artificial world” of psychological equity: Reohr 1991: 47, 54; cf. Walster et al. 1978: 18–19; Fehr 1996: 28–29. On moral equality in patronage and friendship, see Eisenstadt and Roniger 1984: 2.

¹²⁷ Davis and Todd 1985: 20.

¹²⁸ Wolf 1966: 13; Brain 1976: 109, 114–18 (with a case study of the frankly unequal friendships of the pre-colonial Bangwa of Rwanda); Peters 1977: 275; Reisman 1979: 7, 91; 1981: 207; Reohr 1991: 90; Rawlins 1992: 143–44 (with a case study of two friends who sustain and candidly acknowledge “an asymmetrical pattern of interdependence”); Grunebaum 2003: 26, 28, 86, 140–41, 159 (on the most common form of Indian friendships, which typically consist of junior and senior partners).

¹²⁹ Examples at Mauss 1969 (orig. 1924): 3, 8–11; discussion: Brain 1976: 147; Landé 1977: xv, xxvi; Allan 1989: 54; Reohr 1991: 91. The terms “subjective” and “objective” are borrowed from Gregory 1982: esp. 8, where gifts are described as “subjective and personal” insofar as their worth is determined by the gifting partners, while commodities are “objective” since their value is established by impersonal markets.

also opposed to lending, in which the return of the loan, explicitly guaranteed by a legal act, is in a sense already performed at the very moment when a contract is drawn up ensuring the predictability and calculability of the acts it prescribes.¹³⁰

“Partner-opponents” thus practice strategies of misrecognition and misidentification (*méconnaissance*) – a “collectively maintained and approved self-deception,” “a collectively produced make-believe” – in order to keep reciprocity going.¹³¹ Reciprocal gift exchanges (as opposed to swapping and lending), by definition, can never be simultaneous and equal or complete and fully achieved.¹³² If at any point friendly exchanges, measured primarily in terms of symbolic capital, ever reached true equilibrium, the relationship would simply cease to exist since the self-validation provided by similarity-seeking and the self-sufficiency provided by complementarity-seeking would be fully met, the participants in the relationship would have no further need to associate, and the cycle of reciprocity would end. Thus an interval needs to be interposed – “neither too short . . . nor too long” – during which the receiver is “expected to show his gratitude towards his benefactor . . . lest he be accused of ingratitude.” The management of that interval is thus a strategy to achieve “situational advantage”: “to put off . . . the return of a gift can be a way of keeping one’s partner-opponent in the dark about one’s intentions,” but it can also serve to “exact the deferential conduct that is required” if relations are to continue.¹³³

What this means is that some disequilibrium of exchange (caused by deferral and difference) must always be present along the friendship continuum; therefore, even if they are not of the avowedly agentic type, in structural terms, friendships must always tolerate some measure of inequality. Here is Bourdieu again:

¹³⁰ Bourdieu 1977: 5–6 (cf. 171) = 1990: 105. Bourdieu was building on Mauss 1969: 34: “time has to pass before a counter-[gift] can be made.” Mauss’s insight has recently been applied in Roman studies by Verboven 2002: 176–77; in Greek studies in the classic Finley 1954: 57–63, 151, and by von Reden 1995: 79 and L.G. Mitchell 1997a: 5 n. 23. For an interesting early-modern application, see Zemon Davis 2000: esp. 64–66 (a discussion of sixteenth-century “courtesy books,” which reminded readers to reciprocate neither too soon nor too late; only in sales and payments, Zemon Davis observes, was an end to the exchange possible).

¹³¹ Bourdieu 1990: 105–06, 114; cf. 112: “a sincere fiction of a disinterested exchange”, 118: “in an economy which is defined by the refusal to recognize the ‘objective’ truth of ‘economic’ practices . . . symbolic capital is this denied capital”, 122: “symbolic capital [is] ‘material’ capital misrecognized and thus recognized”, 140–41: “misrecognition [is] an alienated cognition . . . [a] mis-cognition.” For the role of misrecognition in international relations, see Lebow 2008: 69.

¹³² Cf. Reohr 1991: 63; Bourdieu 1990: 141: “each state of the social world is . . . no more than a temporary equilibrium, a moment in the dynamics through which the adjustment between distributions and incorporated or institutionalised classifications is constantly broken and restored.”

¹³³ Bourdieu 1990: 106; cf. Grunebaum 2003: 13 (on Kantian friendship, in which “the recipient of a kindness creates an inequality that can never be removed”).

As one moves away from perfect reciprocity, which assumes a relative equality of the economic situation, the proportion of counter-services that are provided in the typically symbolic form of gratitude, homage, respect, obligations or moral debts necessarily increases . . . [T]he conversion of economic capital into symbolic capital . . . produces relations of dependence that have an economic basis but are disguised under a veil of moral relations.¹³⁴

As Kant also recognized, although friends can strive towards equality as an ideal goal, truly equal friendship “is unattainable in practice.”¹³⁵ Thus, despite Richard Saller’s assertion to the contrary (see above), asymmetry cannot serve to differentiate, for the outside observer, friendship from dependent relationships such as patronage; rather, the difference can only be intuited from the processual dynamics of the relationships themselves, and, as I have argued elsewhere, must depend on such factors as level of affect and candor, the amount of exchange of symbolic (as opposed to material) capital, and to what extent both partners are able to define the nature and boundaries of the relationship.¹³⁶

Because it is an asymmetrical gift-exchange-based relationship, moreover, friendship is of necessity a power relationship, as indeed Bourdieu’s use of the discourse of competition, debt, and difference suggests, and the structure of the friendship process, via the *habitus*, is at heart coercive in that it forces partner-opponents to play socially scripted roles. Just as the *habitus* of *méconnaissance* compels the partners to engage in an ongoing self-conscious misvaluation of their exchanges, the rules of deferral and difference governing these exchanges mandate competitive giving. “In theory [gifts are] voluntary, disinterested and spontaneous,” according to Marcel Mauss, “but are in fact obligatory and interested.”¹³⁷ In Bourdieu’s estimation, “symbolic capital is the product of a struggle in which each agent is both a ruthless competitor and supreme judge.”¹³⁸ Generosity is a manifestation of both the giver’s power and the receiver’s subordination, a strategy, for the giver, to achieve domination: “a man possesses in order to give,” Bourdieu argues, “[b]ut he also possesses by giving.” Although the social conventions governing friendship, today as in antiquity, abjure such calculus, gift-giving is a zero-sum competition for status: a gift bestowed on someone raises the giver’s status, and hence power in the relationship, in an amount proportional to the amount the receiver’s status and power

¹³⁴ Bourdieu 1990: 122–23. ¹³⁵ Grunebaum 2003: 13, 75, 99.

¹³⁶ Burton 2003: 343–48; above, p. 34 and n. 28.

¹³⁷ Mauss 1969: 1 (cf. 5: “[gifts] take place under a voluntary guise [but] are in essence strictly obligatory”).

¹³⁸ Bourdieu 1990: 136; cf. 140: “symbolic struggles . . . a permanent struggle . . .”

fall by accepting it. The gift resembles a friendly gauntlet thrown down, “a provocation to reply,” and a test of honor; it is an act of “symbolic violence, gentle, invisible violence, unrecognised as such, chosen as much as undergone, that of trust, obligation, personal loyalty, hospitality, gifts, debts, piety, in a word, of all the virtues honoured by the ethic of honour.”¹³⁹

So too for Cicero, as has been seen, friendship is an *honesta certatio* (*De Am.* 32) – “an honorable struggle” or “a competition in kindness” – where “equal exchanges of duties and favors” appear “cheap and paltry” (*altera sententia . . . definit amicitiam paribus officiis ac uoluntatibus. Hoc quidem nimis exigue et exiliter . . .*); “true friendship,” by contrast, “is richer and more abundant and unconcerned with keeping strict watch lest it repay more than it has received” (*diuitior mihi et affluentior uidetur esse uera amicitia, nec obseruare restructe ne plus reddat quam acceperit. De Am.* 58).¹⁴⁰

Recognizing the power dynamics inherent in friendship, Cicero devotes several chapters of the *De Amicitia* to a discussion of unequal friendship (69–72).¹⁴¹ Using the example of Scipio Aemilianus, Laelius suggests that such men of obvious superior excellence should not vaunt themselves above their friends of inferior rank (*inferioris ordinis amicis*), but rather should practice equalizing strategies so that their superiority (measured in terms of virtue, talent, or wealth: *uirtutis ingeni fortunae*) is shared with friends of inferior social or financial station:

¹³⁹ Bourdieu 1977: 191; 1990: 126–27 (whence the earlier quotation); cf. 297 n. 2: “a gift always contains a more or less disguised challenge”, 298 n. 10 for the Kabyle saying, “a gift is a misfortune.” See also Zemon Davis 2000: 10: “gift systems always have the potentiality for trouble brewing within them. They are not simply benign; reciprocity is not assured. Gift practices can explode into unbridled and violent rivalry . . . or collapse under excessive domination by the donor”, 67–84, a chapter entitled “Gifts Gone Wrong.”

¹⁴⁰ Cf. *De Am.* 31: *ut enim benefeci liberalesque sumus, non ut exigamus gratiam (neque enim beneficium faeneramur, sed natura propensi ad liberalitatem sumus . . .)* (“as we are beneficent and generous, not in order to exact repayment [for we do not lend favors out at interest, but by nature we have a tendency towards kindness] . . .”).

¹⁴¹ Cicero was probably familiar with Aristotle’s earlier discussions on the subject: Arist. *Eth. Eud.* 1238b18–1239b6, 1242b2–22; *Eth. Nic.* 1158b11–1159a, 1162a34, 1163a24–1163b (discussion: Griffin 1997: 86, 95). The most famous Latin source is Sen. *Ben.* 6.34.2, who states that Livius Drusus (tr. pl. 91 BC) and Gaius Gracchus divided their friends into two ranks – *amici primi* and *amici secundi* – according to whether they were granted private audiences or were admitted in groups or along with everyone else (*alios in secretum recipere, alios cum pluribus, alios uniuersos*). Saller 1982: 11; 1989: 57–58 suggests that these latter three categories correspond to *amicitiae*, *amicitiae inferiores/minores*, and *clientela* respectively, but these are not the terms Seneca uses. Besides, Seneca’s observation is retrospective and may say more about later practices under the Empire rather than Republican ones. Further discussion at Hellegouarc’h 1963: 54; Rouland 1979: 267; Brunt 1988a: 420; Konstan 1997: 140. For unequal friendships recorded on inscriptions of imperial date found in and around the city of Rome, see Panciera 2001 (although one need not agree with his conclusion that in such relationships the superior partner takes on the role of patron [17]).

Impertiant ea [sc. uirtutem ingenium fortunam] suis communicentque cum proximis; ut si parentibus nati sint humilibus, si propinquos habeant imbecilliore uel animo uel fortuna, eorum augeant opes eisque honori sint et dignitati.

Let them share [their virtue, talent, or wealth] with their friends and hold them in common with those closest to them so that if they are of humble parentage or have family that is weaker in terms of ability or wealth, let them increase their wealth or be a source of honor and status for them. (*De Am.* 70)

But while superiors have the power and ability to equalize their friendships – to condescend to their inferiors, in essence (*superiores exaequare se cum inferioribus debent*; cf. *Sen. Ben.* 2.12.2: *superior . . . descenditque in aequum*, “the superior condescends to a level of equality”) – inferiors should not take it badly that they cannot match their superiors in terms of talent, wealth, or rank (*inferiores non dolere se a suis aut ingenio aut fortuna aut dignitate superari*). Better for them to keep silent and allow their superiors the opportunity to display gratitude rather than constantly remind the latter of services they have performed for them (*[officia] meminisse debet is in quem collata sunt, non commemorare qui contulit*: *De Am.* 71); in so doing they may lift themselves up just as their superiors have condescended to be their friends (*ut ei qui superiores sunt submittere se debent in amicitia, sic quodammodo inferiores extollere*: *De Am.* 72). A good rule of thumb for managing unequal friendships is for the superior to give as much as he can, but also only so much as his partner can sustain (*primum quantum ipse efficere possis, deinde etiam quantum ille, quem diligas atque adiuues, sustinere . . . Quod si etiam possis quiduis deferre ad alterum, uidendum est tamen quid ille possit sustinere*). “However much you excel,” moreover, “you cannot raise all of your friends to the highest honors” (*Non enim tu possis, quamuis excellas, omnes tuos ad honores amplissimos perducere*: *De Am.* 73).¹⁴²

Thus Cicero’s discussion of unequal friendship partakes of some of the same features that asymmetrical friendships generate in the modern world. Particularly noteworthy are the equalizing strategies that some friends practice, as well as the gift-exchange basis of such relationships (in which wealth, talent, or status is frankly shared). Note too that Laelius does not discount the possibility of unequal friendships being fixed and perpetuated – agentic, in modern terms: Scipio Aemilianus, for instance, was the greatest man of his generation, and while he could practice equalization strategies

¹⁴² Cf. *Cic. Off.* 1.42: *ut [benignitas] pro dignitate cuique tribuatur* (“kindness must be proportional to the status of the receiver”); *Sen. Ben.* 2.15.3: *quaedam enim [beneficia] minora sunt, quam ut exire a magnis uiris debeant, quaedam accipiente maiora sunt* (“some benefits are too small than ought to come from great men and some are too large for the other to take”).

with some (his brother Q. Fabius Maximus, L. Furius Philus, P. Rupilius, Sp. Mummius [*De Am.* 69] – and Laelius himself, of course [cf. *De Am.* 51]), to elevate others – P. Rupilius' brother Lucius, for example – he was simply unable to condescend far enough (*De Am.* 73).

In terms of friendship's inherent structural asymmetry, Seneca anticipates Bourdieu's rule concerning deferral of exchanges and his principle of misrecognition: "it is a kind of rejection," says Seneca, "to send back something at once and thus expunge a gift with a gift" (*reiciendi genus est protinus aliud in uicem mittere et munus munere expungere*: *Ben.* 4.40.4), and "when we say 'Let he who gives a benefit forget it,' we mean 'Let him seem to have forgotten it; let his memory of it not be apparent or rush in'" (*cum dicimus: 'Qui beneficium dedit, obliuiscatur,' hoc dicimus: 'similis sit oblito; memoria eius non appareat nec incurrat'*: *Ben.* 7.23.2 [emphasis added]). And although Cicero nowhere puts it in as many words, much of what he says dovetails nicely with modern theoretical research. As noted earlier, Cicero's characterization of *amicitia* as an "honorable struggle" (*honesta certatio*) certainly gets to the heart of the competitive nature of the relationship and its gift-exchange basis. As was noted in the Introduction (p. 14), Cicero and his peers had considerable status-anxiety when it came to accepting gifts: most great men prefer not to be overbenefited by accepting great favors lest their rank – and the labeling of that rank – sinks from "friend" to "client" (*Off.* 2.69). Publilius Syrus states it more starkly: "to accept a kindness is to sell one's freedom" (*beneficium accipere libertatem est uendere*: *Sent.* B5 M). Seneca also acknowledges that some men fear obligation lest they get the reputation of being the client of the one to whom they owe their livelihood and status (*rariores in eorum officiis sunt, quibus uitam aut dignitatem debent, et . . . opinionem clientium timent*: *Ben.* 2.23.3), but, he assures us, it is no disgrace to be vanquished by benefits and become obligated to men whose great fortune and outstanding merit prevent a similar return (*non turpiter uincitur beneficiis, si ab his obligatus est, ad quos aut fortunae magnitudo aut eximia uirtus aditum reddituris ad se beneficiis claudit*: *Ben.* 5.5.1).

Some observations by modern Classical scholars can round out this discussion of asymmetrical friendship. Ian Morris in his important study of gift-giving in Archaic Greece has discovered that a system of "alternating disequilibrium" was the rule "where the aim is never to have debts 'paid off,' but to preserve a situation of personal indebtedness."¹⁴³ In her pioneering study of gift and debt among the Roman elite, Suzanne Dixon has found

¹⁴³ Morris 1986: 2.

that “notional equality in an exchange relationship . . . is seldom the case in a hierarchical society where one of the chief functions of wealth and status is the display of generosity [and] in any case, payment was never quite complete, for the obligation outlasted the specific repayment.”¹⁴⁴ Finally, Peter White concludes from his study of Roman poets and their “patrons” that by virtue of the mechanism of the exchange of favors, Roman “*amici*” rarely could be and rarely considered themselves as peers.”¹⁴⁵

The abundance of documentary evidence, ancient and modern, as well as extensive theoretical work on friendship has thus demonstrated more than the mere existence of unequal friendship – it has proven, rather, its structural necessity. This is a theme to which this study will have occasion to turn repeatedly over the next three chapters where the dynamics of Roman international relations will be reconceptualized (or, more accurately, restated in the language used by the ancient sources themselves) as *amicitia* rather than *clientela*.

For the moment it will be appropriate to end this discussion and the chapter with two practical examples, one taken from the sphere of interpersonal relations, the other from the diplomatic sphere, in order to show how critical a processual analysis is for an appreciation of the category of unequal friendship; to demonstrate the intersection between interpersonal and international *amicitia* in the minds of the Romans and their allies; and finally to stress how deeply involved are gesture, emotion, and especially language in the construction of both international and interpersonal friendships.

We happen to know from his own (now fragmentary) account that during his period of political exile in Rome after 167 BC, the Achaean League statesman and historian Polybius was courted and befriended by the great Scipio Aemilianus.¹⁴⁶ Polybius reveals that their “friendship and intimacy” (φιλία καὶ συνήθεια: 31.23.3) began with Scipio borrowing some books from him and engaging in discussions about them. Polybius’ kindness was

¹⁴⁴ Dixon 1993: 456–57.

¹⁴⁵ P. White 1978: 81; cf. 1993: 276 n. 20: “it can probably be taken for granted that, to the eyes of Romans, the two parties to a friendship would rarely have looked like equals.” White’s insights are incidental to his main concern in these works, which is to challenge the conventional notion that Roman elite friends of the poets were “patrons” of the arts in the modern sense – or indeed *patroni* in the ancient Roman sense (cf. P. White 1978: 92: “the modern term ‘patronage’ biases our interpretation of *amicitia*”; White is followed by Konstan 1997: 143–45). The Greek case was similar: von Reden 1995: 210–11 (relationships between “patrons” and their potters, painters, and poets was “one of *philia*, if only hierarchically defined”). For a sixteenth-century parallel, see Nagel 1997: 647–55, 666–68, esp. 652: “unlike a work made under commission for a client, Michelangelo’s gift for Vittoria [was] actuated by love.”

¹⁴⁶ Polyb. 31.23–25. Discussion: Astin 1967a: 19–20; Gruen 1992: 253–54; Eckstein 1995b: 8, 149–50; Burton 2003: 340–41.

reciprocated by Scipio and his brother Fabius, who asked a Roman praetor to allow Polybius to stay in Rome instead of being sent out to one of the Italian *municipia*, like his fellow Greek exiles. After this favor was granted, Polybius' intimacy with the brothers continued to grow, until one day Scipio asked Polybius why he paid so much attention to his brother Fabius and not to himself; was it for that same reason that his fellow countrymen despised him, that he seemed to lack energy and did not plead cases in the law courts? Polybius expressed his surprise at the younger man's words and explained that he naturally favored Fabius because he was the elder of the two siblings. Impressed by Scipio's "high-mindedness" (μέγα φρονῶν: 31.24.4) Polybius promised to help him attain his goal of a good reputation, whereupon Scipio shook the historian's hand vigorously and blessed the day Polybius would decide to live with him (μετ' ἐμοῦ συμβιώσεις: 31.24.9); Polybius, for his part, was delighted at Scipio's response, but was also embarrassed given Scipio's family's high station and wealth (τὴν ὑπεροχὴν τῆς οἰκίας καὶ τὴν εὐκαιρίαν τῶν ἀνδρῶν: 31.24.11). The historian sums up their relationship thus:

ὁ Σκυπίων οὐκέτι τὸ μεράκιον ἐχωρίσθη τοῦ Πολυβίου πάντα δ' ἦν αὐτῷ δεύτερα τῆς ἐκείνου συμπεριφορᾶς. ἀπὸ δὲ τούτων τῶν καιρῶν λοιπὸν ἤδη κατὰ τὸ συνεχὲς ἐπ' αὐτῶν τῶν πραγμάτων πείραν αὐτῶν διδόντες ἀλλήλοις εἰς πατρικὴν καὶ συγγενεϊκὴν ἦλθον αἵρεσιν καὶ φιλοστοργίαν πρὸς ἀλλήλους.

Scipio never left the side of Polybius, and considered all else secondary to his company . . . From that time onwards, they constantly gave one another practical proofs of their attachment, and came to regard each other with a mutual affection like that of father and son or near relations. (31.24.12–25.1)

The anecdote perfectly illustrates the escalating reciprocity of gifts and favors – and the anxieties this process generates – that this chapter has identified as the defining marker of friendship. But note too the complexity of embedded asymmetries that become integral to the relationship without, it is worth emphasizing, reducing it to one of frank dependency or *clientela*. Although Scipio Aemilianus (and his brother Fabius) performed what would seem to be an irredeemable favor for the helpless exile – intervening with the urban praetor to gain special treatment for him – Scipio's emotional bid for greater intimacy with Polybius – and his joy at the historian agreeing to live with him¹⁴⁷ – complicated the situation. The intensity

¹⁴⁷ He means this literally, of course; cf. Cic. *De Am.* 15 (*cum Scipione uixerim . . . quocum . . . domus fuit . . . communis*, "I lived with Scipio and we shared a home"); 103 (*una domus erat [nobis], idem uictus isque communis*, "there was one home for us and we shared the same food"); discussion: de Franchis 2008: 55. See also Cic. *Fam.* 9.24.3, where Cicero argues that banquets are better described by the Latin term *conuiuia* than the Greek συμπόσια and σύνδειπνα since there is a literal "living

and depth of feeling, and sheer gratitude on Scipio's part suggest true friendship rather than patronage – as this relationship has sometimes been misidentified.¹⁴⁸ The misidentification arises from a “monothetic,” static analysis of the evidence. The inadequacy of such an approach is revealed when an attempt is made to identify the superior partner in the relationship Polybius describes. Although Scipio was the noblest Roman of his day and bestowed an enormous *beneficium* on the historian, Polybius' suggestion that their relationship was akin to that of a father and son can only be construed as meaning that Polybius saw himself – the older, wiser statesman whom the 18-year-old Scipio courted and whose sage advice he sought – as the father figure, not the other way around. Despite the suggestion of some modern scholars, this cannot be a case of *clientela*; if it were, the text must be taken to mean that Scipio, in fact, was the client of Polybius. This is patently absurd, of course, and shows the dangers of ignoring the language used by Polybius himself. Scipio Aemilianus' relationship with Polybius was an unequal friendship, and its asymmetry was not static, but fluctuated in accordance with the natural evolution of the relationship. Thus when Scipio intervened with the praetor to change the conditions of Polybius' confinement, Scipio was in the ascendant; but after Scipio begged for deeper intimacy with Polybius and the historian (reluctantly) agreed, the asymmetry was reversed. In the period immediately following this (the subject of Polybius' reflections in Book 31), the senior Greek historian and politician, rather than the Roman teenager in need of a teacher, was the superior partner in the relationship for its most crucial purpose at that particular moment in time.¹⁴⁹

together” among friendly diners (*simul uiuitur*); discussion: Peachin 2001: 135. Cohabitation, or at least spending as much time as possible together, is a basic requirement of all ancient philosophical virtue friendships: Grunebaum 2003: 9–10, 12.

¹⁴⁸ Astin 1967a: 1, who calls Polybius “not only a friend of Scipio, but [also] a client”; of course one cannot be both at once: Cic. *Off.* 2.69 with Burton 2003: 342; cf. Konstan 1995: 341: “the idea of friend was never reduced to that of patron and client”; 1997: 137; Grunebaum 2003: 26 (on the clear distinction between unequal friendships and other social relationships of dependence in Indian culture). One should also be wary of the suggestion that Polybius “exaggerated the depth and intimacy of the *amicitia*” (Gruen 1992: 254); patent exaggeration would have left the historian open to criticism and mockery by his and Scipio's contemporaries (see, *apropos* of another contentious issue about which Polybius asserts his personal opinion, Eckstein 2006: 272: “in a society where ridicule was a powerful weapon against intellectuals, Polybius would not have taken such a chance”; cf. Eckstein 2008: 138; ancient society was “a society much given to ridicule”). Identification of the relationship as *amicitia*: Rouland 1979: 329; Herman 1987: 18; Eckstein 1995b: 8; Pina Polo 2001: 96; Burton 2003: 340–41 (on asymmetrical friendship in particular).

¹⁴⁹ This is remarkably similar to contemporary Indian friendships “between a ‘junior partner’ and a ‘senior partner’ who ‘is a little older, wiser, more mature, better informed about the ways of the world, and more resourceful’” (Grunebaum 2003: 26, quoting Parekh 1994: 108).

Also noteworthy is the touch of anxiety and embarrassment Polybius feels about achieving full intimacy – indeed, cohabitation – with a man of such great family and wealth. The status-anxiety Polybius feels is related to the anxieties all friends feel, as has been seen, when deepening the level of trust (and vulnerability) that accompanies increasing intimacy. But there is something else going on here as well, and it is related to the unique set of anxieties that asymmetry in friendship can provoke. Like the great man who is worried about being overbenefited and thus being reduced from friend to client (Cic. *Off.* 2.69), or the superior friend, worried about giving more to an inferior friend than the latter can sustain (Cic. *De Am.* 73), or the disgruntled inferior, reminding his superior friend of his favors and resenting his status within the relationship (*De Am.* 72) – as in all these cases, Polybius' anxiety and embarrassment stem from the power asymmetries generated by the processual dynamics of the perpetuation of friendship. He is concerned with the dramatic shift in the balance of favors – the balance of power – within the relationship. In a highly status-conscious world where the prevailing social *habitus* dictated that the hostage should occupy a lower position than his captors, and where, as Polybius reveals, the elder of two friends (in this case, Scipio's brother Fabius) should automatically be accorded more respect than the younger (Scipio), Polybius and Scipio change places in dramatic fashion and, in Bourdieu's terms, shatter the illusion of the collectively agreed-upon misrecognition of the relative social value of the symbolic capital at stake at this moment and between these individuals.¹⁵⁰

A final example manifests the same dynamics and anxieties, this time with international-diplomatic consequences. After his capture of New Carthage in spring 209 BC, Scipio (the future Africanus the Elder) ordered the captives of Spanish descent to be brought before him.¹⁵¹ After caressing and reassuring the children, he bid all the hostages to be of good cheer, “for they had entered into the power of the Roman people, which prefers to bind men by kindness rather than by fear, and to hold foreign peoples joined to them by good faith and alliance rather than subject to them by

¹⁵⁰ Bourdieu 1990: 114, who tells the story of an Algerian mason who outraged public opinion in France by refusing the meal traditionally offered to such craftsmen on the completion of his job; the man instead insisted on a cash equivalent, “thus expos[ing] the device most commonly used to keep up appearances through a collectively produced make-believe. . . . betraying that best-kept and worst-kept of secrets (since everyone kept it), and breaking the law of silence that guaranteed the complicity of collective [misrecognition].”

¹⁵¹ What follows is based closely on Livy 26.49–50; Polyb. 10.18–19.7; cf. Dio 16.57.43; Zonar. 9.8. On the New Carthage campaign, see Walbank 1967: 205–20; Lazenby 1978: 134–40; Richardson 1986: 47; Eckstein 1987a: 209–15; Eckstein 1995b: 177–82; Richardson 1996: 32–33.

harsh slavery” (*uenisse enim eos in populi Romani potestatem, qui beneficio quam metu obligare homines malit exterarumque gentis fide ac societate iunctas habere quam tristi subiectas seruitio*; Livy 26.49.8). Scipio then instructed the captives to write to their families, informing them that the Romans would restore them to safety on condition that they become Roman allies. Messengers were sent to summon the families to meet Scipio and collect their loved ones. Scipio’s quaestor, C. Flaminius, was assigned the task of protecting the captives, while the commander distributed gifts to them, giving the girls trinkets and bracelets, and the boys, knives and swords.

A short time later, some of Scipio’s soldiers, knowing their general’s fondness for women, presented to him a beautiful captive girl, but Scipio, though impressed by her beauty, refused the gift, and began making inquiries into her native city and parentage. Learning that she was betrothed to a certain Allucius, one of the leading men of the Celtiberians, Scipio summoned both the girl’s parents and Allucius. He told Allucius that although it was wholly within his power to secure his fiancée’s love for himself, it was Allucius’ love (*amor*) that Scipio really wanted. All that he was asking for in exchange for the girl was that Allucius become a friend to the Roman people (*amicus populo Romano*; Livy 26.50.7). Embarrassed but overcome with joy, Allucius grasped the general’s right hand and called upon the gods to repay Scipio’s kindness since he himself never could. The captive girl’s blood relations were then summoned, and they begged Scipio to accept as a gift the gold they had brought in order to ransom her. Scipio resisted their entreaties, but in the end reluctantly accepted the treasure, and ordered it to be laid at his feet. He then summoned Allucius, and ordered him to pick up the gold and accept it as a wedding present. The young man was so delighted with Scipio’s treatment of him that he returned home and praised the Roman general to his people, emphasizing how he “conquer[ed] everything not only by arms but also by kindness and favors” (*uincens omnia cum armis tum benignitate ac beneficiis*). Within a few days, Allucius was back in Scipio’s camp with 1,400 native horsemen to serve alongside Scipio’s legions.

Once again, the processual dynamics of friendship formation take center stage here, in a diplomatic context, complete with competitive reciprocity, status-asymmetry and anxiety, as well as personal gratitude and affection. The essential dynamism of this interaction is readily apparent simply in the overlapping and complex interweaving of several different relationships at once: thus the soldiers’ initial gift to Scipio results in alliances with the Spanish captive’s family and people, and the family’s gift of gold to Scipio becomes Scipio’s wedding present to Allucius, thus strengthening

the bond established by the general's initial return of Allucius' fiancée. Also remarkable are the strategies that the girl's family and Allucius adopt to reciprocate Scipio's kindness, converting the gold from a ransom into a gift, asking the gods to requite the general, pledging their love and kindness, expressing their gratitude, and providing cavalry.

This escalation of favors, however, serves not just to establish the relationship, but also to allow the players to claim status within it, its basic asymmetry at this point in time revealing anxieties on both sides. For the captive girl's family, of course, her restoration (with her virginity intact) is a favor that cannot be repaid; hence their anxious attempts to raise the stakes of their reciprocal act by converting their ransom into a gift. But anxiety is apparent on Scipio's side as well as he attempts to parry the equalization strategies used by the girl's family. This is why he converts their gift into a dowry for the girl: he attempts to perpetuate and amplify his dominant position by adding to the role of superior friend that of *paterfamilias*, thus becoming, in effect, the girl's father (and Allucius' father-in-law). Scipio's metaphorical paternity – like Polybius' own towards Aemilianus – is the crucial detail that a static analysis might easily overlook, but that a processual reading imbues with meaning and significance.

In this chapter I have attempted to set forth the necessary theoretical framework for examining Roman international relations in the Middle Republic in terms of *amicitia* or "friendship." As we have seen, a processual approach and a Constructivist perspective can explicate primary source details and information that might otherwise be overlooked or dismissed as mere rhetorical window dressing. Moreover, the concept of unequal friendship flexibly accommodates asymmetrical interpersonal and international relationships without resorting to a mischaracterization of the relationship as *clientela* (with all the distorting effects that conception brings with it). Language matters as much in the study of international relations as it indeed does in the study of human interpersonal relationships, and it is in that spirit that the evidence for Roman international *amicitia* during the Middle Republic has been set forth in the remaining chapters of this study.

CHAPTER 3

Amicitia incipit: beginning international friendship

INTRODUCTION: INTERNATIONAL FRIENDSHIP FORMATION AND ITS DISCOURSES

The Romans were not the first people to initiate informal international friendships in the Mediterranean basin in antiquity: that honor most likely belongs to the Greeks. The Romans, however, adopted the practice with great enthusiasm beginning in the third century BC.¹ This chapter explores the dynamics of Roman international friendship formation using the same interpretative framework applied in the previous chapter to the phenomenon of beginning interpersonal friendship. This chapter also closely scrutinizes the language and rituals of international friendship formation using the insights of IR Constructivist theory as discussed in [Chapter 1](#). As will be seen, moral standards and interests, and ideas and ideals, seem to have been as much genuine concerns for the participants in interstate friendship as they certainly were to the ancient literary sources that record them. Here I will begin building the rather difficult case that the moral aspect of *amicitia* formation had significant real-world, constitutive effects on the violent anarchy of the ancient Mediterranean international system.

The difficulty of arguing for the constructive effect of moral discourse and dispositions arises from the fact that states almost invariably form friendships and alliances because of the real or perceived threats they face from other states, that is to say, primarily for pragmatic or utilitarian reasons. States also align themselves with others usually for the sake of some short- or long-term self-interested goal (strategic advantage, economic gain, and so on). The language of affect, emotion, and morality is often present, but is usually instinctively rejected by observers and analysts as mere discourse, hypocrisy – or worse, political cover for naked self-interest.

¹ Gruen 1984: 54–95.

As Polly Low observed, the main difficulty with gauging the real-world effects of moral criteria in international relations is that “they can be made to be relevant to anything, and, more crucially, be made part of an argument justifying just about any course of action.”² In the Roman context, Alexander Jakobsen has recently shown that the Roman ideology of *iustum bellum*, “the just war,” had to satisfy normative ethical and moral demands rather than strictly formalistic or technical-legal criteria, which implies the malleability of moral justifications and their susceptibility to being transformed into pretexts.³

As has been seen in the the first chapter to this study, IR Realists and those influenced by them are particularly liable to the temptation to dismiss language as “mere” discourse. But, to take only one modern example, the “special relationship” that binds America to Britain in particular amongst European states is as much an emotional as a political-ideological bond, grounded in past cooperation in two world wars, a shared value-system based on freedom, democracy, and human rights, and, perhaps most importantly, a former colonial relationship, a common language, and a similar cultural heritage. Constructivists regard such bonds as significant – indeed, constitutive – of international partnerships, and credit them with a great deal of autonomous political and ideological force. So rather than dismissing the moralizing and sentimental diplomatic discourses of the ancient literary sources as “mere” discourse, rhetorical extravagance, or attempts at deception (or indeed self-deception) on the part of their authors, the following analysis asserts the constructive power of morality amid (and inextricably bound up in) the complex rational calculus of ancient foreign-policy decision-making.

The moralizing discourse of the literary sources, moreover, is not merely rhetorical superstructure or an adjunct to the main business of practical diplomacy in the ancient world. Morality, it seems, was rather the *essence* of ancient diplomacy. The extant corpus of diplomatic inscriptions from the period – primary evidence free of the mediating effects of a highly rhetorical historiography – is suffused by the same moralizing language as the literary texts. Thus, for example, in his letter to the town of Chyretiae in Perrhaebia, documenting Rome’s restoration in the 190s BC of some Chyretiaean property that had become *ager publicus populi Romani* during the Second Macedonian War, the Roman commander T. Quinctius Flamininus characterizes the Romans as “champions of what is honorable”

² Low 2007: 231.

³ Jakobsen 2009: 63, 65. On *iustum bellum* generally, see Drexler 1959; Nörr 1989: 118–28.

(προεστηκότες τοῦ ἐνδόξου), and stresses their “nobility and goodness of character” (καλοκαγαθία), lack of avarice (ἐν οὐθεν φιλαργυρῆσαι), and “goodwill” (χάριτα) towards the Greeks. The Greeks too, for their part, set up numerous inscriptions in the same period emphasizing the Romans’ “excellence and beneficence” (ἀρετὴ καὶ εὐεργεσία), “piety” (εὐσεβεία), and “goodwill” (εὐνοία), as well as their own “goodwill” (εὐνοία) towards the Romans.⁴ Regardless of where it originated, this shared euergetic discourse, I will suggest here, was not simply empty gesture or specious *politesse*, but an effective tool that could be (and frequently was) invoked to achieve real-world, practical ends that could (and frequently did) temper the hard realities of power relations in the ancient Mediterranean international environment.⁵ Inscriptions were of course designed for public consumption, and were thus primarily intended to advertise, both to the states concerned and to outsiders, the health of the relationships represented, and even to justify the association on grounds other than sheer self-interest. The moralizing discursive strategies adopted for these purposes were thus entirely appropriate on a strictly pragmatic level. However, when one reflects on the ancient ideology, discussed in the previous chapter, that true friendship was possible only between virtuous men, it makes sense that the language of morality and affect should be an essential part of the ideology of international friendship as well, and, as I will attempt to show here, that it must have played an important role – indeed a constitutive role – in the process of interstate friendship formation. In Craig Williams’s terms, such language constituted “socially meaningful acts,” or “a type of performative utterance.”⁶

The other aims of the present chapter are fairly modest. After a brief discussion of the problem of the imprecision of terminology used to describe friendship and alliance in the literary sources, I intend to set forth the evidence for the mechanics and protocols of initiating international friendship with Rome. This is by no means intended to be a complete survey, but a sampling of the most relevant cases in the extant literature. The focus, in

⁴ Flamininus’ letter: *Syll.*³ 593 = *RDGE* 33 (quotations from ll. 5–6, 11, 12, 13); excellence and beneficence: *SEG* 11.73 = *SEG* 22.214; excellence and piety: *IG* 11.4.712 (ll. 16–17); Roman goodwill: *Syll.*³ 601 = *IGRom* 4.1557 = *RDGE* 34 (l. 18); *IG* 11.4.712 (l. 18); *SEG* 16.265 (ll. 9–10); Greek goodwill: *Syll.*³ 601 = *IGRom* 4.1557 = *RDGE* 34 (l. 24). On the discourse of the inscriptions dealing with Greek interstate relations, see Mitchell 1997b: 37–44; Low 2007: 135–43.

⁵ On the language of Hellenistic euergetism, see Gruen 1984: 158–200; Veyne 1990: 85–200; Ferrary 1988: 117–32; 1997; Ma 1999: 179–242; Eilers 2002: 97–144. The distinctively Roman contribution to this discourse was to add the language of patronage to describe an individual senator’s or commander’s personal relationship with individuals or communities (cf. above, Chapter 1, n. 11); Ferrary 1997; Eilers 2002: 112–13.

⁶ Williams 2008: 40 (quoted above, Chapter 1, p. 14, and n. 47).

other words, will be on those instances where the sources describe the process of initiating *amicitia* in sufficient detail to permit processual analysis, and hence, meaningful conclusions, and when the moral and emotional issues involved receive explicit discussion alongside the more pragmatic considerations of the particular military–strategic circumstances. For reasons of space, this cannot be a complete list, and fault may be found for omissions of some important cases. So, for example, Rome’s establishment of *amicitia* with Saguntum will not be discussed, not because it has no intrinsic significance for the study of Roman diplomacy and imperialism *per se* (it surely does), but rather because the evidence for this event is so poor; indeed the lack of evidence for the timing and rationale of Roman–Saguntine alliance is precisely what makes its role in the escalation phase leading to the Second Punic War so controversial. It is, therefore, best to delay the discussion of this case until subsequent chapters.

For ease of exposition, the discussion will be divided into four sections, corresponding to the four ways in which the Romans generally entered upon friendships with their international partners: through military cooperation, diplomatic exchanges, unconditional surrender (*deditio*) performed voluntarily for the explicit purpose of receiving Roman protection, and unconditional surrender (*deditio*) following military defeat by Rome (which I will call “surrender under duress” to distinguish it from the voluntary kind).⁷ Because of its importance to the issue, not to mention the sheer volume of scholarly debate on the topic, a brief digression on the nature and meaning of *deditio* will have to be undertaken between the discussion of the first and second pairs of methods of initiating Roman international friendship.

SOCII AND AMICI

Some common scholarly misperceptions must be cleared away before the formal analysis can begin. It was once believed that Roman *amici* formed a separate diplomatic category from Roman *socii*: the former were supposed to have enjoyed mere informal friendly relations with Rome with no explicit practical obligations, while the latter were obligated by formal treaties to

⁷ The categories are Gruen’s (1984: 55), based generally on those of Heuss 1933: 12–59. Livy 28.34.7 distinguishes between allies with whom Rome has a friendship (*amicitia*) that has come via treaty or equitable laws (*foedere . . . aequis legibus*), and those who performed the surrender (*deditio*) ritual. His is a much looser distinction, but the relationships he describes first seem to belong to the first two categories adopted here, and those in the second to the latter two. On *deditio* generally, see Burton 2009; below, pp. 114–22; on *foedus aequum*, see below, n. 18.

provide military assistance in Roman wars. Mommsen introduced a further distinction: the expression *socii et amici*, commonly encountered in the sources, indicated a further and distinct technical-legal category denoting those who enjoyed a formal “treaty of friendship” (*Freundschaftsvertrag*).⁸

As early as 1907, however, Louise Matthei argued that Mommsen’s third category placed undue interpretative strain on the extant evidence,⁹ while more recent research has demonstrated conclusively that ancient authors knew of no precise distinction between *amicus*, *socius*, and *amicus et socius*, and for this reason employed these terms quite interchangeably and indiscriminately.¹⁰ Thus, to take but a few examples, M. Fabius established *societas et amicitia* with Umbrian Camerinum in 310 BC; the Saguntines are reported to be Rome’s allies, but are also in a state of friendship with the Republic; Hiero II and the Romans became *socii* in 263, but at the same time enjoyed *amicitia*; the Aetolian treaty of 211 established *amicitia* and *societas* between Aetolia and Rome; and finally, the Lucanians in 298 asked to be taken into Roman protection against the Samnites, and the Romans granted the request, establishing what the Greek historian Dionysius of Halicarnassus calls both a friendship, an alliance, and a treaty.¹¹

The “terminological inexactitudes” of the literary sources are not merely due to slovenliness,¹² nor do they arise from a particular literary concern for rhetorical variety, for there is now proof from inscriptional evidence that official documents used the same combinations of terms without necessarily implying formal, technical distinctions. So, for example, inscriptions

⁸ Mommsen 1887: 590–95. Mommsen based his concept of a *Freundschaftsvertrag* on the customary opening formula of the ancient Roman *foedera* (“There shall be friendship between . . .”), but, as Heuss 1933: 12, 16–17 shows, such phrases are designed merely to reduce to words the transcendent bond of *amicitia*, without necessarily indicating a different type of *foedus* (a *Bündnisvertrag*) altogether. Cf. also Coskun 2008b.

⁹ Matthei 1907: 184–85 (followed by Heuss 1933: 26–27 n. 1; Larsen 1935: 195; Dahlheim 1968: 165, 228). Note, however, that Matthei’s own characterization of *amici et socii* as “the official title applied to the *amici* by the Roman government” is as unduly legalistic as Mommsen’s own interpretation of the phrase.

¹⁰ Early advocates for abandoning the distinction include Heuss 1933: 26–27 n. 1; Dahlheim 1968: 163–70, 226–29; see also Gruen 1984: 25 and n. 66; Lintott 1993: 32; Kallet-Marx 1995a: 185; Eckstein 1999: 405–11; Coskun and Heinen 2004: 156; Rich 2008: 56; Eckstein 2008: 47.

¹¹ Fabius’ *societas et amicitia* with Umbrian Camerinum: Livy 9.36.7–8 (discussion below, pp. 88–90); Saguntum as allies: Polyb. 3.15.8 (σύμμαχοι); Livy 21.6.4 (*socii populi Romani*; cf. 21.16.2: *sociorum*); Saguntum as *amici*: Livy 21.19.5 (*in amicitiam*); Hiero II as *socius*: Livy 22.37.4, 8, 56.8; cf. Polyb. 1.16.9 (συνμάχοις); Plut. *Marc.* 8.6; App. *Sic.* 2 (σύμμαχος); Hiero as *amicus*: Livy 22.37.7–8 (*amicitia*); cf. Polyb. 1.16.9 (φίλοις); Zonar. 8.8.2; cf. Dio fr. 43.1; Plut. *Marc.* 8.6; App. *Sic.* 2 (φίλος) (discussion below, pp. 142–53); Aetolian treaty establishes *amicitia* and *societas* between Aetolia and Rome: Livy 26.24.9 (discussion below, pp. 90–94); Lucanians’ friendship, alliance, and treaty: Dion. Hal. 17/18.4 (τῶν συνθηκῶν . . . φίλοι καὶ σύμμαχοι; cf. Livy 10.12.1–2 [omitting *amicitia*]).

¹² As argued by Matthei 1907: 186; cf. Sands 1908: 24–28 (on Livy: “a mere translator or compiler” whose “terminology is most untrustworthy”), 45.

discovered in Yugoslavia in the 1930s and 1960s record both “alliance and friendship” (συμμαχία καὶ φιλία) between Rome and Pharos in the late third century BC, when our literary sources, including perhaps Polybius, know only of informal φιλία between the two states in that period (Dio fr. 53 = Zonar. 8.20.11; cf. Polyb. 3.16.4). As Arthur Eckstein has shown,¹³ it is extremely unlikely that Demetrius of Pharos had a formal treaty with Rome. So even in “official” contexts,¹⁴ the terminology of Roman diplomacy was highly fluid. Why this was so is a matter for speculation; perhaps the balanced phraseology of *societas amicitiae* and its variants in the official documents was designed to lend an air of solemnity and dignity to the agreements, in which case it may be that it is the language of the official documents that is primarily responsible for the “terminological inexactitudes” of the literary sources that used them. However that might be, the trend of current scholarship is, rightly, to abandon rigid distinctions between *socius*, *amicus*, *socius et amicus*, and related expressions.

This is not to deny that the Romans occasionally used treaties to initiate their diplomatic relationships, usually for the sake of specific short-term goals in the face of a temporary strategic or logistical disadvantage (the treaties with the Aetolian League in 211 BC, and Syphax of Numidia in 206/205), to secure peace after major wars with significant Mediterranean powers (the treaties with Carthage in 241 and 201, Macedon in 205 and 196, Aetolia in 189, and Syria in 188), or at the specific request of their *amici* (the treaties with the Achaean League sometime in the late 190s or the 180s, and with Rhodes in 164 or 163).¹⁵ What deserves emphasis, however, is that the common thread that links those relative few of Rome’s allies who possessed formal treaties with the Republic during our period to the overwhelming majority who lacked them is *amicitia*: a treaty (when it is known in any detail) will refer to the friendship established upon agreement to the treaty’s terms, or the treaty partners will be referred to in the sources as both *foederati* and *amici* (more commonly the latter) long after the treaties have gone into force. Thus the true basis of all Roman international relationships – with or without treaty, whether characterized as *societas* or *amicitia* – is, in the final analysis, *amicitia*. Due attention of course will be paid here and in subsequent chapters to the reasons for, the obligations arising from, and the timing of the treaties where appropriate, but the primary concern will be to explore the *amicitia* upon which those treaties were based.

¹³ Eckstein 1999; discussion below, pp. 136–41.

¹⁴ On “official terminology,” see Richardson 2008: 44, 103, 177–78.

¹⁵ Detailed discussion and references: Gruen 1984: 13–53, 731–51.

The example of the Lucanian treaty of 298 BC mentioned earlier raises another important issue that requires clarification at the outset: did the Romans draw any significant distinctions, in terms of status, attitudes, and expectations, between their intra- and extra-Italian international partners? The conventional understanding is that Rome usually imposed formal, binding treaties of alliance on her Italian allies, obliging them to supply annual levies of troops to help fight in Rome's wars;¹⁶ these alliances were duly recorded in an official document at Rome called the *formula togatorum*.¹⁷ The treaties were for the most part "unequal," and their obligations overtly favored Rome.¹⁸ Recently, however, John Rich has convincingly shown that even within Italy itself, formal treaties of alliance were rare, and most Italian states were probably bound to Rome merely by virtue of having performed *deditio*, and thus having been brought under Rome's *dicio*. Rich counts only fourteen uncontroversial examples of treated allies of Rome in Italy down to 265 BC – "a meagre haul," considering the hundreds of cities and peoples under Roman *dicio* in the peninsula.¹⁹

It is nevertheless clear that Roman expectations of their Italian allies, regardless of whether they had a treaty or not, were considerably greater – and more onerous – than their expectations of their extra-Italian friends, particularly in terms of obeying Roman demands for troop contributions and demonstrating basic loyalty.²⁰ This is the clear implication of Polybius' comment that by the time of Pyrrhus' invasion, the Romans regarded Italy as their own private property, and accordingly attacked anyone who challenged their supremacy there.²¹ It is also apparent from the fact that the Romans seem to have kept two separate official lists of their allies: the *formula togatorum* for the Italians, and the mysterious *formula amicorum/sociorum/amicorum et sociorum* for everyone else. The existence of the

¹⁶ Badian 1958a: 25–32, 142–43; Dahlheim 1968: 138, 159–62; Harris 1971: 85–113; Ilari 1974: 25–56; Harris 1979: 62; Eckstein 1987a: xii, 65; Ferrary 1988: 40; Rich 2008 (with others listed at 55 nn. 8–9).

¹⁷ Badian 1958a: 29–30; Brunt 1971: 545–48; Ilari 1974: 57–103; Salmon 1982: 169–71; Gruen 1984: 15 (the latter following Brunt); Baronowski 1984; Lo Cascio 1991/1994; Rich 2008: 67.

¹⁸ However, there was no technical-legal distinction, as was once conventionally accepted by scholars, between *foedera iniqua* and *foedera aequa*: Matthaei 1907: 183; Badian 1958a: 26–27; Ilari 1974: 34–41; Salmon 1982: 67–68; Gruen 1984: 14–15; Nörr 1989: 98; Ferrary 1990: 218 n. 2; Baronowski 1990; de Libero 1997: 278 n. 41; Oakley 2005: 273; S. Mitchell 2005: 188–89; Rich 2008: 58–59.

¹⁹ Rich 2008: 69; cf. Lomas 1993: 77–84.

²⁰ Cf. Gruen 1984: 285: "Roman attitudes . . . show a clear divide between the experience in Italy and the expectations in the eastern Mediterranean."

²¹ Polyb 1.6.6: τότε [i.e., after the wars with the Etruscans and Samnites] πρῶτον ἐπὶ τὰ λοιπὰ μέρη τῆς Ἰταλίας ὥρμησαν, οὐχ ὡς ὑπὲρ ὀθνείων, ἐπὶ δὲ τὸ πλεῖον ὡς ὑπὲρ ἰδίων ἥδη καὶ καθηκόντων σφίσι πολεμήσοντες ("at that time the Romans first attacked the rest of Italy, regarding it not as a foreign country, but as if it already belonged to them").

latter list is fascinating in and of itself for the present topic, since it confirms the conceptual slippage between interpersonal and international *amicitia* (note that there is no list called a *formula clientium*). Enrolled in the *formula* were individual foreigners as well as entire states; thus an inscription of 78 BC (*RDGE* 22, l. 12) records the enrolment of three Greek naval officers in *formula ameorum*, while Appian tells us that Ilium, Chios, Lycia, Rhodes, Magnesia-ad-Sipylum, and others were inscribed as Roman φίλοι in 84 (App. *Mith.* 61). By analogy with what we have seen regarding the “terminological inexactitudes” of the sources, both literary and inscriptional, when describing Roman *amici* and *socii*, the *formula amicorum* probably refers to the same list as the *formula sociorum* and the *formula amicorum et sociorum* mentioned in other texts. The point to note here, however, is that this *formula* was regarded as a mark of privilege for those foreigners who performed outstanding service for Rome, whereas the *formula togatorum* was a sign of the Italian states’ subjection to Rome. To appear on the former list was to enjoy such diplomatic privileges as receiving gifts, food, lodging, and a formal introduction into the Roman senate while in Rome; to appear on the latter was to be obliged to provide troops for the Roman army.²²

But the more important point, for the present purpose, is that the Romans nevertheless called their Italian allies *amici*, and treated them accordingly. Although misconstruing these relationships as *clientelae*, Badian is nevertheless correct to observe that “an extra-legal element, essentially similar to that which determined the relations between Rome and her ‘free’ friends, was inherent in the Italian Confederacy from the beginning”; and indeed, by the second century BC, the Italian treaty arrangements ceased to matter at all: “like her relations with those ‘friends’ altogether without treaties . . . they were based on duties owed in return for *beneficia*.”²³ The case of the Italian alliances, while somewhat different in terms of history, expectations, and obligations, is notionally connected to Rome’s extra-Italian relationships by the binding link of *amicitia*, and the moral construction of the relationship as one of mutual *beneficia* and *fides*. In

²² On *RDGE* 22 and the *formula amicorum/sociorum/amicorum et sociorum*, see Gallet 1937; Badian 1958a: 12 and n. 4 (who, however, assimilates the *amici* on the list to virtual *clientes*); Marshall 1968; Sherk 1969: 126–29; Bowman 1990; Raggi 2001; Valvo 2001. Sands 1908: 40–42 (followed by Gallet and Valvo) believed that the *formula amicorum* and the *formula sociorum* were two separate lists; Badian, Marshall, and Raggi believe they were one and the same; Bowman believes the name of the list evolved over time. Gallet (followed by Sherk) argued for judicial and fiscal, in addition to diplomatic, privileges for those on the list, but he has not generally been followed (by Marshall, Bowman, and Raggi).

²³ Badian 1958a: 143–42, 152; cf. Rich 1989: 131–32; Rich 2008.

what follows, then, instructive Italian examples may also be used without fear of distorting the analysis of the beginnings and discourses of Roman international friendship.

FRIENDSHIP ESTABLISHED THROUGH WARTIME COOPERATION

It is perhaps surprising that our sources preserve hardly any evidence for the Romans establishing *amicitia* with other states strictly by virtue of being on the same side in a major war. The only possible example – and it must remain only a possibility – for which there is adequate information is the establishment of friendship in the last decade of the third century BC between Rome and Pergamum, through its king Attalus I. This will have to suffice as the paradigm case for this section.

The Roman relationship with Pergamum was established ca. 209 BC, during the so-called First Macedonian War, when Rome was forced to fight what was, in effect, a proxy war through the Aetolian League against the League's traditional enemy, Philip V of Macedon, in order to distract the king from the effective pursuit of his alliance with Hannibal (struck in 215).²⁴ The Aetolians, who in their treaty with Rome in 211 had already made provision for admitting Attalus (among others) into their alliance, conferred on the Pergamene king the generalship of their League for the year 210/209. Attalus arrived in Greece, probably in early spring, and twice suffered defeat at the hands of Philip V's Macedonian phalanx. He then retired to Aegina for the winter 209/208, and was there joined by the commander of the Roman forces, the proconsul P. Sulpicius Galba. At the start of the following campaigning season, the joint fleet of Attalus and Galba ravaged the islands of Lemnos and Peparethus, and then went on to attack Phocis and Euboea, Attalus by land, Galba by sea. Joint Roman and Pergamene forces then captured and sacked the cities of Oreus and

²⁴ Discussion of the First Macedonian War: Holleaux 1935: 173–305; Walbank 1940: 68–105; Badian 1958a: 55–61; Will 1967: 82–100; Errington 1971: 109–18; Lazenby 1978: 157–68; Briscoe 1978: 153–55; Gruen 1984: 373–81; Eckstein 2002: 285 and nn. 54, 56; Pfeilschifter 2005: 73–77; Eckstein 2006: 268; 2008: 89–90, 104–05; Scherberich 2009: 160–72. Going against the grain of most scholarship on the issue, Harris 1979: 205–08 and Rich 1984: 126–80 argue that Roman aims in the war were not primarily defensive and limited, Harris because he wishes to make the Romans look as aggressive as possible, and Rich because he believes that the Livian notices on the war (23.33–34.9; 24.40; 26.24.1–26.4; 29.12) are chronologically confused. Rome's willingness to make an unsatisfying peace with Philip in 205 BC, after having been abandoned by its Aetolian allies the year before, inclines me to side against Rich with the majority of scholars. For Philip's treaty with Hannibal, see Polyb. 7.9; Livy 23.33.9–12; App. *Mac.* 1; Zonar. 9.4.2–3 (with discussion at Walbank 1967: 42–56; Coppola 1993: 169–94; Bederman 2001: 185–89; Pfeilschifter 2005: 73–74; Scherberich 2009: 158–60 [others listed at 159 n. 10]); on Rome's treaty with Aetolia, see below, pp. 90–91.

Opus. But when word reached him that Prusias I, the king of Bithynia, was ravaging Pergamum in force, Attalus suddenly withdrew from the fight and sailed back to Asia Minor.²⁵

What was the nature of Rome's relationship with Attalus while Galba was conducting joint operations with him? The sources omit this detail from their narratives of the campaign of 208 BC, so we are forced to look ahead to retrospective commentary in the extant texts. By 205 Attalus was included as an *adscriptus* on the Roman side in the Peace of Phoenice that ended hostilities between Philip and Rome (Livy 29.12.14). Livy further reveals, in his account of the summoning of the Great Mother goddess from Pessinus in Asia Minor to Rome in the same year,²⁶ that Rome as yet had no allies in Asia "but had initiated friendship with King Attalus because of their common war against Philip" (*cum Attalo rege propter commune aduersus Philippum bellum coeptam amicitiam esse*: Livy 29.11.2). If we can credit this retrospective comment of Livy's – and there is no good reason to doubt him, given the categorical nature of his statement, and his apparent concern that the reader recognize the diplomatic realities confronting Rome in the East in 205 – it must follow that Galba established *amicitia* with Attalus as a result of their military cooperation in 208, perhaps during winter 209/208, when the consul and the king were both at Aegina coordinating their strategy for the following spring.²⁷

Unfortunately, Livy is silent on the precise details of the arrangement, nor do we hear anything of the language that passed between the consul and the king beyond the fact of the establishment of friendship itself. Recourse must be had, once again, to retrospective commentary. In 200 BC, Attalus and some Roman ambassadors met at Athens to discuss the impending war against Philip V, and Polybius reports that they discussed their joint operations in the past (that is, in the previous war against Philip), and that the king was "overjoyed" (περιορχῆς) that the Romans were ready

²⁵ Provision for Attalus' inclusion in the treaty of 211 BC: Livy 26.12.9 (he becomes an Aetolian *socius* at Livy 26.37.5); Attalus' generalship of the Aetolian League: Livy 27.29.10; Attalus' first military campaign against Philip: Livy 27.30.2; winter 209/208 at Aegina: Livy 27.33.4–5; campaign of 208: Polyb. 10.41–42; Livy 28.5–8; App. *Mac.* 3; Dio fr. 57.57–58; Zonar. 9.11.4; cf. Just. *Epit.* 29.4; Attalus' withdrawal: Livy 28.7.10; Dio fr. 57.58.

²⁶ On this event see Burton 1996 against Gruen 1990: 5–33, with older scholarship cited there, and Erskine 2001: 205–24.

²⁷ Discussion: Sands 1908: 54, 184–85; Heuss 1933: 32–35; Holleaux 1935: 208–09; McShane 1964: 105–11; Dahlheim 1968: 204 n. 59, 225; Hansen 1971: 48–49; Cimma 1976: 67; Green 1990: 300. Gruen 1984: 77, 530 dates the beginning of the friendship to ca. 210 BC, which is perhaps too early (Jerome's *Chronicle*, for what it is worth, dates it to 209, which coincides nicely with the chronology adopted here). The arrangements between Galba and Attalus were probably not formalized by a treaty of alliance: Heuss 1933: 34.

to fight the Macedonian again (16.25.4). The standard ancient diplomatic practice of rehearsing past collaborations is in evidence here, but there is also a hint of the emotion and sentiment that the discussions excited in the king – hence his joy with what the Roman envoys said. Explicit confirmation of these feelings is embedded in a later speech which Attalus’ son, Eumenes II, delivered before the senate in 189, after the Romans defeated Antiochus III in the First Syrian War. In the speech (Polyb. 21.19–22; cf. Livy 37.53), Eumenes reflects on his own loyalty to Rome, which he inherited from his father. The practical aspect of the relationship, in the form of Attalus’ military assistance to Rome, receives appropriate emphasis here, but the language Eumenes uses to foreground these *beneficia* (τὰς πράξεις in Polybius’ Greek) is also noteworthy. The theme of the speech is Pergamum’s friendship and goodwill towards Rome (τῆς ὑμέτερας φιλίας καὶ τῆς εἰς ὑμᾶς εὐνοίας: Polyb. 21.20.1), which, Eumenes says, has had no rival amongst Rome’s other allies and friends ever since Attalus began the association; indeed, the elderly Pergamene king suddenly died of a massive stroke while trying to convince the Boeotians to join Rome’s coalition of φίλοι against Philip V in 197 (Polyb. 21.20.5; Livy 37.53.10). In his version of the speech, Livy also has Eumenes remark on Attalus’ “perpetual and consistent loyalty” towards Rome (*perpetua et constanti fide*: 37.53.8).

Of course such rhetoric cannot really prove that a moral element was present, much less constitutive, at the birth in 209/208 BC of Attalus’ friendship with Rome, which, after all, was joined for the practical purpose of a military alliance in the face of a common enemy. But that the friendship can be credibly couched in these terms before the Roman senate, and before Polybius’ (and Livy’s) readership, is surely indicative of an authentic moral core of the relationship in the minds of the participants, the historians, and their readers. Similar language may have indeed passed between Attalus and Galba when they began their association in 209/208 at Aegina. Similarity of moral virtue, the “expressive” side of the friendship calculus, perhaps played some role in Rome’s formation of friendship with Attalus, just as it did in Roman interpersonal friendships, as demonstrated in the previous chapter. Similarly, the passage of time – and a shared history of confronting mutual dangers and hardships – only deepened the affective bond between these international partners. This is an instance of the Constructivist thesis that “history matters,” that is, mutual social learning by states through years of shared experience can transform potential competitors within the international system into durable partners, shifting the character of the system away from violent, conflictual anarchy towards one that provides

more security for more states.²⁸ As Livy says explicitly, Rome's friendship with Attalus began because of their shared war against Philip (*propter commune aduersus Philippum bellum coeoptam amicitiam esse*: Livy 29.11.2). But as Attalus and the Romans must have emphasized at Athens in 201, and as Eumenes points out in his speech before the senate, the salience of the relationship grew out of a sense of a common destiny, a shared identity and purpose that went beyond wartime collaboration, and included such favors as Attalus' procurement of the Great Mother stone of Pessinus for Rome in 205.

A processual reading of the establishment of friendship between Rome and the Attalids of Pergamum also divulges precise parallels with friendship formation in the interpersonal sphere. Attalus' approach to the Romans is of course a purely voluntary act, based, as has already been seen, on both a complementarity of needs (that is, Rome's need for allies in the East, and Attalus' need to forge stronger ties with others in order to balance the power of the Macedonian kingdom), and an "expressive" similarity of moral virtue. Note, however, that the relationship thus established also allowed the purported lesser partner, Attalus, considerable freedom of choice and individual initiative, not only in his initial, apparently unconstrained, decision to join Rome, but, more significantly, in his decision to withdraw from joint operations – without chastisement or repercussions from Rome – when his own kingdom was under threat from Prusias of Bithynia in 208.²⁹ *Amicitia*, rather than some purported *clientela* relationship, provides a much better conceptual framework for the Roman–Pergamene alliance at its inception.³⁰ This is as far as the evidence can take us, but what little there is suffices to establish the nature of, and perhaps even the discursive framework surrounding, the original Roman–Pergamene alliance at its inception.

²⁸ As will be clear from my interpretation here and elsewhere in this and subsequent chapters, I disagree fundamentally with Eckstein 2006: 314, for example, that the "profound geopolitical transformation" of the Mediterranean world from violent, conflictual multipolar anarchy to a more stable unipolar hegemony under Roman control "was achieved through massive violence." The building of long-standing, morally based, and ultimately emotional and sentimental relationships with other powers played a significant role as well.

²⁹ If indignation may be detected in Livy's comment on Attalus' withdrawal – *omissis Romanis rebus atque Aetolico bello* ("he abandoned the Roman campaign and the Aetolian war": 28.7.10) – it belongs to the historian, and says nothing about the Roman attitude at the time: Burton 1996: 61. Strange, and utterly unconvincing, is Grainger's view that Attalus was a serial shirker and a liar: Grainger 2002: 31, 33. The continuing warmth of the senate's attitude towards the king until his death in 197 BC puts paid to Grainger's thesis.

³⁰ Even Badian 1958a: 99–100 is forced to admit that "down to the end of the Third Macedonian War . . . [Pergamum] and Rhodes, the chief 'friends' of Rome, generally had as much freedom as they wanted"; but note the tendentious use of quotation marks around "friends."

FRIENDSHIP ESTABLISHED THROUGH DIPLOMATIC EXCHANGES

Closely related to the previous method of establishing *amicitia* is Rome's use of high-level diplomacy to establish contacts and solicit potential helpers in current or future zones of conflict. When warfare took the legions far from Rome, Roman generals frequently sought international *amici* near or within theaters of war in order to secure vital resources and infrastructure for their armies. At other times, existing *amici* sought third-party arbitration by the Romans in their conflicts with other states, and Rome, if such mediation was successful, extended its circle of *amici* to include the mediating states as well. Occasionally the sources describe *amicitia* resulting from requests by a foreign state for a closer relationship with Rome, primarily in recognition of Rome's military reputation, or as a hedge against future contingencies, but with no formal surrender (*deditio*: see below) being performed and with no strings attached, except perhaps for a loose bilateral pledge of military support. In this section, examples of each of these three situations will be examined.

During her rise to power in Italy, Rome often required the assistance of other Italic peoples against its enemies, especially when warfare drew Roman legions far from Latium and into *terra incognita*. Under the year 310 BC, Livy records a reconnaissance expedition into the Ciminian forest by M. Fabius, brother of one of the current consuls, Q. Fabius Maximus Rullianus, in order to test the feasibility of pursuing the fleeing remnants of a recently defeated Etruscan army into Umbria. After penetrating as far as Umbrian Camerinum, Marcus was granted an audience with the Camertian senate, and established *amicitia* with them in the name of his brother Quintus; the two sides may also have struck a formal treaty at this point, for Livy calls the resulting relationship *societas amicitiaque* (9.36.7), and, as will be seen shortly, a Roman treaty with Camerinum is well attested in later sources.³¹ Whatever the case, as a result of the negotiations in 310, Marcus enjoyed the hospitality of the citizens of Camerinum, and was promised thirty days' provisions for his own army, plus the full muster of the Camertian youth to assist in the Roman expedition.³²

It is worth exploring Livy's dual characterization of this relationship further, since a series of notices reveal its ongoing importance. In 205 BC,

³¹ Harris 1971: 56 argues that the Camertes had a strong motive to strike a treaty in 310 BC: they were under threat from the Senonian Gauls. Cf. Oakley 2005: 473: "it is a reasonable conjecture that this *foedus* originated in, or shortly after, 310/309 and that [Livy's] *de societate amicitiaque* alludes to it."

³² Livy 9.36.2–9; Frontin. *Str.* 1.2.2; Flor. 1.11.3. Livy 9.36.2 records variant traditions which make either K. Fabius or C. Claudius (K. Fabius' half-brother) the leader of the expedition.

the Camertes sent 600 troops in support of the Roman war effort against Carthage as an “equal treaty” partner (*aequo foedere*: Livy 28.45.20); a century after that, they provided two cohorts for Marius’ campaigns against the Cimbri, again according to their “most equal treaty” (*foedus...aequissimum*: Cic. *Balb.* 46, 50); and more than three centuries later, the Camertes proudly advertised to the world on an inscription “the eternal security and glory” of their “equal treaty” with Rome.³³ Clearly the Camertes cherished their equal treaty with Rome,³⁴ which only became more valuable as Roman power grew over the course of centuries. But the foundation of the relationship – *amicitia* – must be kept in view as well. As IR Constructivists recognize, the coordination of policy and action by two states over the *longue durée* results in social learning and creative change within each state, such that both come to recognize a shared identity, history, and destiny;³⁵ the formal basis of the relationship remains important, but grows less constitutive of it in practice. If we had more information about Roman–Camertian relations over the course of six centuries, theirs may well have come to resemble the modern “special relationship” between the US and Britain.

A Constructivist and processual reading also finds deeper meaning in the *aequitas* celebrated by both the Romans and Camertes well into the Imperial period. Regardless of how representative of reality this equality was either at the moment of the relationship’s inception in 310 BC, or when Camerinum supplied troops for Roman wars in 205, and again a century later, or when their treaty was renewed in the early third century AD, the shared discourse of *aequitas* was evidently a mutually satisfying construction – and was thus constitutive – of the relationship for both partners. This is a classic instance of Pierre Bourdieu’s “misrecognition,” whereby friends continually construct and reconstruct their relationship in particular ways in order to ensure that mutual exchange of symbolic and material capital continues.³⁶ A *clientela* interpretation, by contrast, would reduce this discursive strategy to a polite euphemism deployed by the dominant partner, and render the evidence for it completely incoherent. In *ILS* 432 the Camertes do not look back with affection on a six-century-old subjection; rather, they celebrate the “eternal security and glory” of their

³³ *CIL* 9, 5631 = *ILS* 432: *Imp. Caesari L. Septimio Seuero Pio Pertinaci Aug. Arabic. Adiab. Parthic. max. Britt. max. tr. pot. xviii. imp. xii. cos. iiii. p.p. caelesti eius indulgentia in aeternam securitatem adque gloriam iure aequo foederis sibi confirmato, Camertes p.p.* Discussion: Salmon 1967: 243; 1982: 207 n. 545; Harris 1971: 86, 88–89, 99; Oakley 2005: 473; Rich 2008: 60, 75.

³⁴ So Rich 2008: 75.

³⁵ Ashley 1986: 258 (quoted above, Chapter 1, p. 18, and n. 65).

³⁶ Above, Chapter 2, p. 65, and n. 131.

equal relationship with Rome. In the *pro Balbo*, Cicero does not gloat over Camerinum's dependency on Rome; rather, he celebrates the Republic's rewards for virtue (*praemia uirtutis*) given to "a city most closely connected and most friendly" to Rome (*coniunctissima atque amicissima ciuitate: Balb. 47*). Similarly, the logic of *clientela* would seem to place the Camertes, rather than the party soliciting a favor, the Romans, in the role of patron in 310 BC when the relationship was initiated, with this somehow being reversed later on. Rather than resort to such a counterintuitive conclusion, it is perhaps better to interpret the relationship between Rome and Camerinum as they themselves did, as *amicitia*. Asymmetrical this friendship certainly was, with the Romans, at the beginning of the relationship, occupying the position of inferiority at that precise moment and for the friendship's immediate purpose, and with the Camertes, later on under the empire, in a far inferior position to Rome – but it was *amicitia* nevertheless.

A century after Rome and Umbrian Camerinum established their *amicitia*, the Romans again found themselves in a grim logistical predicament, this time much further afield. Philip V of Macedon and Hannibal joined forces in 215 BC, shortly after Rome had suffered continuous defeat at Carthaginian hands on home soil for over two years, and the loss of perhaps over 100,000 soldiers. Rome had neither the manpower nor the resources, at least in the immediate short term, to open up another major front in the conflict with Carthage, and desperately needed help in keeping the Macedonian king occupied in Greece, and as far away from Italian shores as possible. Probably in autumn 211 BC, the Roman naval commander in Greece, M. Valerius Laevinus, sought out the friendship and alliance of the Aetolians, the perennial enemies of the Macedonian kingdom. According to the terms of the treaty that resulted – part of which still survives in an inscription – friendship and alliance (*amicitiam societatemque: Livy 26.24.8*) between the Aetolians and the Romans was to be established with the mutual understanding that the Aetolians would take possession of cities captured jointly or individually by themselves and the Romans, and incorporate into the Aetolian League those cities and peoples that surrendered to either party, while the Romans would receive only the movable booty of those cities they captured, and take a share of the plunder from cities captured jointly with the Aetolians.³⁷

³⁷ Livy 26.24.8–14; *SEG* 13.382 = *IG*² 9.1.241; discussion: Heuss 1933: 37–44; Holleaux 1935: 208–12; Badian 1958a: 56–57, 293–94; 1958b: 197–208; Carcopino 1961: 80–81; Will 1967: 74–77; Larsen 1968: 365–68; Dahlheim 1968: 181–207; Errington 1971: 113–14; Harris 1979: 207; Gruen 1984: 17–21, 377–78; Rich 1984: 27–28, 155–57; Eckstein 1987a: 290–93; Ferrary 1988: 27, 32–33; Green 1990: 299–300; Eckstein 2008: 88–91; Scherberich 2009: 160–63.

What was the nature of this treaty, evidently the first Rome struck with an extra-Italian power in the Greek East, and how enduring were its specific provisions meant to be? The controversy on the second point began in antiquity: the Aetolians could reasonably claim that the treaty was still in effect in 197 BC, while in 199 and 197 the Romans could claim, with equal plausibility, that the treaty had no validity beyond 206, when the Aetolians signed a separate peace with Philip, thus violating one of the treaty's explicit provisions.³⁸ Whether the treaty's terms would have persisted beyond 206, had the Aetolians not violated the specific ban on making peace with Philip while the king was still in a state of war with Rome, is of course unknowable. On balance, the view of Alfred Heuss (and others) that the treaty's provisions are rather too context-specific to suggest a purported long-term treaty of alliance is probably correct³⁹ – although it should be noted that the Romans themselves did not assert this in 199 or in 197, when the treaty itself became a matter of dispute between them and the Aetolians. Eugen Täubler, recognizing the context-specific nature of the treaty's terms, tried to suggest that the pact of 211, and indeed all Roman treaties, actually consisted of two discrete formal parts – a long-term alliance basis for the treaty (*Grundvertrag*), and the particular conditions upon which the validity of the treaty rested (the so-called *Spezialbestimmungen*).⁴⁰ Täubler's thesis has been challenged on various grounds, including the fact that the Romans (and Greeks) had no equivalent terms for these modern technical-legal concepts.⁴¹ I would further suggest that, as has already been seen in the case of Rome's relationship with Umbrian Camerinum, the crucial aspect of the relationship was understood by all to be *amicitia* rather than the particular terms of the original treaty of 211. This primarily moral basis of the relationship was meant to endure beyond the specific context of the war, and the immediate purposes for which the treaty was struck.⁴² There is also no evidence that the Romans ever intended their international

³⁸ Aetolian claim: Polyb. 18.38.6–9; Livy 33.13.9–16; Roman claims: Livy 31.31.18–20 (199 BC); Polyb. 18.38.8–9; Livy 33.13.11–12 (197 BC); separate peace with Philip: Livy 29.12.1, 5; forbidden: Livy 26.24.12. In 197 BC Flamininus additionally objected (incorrectly, it turns out) that, despite Aetolian claims on three Thessalian cities that surrendered voluntarily to Rome (Larisa Cremaste, Echinus, and Pharsalus), the treaty of 211 mandated only turning over to the League those places that were taken by force (Polyb. 18.38.8–9; Livy 33.13.11–12); the relevant portion of the treaty that survives on *SEG* 13.382 = *IG*² 9.1.241 (ll. 15–23) makes no such distinction; further discussion below, p. 272.

³⁹ Heuss 1933: 39, 41; cf. Dahlheim 1968: 206–07; Gruen 1984: 20.

⁴⁰ Täubler 1913: 4–6, 210–14; cf. Holleaux 1935: 237; Larsen 1935: 199–200; Walbank 1940: 82–84.

⁴¹ Heuss 1933: 37–44; Dahlheim 1968: 206–07; Cimma 1976: 100–07; Gruen 1984: 18–19.

⁴² So Heuss 1933: 57: "the solemnly concluded treaties, regardless of whether they are mere peace treaties or treaties of alliance, are thus nothing other than some updated form of *amicitia*. This is its inherent premise, and thus in this sense every international treaty in the Roman view is a 'treaty of friendship.'"

friendships to be time-bound, context-specific, or only for a particular purpose; we rather more frequently hear of *amicitiae* being renewed and revised when friendly kings died, or Roman contact with other states had lapsed.⁴³ This happens often enough in personal friendships as well, usually after friends have endured long periods of separation, or when children perpetuate relationships with their parents' friends after their own parents have died. *Amicitiae*, both interpersonal and international, were envisioned as being permanent until some perceived violation of *fides* by either partner dissolved the relationship.⁴⁴ The Romans believed that their *amicitia* with the Aetolians lapsed not when a purported terminal date of their treaty had been reached, but when the Aetolians made a separate peace with Philip in 206. By so doing they had betrayed Rome's friendship, and thus forfeited any further claim on Roman *fides*.

In terms of the discourse of *amicitia* deployed during the Roman–Aetolian negotiations of 211, Livy says that Laevinus convinced the Aetolians to side with Rome by demonstrating not only the practical benefits of the association – citing, in particular, Rome's recent military successes in Italy (the capture of Capua) and in Sicily (the capture of Syracuse) – but also the Roman tradition of treating allies well (*a maioribus traditum morem Romanis colendi socios*). In this regard, Laevinus apparently stressed Rome's generosity in extending Roman citizenship rights to some allies, while others were so happy with their treatment as free allies of Rome that they preferred to stay allies rather than to become citizens (*alios in ciuitatem atque aequum secum ius acceperissent, alios in ea fortuna haberent ut socii esse quam ciues mallent*). The Aetolians, Laevinus added, would be held in greater esteem (*in maiore . . . honore*) inasmuch as they would be the first overseas people to enter Roman *amicitia*. The Romans, moreover, would not behave like the Aetolians' "harsh neighbors" (*grauis accolae*), the Macedonians. Returning to practical matters, Laevinus promised to reverse Philip's recent successes against the Aetolians, and reestablish Aetolia's traditional *dicio* over the Acarnanians. The Aetolians readily assented after Scopas, the League's general, and Dorimachus, one of their *principes*, persuaded them of the power and majesty of the Roman people (*uim maiestatemque populi Romani*), although, Livy drily adds, the promise to reincorporate Arcanania into the League played a decisive role in their decision (*maxime tamen spes potiundae mouebat Acarnaniae*) (26.24.2–8).

⁴³ See Heuss 1933: 46–47; examples of renewals of *amicitia* at Livy 40.58.9 (Perseus), 42.6.6–7 (Antiochus IV).

⁴⁴ Dahlheim 1968: 228; see below, Chapter 5, for the end of international *amicitia*.

Despite the historian's rather cynical interpretation of the Aetolians' motives, what is particularly striking here is the moralizing language in which the terms of this practical arrangement are cast. Although the motivation on both sides stems from self-interest and potential gain (the Romans need the Aetolians to help them fight Philip, and the Aetolians want Acarnania restored to their control, as well as revenge on Philip for the Social War of 222–217 BC), Laevinus stresses Rome's kind treatment of her friends and allies, contrasting the Romans' generosity and the honor they bestow on their friends with Philip's cruel and high-handed conduct towards the Greeks. From this it is apparent that the Romans conceived of their relationships with other states as being governed by moral considerations in the pursuit of practical ends, and because the Aetolians decided to side with Rome, this must mean that they publicly accepted on faith the Romans' arguments about their trustworthiness as allies. Although the explicit evidence is missing (and much of the Aetolians' future behavior would speak against it, at least in the Roman view), the Aetolians no doubt felt that the Romans' moral virtue matched their own. They thought of themselves as tough, independent-minded Greeks who were ready to stand up to what they regarded as Macedonian oppression, from which they had already suffered when Philip detached Acarnania from the League. As in interpersonal relationships, friendship is formed when similarity of interests (in the form of the common enemy Philip) merges with (perceived) similarity of character and moral virtue (the "expressive" aspect of friendship). In sociological terms, similarity and complementarity act in tandem in the process of friendship formation to push the partners towards the same end. The real-world impact of this morally constructed relationship on international politics was the frustration of the plan by the Carthaginian–Macedonian axis to destroy Roman power in the Mediterranean when it was hanging on by a thread.

Finally, something should be said about the relative status of Rome and the Aetolian League at this critical juncture in Mediterranean history. Just as in the case of Rome's relationship with the Camertes in 310 BC, so too in this context it is the Roman needs and vulnerability that deserve emphasis. Certainly this is the focus of Polybius' account: "the Romans," he says, "sent embassies to the Greeks, fearing the daring of Philip, and taking care lest they be attacked in the present dangerous circumstances" (Ρωμαῖοι πρὸς τοὺς Ἕλληνας [ἐπρέσβευον] δεδιότες τὴν τοῦ Φιλίππου τόλμαν, καὶ προορώμενοι μὴ συνεπίθῃται τοῖς τότε περιστάσιν αὐτοὺς καιροῖς: 5.105.8). This acknowledgment of Rome's reduced status, perhaps not surprisingly, is missing from Livy's account of the

Roman–Aetolian negotiations. His Romans prefer to bluster about having “already broken the violence and spirit of the Macedonians,” and being on the verge of bringing Philip to his knees (*M. Valerius Laeuinus [dicit Macedonarum] se uim ac spiritus et iam fregisse et eo redacturum esse . . .*: 26.24.5). But even Livy cannot deny that at the time Philip signed the pact with Hannibal in 215, the senate was “gravely concerned at how burdensome it would be to begin a Macedonian war when they could barely endure the war with Carthage” (*gravis cura patres incessit, cernentes quanta uix tolerantibus Punicum bellum Macedonici belli moles instaret*: 23.38.5). Thus what emerges with great clarity from the geostrategic circumstances in the East after 215 is that the Aetolians were more than eager to restart the Social War against Philip (which had ended so unsatisfactorily for them in 217), that the Romans provided them a suitable opportunity to bring this about, and that the Republic was in no position to dictate the terms of their alliance in the manner of a patron to a client. Indeed, given the specific terms of the Roman–Aetolian treaty as they finally emerged from the negotiations, it is clear that it was the Aetolians who were in the driver’s seat here.⁴⁵ At the moment the treaty was made, and for the specific purposes it was designed to achieve (limited, from the Roman perspective), the asymmetry in the relationship favored the Aetolians.

A further example of Rome taking the initiative in seeking an alliance through diplomatic means reinforces this aspect of the evidence. In 213 BC, according to Livy, the Roman commanders in Spain, P. and Cn. Cornelius Scipio, sent envoys to Syphax, king of the Masaesulians in Numidia, who was then waging his own war against the Carthaginians. The Roman commanders’ “hope” (*spem*) was to establish friendship and alliance with the king (*amicitiam societatemque*). The Scipios’ purpose was avowedly to encourage Syphax to keep the Carthaginians occupied at home (*perseueraret urgere bello Carthaginenses*), and they were prepared to promise in return for his help “gratitude, with interest” (*bene cumulatam gratiam*). The three Roman legates, who were also centurions in the Scipios’ armies, discussed Roman military tactics with Syphax, who then requested that the Romans, “as befitting good and faithful allies” (*ut pro bonis ac fidelibus sociis*), allow one legate, Q. Statorius, to remain with him in order to train Syphax’s men in Roman-style infantry warfare. The other two centurions returned to Spain with ambassadors from Syphax whose brief was to confirm the king’s pact with Rome, and to encourage the Numidian contingents in the Carthaginian army to desert to the Roman side. “Thus was friendship

⁴⁵ Gruen 1984: 19–20; Goldsworthy 2000: 257; Eckstein 2008: 89.

begun between Syphax and the Romans" (*ita cum Syphace Romanis coepta amicitia est*), Livy concludes.⁴⁶

Unfortunately nothing more is heard of the results of these negotiations, but under the year 210 BC, the year after the Scipios had perished in Spain, Livy records an embassy from Syphax to the Roman senate "in order to seek Roman friendship, as it were from the very source" (*ab ipso uelut fonte petere Romanam amicitiam*: 27.4.6). The king enumerated for the *patres* his many successes in the field against the Carthaginians, and reminded them that there was no people for whom he was a greater enemy than the Carthaginians, just as there was nobody to whom he was more friendly than to Rome (*legati ab rege Syphace . . . quae is prospera proelia cum Carthaginensibus fecisset memorantes: regem nec inimiciorem ulli populo quam Carthaginensi nec amiciorem quam Romano esse adfirmabant*). The senate gave Syphax a favorable reply (*senatus . . . benigne respondit*) and sent legates with gifts for the king, including an embroidered toga and tunic, an ivory chair (the traditional Roman method of recognizing royalty), as well as a golden *patera* weighing five pounds.⁴⁷

Again, nothing more is heard from Syphax until 206, when P. Cornelius Scipio, the future Africanus and son and nephew of the previous commanders in Spain, took steps to contact the king in order to secure his assistance for his impending African campaign. Scipio sent his right-hand man, Laelius, ahead of him with gifts for Syphax, and the king indicated that he would accept Roman *amicitia* (evidently its renewal), but would only give his oath to the commander in person; for the moment, all he was prepared to provide as a gesture of his good faith was a safe escort to Africa for Scipio. Because in the interim Syphax had struck a formal treaty with Carthage, when Scipio crossed to Africa in fulfillment of the king's request, he was confronted at Syphax's court with the Carthaginian commander Hasdrubal, son of Gisco. The king then tried to broker a peace between the two commanders, and although Scipio charmed both his host and his adversary, he refused to negotiate, excusing himself on the grounds that he had no senatorial mandate to do so. In the end, Scipio persuaded Syphax to

⁴⁶ Livy 24.48. Eckstein 1987a: 204–05 defends the historicity of the episode; Lazenby 1978: 129 is less committed. Eckstein also rightly stresses that no formal treaty with Syphax was struck at this time; Vervaeke and Nāco del Hoyo 2007: 33 and n. 25 disagree, but do not argue the point.

⁴⁷ Livy 27.4.5–10; cf. App. *Hisp.* 15–16. I disagree with Eckstein 1987a: 205, that the senate's gifts constitute a "lackluster" response: the amount of symbolic capital the Romans invested in the gifts is very large, and Livy (or his source) has probably abbreviated in the circumlocution *senatus . . . benigne respondit* (Livy 27.4.7) what was in all likelihood a fulsome and gracious response to the king. Cf. Levene 2010: 258: the gifts symbolize the fact that the receiver, "though a foreigner, is being received not merely into the Roman world, but into the highest status within that world."

strike a treaty with the Romans (*foedere icto cum Syphace*: Livy 28.17.12; cf. App. *Hisp.* 30).⁴⁸ In Rome, however, there was contentious debate over the Numidian alliance. One of Scipio's senatorial rivals, Q. Fabius Maximus Cunctator, led the charge, citing Syphax's appetite for deceit (*fraus*: Livy 28.42.7). Time was to prove Fabius' misgivings right, for shortly after his meeting with Scipio and Hasdrubal, Syphax married Hasdrubal's daughter, Sophoniba, and began openly supporting the Carthaginian war effort. Hasdrubal convinced the king to send an embassy to Scipio, now at Syracuse and waiting to cross to Africa, to warn the Roman commander not to wage war in Africa, nor to rely on Syphax's previous promises, for he had recently added a marriage alliance and a *foedus* to his existing *hospitium* with Hasdrubal. Scipio responded by admonishing the king not to violate their own *hospitium*, his recent *societas* with Rome, or "divine law, good faith, the extension of their right hands, or the gods, the witnesses and arbiters of compacts" (*fas, fidem, dexteras, deos, testes atque arbitros conuentorum*: Livy 29.24.3).⁴⁹

I have described not only the beginning of this relationship, but also its peregrinations over the course of several years primarily because it perfectly, and more importantly processually, illustrates the interweaving of interpersonal and interstate friendship between the Scipio brothers, Syphax, the Roman senate, Hasdrubal and the Carthaginians, Scipio Africanus, and others (including the obscure Q. Statorius). At every turn in this complicated story, gifts are lavished; services (including a marriage alliance) are pledged and performed immediately, spontaneously, and generously; and there is even a serious attempt by Syphax to mediate the conflict between two warring states friendly to him. Also significant, as might be expected, is the phenomenon of the "reconnaissance dance" and its attendant anxieties. Thus despite Syphax's apparent delight (*grata ea legatio barbaro fuit*: Livy 24.48.4) at the Scipios' initial friendly overtures towards the king,

⁴⁸ The historicity of this treaty need not be doubted, although the point is perhaps moot since no formal ratification at Rome followed (Eckstein 1987a: 222); the pact is therefore what Badian calls a military convention, or what Täubler called a *Feldherrvertrag*: Täubler 1913: 133; Badian 1958a: 119; Eckstein 1987a: 215 n. 108.

⁴⁹ Laelius' visit and Syphax's request for an interview with Scipio: Livy 28.17.4–9; cf. App. *Hisp.* 29; Scipio's voyage: Livy 28.17.10–16; cf. App. *Hisp.* 30; attempt at mediation: Livy 28.17.16–18.11; cf. Zonar. 9.10.1; App. *Pun.* 17; Scipio's charm: Livy 28.18.6–8; cf. Polyb. 11.24a.4; Fabius' misgivings: Livy 28.42.7–10; Syphax's marriage and Carthaginian alliance: Livy 29.23.2–5; cf. 30.12.11; Dio fr. 57.67; Zonar. 9.12.1; App. *Pun.* 18; Syphax's embassy: Livy 29.23.7–10; Scipio's response: Livy 29.24.2–3. Later, after Syphax's capture, Scipio would rebuke the king in terms similar to those listed at Livy 29.24.3; Livy 30.13.8–14; App. *Pun.* 27–28; cf. Zonar. 9.13.3–4; Dio fr. 57.73; Diod. Sic. 27.6.1–2. Discussion: Sands 1908: 25; Heuss 1933: 29–30; Dahlheim 1968: 229–30; Errington 1971: 92–98; Dorey and Dudley 1972: 99–100, 116, 135; Lazenby 1978: 129, 151–52, 202; Eckstein 1987a: 221–22; Levene 2010: 247–60.

he nevertheless insists on a pledge of good faith from the Romans in the person of the military adviser Q. Statorius, who performs the *beneficium* of training the king's soldiers in Roman infantry warfare. So too, later on, Syphax insists on more than simply a high-level delegation headed by Scipio Africanus' right-hand man, Laelius; only a personal interview with Scipio himself, whose hand Syphax could shake and before whom he could swear an oath, would suffice to make the friendship binding. The "grand (almost Alexander-like) gesture"⁵⁰ of courtship by Scipio – crossing to Africa, reclining on the same couch as the enemy commander, Hasdrubal, in Syphax's presence, and finally striking a *foedus* with the king in these uncomfortable circumstances – was transparently designed to impress upon the king the "above and beyond the call" nature of Roman *fides* and *amicitia*. Scipio, implicitly, appreciated the tendency towards non-engagement in the "reconnaissance dance" phase of beginning friendship, and was willing to do his utmost to convince Syphax of Rome's seriousness as a potential friend, and of the sincerity of Roman *fides*.

Nor was all of this empty language and mere gesture, but, as a Constructivist reading of these extraordinary events would conclude, language, ideas, and ideals were constitutive of the interrelations between Syphax, Rome, and Carthage. The moral discourse used by Syphax and Rome (and, undoubtedly, by Hasdrubal and Syphax in their negotiation of a marriage alliance) had real-world consequences – mostly negative, as will be seen shortly, for both Syphax and Rome – but significant enough on its own to send the balance of interests of both sides along rather different political and geostrategic trajectories than if self-interest were all that was at stake. Rome's relationship with Syphax was constructed almost entirely in moral terms right from the beginning, during the initial contact of 213 BC, when Roman *bene cumulatam gratiam* was promised, and Syphax buttressed his first request for a favor – military training for his soldiers – by emphasizing that such *beneficia* were to be expected of good and faithful allies. Again in 210, when Syphax reminded the senate of his unmatched friendship, the *patres* warmly responded. Finally, late in 206, the moral dimension of their bond was emphasized when Scipio reminded Syphax of their *hospitium*, divine law, *fides*, and the handshake. Note that these were the sole grounds upon which Scipio urged Syphax to respect his *amicitia* with Rome; mutual self-interest, the superiority of Roman arms, the weakness of the Carthaginians, threats of Roman reprisals – none of these Realist motivations make an appearance. Even after Syphax's defection and later capture by the Romans,

⁵⁰ Eckstein 1987a: 221.

Scipio was moved to sympathize with the changed fortune of the king, the memory of their *hospitium*, the shaking of their right hands, and the alliance privately and publicly joined (*mouit et Scipionem cum fortuna pristina uiri praesenti fortunae conlata, tum recordatio hospitii dextraeque datae et foederis publice et priuatim iuncti*: Livy 30.13.8). Despite the impression created by our patchy evidence of limited and intermittent contact between Syphax and the Romans, the eight years spent building up this relationship, and the mutual expenditure of large amounts of political and symbolic capital, compelled both sides to regret the failure of their relationship.

If, as has been suggested, Syphax was impressed on a moral level by the Romans' conduct over the course of their relationship, first by the Scipio brothers' *gratia*, then by the senate's *benignitas*, and finally by the future Africanus' charm and character, did the Romans themselves at any point credit the king with some degree of moral equivalence? Unfortunately, a clear answer is precluded by Livy's construction of the king's character and actions, which reduces everything to a caricature of barbarian puerility, duplicity, vanity, and lust: the king is a "barbarian, unaccustomed to Roman ways" (*barbarum insuetumque moribus Romanis*: 28.18.6); his delight and joy are closely tied to his barbarian nature (cf. 24.48.4: *grata ea legatio barbaro fuit*; 28.17.8: *barbarus laetus*); and "the Numidians more than other barbarians are prone to passionate lust" (*sunt ante omnes barbaros Numidae effusi in uenerem*: 29.23.4). Clearly a tendentious portrait, clouded by outrage and informed by hindsight, which is why we should not put too much faith in Livy's attribution to Scipio himself the belief that Syphax "would hardly hold his commitment to the Romans more serious or sacred than the common run of barbarians, whose loyalty hangs on fortune" (*[Scipio] quod haud grauius ei sanctius quam uolgo barbaris, quibus ex fortuna pendet fides, ratus fore*: 28.17.6). All this conforms rather too neatly with Livy's own caricature of the barbarian "other" in his *in sua uoce* commentary elsewhere, and further loses value as independent evidence for Scipio's views since Livy attributes precisely the same opinion to Hasdrubal, son of Gisgo, later on in his narrative: "Hasdrubal was mindful of how vain and changeable was the nature of barbarians" (*Hasdrubal, memor . . . quam uana et mutabilia barbarorum ingenia essent*: 29.23.6).⁵¹

On the other hand, other than the senate's kindly response to Syphax and gifts to him in 210 BC, the record preserves no positive evidence for the Romans' crediting the king with even a modicum of moral worth.

⁵¹ On Livy's "other" construction of Syphax, Masinissa, and the Numidians generally, see Levene 2010: 220, 247–60.

All we hear is chastisement, criticism, and stern reminders to Syphax of his pledges and promises. As a *hospes* at Syphax's court, Scipio did not go out of his way to correct Hasdrubal when the latter observed that the Roman commander entrusted himself to "the untested good faith" of the king (*fidem inexpertam*: Livy 28.18.10), despite the fact that Syphax's *fides* had been tested repeatedly between 213 and 210, when he effectively kept the Carthaginians distracted in Africa while encouraging the defection of the Carthaginian army's Numidian contingents in Spain. Such shabby treatment of the king by Rome may in fact explain why Syphax did not feel morally obligated to adhere to a strict interpretation of his alliance with the Romans, or why he ultimately decided to marry into the family of Hasdrubal – a tangible indication by the Carthaginian of his approval, on a moral and affective level, of the Numidian king's character.⁵²

The case of Rome's relations with Syphax may therefore be regarded as an instance, in the international sphere, of the failure to engage during the "reconnaissance dance" phase of beginning friendship, when both partners must provide reasonably clear indications that they credit each other with similarity of moral character. The responsibility for this failure, if the evidence may be trusted, lay with the Romans, who treated Syphax as a man of little moral worth. The reasons for this are less clear; perhaps it was sheer ethnic prejudice. On the other hand, the Romans showed themselves perfectly capable of entering a long-lived friendship a bit later on with the Numidian Masinissa – even after he too demonstrated "the headlong nature of the Numidians in love" (*genus Numidarum in Venerem praeceps*: Livy 30.12.18; discussion below) by hastily marrying Sophoniba. Perhaps Rome's treatment of Syphax was more a manifestation of Roman status-anxiety over the asymmetry of exchange within the relationship with the king at this particular time, when Rome felt vulnerable, and Syphax was reasonably confident of his superior position. As will be seen in [Chapter 5](#), this was a not uncommon symbolic equalizing strategy used by the Romans to gain status in their international relationships.

A processual interpretation of the repeated attempts at friendship formation in this case serves to reinforce this impression. First, that Syphax had, in the Roman view at least, a fairly elastic definition of *fides* is in itself significant; the king evidently thought that the interpretation of his *amicitia* with Rome was bilateral rather than one-sided, as it would have been in a dependent international relationship. Note too that Fabius' misgivings

⁵² On the Romans' treatment of Syphax, cf. Eckstein 1987a: 221: the king's demand for a personal interview with Scipio "may be an indication of Syphax's irritation at the haphazard manner in which the Romans had previously handled relations with him."

about Syphax's loyalty had to be argued for rather than simply posited before the senate; the *patres*, Fabius must have appreciated, believed their international *amici* should enjoy a certain amount of autonomy in their foreign-policy decisions, as indeed Attalus of Pergamum did around this same time when he abandoned the Roman war against Macedon to protect his kingdom from Prusias of Bithynia (above, pp. 85, 87). However, like the Aetolians (above, pp. 91–92), Syphax miscalculated: making a separate peace (or in Syphax's case, a *foedus*) with Rome's current enemy was simply unacceptable. The *hospitium* with Hasdrubal, on the other hand, simply was not an issue; Fabius did not specifically cite it as a reason for not pursuing the alliance with the king in his speech to the senate, nor, of course, did it prevent Scipio from striking a treaty with Syphax when the king's *hospitium* with Hasdrubal was revealed.

What some Romans interpreted as bad faith, however – and this is the second point to note – looks at the problem of Syphax's behavior the wrong way around. It is surely the perspective of Syphax, rather than that of the Romans, that matters here. The king could only have concluded from the Scipio family's repeated and strenuous attempts to court him that the balance of negotiating power lay with him, not Rome. In 213 BC, the Scipio brothers needed Syphax to keep the Carthaginians busy in Africa, while Syphax, for his part, was merely happy to make the connection (*grata ea legatio barbaro fuit*: Livy 24.48.4), and, being sufficiently confident in his superior position in the relationship, and therefore in the balance of exchanges, requested the immediate performance of a favor – training for his troops by Q. Statorius, a centurion from the legions – as a pledge of Roman *fides*. In 206, moreover, Scipio Africanus could not even contemplate an invasion of Africa without sufficient cavalry, which his own army lacked, but which Syphax had in abundance. Indeed this is why the Roman commander pursued Syphax so strenuously, initially taking time out from conducting a critical Roman war in Spain, and undertaking a long and potentially hazardous journey from Tarraco deep into enemy territory to meet with Syphax in Africa.⁵³ Later, when the king's envoys visited him at Syracuse, Scipio was even prepared to overlook what the

⁵³ Scipio's ships narrowly avoided interception by the Carthaginian fleet as they were entering the port in Numidian territory: Livy 28.17.13–16; App. *Hisp.* 30; the return journey was equally perilous: Livy 28.18.12; it was also dangerous to cross into hostile territory in Africa: Livy 28.18.10. Just how crucial to the success of the Roman enterprise in Spain was the presence of the Roman commander on the ground, as Africanus well knew, was proven by significant defections of Rome's Spanish allies after the deaths of the Scipio brothers in 211 BC (Livy 25.36.15: *alienata prouincia*; some stayed loyal: Polyb. 10.7.3; cf. Livy 28.42.3). Soon after his African interlude, a rumor that Africanus himself was dead once again prompted widespread revolt in Spain (Livy 28.24.1–4).

Romans regarded as Syphax's repeated displays of bad faith – including now a formal treaty with Carthage – in order to convince the king to fulfill the obligations of friendship; in this same episode, according to Livy, Scipio was in despair over the wrecking of his plans and the loss of his great hope of having Syphax as an ally (*Scipio quamquam magno momento rerum in Africa gerendarum magnae spe destitutus erat*: 29.24.2). Syphax clearly got the message about whose needs and vulnerability were more acute in the context of Rome's Spanish and African campaigns; thus his demand that Scipio come to Africa for a personal meeting, for which he was prepared to provide the Roman commander “only an escort as a pledge of his good faith” (*in id modo fide ab rege accepta, tutum aduentum fore*: Livy 28.17.9 [emphasis added]). The apparent freedom with which Syphax interpreted his prerogatives and obligations as a Roman *amicus* arose from what he assumed was his stronger bargaining position; he thus felt comfortable enough in exercising a free hand while trying to balance Roman and Carthaginian power to suit his own best interests. Such latitude of independent action is incompatible with the foreign *clientela* model of Roman international relations: in this context, as in so many others, the power of choice and interpretation of obligations clearly resided with both parties rather than the Romans alone. Syphax, for the period under consideration here (213–206 BC), and for the specific purposes of his *amicitia* (to help Rome in their Spanish and African campaigns), was clearly in the dominant position.

Finally, how can this evidence be subjected to a Constructivist interpretation? The Romans' evident refusal to credit Syphax with even a modicum of moral equivalence significantly affected the king's decisions – and, more importantly, had an autonomous political effect in constructing the geostrategic realities faced by Rome in Africa. A host of contingent strategic variables – Rome's deficiency in cavalry, Syphax's position in his own kingdom, Carthage's ability to resist the Roman invasion forces, and, eventually, Masinissa's involvement in the war in Africa – all hinged upon moral and emotional criteria, according to the ancient sources. The failure of both sides to agree on their relative moral standing resulted in the failure to move the local system towards a consensus-based, collective-security community, but instead only exacerbated the already violence-prone anarchy in North Africa, which would culminate in some of the most egregious examples of bad faith and inhuman atrocity of the Second Punic War, including covert espionage by the Romans under the pretense of good-faith diplomacy, and their burning of the Numidian-Carthaginian double camp ahead of the Battle of Zama; Polybius says the latter action was incomparable to any

other that preceded it, so far did it exceed all in sheer horror.⁵⁴ Like the United States after 9/11 – which quickly burned through an unprecedented fund of international goodwill as the George W. Bush administration was perceived to behave more unilaterally, failed to grant America's traditional allies ("Old Europe") moral equivalence, and became increasingly bogged down in a worsening security situation in the Middle East, punctuated by episodes of barbaric cruelty on all sides, but, most uncharacteristically, on the part of the US itself – so in North Africa in the late third century BC, Rome's failure to credit an ally with equivalent moral *fides* contributed to the dissipation of a fund of Roman political capital that had been built up with Syphax over the course of eight years, and resulted directly in the decline in Rome's geostrategic position, the erosion of regional security for all, and the perpetration of unprecedented wartime atrocities.

One final example of the Romans establishing *amicitia* by soliciting an alliance may reinforce some aspects of this interpretation of Rome's relationship with Syphax. In the midst of Rome's second war with Philip V of Macedon, T. Quinctius Flaminius, the consul of 198 BC, launched a significant diplomatic initiative to persuade the Achaean League to abandon its long-standing alliance with the Macedonian monarchy and side with the Romans. The Achaeans held an extraordinary meeting of the League assembly at Sicyon to listen not only to the prestigious Roman delegation – headed by Flaminius' brother, Lucius – but also to Attalus of Pergamum and ambassadors from Rhodes and Athens, well-established Roman *amici* whom Flaminius had called upon to speak on Rome's behalf. Unfortunately Livy, the principal source for this episode (and whose account clearly derives from Polybius⁵⁵), does not reproduce what the ambassadors actually said, except to mention that the Athenians attacked Philip in the strongest terms. This is echoed in a speech of Aristaenus, the Achaean *strategos*, which Livy does reproduce, where the general refers to Athenian comments concerning Philip's "cruelty, greed, lust," and his "crimes against the gods above and below" (*crudelitatem, avaritiam, libidinem . . . scelera in superos inferosque deos*: 32.21.21). Aristaenus' speech in support of Rome also reveals that his position was motivated primarily by fear of the Romans' military forces, in whose shadow these negotiations were being conducted.⁵⁶ The

⁵⁴ Polyb. 14.5.14; on these events, see Polyb. 14.4–5; Livy 30.3.8–6; discussion: Levene 2010: 233–34.

⁵⁵ Aymard 1938: 94; Eckstein 1990: 54–58.

⁵⁶ The Roman fleet was lying off Cenchræa, and Flaminius was marching through Phocis and Locris, as Aristaenus reveals (Livy 32.21.7). Eckstein 1976: 139 argues that the fear motif may be exaggerated in Livy's account (derived from Polybius' defense of Aristaenus at 18.13.8); but see Eckstein 2008: 281: "fear . . . was provoked by very unsubtle Roman threats."

strategos warns that if the Achaeans spurn the alliance (which would be insane, *uix mentis sanae estis*: 32.21.37), the Romans will be their enemies by default, and the obstinacy of those few who remain unconvinced will bring complete destruction of the Achaean people (*pertinacia sua gentem uniuersam perditum iret*: 32.22.6). In addition to playing on his audience's fear of Roman power, Aristaeus holds out a tempting incentive: the Romans have also pledged to restore Corinth to the League. The Achaean *strategos* also raises doubts about the practical value of remaining in alliance with Philip, who has shown marked indifference to the attacks on the League by Nabis of Sparta. He then turns to his own personal assessment of the practical value of an Achaean alliance for the Romans: "no doubt impelled by fear and trapped in a foreign land, because they wish to lie concealed under the shadow of your aid, they flee to your alliance, that they may be received into your harbors, that they may make use of your provisions" (*metu enim uidelicet compulsi et deprensi in aliena terra, quia sub umbra uestri auxilii latere uolunt, in societatem uestram confugiunt, ut portibus uestris recipiantur, ut com meatibus utantur!*: 32.21.31). A mixture of Achaean fear, Roman need, and mutual practical advantages on both sides helped persuade the Achaean assembly to abandon their Macedonian alliance and become friends of the Roman people.⁵⁷

Thus far no surprises: the Romans and Achaeans consult their own self-interest in practical terms, and decide they need each other – the Romans, it must be stressed, needing Achaean assistance more than the Achaeans need Rome's friendship. Roman motivations conform to the pattern already noted in this section concerning the alliances sought with the Camertes, the Aetolians, and Syphax: the Romans frequently sought international partners in places far from home where they required assistance of various kinds, usually of a military nature.

Sheer self-interest and *Machtpolitik* are not the whole story, however. Once again, just as in the case of Syphax and Scipio Africanus, the construction of the relationship in moral terms contributes significantly to Roman and Achaean decision-making in 198 BC. It is true that in this case there is no positive evidence for the moral appeal of Roman *amicitia*, since Livy omitted the speeches on the Roman side where such sentiments will no doubt

⁵⁷ Embassy of Romans, Attalus, Rhodians, and Athenians at the meeting at Sicyon: Livy 32.19.5–6; Athenian attack on Philip: Livy 32.19.12; Aristaeus' speech: Livy 32.21; Roman promise to restore Corinth to the Achaeans: Livy 32.19.4; 33.32.5; cf. 33.34.9; Philip's indifference to Achaia: Livy 32.21.9–11, 13; Achaeans decide to join Rome and send troops to Corinth: Livy 32.23.1–3. Discussion: Holleaux 1935: 230; Larsen 1968: 230, 392, 394; Errington 1969: 41, 43, 72, 87; Briscoe 1973: 200–12; Eckstein 1976: 138–41; Gruen 1984: 442–47; Eckstein 1987a: 278; 1987b; 1995b: 200–02; Derow 2003: 60; Eckstein 2008: 281, 283–84.

have appeared. Nevertheless, as has been seen, Aristaenus' comments were apparently designed to amplify and reinforce the content of the missing speech by L. Flamininus. In his speech, Aristaenus stresses his anxiety over the morality of abandoning the Achaean League's long-standing alliance with Philip: the Achaean *strategos* goes out of his way to play down the king's reminders of the sanctity of their alliance and oath (*societatis . . . iuris iurandi*: Livy 32.21.5; *foedere ac iure iurando . . . cuius . . . religionem . . .*: 32.21.9) by arguing that it was Philip who broke his promise to protect the League the year before, when he failed to protect the Achaeans against the depredations of Nabis of Sparta, and now, when he is leaving them vulnerable to the forces of Nabis and Rome (*oblitus societatis eius quam nunc iactat [nos] uastandos depopulandosque Nabidi ac Lacedaimoniis reliquit . . . [Philippus] nos, socios ueteres, simul ab Nabide ac Romanis [non] tueatur*: 32.21.11–12). Aristaenus then delivers the *coup de grâce*, thus absolving the Achaeans of any moral fault: "if Philip deliberately abandoned so many allies to the depredations of their enemies, who can refuse his allies the right to look out for themselves?" (*si sua uoluntate tot socios reliquit hostibus diripiendos, qui recusare potest quin et socii sibi consulant?*: 32.21.15). In a similar vein (and for similar moral guilt-assuaging purposes), Aristaenus places great emphasis on the Athenians' reports of Philip's depravity, and provides in addition a detailed list of Philip's previous crimes, such as the atrocities committed against the Cians, Abydenes, and Messenians, his murders of his *hospes*, Chariteles, during a feast, and of Aratus of Sicyon and his son, whose wife the king then raped along with numerous other maids and wives of the household (32.21.21–25). Here Aristaenus seems to indicate that he is responding to and amplifying specific points that had earlier been raised by the Athenian ambassadors – with prompting, perhaps, from the Roman delegation, or in conjunction with L. Flamininus' opening speech.

Whatever the case, in the Achaean decision to join the Roman side in 198 BC, as in several cases examined in this chapter so far, moral considerations merge with the practical needs of the moment in the minds of policymakers. Such considerations must have played some, unfortunately now rather opaque, role in deciding the Achaeans to entrust themselves to the *fides* of Rome. Once again, a Constructivist reading would suggest that the moral factors emphasized by Aristaenus, the Athenians, and likely by L. Flamininus himself played at least some part in this major alteration of the configuration of alliances in Greece. By stripping Macedon of its traditional allies in the Achaean League, Aristaenus, the Athenians, and L. Flamininus overturned a long-standing, delicate balance of power in the region, a change that would ultimately result in Philip V's defeat, witness

the establishment of a new, more stable balance of power in Greece, and neutralize the Macedonian threat for the next twenty years. A shift toward collective security and away from violent, conflictual anarchy in the region arose as much from moral as *Machtpolitik* factors.⁵⁸

Thus far in this section we have considered cases where pressing military and related needs compelled the Romans to seek allies abroad, resulting in diplomatic exchanges, in some cases treaties of various types, and ultimately informal *amicitia*. Another means of establishing *amicitia* through diplomacy occurred when Rome was asked by one of its preexisting *amici* to arbitrate its disputes with another state with which Rome apparently had no prior relations. The sources for the period under consideration attest only one likely example, and an obscure one at that. In 198 BC, when Antiochus III was attacking the kingdom of Pergamum, Attalus begged for Roman military intervention. The Romans refused on the ground that they could not aid Attalus against an ally and friend of the Roman people (*socium et amicum populi Romani*: Livy 32.8.13), but would send a delegation asking Antiochus to leave Attalus alone, since “it was proper that kings who were allies and friends of the Roman people also preserve the peace amongst themselves” (*aequum esse socios et amicos populi Romani reges inter se quoque ipsos pacem servare*: 32.8.16). Antiochus fully complied with Rome’s wish.⁵⁹

It is unclear when exactly the *amicitia* with the Seleucid kingdom referred to in the passages quoted above was first established. It may have been sometime during the reign of Seleucus II (reigned 247–226 BC), for Suetonius states that the emperor Claudius once produced an old letter showing that the senate and people of Rome promised friendship with Seleucus if he canceled the tribute of Ilium forever.⁶⁰ A far better candidate, however, is

⁵⁸ The establishment of a more permanent peace, of course, had to await the defeat of the Aetolians and Antiochus in 189–188 BC, but as will be seen in [Chapter 5](#), these events also lend themselves quite neatly to a Constructivist interpretation.

⁵⁹ Attalus’ complaint: Livy 32.8.9–12; senate’s reply: Livy 32.8.12–16; Antiochus’ compliance: Livy 32.27.1. Leuze 1923: 190–201; Badian 1959: 82–84; Schmitt 1964: 269–70; Errington 1971: 156–57; Briscoe 1973: 183; Rawlings 1976: 3–5; Gruen 1984: 538–39, among others, defend the authenticity of the episode against Holleaux 1942: 331–35 (cf. Ma 1999: 279–81). Grainger 2002: 31–36, believes that the story is true, but that Attalus was lying about Antiochus’ attack on Pergamum. His theory, however, depends on his unconvincing portrait of Attalus as a serial shirker: above, n. 29.

⁶⁰ *Illeisibus quasi Romanae gentis auctoribus tributa in perpetuum remisit recitata uetere epistula Graeca senatus populique R. Seleuco regi amicitiam et societatem demum pollicentis* (Suet. Claud. 25.3). Gruen 1984: 64–65, 612; Grainger 2002: 11–13 defend the authenticity of the friendship with Seleucus against, among others, Holleaux 1935: 56–58 and Ferrary 1988: 25 n. 81. Battistoni 2009: 81–82 doubts the *societas* but not the *amicitia*, but as we have seen, this pairing is conventional and need not imply that a formal *foedus* existed between Rome and the Seleucid kingdom. Erskine 2001: 172–75 argues that “Seleucus” is an error, and that the *amicitia* in question refers to the request of Antiochus III for an alliance in late 194 BC (on which, see below, p. 341).

to hand in an episode much closer in time to the exchange of 198. Under the year 200 BC Polybius records a Roman embassy to Antiochus III to try to persuade the king to settle his dispute with Ptolemy V peacefully.⁶¹ Thus in 198 the Romans could plausibly claim before Attalus that they were friends and allies of the Seleucid kingdom, and even more to the point of Antiochus himself, since *amicitia* was probably established on the occasion of their mediation of a dispute between their friend, Ptolemy V, and the Seleucid king in 200. Unfortunately this is the limit of what the sources say about the episode, but it suffices to demonstrate yet another method by which Rome established *amicitia* through diplomatic initiatives.⁶²

The moral restraint exercised by the Romans towards Antiochus, and by Antiochus towards Attalus in 198, also deserves some attention. Here *amicitia* was invoked on all sides in order to settle an escalating dispute between the two kingdoms – and it was remarkably effective. The constitutive power of the ideal of international friendship may not fully explain Roman behavior on this occasion; after all, as we have seen, it was precisely in this period that the war with Philip had reached an impasse, and the Romans were about to launch a major diplomatic offensive against Macedon by bringing the Achaean League onto the Roman side. Rome was therefore far too preoccupied with the war with Philip to contemplate undertaking further war with the most powerful Hellenistic monarch of the period, who was then at the height of his power, having recently returned from a triumphant Alexander-like *anabasis* in the eastern regions of his empire. Roman motivation thus requires little explanation.⁶³ What does require explanation, however, is Antiochus' self-restraint. The all-powerful ruler of the East, who now called himself "the Great," would have had every reason to take advantage of Rome's preoccupation, and give in to his "insatiable imperialist appetite"⁶⁴ if all he was motivated by was self-interest, and his calculus was driven by the Realist imperatives of the international system. Rather than indulge in pure speculation because Antiochus' behavior

⁶¹ οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι . . . ἀπέπλευσαν ὡς Ἀντίοχον καὶ Πτολεμαῖον ἐπὶ τὰς διαλύσεις (Polyb. 16.27.5). On the diplomacy of 200 BC, see Holleaux 1935: 50–51; Heuss 1933: 35–37; Walbank 1967: 533–34; Dahlheim 1968: 258 n. 72; Errington 1971: 156; Cimma 1976: 70–72; Gruen 1984: 616, 617 n. 26; Ma 1999: 73, 81–82; Grainger 2002: 24–25, 28–29; Eckstein 2006: 286–89; 2008: 308–11 (with others cited at n. 2), 338.

⁶² The possibly parallel case of Athens' *amicitia* is too controversial to warrant discussion here; see Holleaux 1935: 117–19, 269–70; Dahlheim 1968: 219–21 n. 99; Gruen 1984: 56–57 n. 16; Eckstein 2008: 206–11.

⁶³ Cf. the verdict of Badian 1959: 84: a Machiavellian explanation for the senate's actions is not convincing; cf. Grainger 2002: 34: "the caution of the Roman Senate is notable."

⁶⁴ Gruen 1984: 613.

cannot be explained in Realist terms,⁶⁵ we should accept the verdict of the ancient sources: Antiochus complied with Rome's request because his obligations arising from *amicitia* compelled him to do so. In the diplomatic conflict between Rome and Antiochus in 198, the constitutive power of language and ideals was at least as constructive, and probably more so, of a peaceful outcome to the dispute with Attalus as any considerations of *Machtpolitik*.

This section may profitably be rounded out with a discussion of a third mode of establishing international *amicitia* through formal diplomacy – when the initiative came from a state that had no previous contact with the Romans, had not surrendered to them, nor had been defeated by them in war. Several examples of this type of friendship formation exist in the extant sources. If the *amicitia* with Seleucus II just discussed is authentic, the fact that the letter is couched in terms of a response indicates that it was the Syrian king who solicited Roman friendship.⁶⁶ The first and second treaties between Rome and Carthage, securely dated to 509 and 348 BC respectively, and both mentioning, in Polybius' record of them, φιλία between the two states, were probably struck on Carthaginian initiative.⁶⁷ According to Livy and Diodorus, the Samnites were also the initiators of their friendship (and treaty of alliance) with Rome in 353 (Livy 7.19.4; Diod. Sic. 16.45.8 [dated to 350]).⁶⁸ Finally, the record also attests an embassy from Ptolemy II Philadelphus in 273, who was prompted to seek Roman friendship because of the Republic's growing reputation for military prowess, particularly after the recent Roman victory over Pyrrhus, a long-standing ally and protégé of Ptolemy. On this occasion the Egyptian king sent gifts and asked for Roman friendship, and the Romans acceded to the request, sending to

⁶⁵ The only explanation offered is that Antiochus was not yet ready to tangle with Rome: Badian 1959: 83–84; Schmitt 1964: 275; Rawlings 1976: 4–5; Gruen 1984: 538; Grainger 2002: 36 (a retreat from his earlier position that Antiochus was now at loose ends, since his conquest of Coele-Syria was complete: 32). Even Holleaux 1942: 334–35, who regards the entire episode as an annalistic fabrication, suggests that Antiochus would not risk provoking Attalus and Rome at this time since he was still fighting Ptolemy for possession of Coele-Syria. Given the relative positions of Rome and Antiochus in 198 BC (with Rome struggling to keep up with Philip, and Antiochus having made a victorious end of his war with Ptolemy), such speculation is inadequate.

⁶⁶ The key phrase in the Suetonius passage quoted earlier (above, n. 60) is *senatus populiue R. Seleuco regi amicitiam et societatem demum pollicentis*: Holleaux 1935: 48 n. 3; Gruen 1984: 64–65.

⁶⁷ The treaties are quoted at Polyb. 3.22–25. For the interpretation adopted here, see the arguments of Heuss 1933: 8; Dahlheim 1968: 127 n. 27; Errington 1971: 9–10; Gruen 1984: 59–60, who also provide earlier bibliography on this large topic, to which also add Ferrary 1988: 34–40; Nörr 1989: 104–06, 108–09; Scardigli 1991: 47–127 (with extensive bibliography at 47–53, 89–93); Cornell 1995: 210–14, 325–26; Lazenby 1996: 31–35; Hoyos 1998: 5–16; Forsythe 2005: 122–23, 280–81; Serrati 2006: 114–20.

⁶⁸ Discussion: Salmon 1967: 187–93; Oakley 1998: 197–98.

Ptolemy a prestigious embassy headed by Q. Fabius Maximus Gurgus, a man who had been consul twice.⁶⁹

Thus far the evidence is not particularly illuminating for the present purposes: the sources say nothing beyond the mere fact of the relationships being established. The actual exchanges – and the language that passed between the Romans and the representatives of the other states – are regrettably missing. One further example is somewhat more informative. In 206 BC Masinissa, a member of the Numidian Massylian royal house, having suffered defeat at the hands of Rome in 208 at the battle of Baecula (which resulted in his nephew, Massiva, being captured and subsequently released: Livy 27.19.9–12), and again in 206 in a cavalry skirmish before the battle of Ilipa, decided to throw off his long-standing allegiance to Carthage and come over to the Roman side. He met with the Roman propraetor, M. Junius Silanus, at Gades, but the substance of their conversation is not recorded (28.16.11–12). A variant tradition has Masinissa meeting with P. Cornelius Scipio (the future Africanus) at Gades as well (28.35; App. *Hisp.* 37), but this is perhaps best dismissed as a doublet of the meeting with Silanus.⁷⁰ After the meeting, Masinissa crossed back to Africa to inform his people of his change of policy.⁷¹

The relationship established in 206 BC was evidently *amicitia*, for in a later retrospective passage in Livy's narrative, Scipio says to Masinissa, "you came to Spain to join friendship with me" (*in Hispania ad iungendam mecum amicitiam uenisse*: Livy 30.14.4; cf. App. *Hisp.* 37: φιλία). It is unlikely that a formal treaty of alliance was struck with the Numidian in 206 since at that point Masinissa had no legal standing as a head of state – and indeed no territory over which he could exercise sovereignty – but was a fugitive and an outlaw from the Massylian kingdom.⁷² No formal surrender took place, apparently, which stands to reason, given the relative symmetry of needs in the relationship at this point. As we have seen, the

⁶⁹ Dio fr. 41; Zonar. 8.6.11; Dion. Hal. 20.14.1–2; Val. Max. 4.3.9; Just. *Epit.* 18.2.9; App. *Sic.* 1; Eutrop. 2.15; Livy *Per.* 14. The Dio-Zonaras passage emphasizes Ptolemy's motivation. There exists a large bibliography on the subject, but most useful are Heuss 1933: 28–29; Holleaux 1935: 60–83; Dahlheim 1968: 141–46; Errington 1971: 8–9; Gruen 1984: 62–63, 673–75; Grainger 2002: 5–8 (rightly emphasizing the timing of the embassy and its relationship to the impending Roman defeat of Ptolemy's ally Pyrrhus); Eckstein 2008: 201–02.

⁷⁰ So Walsh 1965: 150 n. 13; Eckstein 1987a: 235 n. 7 (following Walsh); *contra* Lazenby 1978: 154.

⁷¹ On Masinissa's relations with Rome generally, see Badian 1958a: 125–37; Walsh 1965; Dahlheim 1968: 230–34; Errington 1971: 92–101, 257–68; Dorey and Dudley 1972: 116, 134–35; Cimma 1976: 46–51; Lazenby 1978: 151, 154, 212–13; Thompson 1981; Eckstein 1987a: 234–46.

⁷² So Dahlheim 1968: 231; cf. Badian 1958a: 295; Masinissa was "a rebel and an adventurer." On the complex Massylian succession struggle of 206–205 BC, see Walsh 1965: 150; Thompson 1981; Eckstein 1987a: 237–38.

defection of Syphax from Roman *amicitia* – and the consequent loss of his vital cavalry support – was a grievous logistical blow to Rome's plans for the upcoming African campaign. Masinissa, who was himself in need of help to take back his kingdom, now stepped in to fill that gap. But note too that despite the complementarity and rough symmetry of needs here, it was Masinissa who seemed to dictate the terms of the arrangement: despite having promised that he had access to “a hardly negligible force” of cavalry (*haud contemnendis copiis*: Livy 29.4.9), he later arrived at Scipio's headquarters with perhaps as few as 200 horse. The Roman reaction was not disappointment, but great joy (*laetissimus*: 29.29.4).⁷³

It is worth examining the retrospective passage at Livy 30.14 further since it also contains some evidence for the moral foundation of Rome's *amicitia* with Masinissa. The context of the passage is a meeting between Masinissa, Scipio, and Laelius in 203 BC, in which the Roman commander criticized the Numidian for secretly marrying Sophoniba, daughter of the Carthaginian general, Hasdrubal, and wife of the recently defeated Syphax:

Aliqua te, Masinissa, existimo intuentem in me bona et principio in Hispania ad iugendam mecum amicitiam uenisse et postea in Africa te ipsum spesque omnes tuas in fidem meam commisisse. Atqui nulla earum uirtus est propter quas tibi adpetendus uisus sim qua ego aequae ac temperantiae et continentiae libidinum gloriatus fuerim. Hanc te quoque ad ceteras tuas eximias uirtutes, Masinissa, adiecissem uelim.

I suppose you saw some good qualities in me, Masinissa, both in the beginning when you came to Spain to join friendship with me, and later in Africa when you entrusted yourself and all your hopes to me. But none of those virtues on account of which I seemed to be worth pursuing to you would I have prided myself so much as on self-restraint and imperviousness to vice. This I would also have you, Masinissa, add to the rest of your outstanding virtues.⁷⁴

Here is one case where the moral foundation of beginning friendship with the Romans in the international sphere and its constitutive effects are made explicit, and it is precisely what the analysis of interpersonal *amicitia* in the previous chapter would lead one to expect. Scipio's moral virtues, and Masinissa's too, Scipio claims, were a significant part of what drew the two leaders into friendship in the first place. Of course, these are two individuals,

⁷³ Levene 2010: 252–54, esp. 253: “Rome's alliance [*sic*] with Masinissa means that, if only to a limited degree, the Romans are dancing to Masinissa's tune.” Note too that Scipio was on the verge of revising his invasion schedule upward after Masinissa complained that the Roman was being lazy (*segniter*) in not pressing his advantage against Carthage and Syphax (Livy 29.4.8–9), but, in the end, he was diverted by the necessity of recapturing Locri (Livy 29.6.1).

⁷⁴ Livy 30.14.4–6; cf. Zonar. 9.13.2–4; App. *Pun.* 28; Diod. Sic. 27.7.

not states, but the subsequent long history of Rome's interaction with Masinissa (who lived to be over 90 years old: App. *Pun.* 106; Plin. *HN* 7.156) is overwhelmingly positive, and, according to Livy, from the very outset of his *noua consilia* in 206 the Massylian chief displayed "the most unswerving loyalty down to extreme old age" (*constantissimae ad ultimam senectam fidei*: 28.16.12). In the latter passage, Masinissa's *fides* must be understood to be towards Rome itself, for he long outlived Scipio Africanus. This is not to deny, however, the power of the interpersonal dynamic, and the complex interplay between interpersonal and international *amicitia* in the episode, which, as was seen at the end of the previous chapter, was also typical of Scipio's relationship dynamic with the Spanish peoples after the New Carthage campaign in 209. In both cases, the sources amply demonstrate the apparent conceptual and discursive slippage between interpersonal and international *amicitia* in the minds of the main actors, because, of course, the relationships in question are precisely the same. Particularly interesting here are the important, constitutive foreign-policy implications of a set of deeply personal and emotional interactions between Masinissa and Scipio – culminating in the forced suicide of Masinissa's beloved Sophoniba – for the relationship between Rome and Numidia in the short term leading up to Zama, and for the long-term fifty-year relationship of absolute *fides* that followed.

Of course, it is impossible to know for sure whether the language at Livy 30.14.4–6 is Scipio's own. It may not inspire confidence that Livy's Scipio seems to refer to an earlier meeting between himself and Masinissa in Spain, which, as was seen earlier, probably never took place. On the other hand, Livy's account is probably derived from Polybius, who himself had access to good sources – including Masinissa himself, whom the Greek historian personally interviewed.⁷⁵ The Livian passage, moreover, does not say that Masinissa actually met with Scipio, merely that this was his purpose in crossing to Spain; Masinissa's recognition of Scipio's good qualities, in addition, could well have taken place at a distance or second-hand. After all, Masinissa already knew of Scipio's magnanimous release of his captive nephew, Massiva, after the battle of Baecula. Whatever the case, the readers of Livy (and perhaps of Polybius as well) will not have questioned the moralizing tone or the discourse of friendship found in Scipio's description of the beginning of his – and the Roman state's – *amicitia* with Masinissa. Nor should we: this language had a constitutive impact on how the partners

⁷⁵ Polyb. 9.25.4; Eckstein 1987a: 245.

constructed the relationship, and in turn, a real-world effect on the regional security system in North Africa. Thus Scipio's shaming of Masinissa on moral grounds for marrying Sophoniba led directly to the king abandoning (indeed poisoning) his Carthaginian wife, thereby removing any possibility of a Numidian–Carthaginian rapprochement at the crucial closing stages of the Second Punic War. The persuasive Sophoniba represented a very real danger to the Roman campaign: Syphax had already confessed to Scipio that his former wife's feminine wiles had alienated him from his Roman alliance, and caused him to take up arms against his Roman *amicus* (*illam furiam pestemque omnibus delenimentis animum suum auertisse atque alienasse, nec conquiesse donec ipsa manibus suis nefaria sibi arma aduersus hospitem atque amicum induerit*: Livy 30.13.12).

It is worth delving into the Masinissa–Sophoniba drama even further, for it allows us to identify more precisely the nature of Rome's relationship with Masinissa. Does Masinissa's compliance with Scipio's request to give up Sophoniba mean that the king was Scipio's – or Rome's – client? Rome's superior position in the relationship is certainly indicated in Scipio's assertion that everything that formerly belonged to Rome's defeated enemy, Syphax, including his wife and kingdom, was the spoils of the Roman people (*[Syphax] ipse coniunx regnum ager oppida homines qui incolunt, quicquid denique Syphacis fuit, praeda populi Romani est*: Livy 30.14.9). Badian is thus right to argue that Masinissa was “more than any other king . . . the creature of Rome, and indeed of one Roman [i.e., Scipio].”⁷⁶ Whether he was Scipio's client, however, much less that the Numidian kingdom was ever a client state of Rome in any meaningful sense, is another matter entirely. In his criticism of Masinissa's conduct, Scipio is careful to cast his assertion of Rome's prerogative over the spoils of war in terms of justice and right: “it is right that Sophoniba be sent to Rome” along with Syphax, “and the judgment and decision about these matters belongs to the senate and people of Rome” (*Romam oportet mitti, ac senatus populiue Romani de ea iudicium atque arbitrium esse*: 30.14.10). Scipio does not deliver an imperious command to Masinissa to hand over Sophoniba as a patron would to a client; the only demand he makes of the king is a moral one – that he “conquer his high spirit, and take care lest he mar many good qualities with a single vice, and destroy the gratitude for so many good services with a fault greater than the cause of that fault is” (*uince animum; caue deformes multa bona uno uitio et tot meritorum gratiam maiore*

⁷⁶ Badian 1958a: 125.

culpa quam causa culpa est corrumpas: 30.14.11). Note too that in his initial admonition to Masinissa in the passage quoted above, Scipio uses the polite discourse of friendship to offer advice to the king (“This I would also have you, Masinissa, add to the rest of your outstanding virtues . . .,” *hanc te quoque ad ceteras tuas eximias uirtutes, Masinissa, adiecisse uelim* . . .), rather than inflicting a stern lecture – and perhaps physical harm – as a patron might be expected to do to a client who was caught out trying to cheat him.⁷⁷ Masinissa also has options: he need not have destroyed Sophoniba, but could have awaited the verdict of the senate on the possession of that particular spoil, as he was instructed to do by Scipio. That he chose to do the former is in itself a remarkable manifestation of his independence and self-determination as a Roman *amicus*; Masinissa “[took] Sophoniba out of the power of Rome . . . in direct contravention of Scipio’s instructions to him.”⁷⁸ The relationship of Masinissa to Scipio, and of the Numidian kingdom to Rome, is properly understood as *amicitia*, and the behavior of both Scipio and Masinissa indicates that they were conducting themselves according to its expectations and imperatives.

Further evidence is available, but it requires looking ahead to an episode that took place almost forty years later, in 168 BC, when Masinissa sent his son, Masgaba, to Rome to congratulate the senate on Rome’s victory in the Third Macedonian War. On that occasion, Masgaba was given the signal honor of an escort by the quaestor, L. Manlius, from Puteoli to Rome. In the senate, Masgaba proclaimed before the *patres* that his father enjoyed only the usufruct of his kingdom – Rome was its true master (*usu regni contentum scire dominium et ius eorum, qui dederint, esse*: 45.13.15); in response, the senate reminded the king that his assistance in the recent war had been requested – not demanded – and that he had been repaid for his contributions of grain (*rogasset eum per legatos senatus, quae ad bellum opus essent, et non inperasset [et] pecuniam ei pro frumento misisset*: Livy 45.13.14).

Badian observes of this polite little disagreement that “the Romans were not prepared to accept [Masinissa’s] theory of *clientela*” – nor should we. *Pace* Badian, the source of the king’s confusion here arises not from “the contrasted views of *clientela*,” or from the assumption that “*clientela* baffled the non-Roman”;⁷⁹ it arises, rather, from the clash of two different

⁷⁷ Later Roman law was explicit in exempting a patron so treated from filing a formal *legis actio* against the client; Paul. *Dig.* 47.2.90: *Si libertus patrono uel cliens, uel mercennarius ei qui eum conduxit, furtum fecerit, furti actio non nascitur*. Presumably this means the patron could exact retribution from his client without constraint imposed by law since, in legal terms, the client was a member of the patron’s household, and thus subject to his *patria potestas* (Saller 1989: 51).

⁷⁸ Levene 2010: 257. ⁷⁹ Badian 1958a: 129.

interpretations of the moral obligations – and prerogatives – of international *amicitia*. As was noted in the discussion of candor in the previous chapter, it is the privilege of both partners in a friendship to interpret the relationship however they may; those interpretations may differ, but this does not infringe on the basic right of self-determination possessed by both parties. Clients, by contrast, enjoy no such right: their task is to listen to their patron, take his advice, and display appropriate gratitude.

On the occasion of Masgaba's embassy to Rome, the senate and Masinissa were not arguing over whether their relationship was *clientela*, or how that concept was to be defined; the senate, in fact, was asserting the Numidian kingdom's status-equivalence, not its subjection to Rome. The dispute was rather over whose interpretation of friendship's obligations and the relative status of the partners should prevail. Masinissa was asserting that the asymmetry between Numidia and Rome, at that moment and for the specific purpose of the exchange, favored Rome, but to a degree that was greater than the senate was prepared to accept. The *patres* countered by pointing out that they had already attempted several equalizing strategies instead of (as the logic of *clientela* would demand) reinforcing the asymmetry: during the war they had merely requested favors from Masinissa, but did not demand them, which, it is implied, they had been in no position to do; they had also repaid Masinissa for his gifts of grain as soon as they were able. This latter detail deserves emphasis. As was seen in [Chapter 2](#), what distinguishes gift exchange from mere commercial transactions is symbolic capital, which results from the partners manipulating the timing of gift-exchange reciprocity in order to keep the cycle of exchanges going – and to achieve higher status within friendship. The senate's attempt to “de-gift” Masinissa, as it were, by converting his gift of grain into a commercial purchase was designed to deprive the king of his symbolic capital, thus canceling out any status he may have gained through the initial bestowal of the gift. In the diplomatic exchange of 168 BC, the Roman senate was evidently anxious to show not only that Masinissa's perception of the breadth of asymmetry in Numidia's relationship with Rome was exaggerated, but also that Rome had not allowed its own status relative to that of the Numidian kingdom to fall in the recent war by accepting gifts or favors from the king. These were not the sorts of anxiety that would weigh too heavily on the minds of powerful patrons. The processual logics of the senate's exchange with Masgaba indicate that Rome's relationship with the Numidian kingdom was constructed by both sides as *amicitia*, not *clientela*; all that was at issue was whose interpretation of the *amicitia* – its obligations and the relative status of the partners – prevailed.

A brief review is in order. In these first two sections I have tried to show that Rome often established *amicitiae* with foreign states through cooperation in war and through diplomatic exchanges. Generally there were three circumstances that facilitated the latter mode of entering Roman *amicitia*: when Rome sought allies in distant theaters of war, when she intervened in disputes between her preexisting *amici* and other states, and finally when the initiative came from other states to join friendship. Throughout the foregoing analysis, it has been shown that the moralizing tone and discourse of friendship have never been very far from the surface of the ancient accounts of beginning friendship with Rome; the example of Scipio's friendship with Masinissa in particular shows that moral virtues were often explicitly said to underlie the initial attraction, just as they did in the Roman experience of interpersonal *amicitia*. We have also begun to establish that such moralizing discourse was not "mere" language, disguising what were in reality *clientela* relationships of subservience, but rather expressed the true nature of the *amicitiae*, and indeed aided the Romans and their international partners in understanding and, more importantly, bilaterally constructing their associations. These constructions were, in turn, constitutive of international politics and local constellations of alliances and enmities, and sometimes of the nature of the international system, moving it away from violent anarchy and towards a more peaceful and robust collective security. These associations, moreover, were as often, if not more so, instantiated by Roman needs and vulnerability as by those of their new friends. Moral attitudes, perceptions, and performances, played out in the sequence of public interactions and exchanges, had constitutive, real-world effects on international politics.

DIGRESSION: *DEDITIO*

It is now time to turn to the second two methods of initiating *amicitia* with Rome – by performance of unconditional surrender, *deditio*, either voluntarily in anticipation of Roman protection (or in fear of Roman attack), or under duress after military defeat at Rome's hands.⁸⁰ Three

⁸⁰ The modern bibliography on *deditio* is vast; for a list, see Burton 2009: 237 n. 1. The typology of *deditio* adopted here is a refinement of Gruen 1984: 55: "A state that sought Roman assistance and was accepted into *fides*" – that is, through *deditio* – "would henceforth be adjudged an *amicus*. Even former enemies, once defeated in war and agreeing to terms," – that is, performing *deditio* – "would take on the new status." For Rich 2008: 62, "*deditiones* were made not only by communities under attack, but also by those seeking to avert attack and sometimes by communities voluntarily siding with Rome." Rich's first category corresponds to my "*deditio* under duress," while his second two are what I have designated voluntary *deditio*. Dahlheim 1968: 52–67 calls voluntary surrender

interlocking issues require discussion before proceeding: the nature of the *fides* inherent in *deditio in fidem* (and thus the correct identification of the relationship that results from a successful surrender); the meaning of *deditio* in its various descriptive forms (*deditio in fidem*, *in potestatem*, *in dicionem*); and the constitutive effects of *deditio* (and similar ancient surrender rituals) on the structure of the ancient Mediterranean international system in the third and second centuries BC.

As was seen in the previous chapter, *fides* furnished the basis and ongoing security of friendship – it was, in Cicero’s words, “the foundation of that stability and constancy which we seek in friendship” (*firmamentum autem stabilitatis constantiaeque est, eius quam in amicitia quaerimus, fides*: *De Am.* 65). *Fides*, however, was also the moral glue that bound together patrons and clients, which, it can be fairly argued, was what compelled Ernst Badian to make *clientela* the conceptual foundation of his great work on Roman imperialism. Badian writes that *deditio in fidem* performed by states “is, for our purposes, perhaps the most important way of becoming a client, as it embraces defeat in war.”⁸¹ A successful *deditio* involved the temporary disappearance of a community followed by its re-creation by *fiat* of the Roman commander – “a performative speech-act *par excellence*,” in John Ma’s terms.⁸² Given the unanswerable nature of the *fides* of the Roman commander who accepted the surrender of another sovereign state, and the fact that the surrendering state’s very existence depended on the unilateral and final decision of the commander, it is perhaps not surprising that Badian came to the conclusion he did. After all, it seems counterintuitive to suggest, by analogy with interpersonal *amicitia*, that becoming friends involves an initial surrender.

On the other hand, as was seen in the previous chapter, friendship formation is anything but a uniformly benevolent process. Deep anxiety is generated during the “reconnaissance dance” phase of initiating friendship since there is no guarantee that the trust extended by one party, manifested in his opening demonstration of friendly intent through a friendly gesture (*prestation*), will be reciprocated by the other. Moreover, if Immanuel Kant and Jacques Derrida are correct that a defensive *mistrust* of others is the default position for human beings,⁸³ then entrusting oneself to another is an

“*deditio im Frieden*” in order to distinguish it from *deditiones* performed as a consequence of defeat by Rome; see too Nörr 1989: 74: “friedlichen Deditio.” But it must be stressed that these are not distinct technical or legal categories – nor are they the Romans’ own. They are used here simply as a structuring device for the sake of analytical convenience, and to test the argument presented below that treatment of *dediticii* was not differentiated according to the circumstances of their surrender.

⁸¹ Badian 1958a: 4. ⁸² Ma 1999: III.

⁸³ Kant 1991: 214; Derrida 2005: 195 (discussed above, p. 40).

inherently risky proposition – one that indeed requires the proverbial “leap of faith.” This is precisely the dilemma faced by a state surrendering “to the faith” of the Roman people: will the general receiving the surrendering people’s pledge of good faith reanimate them and return their property, or wipe them and their city off the face of the earth? This parallel suggests that the quality of the *fides* inherent in the *deditio* ritual is fundamentally no different from that which inheres in interpersonal *amicitia*. As will be seen shortly, the expectation of mutual candor in the *deditio* ritual reinforces the identification. Thus, despite Badian’s thesis, there is no good reason to ignore the terminology the sources themselves use to describe post-*deditio* international relationships: they are not just terminologically, but also structurally and functionally, *amicitiae*, not *clientelae*.⁸⁴

The next task is to address the practical logics of *deditio*, and the meaning the sources assign to it. The basic groundwork has been laid elsewhere.⁸⁵ The *locus classicus* for *deditio* in most modern discussions of the subject is the abortive surrender of the Aetolians to the Roman consul M.’ Acilius Glabrio in 191 BC (Polyb. 20.9–10; Livy 36.27–29). On this occasion, the Aetolians, exhausted by their exertions on Antiochus’ behalf in the king’s war against Rome, offered unconditional surrender to the consul, but then recanted their decision. It is in this context that Polybius’ famous definition of *deditio* occurs. The Greek historian asserts, probably on the basis of good Roman (including senatorial) sources, “amongst the Romans, surrendering to the good faith has the same force as granting the decision about oneself to the conqueror,” that is, surrendering to Roman *potestas* or *dicio* (παρὰ <δὲ> Ῥωμαίοις ἰσοδυναμεῖ τό τ’ εἰς τὴν πίστιν αὐτὸν ἐγχειρίσαι καὶ τὸ τὴν ἐπιτροπὴν δοῦναι περὶ αὐτοῦ τῷ κρατοῦντι: 20.9.12). Thus, despite the later Latin sources, which suggest that there were differences between the most commonly encountered expressions describing *deditio* – “surrender to the faith” (*deditio in fidem*) on the one hand, and “surrender to the power” (*deditio in potestatem*) or to the “jurisdiction” (*deditio in dicionem*) on the other – Polybius’ contemporary and well-informed testimony must be decisive: all these expressions, as the majority of scholars now recognize, meant the same thing.⁸⁶

⁸⁴ On *dediticii* becoming *amici*, see Heuss 1933: 78–83; Gruen 1984: 55; *contra* Badian 1958a: 7; Rich 1989: 129.

⁸⁵ Burton 2009 is a more detailed version of the discussion presented here; Eckstein 2009 is a response.

⁸⁶ The Latin sources are Val. Max. 6.5.1 and Livy 39.54.6–7, which collectively suggest that lenient treatment followed *deditio in fidem*, and harsh treatment followed *deditio in potestatem*, and that voluntary *deditio* was always *in fidem*, whereas *deditio* after defeat in war was always *in potestatem*. As I have tried to suggest elsewhere, these assertions probably arise from the authors’ misunderstanding

This consistency of meaning is further amplified in Polybius' later discussion of the surrender of the Carthaginians in 150/149 BC, where the historian says that surrendering to Rome's power (ἡ ἐπιτροπή) means that "everything belongs to the Romans, and absolutely nothing belongs to those surrendering" (πάντων εἶναι κυρίους Ῥωμαίους, αὐτοὺς δὲ τοὺς διδόντας ἀπλῶς μηκέτι μηδενός: 36.4.3). Like the Aetolians in 191, the Carthaginians were initially "pleased" (ἔχαιρον: 36.4.5) since they thought that the senate treated them well by allowing them to surrender, and that this moderate treatment would continue, but they then balked at the conditions the Romans laid down. As Glabrio and his legate, L. Valerius Flaccus, demonstrated to the Aetolians in 191 (Polyb. 20.9.7–9, 10.7–8; Livy 36.27.5–8, 28.5–6), so Mago the Bruttian told his fellow Carthaginians in 150/149 that the time for questioning the orders of the Romans had passed once they had surrendered themselves completely to them (Polyb. 36.5.3). The only permissible exception was if a demand were "totally outrageous or beyond expectation" (τελέως ὑπερήφανον <ῆ> καὶ παρὰ τὴν προσδοκίαν: 36.5.4), which is precisely what the Aetolians earlier implied when they accused Glabrio's demands of being "neither just nor Greek" (οὐτε δίκαιον . . . οὐθ' Ἑλληνικόν: 20.10.6).

This escape route is significant to the question of the nature of the *fides* governing the *deditio* process, and, therefore, the nature of the resulting relationship. This gray area was contested ground between the surrendering party and the one receiving the surrender, and opened up discursive space for the surrendering party to dispute the nature of *deditio*, as indeed the Aetolians and Carthaginians did. What is significant about this space, however, is that it could be contested at all, that is, that a person or persons, formally now stateless and in possession of absolutely nothing, could debate the finer points of morality of the nature of the demands made by the person receiving the surrender. Once again, this is not the prerogative of a client, but of a (potential) friend. The space for candor on both sides of the *deditio* ritual supports the point made earlier, that the quality of *fides* in the Roman surrender ritual is identical to that which governs *amicitia*. This makes sense of the fact that the relationship that follows successful *deditio* is, precisely, *amicitia*.

of older terminology: by the time Livy and Valerius Maximus were writing, the generic term *deditio* had probably replaced the older, fuller formulations (*deditio in fidem/potestatem/dicionem*); the Latin authors, therefore, may well have inferred a difference in their sources' terminology where none had originally been intended (Burton 2009: 244 n. 1). Cicero, for one, in the passage quoted below, makes no distinction between treatment of those who have been defeated in war and those whose "battering rams have struck against our walls," but then sought *deditio*. For the scholarship on this issue, see Burton 2009: 243–44 n. 4.

Who or what determines whether a demand is “totally outrageous or beyond expectation,” or “neither just nor Greek”? The answer to this question is crucial not only for understanding the nature of the relationship that arises from *deditio*, but also for the Constructivist thesis of Roman interstate conduct. For the answer, it is appropriate to invoke Pierre Bourdieu’s *habitus*, as was done in the previous chapter to explain the powerful social and cultural sanctions and constraints on the conduct of friendships. As was seen in [Chapter 2](#), *habitus* create and shape expectations of conduct in informal and unstructured interpersonal relationships such that, for example, the *habitus* of gift exchanges between friends mandates that the exchanges be deferred and different. The same construction of normative practice through *habitus* is apparent in the international sphere as well. Both the Greeks and the Romans appear to have had a shared intersubjective conception of the ritual acts and comportment appropriate to surrenders, which pushed the victor in the direction of exercising leniency and mercy, and pulled the *dediticius* towards ritual displays of humility and gratitude.⁸⁷ Thus, according to Cicero:

cum iis, quos ui deuiceris consulendum est, tum ii, qui armis positis ad imperatorum fidem confugient, quamuis murum aries percusserit, recipiendi. In quo tantopere apud nostros iustitia culta est, ut ii, qui ciuitates aut nationes deuictas bello in fidem recepissent, earum patroni essent more maiorum.

Not only must we show consideration for those whom we have conquered by force, but we must also receive those who, having laid down their arms, have fled to the good faith of our commanders, even though their battering rams have struck against our walls. In this a sense of justice has been so carefully observed that those who have conquered states or peoples in war and received them into their faith become their patrons in the manner of our ancestors. (*Off.* 1.35)⁸⁸

The term Cicero uses here to describe the expected attitude of a Roman general receiving surrender – “justice,” *iustitia* – is precisely what the Aetolians in 191 BC called “just and Greek” behavior, and the opposite of what Mago the Bruttian characterizes in 150/149 as “totally outrageous and beyond expectation.” In other words, there was an expectation and an understanding – a shared cultural assumption – by all parties involved that

⁸⁷ For the Greek surrender rituals and some examples, see Gruen 1982: 64–66; Frederiksen 1984: 190; Nörr 1989: 140–42.

⁸⁸ Discussion: Eilers 2002: 38–41. Recall that the patronage of individual conquering generals is not the same as patronage exercised by the Roman state *qua* state: above, [Chapter 1](#), n. 11. On Cicero’s implicit criticism here of Julius Caesar’s deceitful promise to the Aduatuci “to preserve their state if they surrendered before the battering ram touched the wall” (*eorum ciuitatem conseruaturum, si prius quam murum aries attigisset se dedidissent*: Caes. *B. Gall.* 2.32), see Griffin 2008: 87–88.

surrenders were not occasions for exploitation and cruelty by the victor. Likewise, as Glabrio and Flaccus in 191, and Mago the Bruttian in 150/149 emphasized, the victor was entitled to expect demonstrations of contrition and an abject attitude from the conquered. Thus when the Aetolians and Carthaginians anticipated leniency and merciful comportment by the Roman authorities upon whose mercy they had thrown themselves, they were unpleasantly surprised by, in the first instance, Glabrio's gruffness (up to and including his *coup de théâtre*, ordering that the Aetolians be thrown into slave collars and chains to demonstrate to them what *deditio* meant: Polyb. 20.10.7–8; Livy 36.28.6), and in the second, by the surprising omission of any statement by the Romans about the fate of the city of Carthage itself (Polyb. 36.4.9). But note too that in the first case, of course, the Aetolians got treatment above and beyond what they could reasonably expect – that even the intemperate Glabrio allowed them to recant on their *deditio* after the ritual had been completed. Such merciful, generous conduct was uncharacteristic both of the man and of the realities of power implicit in the *deditio* process.⁸⁹

On the face of it, then, the Roman surrender ritual was not an instrument of tyranny, a source of (possibly deliberate) confusion for others, or a means of establishing foreign *clientela*. Rather, it was one among many forms of ancient international sanction, understood by all parties involved, which were specifically designed to compel a victorious military commander towards a merciful attitude and lenient conditions. Although unconditional surrender to the Romans empowered the conquering general to do whatever he wished with the surrendering people, up to and including their obliteration by massacre and mass enslavement, and the destruction of their town, the Aetolians and Carthaginians had been culturally conditioned by their own conventions – *habitus*, in Bourdieuan terminology – and by their past experience with the Romans to expect less extreme, more merciful conduct.

The interpretations offered here have received confirmation from an unexpected source: an actual historical *deditio*, recorded on an inscription from Alcántara, Spain, and dated securely to 104 BC.⁹⁰ What is perhaps most significant about this text is that it shows, without the potentially distorting mediation of an ancient historical text, that the surrender ritual was precisely the same, in terms of its form and purposes, in the historical period as it had been in the archaic past.⁹¹ The fact that the *deditio* and

⁸⁹ Duly emphasized by Eckstein 1995a: 272.

⁹⁰ See the definitive account of Nörr 1989.

⁹¹ As recorded by Livy 1.38.1–2 (the *deditio* of Collatia during the reign of Tarquinius Priscus, late seventh–early sixth century BC).

its result were recorded on durable bronze by the surrendering people, the Seanoc[enses?],⁹² reflects their joy and relief that the Roman commander, Lucius Caesius, son of Gaius, chose to accept their surrender, receiving everything the Seanoc[enses?] possessed – “fields, buildings, laws, and everything else they possessed the day before” the surrender (ll. 8–9: *agros et aedificia leges cete[raque omnia] quae sua fuissent pridie*) – and then returned all of it to them.⁹³ So evidently even here, in Spain, where there occurred some of the worst fighting (and the worst atrocities, on both sides) during the Republic, the *habitus* of mercy and leniency governed conduct. But note too the permanent hierarchical relationship that may have been established between Rome and the Seanoc[enses?] in 104: the latter were to be free (l. 7: [*liberos*]), and to have their possessions, but only for as long as the Romans saw fit (ll. 10–11: *dum populus [senatusque] Rومانus [sic] uellet*).⁹⁴ Unfortunately the precise identification of the relationship that resulted is lacking on the inscription. But by analogy with what has been argued in this section, and given the merciful treatment of the Seanoc[enses?], *amicitia*, albeit of a structurally asymmetric nature, rather than *clientela*, is probably the correct conceptual category.

The *habitus* of mercy had constitutive effects on the structure of the international system. Although warfare was generally endemic and brutal in the ancient world, such international *habitus* as the Roman *deditio* ritual among advanced states prevented the systemic violent anarchy of the third- and second-century BC Mediterranean from devolving into more extreme violent forms, such as a never-ending existential war of all against all. Massacres, mass enslavements, and the wholesale deletions of cities and towns occurred often enough, of course, but these took place during times of extreme systemic stress, when a “power-transition crisis” loomed, when “hegemonic war” broke out, or when an “unlimited revisionist state” entered the scene.⁹⁵ In addition, while modern sensibilities may recoil from the horrific brutality of ancient warfare, which involved hand-to-hand combat primarily with swords designed for hacking and delivering hideous, fatal wounds, and although ancient peoples appear to have taken perverse

⁹² On the identity of the *dediticii* on the tablet, see Hoyos 1989b; 1990.

⁹³ The men, horses, arms, and fugitives that the Seanoc[enses?] had earlier captured (from the Romans, or perhaps other Spanish peoples: Hoyos 1990: 94), were not returned to them (ll. 5–6).

⁹⁴ Or perhaps “provided that” the Romans wish, that is, pending ratification of the commander’s decision: Nörr 1989: 56–63; Rich 2008: 63. If this was the case, there is even less justification for characterizing the post-*deditio* relationship as rigorously asymmetrical, much less *clientela*.

⁹⁵ On these concepts, see Eckstein 2006: 24–26 with references to the relevant political science literature.

delight in participating in such forms of conflict year after year,⁹⁶ there were also significant moral restraints on chaos and violence. *Deditio*, in this context, functioned as a kind of proto-international law, thus mitigating the effects of a formal anarchy with informal, but for all that no less powerful, sanctions.

All of this is not to say that the Romans (and their international competitors and partners) did not occasionally violate their good faith by engaging in sharp practice; there are some remarkable instances of this sort of conduct by Rome, to be discussed in [Chapter 5](#). What requires notice here, however, is that the Romans imposed on themselves several barriers to aggressive conduct, trip wires that were designed to stay their own hands against the weak or defeated, including *deditio*.⁹⁷ The inherent moral sanction of *fides*, enshrined in the surrender ritual, had a constitutive effect on the international system, and reflects the concern of the Romans (and their competitors, but to a lesser extent) to alleviate the violent anarchy of the system in the interest of creating a more stable and controllable collective-security order. The Romans' self-imposed self-restraint, and their respect for the sanctioning power of *fides*, is where their exceptionalism lay, not in their excessive brutality or bellicosity.⁹⁸ Not even the staunchest Realists can deny that *deditio* "usually . . . led to an amenable outcome."⁹⁹

In this preliminary discussion I have tried to establish the basic conceptual framework for the remainder of the chapter. The salient points established here are as follows: the quality of the *fides* governing the *deditio* ritual is the same as that governing interpersonal *amicitia* (which is why the post-*deditio* relationship is always identified as *amicitia* by the sources); *deditio in fidem*, *in potestatem*, and *in dicionem* mean exactly the same thing (unconditional surrender), and our best evidence suggests that treatment of the surrendered was not differentiated according to the formula used by a particular author to describe the surrender; and ancient surrender

⁹⁶ Cf. Polyb. 5.2.6 (quoting Hesiod): the Macedonians "delight in war as if it were a banquet" (πολέμῳ κεχαρηότας ἥντε δαιτί). Cf. Levene 2010: 348 (on the Roman slaughter at Iliturgi in Spain in 206 BC): "the modern West regards such massacres as criminal to the highest degree, whereas in Roman eyes the victors' behaviour here could certainly be justified both legally and in customary practice."

⁹⁷ On the sanctioning power of the related *ius fetiale* procedure and the concept of *iustum bellum* (above, n. 3), see Burton 2009: 241.

⁹⁸ On the Romans' sense of "historical mission" whose task it was to bring *fides* to the world, see Hölkeskamp 2000: 229–30; on their religiously based self-restraint, unique among contemporary powers, see Eckstein 2006: 229. Not even the skeptical Thiel (1994: 149) can deny that "it is an indisputable fact that the Roman community attached great importance to good faith."

⁹⁹ Eckstein 2006: 142; cf. 2008: 55 ("voluntary *deditio* to Rome . . . usually turned out well for the community involved"). Eckstein has since softened his position: *deditio* "was not arbitrary, but it was variable" (2009: 267).

rituals, such as Roman *deditio*, served to mitigate the violent anarchy of the Mediterranean system by imposing a trip wire on aggressive conduct, thereby contributing to the construction of a more collective-security-oriented international system.

VOLUNTARY *DEDITIO*

This section of the analysis deals with situations where the moral considerations and language that this chapter has so far stressed might be thought to give way to the practical realities of warfare – the circumstances under which Rome established most of her international friendships. The sources indicate that when the Romans secured victories over their enemies, neighboring peoples would often rush to place themselves “under the protection of the Roman people,” *in dicionem, in potestatem, or in fidem populi Romani*, surrendering themselves, their cities, and their personal property to the Romans, to whose complete discretion everything was entrusted. Here we will examine several cases when *deditio* is used to establish *amicitia* when the *dediticius* had no preexisting contact, friendly or hostile, with the Roman state.¹⁰⁰

One of the most famous such surrenders occurred, according to the tradition, in 343 BC, when ambassadors from Capua came to Rome seeking “everlasting friendship and help for the present” (*amicitiam in perpetuum, auxilium praesens*: Livy 7.30.1), after having been worsted by the Samnites in a battle (7.29.6–7). The Campanian envoys argued before the senate (7.30.1–19) that they were seeking friendship without *deditio* since, although the circumstances in which they were seeking *amicitia* were more difficult for them than if they had sought it in prosperous times (when the friendship would have been “equal,” *pariter*, but less firm), and although, given the present circumstances, they would be “abject and beholden” (*subiecti atque obnoxii*: 7.30.2) friends to Rome, as a powerful state (second only to Rome itself in Italy), they should be given at least the same consideration as the Romans’ Samnite *amici*, who, however, would continue to outrank the Campanians since their *amicitia* came earlier. The envoys also pointed out that there was nothing in the Romans’ treaty with the Samnites that prevented them from undertaking new *amicitiae*, and that if they refused the Campanians’ request for protection as *amici*, the rich territory of Capua would belong to the Samnites rather than to Rome; but if they accepted their request, in exchange for this one-time favor the

¹⁰⁰ Discussion: Heuss 1933: 78–83; Dahlheim 1968: 52–67.

Campanians would contribute to Rome's "power and glory forever" (*pro imperio uestro et gloria semper*: 7.30.7); everything the Campanians had would belong to the Romans, whom they would regard as their founders, parents, and immortal gods (*conditorum, parentium, deorum immortalium*), and no other state would surpass Capua in "obedience and loyalty" (*obsequio . . . fideque*: 7.30.19) to Rome. The *patres* agreed to friendship (*amicitiam institui*: 7.31.2), but only on such terms as would not violate Rome's existing friendship with the Samnites; all they could do as *amici* of both parties was to send an embassy to the Samnites requesting that the Campanians suffer no violence at their hands. The Campanians found this insufficient, however, and so underwent the *deditio* ritual, thereby ensuring that an attack on themselves by the Samnites would be an attack against Rome since Capua was now effectively Roman property.¹⁰¹

Leaving aside the obvious apologetics for Rome's later treatment of Capua that Livy himself anachronistically introduces in his account of the Campanians' speech (the historian's filter is obviously an *ante hoc* justification for Rome's later punishment of Capua in 211 BC, after their defection to Hannibal in the Second Punic War), and notwithstanding the suspiciously Thucydidean logic of part of the Campanians' argument at Livy 7.30.9 (if you defend us, we will be yours; if you refuse, we will belong to the Samnites),¹⁰² this is a remarkably frank and insightful assessment of the nature of international power in Italy in the mid-fourth century BC. The speech illustrates both the Romans' perception of their own status and power, and its implications for the nature of *amicitia*. The ambassadors argue that the solicitation of *amicitia* when a state is hard-pressed makes

¹⁰¹ Discussion: Salmon 1967: 195–96; Dahlheim 1968: 59–63; Huergon 1969: 29; Harris 1971: 105; Salmon 1982: 13; Frederiksen 1984: 180–91; Nörr 1989: 45–46; Eckstein 2006: 141–42. Frederiksen 1984: 185–91 and Oakley 1998: 284–89 convincingly defend the historicity of the Campanian *deditio* (against, e.g., Heuss 1933: 81; Dahlheim 1968: 59, 60–63; Forsythe 2005: 287–88). Of course I do not pretend to be able to prove that what Livy reproduces are the *ipsissima uerba* of the Campanian ambassadors, but his representation is significant in itself, for it reveals the beliefs, expectations, and attitudes of Livy's Roman readers during the historical period.

¹⁰² Neither is enough, in itself, to justify jettisoning the passage *tout court*, *pace* Forsythe 2005: 284–85, 287–88, or to dismiss it, *per* Oakley 1998: 285, as "almost worthless as historical evidence." More to the point is that the Campanian ambassadors speak as we would expect men in their position to speak. As for Forsythe's probably reasonable suggestion (284–85; cf. Oakley 1998: 285–86) that the model for the argument that if Rome fails to protect the Campanians they will fall to the Samnites and thus add to the Samnites' strength is in fact Thucydides' account of the Corcyrean affair (thus Capua = Corcyra, Rome = Athens, and the Samnites = Sparta/Corinth), this too need not vitiate the substance of the speech since the geopolitical realities in Italy at the time would compel states under threat to make precisely these sorts of argument. And of course, the historical determinist Thucydides would not have been surprised by what the Campanians say here.

for a stronger bond than when the state seeking friendship is prosperous.¹⁰³ Here is the principle of “a friend in need is a friend in deed” from the interpersonal sphere of *amicitia*, well known to the Romans from at least as far back as Ennius.¹⁰⁴ The weaker bond is, in fact, the friendship of equals (*infirmiore uinculo . . . ex aequo*), which is of course what we would expect, given, as was shown in the previous chapter (pp. 64–66), that if true equilibrium between friends were achievable, there would be no compelling reason – in terms of symbolic capital – for the relationship to continue; the self-validation provided by similarity-seeking and the self-sufficiency provided by complementarity-seeking would be fully met, the partners would become perfect *alter egos*, and the cycle of reciprocity would end. But as matters stood in 343 BC, the Campanians were compelled by force of circumstances to seek Roman protection in order to ensure their very survival, and ultimately to perform unconditional surrender, while all they could promise in return was that they would remember the Roman *beneficium*. Nor was this an insignificant pledge: as the ambassadors remind the *patres*, in exchange for the one-time favor of Roman protection (*auxilium in praesens*) the Campanians will provide perpetual friendship (*amicitiam in perpetuum*), and thus contribute to Roman power and glory (*imperium et gloria*). Above all, and in clear anticipation of the discourse of the *deditio* ritual to come, the Campanians promise to make over to the Romans everything they have – themselves, their city, and their (very rich) territory.

The account of the Campanian *deditio* has significant implications for the present topic in other ways. First, it clearly demonstrates the particular Roman view of establishing international *amicitia*: the Romans could see no just means (*par*: Livy 7.31.2) of protecting the Campanians against Rome’s preexisting friends, the Samnites, unless the former surrendered themselves. The usual, cynical IR Realist interpretation of the Roman objection is that the *patres* were searching for an excuse – any excuse – to confront the emerging threat of the Samnites to their own national security, and the Campanians gave them the pretext they needed.¹⁰⁵ But as in the case of Rome’s treatment of Syphax, discussed earlier, it is not Roman motivation that matters here, but the perspective of other states.

¹⁰³ The Samnites, as we might expect, later on argue precisely the opposite before the *patres*, saying that requests from a state that joined Roman *amicitia* in prosperity are more justifiable than those made by a state that seeks Roman *amicitia* in adversity (Livy 8.1.9).

¹⁰⁴ Cf. Enn. *Scaen.* 210 V: *amicus certus in re incerta cernitur* (“a sure friend is discovered in uncertainty”), freely translated as “a friend in need is a friend in deed” by Grant 1971: 209; Warmington 1988: 299.

¹⁰⁵ Badian 1958a: 21, 30, 35 (accepting requests for protection was a Roman “technique” for expanding Roman power); Oakley 1993: 31; Eckstein 2006: 141–44.

Apparently the Romans took quite seriously (because they were expected to) the *habitus* on the proper treatment of old friends, who must take priority over the new. Just how seriously they took their obligations is indicated by all the options they tried to explore in order to avoid contravening their preexisting obligations towards their Samnite *amici*, who were themselves an extremely aggressive, bellicose, and expansionary power in this period. Thus, in terms of the Constructivist model, the Roman insistence that the Campanians undergo *deditio* was an attempt to contain rather than expand the sphere of conflict in southern Italy. The Romans achieved this by raising the stakes of the Samnites' war on the Campanians, that is, by increasing the consequences of Samnite aggression: if the Samnites continued to attack Campanian territory, they would now have to deal with Rome as well as Capua. This Constructivist reading of Roman behavior in these circumstances – that they were trying to contain conflict, and build a more stable collective-security regime in southern Italy – coheres better with the Roman predilection for self-imposed self-restraints on their own aggressive tendencies (above), than the cynical, Realist view that the Romans were simply creating opportunities for their own aggrandizement by manipulating others into performing *deditio*.

The second point to note is that the Romans should not be seen as compelling their *amici* into a position of subservience – *subiecti atque obnoxii* in the Campanian ambassadors' terms – simply for the sake of it, or to reduce them to *clientela* status by virtue of the performance of *deditio*. It cannot be denied that the senate, by advising the Campanians to undergo formal *deditio*, was in fact burdening the ambassadors with an inferior status that they were clearly reluctant to accept; witness the Campanians' outstretched hands, their tears, and their prostration after the ceremony was complete (*manus ad consules tendentes, pleni lacrimarum in uestibulo curiae procubuerunt*: Livy 7.31.5), to say nothing of their initial attempt to avoid *deditio* altogether, choosing instead to deliver an oration promising Capua's abject subservience to Rome. Despite the histrionics of the Livian version of the speech, however, the Campanians must have been fully aware from the outset that regardless of how they entered Roman *amicitia* (with or without *deditio*), their position would perpetually be one of inferiority; hence their initial pledge to consider themselves and all their property as belonging to the Romans, whom they would regard as their founders, parents, and gods. The only point at issue was the extent of their inferiority, that is, the level of self-determination and choice they would continue to exercise as the inferior partner in a Roman friendship.

The broader significance of this finding is that the establishment of friendship by *deditio* was understood by Rome's international partners to be the less attractive option for those trying to initiate *amicitia* than beginning *amicitia* through purely voluntary and unfettered diplomatic exchanges, such as were described in the first part of this chapter. Inferiority could result in either case, of course, but, as some Samnite ambassadors later noted in their audience before the senate in 341 BC, the Campanians were completely under Roman control since they had surrendered themselves to Rome, as opposed to the Latins, who by the terms of their treaty could make war on whomever they chose (*Campanorum aliam condicionem esse, qui non foedere sed per deditionem in fidem uenissent; itaque Campanos, seu uelint seu nolint, quieturos; in foedere Latinos nihil esse quod bellare cum quibus ipsi uelint prohibeant*: Livy 8.2.13). If the Samnite assertion may be trusted, evidently the loss of some foreign-policy decision-making autonomy marked the difference between those who performed *deditio* in order to establish *amicitia* with Rome, and those who enjoyed the protection of a treaty.¹⁰⁶ Once again, a Constructivist reading of this evidence would suggest that by preferring unconditional *deditiones* and informal *amicitiae* (as opposed to formal alliances), thereby closing off foreign policy options for other bellicose states, the Romans were trying to create more security, not less. They pursued these policies in their own interest, of course, but this had the benevolent side effect (intentional or not) of making the formal anarchy of the international system more stable and less war-prone.

The final point to make about the Campanian *deditio* focuses on gesture and comportment – the performative aspect of the “reconnaissance dance” of beginning friendship – and how these help to identify the relationship established by Rome and Capua in 343 BC. The Campanian ambassadors’ articulation of their concerns in this episode mirrors precisely the sorts of anxiety that individuals feel when contemplating beginning friendship, as discussed in the previous chapter. Indeed, the ambassadors’ words are simply the outward manifestation of the sort of internal dialogue that a person trying to initiate a friendship has with himself. These anxieties emerge from the dynamics of gift exchange, according to which the performance of the prestation deprives the giver of some measure of personal autonomy. But it also must have been part of the Campanians’ calculus that their disequilibrium should be temporary, “agentic,” in Dan McAdams’ terms

¹⁰⁶ Rich 2008: 71 “possession of treaty” – even an unequal one – “was in itself a mark of Roman favour,” indicating “a relatively privileged status.”

(pp. 63–64), and subject to equalization strategies instead of being permanent and deeply structural. The Campanians know they will be beholden to the Romans for their *beneficium* of accepting them into their friendship, but before they adopt the fallback option of *deditio* to secure Roman protection, they first explore the possibility of the optimal outcome – informal *amicitia* without unconditional surrender – and, amidst promises akin to performing “virtual” *deditio* (“whatever we will have and whatever we ourselves will be – all of it we will consider yours,” *quidquid deinde habuerimus, quidquid ipsi fuerimus, uestrum id omne existimaturi*: Livy 7.30.18), they are at least able to hint at ongoing agency for themselves (“what you will have done first for our safety we will do forever for your power and glory,” *quod uos pro salute nostra priores feceritis, id nos pro imperio uestro et gloria semper faciemus*: 7.30.7). In attempting to minimize the Roman prestation of accepting their *deditio*, the Campanians manifest precisely the same practical logics that all potential friends engage in during the “reconnaissance dance” phase, where the tendency towards non-engagement is particularly strong because of the Kantian default position of mistrust. Thus there is no need to reduce the Campanians’ status to *clientes* to explain their anxiety and (abject) demeanor. The resulting relationship, *deditio* or no, is, explicitly, friendship (cf. Livy 7.31.2: *amicitiam*).

In addition, the language the Campanians use to assert Capua’s comparable political status to Rome’s is remarkably similar to that used by Rome’s *amici* Eumenes and Syphax when they describe the moral equivalence of their *amicitiae* with Rome, in comparison to that of Rome’s other friends and allies. Just as Eumenes asserted before the *patres* in 189 BC, “as concerns your friendship and my goodwill towards you, frankly I would never, as far as it is in my power, yield to any one alive” (Polyb. 21.20.1; above, p. 86), and Syphax argued in 210, also before the senate, there was “nobody to whom [I am] more friendly than to Rome” (Livy 27.4.6; above, p. 95), so too the Campanians insist that they “yielded to no people except you in terms of the size of our city and the richness of our fields” (*non urbis amplitudine, non agri ubertate ulli populo praeterquam uobis cedentes*: Livy 7.30.6). Rhetorical extravagances all, perhaps, whether of the historical figures themselves or the historians who wrote about them, but it surely matters that this is the language their audiences expected to be deployed in such situations. Clients, of course, were in no position thus to articulate their position relative to that of their patrons; it would be a given (a “habit of mind,” in Badian’s terms) that by virtue of their lot as clients such claims of near-moral equivalence with Rome would be absurd – and deeply offensive to their putative patrons.

We can now turn to perhaps the most famous voluntary *deditio* of all, that of the Mamertines in 264 BC. The evidence and chronology for this event are unfortunately shrouded in controversy, but the basic outlines can be traced with some creative reconstruction.¹⁰⁷ The Mamertines were former Campanian mercenaries who had occupied Sicilian Messana on the northern tip of the island since the 280s, and were constantly being harassed by the forces of Hiero II, the king of Syracuse. At some point after suffering a major defeat at Hiero's hands in battle at the Longanus River,¹⁰⁸ the mercenaries appealed to both Rome and Carthage (the perennial enemy of Syracuse) for assistance. According to Polybius, the Mamertines offered to surrender the city (παραιδόντες τὴν πόλιν: Polyb. 1.10.2) to the Romans, but the senate debated the matter for a long time. The *patres*, according to Polybius, were wary of allowing the initiative in Sicily to pass to Carthage, whose power had recently been growing at an alarming rate. But some senators found it difficult to justify responding positively to the Mamertines, given the fact that they had punished their own soldiers quite recently for doing at Rhegium precisely what the Mamertines had done at Messana (the garrison at Rhegium, made up of Campanian auxiliaries, had massacred the townspeople and taken possession of their city: see discussion in [Chapter 5](#) below, pp. 328–30). It would thus be outrageously hypocritical – in Polybius' words, “an error difficult to defend” (δυσσπολόγητον... τὴν ἀμαρτίαν: Polyb. 1.10.4) – to accept the Mamertine request. In the end, however, the *patres* decided to accept it, and dispatched Appius Claudius Caudex, one of the consuls of 264, to the Straits of Messina with an armed force. Once he arrived at his base at Rhegium, however, Claudius discovered that a Carthaginian garrison had already been placed in the citadel of Messana. After negotiating their evacuation, the Romans then entered the town.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁷ The best overall treatment is Eckstein 1987a: 73–77, 330–34 (on the sources), 335–40 (on the Roman war decision of 264 BC); on the source problems in particular, see also Petzold 1969: 160–61; Walbank 1957 on the relevant Polybian sections; Schwarte 1971; Dorey and Dudley 1972: 1–5; Eckstein 1980a; 1980b; Hoyos 1989a. On the outbreak of the First Punic War more generally, see, in addition to the foregoing, Heuss 1949; Thiel 1954: 128–43; Lippold 1954: 154–69; Dahlheim 1968: 56–58; Hoffmann 1969; Errington 1971: 12–16; Moltzagen 1975: 89–127; Rich 1976: 119–27; De Sensi Sestito 1977: 72–81; Pinzone 1978; Harris 1979: 182–90; Thiel 1994: 132–34; Lazenby 1996: 31–60; Hoyos 1998: 17–115; Eckstein 2006: 164–67.

¹⁰⁸ The date of the battle is either in 269 or 265/264 BC; neither can be established with certainty given the current state of the sources: Thiel 1954: 144–48; Eckstein 1987a: 74–75 n. 3, 79 n. 23; De Sensi Sestito 1977: 223–32 opts for 269.

¹⁰⁹ Mamertine seizure of Messana: Polyb. 1.7.2–4; cf. 8.1; Dio fr. 40.8; Diod. Sic. 21.18; battle at the Longanus: Polyb. 1.9.7–8; Diod. Sic. 22.13; Mamertine appeal to Carthage and Rome: Polyb. 1.10.1–2; Zonar. 8.8.6; Rhegium: Polyb. 1.7; Dion. Hal. 20.4–5; Roman debate, “an error difficult to defend”: Polyb. 1.9.3–4; withdrawal of Carthaginian garrison: Polyb. 1.11.4; Zonar. 8.9.4; cf. Dio fr. 43.7–10; Roman motives for war: Polyb. 1.10.5–11.3.

Such, in brief, is the best account of the Mamertine *deditio* left to us. Polybius' account is only a summary (as indeed is his entire narrative of events down to the real starting point for his history, 220 BC: Polyb. 1.3.1), and much crucial information is omitted. But the historian does reveal, in a later context, that the result of the Mamertine *deditio* was φιλία with Rome (Polyb. 3.26.6).¹¹⁰ Like the Campanian *deditio* of 343, this is a classic instance of the establishment of Roman friendship arising from an appeal for protection – “empire by invitation,” in Geir Lundestad's formulation¹¹¹ – which in turn provokes a major conflict between two rival powers. According to the predominant Realist interpretation of these events, the conflict between Rome and Carthage was the intent behind Rome accepting the Mamertine *deditio*, rather than its unintended consequence.¹¹² Polybius, however, is quite clear that it was prevention of conflict with Carthage that was uppermost in the senators' minds in 264: the senators feared that if the Carthaginians were allowed to get a toehold in Sicily by helping the Mamertines, they would conquer Syracuse and the rest of the island, become “difficult and dangerous neighbors” to the Romans (βαρεῖς καὶ φοβεροὶ γείτονες: 1.10.6), and would use Sicily as a “bridge for a crossing to Italy” (τὴν εἰς Ἰταλίαν . . . διάβασιν: 1.10.9). Thus not even Polybius, who elsewhere argues that the Romans had “a plan of universal aggression” (ἡ τῶν ὅλων ἐπιβολή: 1.3.6, 3.2.6), is willing to attribute to them aggressive intent in accepting the Mamertine *deditio* in 264.

Once again, a Constructivist reading makes better sense of the evidence than the predominant Realist interpretation has done. In 264 BC, the Romans were more interested in containing conflict (such as the small, regional one between Hiero and the Mamertines), and preventing the outbreak of a major “hegemonic war” (such as might arise between Rome and Carthage), than in giving themselves opportunities for aggrandizement and for adding to the chaos in the region. In contemplating the implications of accepting the Mamertine *deditio*, some senators apparently thought that keeping Sicily independent, and having a portion of the island under Syracusan control was the best means of guaranteeing peace and stability in the region, since the island would act as a barrier rather than a bridge between the Roman and Carthaginian spheres, and thereby reduce the potential for major interstate conflict. It was only after the fall of Agrigentum to the Romans in 262, again according to Polybius, that the Romans were

¹¹⁰ Discussion: Gruen 1984: 66 and n. 64. Messana only became a *civitas foederata* later on (Cic. 2 *Verr.* 5.50–52; Flor. 1.18.3; Plut. *Pomp.* 10.2), for Polybius knows nothing of a *foedus* in 264 BC: Eckstein 1987a: 76 n. 8, 331, 333. Ferrary 1988: 13, 23; cf. 1990: 218, believes the treaty was struck as early as 263; Pinzone 1978: 374–79, that 241 is the most suitable date.

¹¹¹ Lundestad 1986.

¹¹² Badian 1958a: 35; Harris 1979: 182–90; Bagnall 1990: 43.

no longer content merely to protect the Mamertines and enjoy the advantages of the war, but wished to expel the Carthaginians from the island entirely, and increase Roman power.¹¹³ It is unclear what “advantages” the Romans are supposed to have enjoyed in the first phase of the war. Material gain, almost certainly,¹¹⁴ but perhaps also the achievement of their main strategic object of keeping the Sicilian bridge to Italy closed to the Carthaginians, with the help of dozens of new Roman *amici* on the island, and a pro-Roman regime firmly in power in Syracuse (see below).

That Rome’s interests lay in containing conflict and reducing the potential for a major war with Carthage is supported by other, more circumstantial evidence. First of all, it seems fairly clear that the senators envisioned only a limited Roman role in the hostilities between the Mamertines and Hiero II of Syracuse, rather than a leading role in a war between themselves and Carthage.¹¹⁵ Carthage was, after all, a long-standing Roman *amicus*, which is of course why the Mamertines found it difficult to decide which city to direct their appeal to in the first place, and in the end chose to cover all their bases and appeal to both Rome and Carthage (Polyb. 1.10.1).¹¹⁶ That only one consul, Ap. Claudius Caudex, was sent with a consular army (two legions) in 264 BC also suggests that the Romans’ assumption, intention, and hope was that they would not have to tangle with Carthage at this stage. That the consul tried negotiation three times – once even after Carthage attacked Roman ships (see below, pp. 237–38) – also suggests prevention of a larger war was a Roman *desideratum*. This also accounts for the feeling of “the majority” (whether of senators or of the people) that if they accepted the Mamertine *deditio* they might risk perpetuating

¹¹³ τῆς δ’ ἀγγελίας ἀφικομένης εἰς τὴν σύγκλητον τῶν Ῥωμαίων ὑπὲρ τῶν κατὰ τὸν Ἀκράγατα, περιχαρῆς γενόμενοι καὶ ταῖς διανοαῖς ἐπαρθέντες οὐκ ἔμενον ἐπὶ τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς λογισμῶν οὐδ’ ἤρκοοντο σεσωκέναι τοὺς Μαμερτίνους οὐδὲ ταῖς ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πολέμου γενομέναις ὠφελείαις, ἐλπίσαντες δὲ καθόλου δυνατὸν εἶναι τοὺς Καρχηδονίους ἐκβαλεῖν ἐκ τῆς νήσου, τούτου δὲ γενομένου μεγάλην ἐπίδοσιν αὐτῶν λήψεσθαι τὰ πράγματα, πρὸς τοῦτοις ἦσαν τοῖς λογισμοῖς καὶ ταῖς περὶ τοῦτο τὸ μέρος ἐπινοαῖς (Polyb. 1.20.1–2).

¹¹⁴ Such as the 100-talent indemnity imposed on Hiero II after his surrender (see below). Polybius says that the consuls convinced “the majority” – whether of the people or of the senators is unclear (Eckstein 1980a; 1987a: 80–83 [senators], against Hoyos 1984; 1998: 58–64 [people]) – to accept the Mamertine *deditio* by pointing to the advantages (again, ὠφελείαι, as at Polyb. 1.20.2) that each would get. This would seem to suggest material gain, since it is an additional motivation placed alongside “the common advantage of the war already mentioned” (τοῖς ἄρτι ρηθεῖσι περὶ τοῦ κοινῇ συμφέρειν τὸν πόλεμον: Polyb. 1.11.2), a back-reference to Polyb. 1.10.5–9, where the desirability of preventing further Carthaginian aggrandizement is stressed.

¹¹⁵ Cf. Eckstein 1987a: 79: “that Carthage would later become involved on the side of Syracuse in the dispute over Messana must have been totally unexpected”; Eckstein 2006: 165: “Rome – like Carthage – was risking conflict with Syracuse.”

¹¹⁶ On the logic of the Mamertines’ dual appeal, see Badian 1958a: 35; Eckstein 1987a: 76–79; Lazenby 1996: 37; Hoyos 1998: 44–46.

the high attrition rate of Rome's recent wars in Italy itself (Polyb. 1.11.2). It was probably not so much the potentially high casualties arising from Rome's role as a protector in the Mamertine–Syracusan conflict that worried "the majority," but rather the possibility of high casualties occurring if this limited war spilled over into a larger one with Carthage. Once again, "the majority" was interested in preventing war with Carthage, rather than provoking it. There may indeed have been a few far-sighted Realists *avant la lettre* in the senate at the time, who thought that conflict with Carthage would arise as a result of Rome's intervention – and that answering the Mamertine appeal would provide exactly the sort of pretext needed by the more hawkish senators to expand Rome's *imperium* into Sicily. To repeat, however: this is not what the evidence of Polybius suggests. The more risk-averse elements in the Roman population strove to prevent rather than provoke war with Carthage. Rome's self-restraint, exceptional among their system competitors, here stands revealed, and indicates a concern on the part of a perhaps significant section of the Roman population to contain and control the violence of the systemic anarchy, not to contribute to it by seizing opportunities for aggression.

More important for the central thesis of this study is the other main reason Polybius gives for Roman resistance to the idea of accepting the Mamertine *deditio* of 264 BC: some senators worried about the Romans being branded hypocrites for defending men who had committed a blatantly immoral act, the sort of crime for which the Romans had punished their own Rhegian garrison in 272. Given these facts, some senators felt it would be "an error difficult to defend" (δυσάπολόγητον . . . τὴν ἀμαρτίαν: Polyb. 1.10.4), and "illogical to send help" (τὴν ἀλογίαν τῆς βοηθείας: 1.10.3) to the Mamertines. Such phrases suggest, at best, that the senate was concerned merely not to be seen by others as hypocritical, and that morality for its own sake did not enter into their calculus at all. But what matters here is not so much the Romans' ability to justify or defend their action (before, it is implied, world opinion) – that is, their ability to mount a credible pretext for accepting the Mamertine *deditio* – as the fact that Polybius uses the term ἀμαρτία. This word always carried a negative moral connotation, whether its meaning is taken to be "failure," "fault," or "error." While it is true that in Polybius' time the Christian sense of "sin" was probably not within the semantic range of ἀμαρτία, "guilt" certainly was, at least since the time of Plato.¹¹⁷ The moral dimension of some of the arguments in the senatorial debate of 264, therefore, should not be

¹¹⁷ Cf. LSJ, s.v.

overlooked, but rather given their due significance. What this shows, once again, is that some Romans were willing to invoke the customary Roman self-imposed self-restraints in policymaking. For some Romans, morality mattered just as much as *Realpolitik* in deciding the issue of the Mamertine *deditio*.

Nor, apparently, was the moral dimension incidental to the first phase of the senate's negotiations with the mercenaries. The Mamertines' initial appeal to Rome was apparently couched in terms that we would expect of a *dediticius* attempting to establish *amicitia*: in the preliminaries to the surrender, Polybius says, the Campanian mercenaries stressed their *ὁμοφυλία* with the Romans (*ὁμοφύλοις*: 1.10.2) – their shared race, ancestry, and kinship. Such is the sentimental discourse of *amicitia*, implying similarity of character and virtue, and like the other instances of initiating friendship with the Romans surveyed so far in this chapter, this similarity was seen by the participants as important enough to stress at the beginning of the relationship.¹¹⁸ Of course this is precisely what we would expect to hear from a petitioning state “asking a favor which they are in no position to reciprocate,”¹¹⁹ but the fact that this stray detail pierces through Polybius' highly compressed summary of events testifies to its real importance on the occasion, rather than being “mere” discourse of no practical consequence. The Mamertines must have been searching for a better alternative to a Punic protectorate; after all, as Badian observes, “the Carthaginians seemed mysterious strangers and not so trustworthy.”¹²⁰

Badian's is probably a fair assessment of the Mamertines' own view, and hits upon yet another moral aspect – trustworthiness – that must have played some role in the Mamertines' decision-making process. There can be no question that the Romans were gradually earning themselves a reputation in the region as preservers of *fides*: a *stater* issued by Epizephyrian Locri, probably in 282 BC, depicts the goddess *pistis* (= *fides*) crowning the goddess Roma.¹²¹ At some point in the 250s/240s, the Romans monumentalized the worship of the goddess Fides, a cult of perhaps great antiquity, with the establishment of a permanent stone temple to her on

¹¹⁸ Badian's quibble – “yet [the Mamertines] were Oscan” (1958a: 31 n. 5) – need not detain us. As Sue Elwyn has suggested, “the Mamertines, as Campanians, may well have been Roman *cives sine suffragio* by descent. Certainly they will have had relatives with that status, and will, by 264 BC, have had relatives married to Roman citizens. This would have been sufficient to make them *ὁμοφύλοις* of the Romans” (Elwyn 1993: 268; followed by Coskun 2008a: 21; cf. Pinzone 2002: 117). On kinship diplomacy more generally, see Jones 1999; Erskine 2001: esp. 162–97, 203–05, 221–24, 235–36, 251–52 (on Rome and Ilium); Russo 2010 (with an important discussion on the difference between *ὁμοφυλία* and *συγγένεια* at 74–79).

¹¹⁹ Elwyn 1993: 272.

¹²⁰ Badian 1958a: 36.

¹²¹ Caccamo Caltabiano 1978, followed by Clark 2007: 62 n. 102.

the Capitoline.¹²² The timing is probably no great coincidence: the temple was a public-relations ploy designed to advertise Rome's *fides* to the world, and perhaps, by implication, to denigrate the perfidy of her Carthaginian foe. The Mamertines' positive evaluation of Rome's *fides* as early as 264, then, may be part of a larger discourse of interstate *fides* being cultivated and developed by Rome in the first half of the third century BC. Whatever the case, the Mamertines' evaluation of Rome's *fides* may have played a significant role in their decision to back Rome, a decision with real-world constitutive effects on the geopolitical situation in the western Mediterranean, whose far-reaching consequences would include the outbreak of a twenty-three-year war between Rome and Carthage.

As for the Roman response, excessive skepticism about their motive is out of place here: the Romans took their *fides* quite seriously, especially towards surrendering states, and could be expected to respond in some positive fashion to the moral pressure being exerted by the Mamertines.¹²³ In fact, that the moral obligation arising from the Roman–Mamertine *amicitia* remained the order of the day from that point on is shown in Polyb. 1.20.1, when the historian states that as late as two years into the war, when the political and military stakes – and Rome's chief adversary – in Sicily had changed so drastically, the Romans' main purpose on the island was still the protection of the Mamertines from the aggression of their enemies (1.20.1, quoted above, n. 113). The *patres'* initial hesitation over accepting the Mamertine *deditio* can thus be explained, at any rate in part, by the moral scruples of at least some of their number and, as was seen in the case of the Campanian *deditio*, by Rome's exceptional adherence to the *habitus* of self-restraint when opportunities for international aggrandizement presented themselves.

As a postscript to the Mamertine *deditio*, something should also be said about the *deditiones* of the Sicilian cities that followed in 263 BC since these cities, for Badian, were “the *paradeigma* of the client state” of Rome, the diplomatic ancestors of the Greek cities whose freedom was later

¹²² Clark 2007: 64.

¹²³ Elwyn is initially skeptical of the Romans' reception of the Mamertines' invocation of *δμοφυλία*: “kinship had little to do with Rome's decision to intervene in Sicily”; but she cannot deny that such an appeal “add[ed] an element of moral and emotional pressure to their petition” (Elwyn 1993: 268) – which dovetails nicely with Badian's point about trustworthiness, and the argument offered here. Battistoni 2009 emphasizes the importance of kinship appeals to the appealing state (“it was an important and not merely a rhetorical element”: 85), and reckons that while “kinship might influence the mood of the Romans... [they] were not willing to let [it] influence their actions beyond a certain limit” (89, 92). On the systemic and self-interested (as opposed to moral) pressures to respond positively to an appeal for help, see Low 2007: 177–78.

proclaimed by Rome in 196.¹²⁴ According to the Greek historian Diodorus Siculus, after the consuls of 263, M.' Valerius Maximus and M.' Otacilius Crassus, captured and destroyed Hadranum and were besieging Centuripa, sixty-seven Sicilian cities, "as fear fell upon them, sent ambassadors to the Romans to seek peace and to announce that they would hand their cities over to the Romans" – in other words, they performed *deditio*.¹²⁵ Apparently one of the conditions of surrender laid down by the Roman generals was the provision of troops, for Diodorus also states that the Romans "took [the Sicilians] into their armies" (ὧν παραλαβόντες τὰς δυνάμεις) before proceeding to Syracuse to besiege Hiero.¹²⁶

The cities that surrendered to Rome were no doubt small affairs,¹²⁷ and the fear they felt for their security in the face of Rome's invading legions – both consular armies, consisting of perhaps as many as 32,000 infantry and at least 2,400 horse¹²⁸ – was no doubt real. Indeed, Polybius remarks on the "confusion and consternation of the Sicilians" (τὴν διατροπὴν καὶ κατὰπληξιν τῶν Σικελιωτῶν: 1.16.4), when the consuls began operations. But compulsion in the face of fear does not mean that these *deditiones* were any less voluntary, technically speaking, than that performed by the Mamertines the year before, and, as the Mamertines' hosting of a Roman garrison in Messana shows, Roman requests for *beneficia* after voluntary *deditio* were by no means unusual. The Sicilian *dediticii* became free *amici* of Rome, none received treaties at the time, and only a few of them would receive them in the future.¹²⁹ It is difficult to imagine the two consuls making separate treaty arrangements with perhaps as many as sixty-seven different *poleis* before hastening off to Syracuse to besiege Hiero. Nor should it be inferred from Cicero's later description of five of these Sicilian cities as *ciuitates sine foedere liberae ac immunes* (Cic. 2 *Verr.* 3.13) that this

¹²⁴ Badian 1958a: 42; on the "Freedom of the Greeks," see below, pp. 223–27.

¹²⁵ εἴτα δειλίας πεσοῦσης καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσι, καὶ αὐτοὶ πρέσβεις ἀπέστειλαν περὶ εἰρήνης καὶ ἐπηγγέλαντο ἐπιδώσειν τὰς πόλεις Ῥωμαίοις ἦσαν δὲ ἐξήκοντα ἐπτά (Diod. Sic. 23.4.1). Eutropius testifies to the *deditiones* as well, but puts the figure at fifty-two cities (*Tauromenitani, Catinentes et praeterea quinquaginta ciuitates in fidem acceptae*: Eutrop. 2.19). The *deditiones* are not recorded in the summary treatments of Polybius (1.16.3) and Zonaras (8.9.10). Discussion of the exact number of cities: Hoyos 1998: 104–06.

¹²⁶ Duly emphasized by Eckstein 1987a: 108 (against Roussel 1970: 88). ¹²⁷ Eckstein 1987a: 105.

¹²⁸ Based on Polybius' explicit statement, in the context of the invasion of Sicily in 263 BC, that "the Romans have four legions of Roman citizens in all apart from the allies... each legion comprising 4,000 foot and 300 horse" (ἔστι δὲ παρὰ Ῥωμαίοις τὰ πάντα τέτταρα στρατόπεδα Ῥωμαϊκὰ χωρὶς τῶν συμμάχων... τούτων ἕκαστον ἀνὰ τετρακισχίλιους πεζοὺς, ἵππεῖς δὲ τριακοσίους: Polyb. 1.16.2); I assume an equivalent number of allied troops. Hoyos 1998: 104 puts the figure at 40,000.

¹²⁹ Only Tauromenium and perhaps Netum had treaties, and these date to the Second Punic War: above, Chapter 1 n. 2.

status was granted in 263 BC, and that the other cities, by implication, were given treaties at that time. Freedom and immunity (from taxation) make the most sense in a provincial setting, where privileged cities were often granted exemption from the Roman governor's jurisdiction and from Roman taxes and tribute. The special status of the five cities mentioned by Cicero, in other words, must date from the era of *Sicilia prouincia*, that is, after the end of the First Punic War at the earliest. The Sicilian cities that performed voluntary *deditio* in 263 were free *amici* of Rome, not *foederati*. Their commitment of troops to the Roman cause arose from their status as *dediticii* and *amici*, not from the provisions of formal treaties.¹³⁰

What were the Romans hoping to achieve by bringing onto their side such a large number of Sicilian towns? This is still the period, specified in Polyb. 1.20.1, when the Romans were content to protect the Mamertines, and enjoy the “advantages” of the war (see above). Already in command of eight legions, the Roman consuls evidently wanted to boost their numerical advantage against Hiero (hence their request for troops from their new *amici*); after all, the planned siege of such a well-fortified city as Syracuse would no doubt require maximum troop numbers and firepower. But the Romans now had to balance Hiero's new ally, Carthage, as well (Polyb. 1.11.7). From a Constructivist viewpoint, their method of achieving this is significant. The Romans were no doubt hoping to delineate a slice of territory on the island covered by congenial states, whose protection was now guaranteed by *deditio*, but who had not subjected themselves to a level of dominance that may have been exerted by the other disputing powers on the island. *Amicitia*, in other words, served to create a benevolent hierarchy between Rome and the sixty-seven cities, thus facilitating Rome's object of keeping at least a portion of Sicily out of Carthaginian and Syracusan hands. The new Roman network of friendly states, coupled with the Mamertine alliance, was intended to balance the new Carthaginian–Syracusan alliance, and to expand the sphere of Roman influence on the island, with the long-term strategic goal of preventing the use of Sicily as a Carthaginian bridge into Italy. The diplomatic method of achieving this goal – *amicitia* – had the benevolent side effect of constructing a community of interest among a large number of Sicilian towns. Their pursuit of a common project under Rome's protection and influence reduced the potential for the war on the

¹³⁰ Discussion: Badian 1958a: 36–42; Eckstein 1987a: 103–13, 168; Badian 1983: 408; Rich 2008: 64 and n. 39. Ferrary 1988: 5–12 argues that the cities were subject to “the control of Roman magistrates” from 263 BC, but there is little evidence that this control was exercised, beyond the request for troops in 263. Rich 2008: 67 demonstrates that even in Italy, treaties were not the basis for Roman troop demands, but rather being inscribed on the *formula togatorum* (above, p. 82).

island spinning out of control, since Rome had effectively neutralized a large number of potential players in the conflict by bringing them into *amicitia*. In the zero-sum hegemonic war that had broken out in Sicily, sixty-seven new friends for Rome also meant sixty-seven fewer enemies, and sixty-seven fewer states that could help Carthage achieve its goal of mastery of the island.

The final example of *amicitia* being established through voluntary *deditio* shifts the focus from Sicily in the 260s BC to the Romans' earliest military expedition to the Greek East. The Romans first crossed the Adriatic into Greece in 229 in response to the plundering raids of the Illyrian pirates under the patronage first of Agron, king of the Illyrian Ardiaei, and then of Teuta, Agron's widow and regent of the heir-apparent to Agron, Pinnes (he was Agron's son by a previous marriage, to Triteuta). Upon reaching Illyrian shores with their fleet, the Roman commanders, L. Postumius Albinus and Cn. Fulvius Centumalus, immediately received the surrenders of Corcyra (on the initiative of its garrison commander, Demetrius of Pharos), Apollonia, Epidamnus, the interior tribes of the Parthini and Atintani,¹³¹ as well as the island state of Issa. According to the ancient literary-historical sources, the result of these *deditiones* was informal *amicitia*, not formal and binding treaties of alliance.¹³²

Although the surviving accounts of these surrenders are not nearly as detailed as the others outlined in this section, some deeper analysis is necessary since the recent scholarly controversy over the nature of Rome's interest east of the Adriatic has significant implications for our subject. At the core of the controversy is an inscription from Pharos (modern Hvar) of uncertain date, published by Louis Robert in two parts in 1935 and 1960.¹³³ Peter Derow, following Ernst Badian's long-standing claim that Rome established a series of "client states" along and behind the Illyrian coastline

¹³¹ For the identification of this tribe as the Illyrian Atintani (cf. App. *Ill.* 7), as opposed to the Epirote Atintanes (cf. Strabo 7.7.8 [326 C]), see Hammond 1989.

¹³² Corcyra: Polyb. 2.11.5–6 (οἱ δὲ Κερκυραῖοι . . . σφᾶς . . . ἔδωκαν εἰς τὴν τῶν Ῥωμαίων πίστιν; φιλίαν); cf. App. *Ill.* 7 (φιλίαν); Apollonia: Polyb. 2.11.8 ([τῶν Ἀπολλωνιαστῶν] δόντων ἑαυτοὺς εἰς τὴν ἐπιτροπὴν . . .); Epidamnus: Polyb. 2.11.10 (Ῥωμαῖοι . . . τοὺς Ἐπιδαμνίους παραλαβόντες εἰς τὴν πίστιν . . .); App. *Ill.* 7 (φιλία); Parthini and Atintani: Polyb. 2.11.11 (φιλίαν); cf. App. *Ill.* 7; Issa: Polyb. 2.11.12 ([Ῥωμαῖοι] προσεδέξαντο καὶ τοὺς Ἰσσαίους εἰς τὴν ἑαυτῶν πίστιν); cf. App. *Ill.* 7; Dio 12.49.1; Zonar. 8.19.3. On these *deditiones*, and the First Illyrian War generally, see Heuss 1933: 82; Holleaux 1935: 129; Larsen 1935: 198–99; Fine 1936: 29–30; Badian 1952a; Walser 1953; Badian 1958a: 45–46; Carcopino 1961: 75–77; Dell 1967; Hammond 1968: esp. 4–7; Dahlheim 1968: 53–56; Petzold 1971; Errington 1971: 38–40; Cimma 1976: 53–54; Rich 1976: 72–73; Harris 1979: 195–97; Gruen 1984: 17, 56–57, 360–68 (esp. 365–66); Cabanes 1988: 268–78; Ferrary 1988: 24–33; Wilkes 1992: 158–62; Coppola 1993: 29–31; Feig Vishnia 1996: 19–21; Derow 2003: 52–53; Pfeilschifter 2005: 68–71; Eckstein 2006: 266; 2008: 29–76; Scherberich 2009: 53–57; Dzino 2010: 47–51.

¹³³ Robert 1935: 489–90 (Part B); 1960: 507–08 (Part A).

following the First Illyrian War,¹³⁴ goes one step further and suggests that because ll. 8–9 of Part A of the (heavily restored) Pharos inscription record the renewal of τὴν συμμαχία [χίαν] after a period of disturbance and death (which Derow takes to refer to the aftermath of the Second Illyrian War, ca. 219 BC), this must mean that Pharos – and the other cities that submitted to Rome during the First Illyrian War – had struck formal treaties of alliance with Rome in the earlier conflict.¹³⁵

Derow's thesis has significant implications for assessing the depth of Roman commitment and interest in the area after the First Illyrian War, and affects our interpretation of Roman *amicitia* as a fundamentally flexible instrument, designed to give Rome wide discretionary power in responding – or choosing not to respond – to calls for protection. *Amicitia*, as many scholars have recognized, allowed Rome to intervene as much – or, in the Illyrian case, as little – as possible in foreign affairs far from Italy.¹³⁶ But if Derow is correct, the Pharos inscription must indicate a more robust Roman influence, and a more aggressively interventionist Roman attitude towards the East, at a much earlier date than is usually supposed.¹³⁷ In Constructivist terms, if Derow is to be followed, then the Romans were apparently much less concerned with containing and quarantining system crises, and establishing more security for more states (chiefly Rome itself), than they were with setting up convenient pretexts to create more opportunities for themselves to intervene in force, and wreak havoc in an ever-widening sphere of Roman interest in the larger Mediterranean world.

¹³⁴ Badian 1952a: 72–81; 1958a: 45–46; cf. Wilkes 1992: 162. Badian was responding to the long-standing, “largely imaginary” (1952a: 78) notion that Rome established a formal “protectorate” in the area (Larsen 1935: 199; Holleaux 1935: 105–06; Fine 1936: 29; Walbank 1940: 12; Cabanes 1988: 277–78; Ferrary 1988: 24–33). But by suggesting that Rome established client states subject perforce to arbitrary changes in Roman foreign policy, Badian was simply replacing the idea of a formal protectorate with the idea of an informal one. The easy slippage between the two ideas is revealed by Hammond 1968: 8, 9, who, following Badian's foreign *clientelae* thesis, at first simply replaced the old term “protectorate” with “buffer zone” and a “zone of direct dependence on Rome,” but two decades later reverted to the language of “protectorate” – though with the proviso that this was a mere euphemism for “the area subjected to Rome” (1989: 11, 23 [euphemism]). It appears that the formerly discredited idea of an Illyrian “protectorate” after 229/228 BC has now been fully rehabilitated in the scholarship in its new guise as a zone of “client states” (e.g., Feig Vishnia 1996: 21).

¹³⁵ Derow 1991, followed by (among others; cf. Eckstein 1999: 397) Coppola 1993: 125–27. Heuss 1933: 82–83 had suspected as much.

¹³⁶ Petzold 1971: 206, 214–15, 220–21: “no expansionist intentions” by Rome; Gruen 1984: 78: the Roman connection was “inert and remote”; cf. 367–68; Eckstein 2008: 42–60, esp. 57: “the Romans seem completely absent” from Illyria after 229 BC; 58: “the Republic exercised only the loosest of hegemonies in Illyria”; 66–67: “Roman interest in Illyria after 228 was so small.”

¹³⁷ A view that is more than congenial to Harris 1979: 195–97; *contra* Holleaux 1935: 129; Gruen 1984: 17, 56–57, 360–68 (esp. 365–66); Eckstein 2008: 42–58.

Derow's conclusions about the Pharos inscription have recently been challenged by Arthur Eckstein.¹³⁸ Eckstein argues that, because the Pharos inscription is so lacunose – not least at ll. 8–9 where the key term τὴν συμμαχίαν [χίαν] appears – Derow's thesis cannot be firmly established. Eckstein further argues that even if it could be proved that the date of the inscription is ca. 219 BC, and that the troubled period mentioned on the inscription refers to the aftermath of the Second Illyrian War – and this must in fact remain most uncertain – Derow's thesis would still be problematic for a host of other important reasons. First and most importantly, Polybius, the best source for Illyrian history in this period, apparently knows nothing of a treaty with Pharos at this time. Moreover, the (heavily restored) phraseology on the inscription – τὴν συμμαχίαν καὶ φιλίαν – need not refer to a formal treaty of alliance since even in official documents such as this, it is as difficult to establish the precise diplomatic status of states on the basis of the Greek and Roman terminology of alliance and friendship on inscriptions as it is in the literary sources, which, as we have seen at the outset of this chapter, use συμμαχία/*societas* and φιλία/*amicitia* indiscriminately and interchangeably. Again, because Demetrius of Pharos was the sovereign ruler of Pharos in the 220s, a fact that Polybius well knew (5.108.7 [explicit]; cf. 2.11.17), the alleged treaty partner referred to on the inscription, “the city of the Pharians” (τῇ πόλει τῇ Φαρίων: l. 4), could not possibly have had its own treaty of alliance with Rome independent of Demetrius, who enjoyed a different diplomatic status, that is, *amicitia*.

These arguments present insuperable problems for Derow's thesis. Granted that Demetrius of Pharos and the other towns and peoples that surrendered to Rome in 229 BC, were bound by Roman *fides* to perform *beneficia* for the Republic, if called upon to do so, this was not according to the specific terms of a formal treaty. As in the case of the Sicilian cities that surrendered to Rome in 263, the obligations of the Illyrian cities and tribes were less tangible, and indeed moral, in accordance with the sanctions imposed by Roman *amicitia*: the Romans' moral duty was to protect the liberty and security of their friends; the moral duty of their friends was to display gratitude and fulfill requests for assistance.¹³⁹ After the Roman evacuation of the region in 229/228, the friendly cities and tribes of Illyria continued to pursue their own domestic and foreign-policy agendas – within parameters, to be sure, circumscribed by Roman security interests in the region, as indeed all small states in the orbit of

¹³⁸ Eckstein 1999; 2008: 45–48, 74.

¹³⁹ Badian 1952a: 82 (we need not, however, follow Badian to his conclusion that *clientela* resulted from these arrangements).

the major Hellenistic powers were long in the habit of doing by now. They were nevertheless free, and Rome “made no attempt to limit that freedom.”¹⁴⁰

The flexible nature of *amicitia* had tangible, constitutive effects on the behavior of Rome’s Illyrian *amici* in the period after the First Illyrian War. Thus, if the Pharos inscription refers to events that took place in the late 220s BC, the Pharians apparently engaged in high-level diplomacy with their mother city Paros, asking for and receiving new colonists to help overcome a demographic dip in Pharos’ population – all of this carried out in the manner of independent states with no apparent reference to Rome.¹⁴¹ So too Demetrius of Pharos could (perhaps) strike a treaty of alliance with Antigonus III Doson of Macedon sometime in the late 220s, overthrow Teuta, who had remained regent of the (much reduced) Ardiaean kingdom of Pinnes by the terms of the Roman settlement of 229/228, eliminate his political enemies in communities south of the Lissus line, established by Rome as a no-go zone for the Illyrian Ardiaei in the settlement of 229/228, conquer Rome’s *amici* the Atintani and capture Dimallum south of the Lissus – all apparently without fear of Roman reprisals or interference.¹⁴² It was only when Demetrius, in company with an Illyrian chieftain, Scerdilaidas, made a piratical naval expedition south of the Lissus (Polyb. 3.16.3, 4.16.6) – shades of Agron’s and Teuta’s pirates in the Adriatic in the late 230s – that the Romans took any notice of his activities. And, as will be seen in [Chapter 5](#), when the rupture came, it was couched in terms not of treaty-violation or aggression, but the immorality of breaking *fides* and violating the bonds of *amicitia*.

Demetrius was thus able to wreak havoc along the eastern shore of the Adriatic for several years in the late 220s BC without so much as a warning embassy from Rome. This should put paid to the idea that the region was a formal Roman protectorate, or subject to Roman control through a network of client states. Indeed, it was one of these purported clients – Demetrius of Pharos – who was most responsible for disrupting Roman arrangements, and doing his utmost to confound Roman attempts to impose order and stability. Does this mean, however, that the constitutive

¹⁴⁰ Badian 1952a: 80, 81. ¹⁴¹ Eckstein 1999: 417–18; 2008: 50.

¹⁴² Alliance with Antigonus: Polyb. 3.16.3; removal of Teuta: Dio fr. 53; cf. Zonar. 8.20.10–13; *coups d'état* south of the Lissus: Polyb. 3.18.1; conquest of Atintani: App. *Ill.* 8; capture of Dimallum: Polyb. 3.18.1. Discussion at Fine 1936: 30–39; Badian 1952a: 82–86 (to be used with caution: Eckstein 2008: 58); Hammond 1968: 10–12; Petzold 1971: 206–14; Gruen 1984: 368–72; Cabanes 1988: 282–87; Wilkes 1992: 162–63; Coppola 1993: 53–62; Eckstein 2008: 58–60 (but cf. 65–66, for doubts about a formal treaty between Antigonus and Demetrius, against which now see Scherberich 2009: 211–16).

power of ideas and discourse failed in the face of the realities of a larger, system-wide violent anarchy? On the face of it, despite the Romans' best efforts (largely in their own interest) to construct a network of friendly states as a hedge against the chronic insecurity in the region, their loose control had the paradoxical effect of creating more violence, not less. This was a consequence of the nature of the *amicitia* bond itself: its informality and, more importantly, its attribution to both parties of the power of choice and self-determination, made it more difficult for the Romans to rein in one of their powerful friends, Demetrius.

On the other hand, the Romans' intervention of 229 BC and the arrangements they made in Illyria brought several years of relative stability to a region that had been a flashpoint of endemic piracy and dynastic warfare for well over a century – to say nothing of the ongoing Illyrian raids on the kingdom of Macedon, which stretched back into the fifth century BC.¹⁴³ In any case, it certainly was not the Romans' intention to create less stability on Italy's eastern flank. Their attempt to construct a collective-security community through their *amici* could only be as effective as the self-restraint of the various peoples of the area, over whom they could not possibly exercise control without a significant Roman military presence. This applies especially in the case of Demetrius of Pharos, that mercurial agent of chaos in the region, who, both before and after his defeat by Rome in 219, sought to embroil the kingdom of Macedon in his imperial adventures (Polyb. 3.16.3, 18.8–11), and later, after the Roman defeat at Trasimene in 217, urged Philip V to undertake an invasion of Italy (Polyb. 5.101.8–10). According to Polybius, Demetrius' fatal last adventure – a “foolish and ill-planned” (εἰκῇ καὶ παραβόλως: 3.18.11) attempt to seize Messene – was typical of the man's entire life. The Greek historian's verdict on the Illyrian dynast must be decisive: “he was a courageous and daring man, but one that totally lacked reason and good judgment.”¹⁴⁴ Having only material

¹⁴³ Cabanes 1988: 85–182; Wilkes 1992: 117–58; Dzino 2010: 45–47. Note Teuta's response to the Roman ambassadors in 230 BC: it was not customary for Illyrian kings to prevent their subjects from plundering on the high seas (Polyb. 2.8.8).

¹⁴⁴ ἀνὴρ θράσος μὲν καὶ τόλμαν κεκτημένος, ἀλόγιστον δὲ ταύτην καὶ τλῆως ἄκριτον (Polyb. 3.18.9). Pace Dzino 2010: 47, I see no evidence that the trend of current scholarship is to prefer the accounts of Appian and Dio/Zonaras to Polybius' version of events. Prejudiced against Demetrius Polybius may well be, but his prejudice is based on his independent critical assessment of the evidence, and the historical facts regarding Demetrius' conduct, rather than an uncritical reproduction of the prejudices of his Roman sources. Polybius' assessment of Demetrius' character at 3.18.9–11 coheres well with what he says of him elsewhere in his work; cf. 5.12.7–8 (Demetrius, “a rash man lacking judgment,” προπετές . . . ἄκριτον, convinces Philip V to plunder and burn down shrines at Thermum in 218 BC); 7.12–14; cf. Plut. *Arat.* 49–50 (Demetrius convinces Philip to massacre the Messenians). See further Walbank 1957: 331; Eckstein 1994a; 2008: 59–60.

like this to work with, it is perhaps no surprise that the Romans failed to construct a lasting collective-security community on the eastern shore of the Adriatic in the 220s.

To summarize the findings of the present section: the ancient literary-historical sources frequently attest to the establishment of informal Roman *amicitia* through the process of voluntary *deditio*. Although the practical goal of survival was paramount in the minds of the *dediticii*, the moral dimension is once again never far removed from their decision-making processes; thus, for example, the Campanians stressed the Romans' moral worth when soliciting Roman protection against the Samnites, while the Mamertines ultimately thought the Romans more trustworthy than the Carthaginians. This process also meant that the Romans were honor-bound to protect their friends, who had to settle for some loss of autonomy, particularly in the realm of foreign-policy decision-making, and for an inferior position in the friendship. So again, the Campanians angled for a more equitable means of establishing friendship with the Romans than complete surrender, and after the default option of performing *deditio* had been (reluctantly) taken up, the Romans were strictly obliged to protect their new *amici*. This is not to say that practical motives on the Romans' part were entirely absent: given the Manichean logic of warfare in the ancient Mediterranean system – as Aristaenus pointed out to the Achaean League assembly in 198 BC in an attempt to persuade the Achaeans to abandon their alliance with Philip and join Rome (above, pp. 102–05), and as the Romans recognized when receiving the surrenders of sixty-seven Sicilian towns in 263 – securing *amici* in a theater of war reduced the number of potential enemies there.

But a Constructivist reading of the *deditio* ritual and its purposes indicates that the Romans' intention was not to create opportunities for their own further self-aggrandizement, or to add further to the chaos in these war zones. To the contrary: receiving surrenders was designed to contain and reduce disorder and violence, primarily in the Romans' own best interest. If the Romans did not always achieve that purpose (as in the case of the Illyrians, and the unstable Demetrius of Pharos), this is not the same as saying that the constitutive power of ideas and discourse was always and everywhere ineffective, or that the Romans did not at least make serious attempts to construct a more security-conscious, consensus-based community of *amici*. Unlike their overtly aggressive Hellenistic and Punic contemporaries, the Romans were more interested in constructing barriers to expansion (both their own and that of others) and methods of control (congenial to themselves, of course) than in contributing to and fueling the

prevailing violent anarchy of the Mediterranean system. Anarchy is indeed what states make, or try to make, of it.

DEDITIO AFTER DEFEAT

The discussion may now turn to those cases in which *deditio* was performed by states following their defeat by Rome in battle. The focus will be on two cases in particular, the surrender of Hiero II, the king of Syracuse in 263 BC, and the surrenders of Spanish towns and tribes during the early phase of Roman involvement in Spain in the late third and early second centuries BC. Part of the intention here is to determine whether those states that performed *deditio* after being defeated by Rome received treatment comparable to those that came under Roman protection voluntarily. It will also be useful to begin some preliminary work on the question, to be subject to detailed analysis in [Chapter 5](#), of whether *dediticii* whose first encounter with the Romans had been on the battlefield (Hiero, some Spanish tribes) were treated any differently than those who had formerly enjoyed Roman friendship, but had abandoned the relationship and gone to war with the Romans (the Aetolians in 191, discussed earlier).

The surrender of Hiero II of Syracuse in 263 BC is unfortunately obscured in the fog of controversy surrounding the outbreak of the First Punic War. The stage has already been set by the earlier discussion of the Romans' establishment of *amicitia* with the Mamertines in 264, and with perhaps as many as sixty-seven other Sicilian cities the following year. After the consul of 264, Ap. Claudius Caudex, crossed to Sicily from Rhegium, he defeated the Carthaginian and Syracusan forces in separate engagements, and probably even attempted to lay siege to Syracuse itself.¹⁴⁵ When the new consuls of 263, M.' Valerius Maximus and M.' Otacilius Crassus, arrived in Sicily, Valerius drove the Carthaginians and Syracusans away from Messina for good, and made a second attempt on Syracuse (Diod. Sic. 23.4; Zonar. 8.9.11). The consuls then went on to secure the friendship of sixty-seven Sicilian communities through voluntary *deditiones*, in addition to forcing the surrenders of several cities, including at least one (Halaesa) subject to Hiero (Diod. Sic. 22.13.2 [explicit]). As the Roman legions were approaching Syracuse for the second time in a little over a year, Hiero decided to throw in his lot with Rome, sent envoys to the Roman

¹⁴⁵ Polyb. 1.12.4, 15.5, 8, 10–11; Zonar. 8.9.10 (explicit); cf. Diod. Sic. 23.3 with 23.4 (implicit). The tradition of Claudius' siege of Syracuse is controversial: it is defended by Berve 1959: 31–33; De Sensi Sestito 1977: 91–92; Eckstein 1987a: 341–44; Lazenby 1996: 49–51 (who, however, only allows that the Romans made “some sort of tentative approach to Syracuse . . . but [then] withdrew”); Hoyos 1998: 100–03; *contra* Walbank 1957: 66–68; others cited in Hoyos 1998: 100 n. 1.

commanders to seek peace and, according to Polybius, to “shelter himself under Roman protection.”¹⁴⁶ A peace treaty resulted, the terms of which included the surrender of all Romans captured in the war thus far, and the payment of a war indemnity of 100 talents (25 of which were payable immediately). The Romans, for their part, were prepared to recognize Hiero officially as the ruler of Syracuse and its subject cities (Acrae, Leontini, Megara, Helorum, Netum, and Tauromenium), but apparently compelled the king to renounce all claim to his other pre-war Syracusan subjects in northeast Sicily. The treaty was to remain in force for a period of fifteen years.¹⁴⁷ Hiero then established friendship for the Syracusans with the Roman people (Polyb. 1.16.5, 9; cf. Plut. *Marc.* 8.6 and App. *Sic.* 2 [explicit]), apparently for the first time.

A stronger case must be made for the suggestion made here that Hiero performed *deditio* in 263 BC since, so far as I know, no scholar has ever so argued in print. I have assumed that Polybius’ statement that “Hiero sheltered himself under Roman protection” (Ἱέρων ὑποστείλας ἑαυτὸν ὑπὸ τὴν Ῥωμαίων σκέπην: 1.16.10) is a periphrasis for his usual way of describing what the surrendering party does, using a form of δίδωμι plus τὴν ἐπιτροπὴν περὶ αὐτῶν.¹⁴⁸ Parallels for this practice are available. In the context of the discussion of the Aetolian surrender of 191, for example, the historian describes surrender as “handing oneself over to the faith” (εἰς τὴν πίστιν αὐτὸν ἐγχειρίσαι). Thus it may well be the case that when Polybius says “Hiero sheltered himself under Roman protection” at 1.16.10, this was just another, more evocative, way of describing a formal surrender than his usual method of using a form of δίδωμι plus τὴν ἐπιτροπὴν περὶ αὐτῶν.

This interpretation gains support from the late and often unreliable *De Viribus Illustribus*, which states explicitly, “the consul received Hiero in *deditio*” ([consul] *Hieronem . . . in deditionem accepit: De Vir. Ill.* 37.5). The Livian tradition may lie behind this evidence, for although we lack Livy’s narrative for 263 BC, and the corresponding *Periocha* 16 does not record a Syracusan *deditio*, the statement of Livy’s epitomator, Orosius, that “Hiero sought peace as a suppliant” (*Hiero pacem supplex rogaret: Oros.*

¹⁴⁶ Sources for Hiero’s negotiations: Polyb. 1.16.3–9; Diod. Sic. 23.4.1; Zonar. 8.9.11; Livy *Per.* 16; Eutrop. 2.19; Oros. 4.7.3; *De Vir. Ill.* 37.5.

¹⁴⁷ Surrender of Roman hostages: Polyb. 1.16.9; Diod. Sic. 23.4.1; Zonar. 8.9.11; 100-talent indemnity: Polyb. 1.16.9; cf. Eutrop. 2.19; Oros. 4.7.3 (where the figure is 200 talents); 25 talents (150,000 drachmae) payable immediately: Diod. Sic. 23.4.1 (with Eckstein 1980c: 184 n. 4, citing earlier scholarship); renunciation of claims to a Syracusan empire in northeast Sicily: Diod. Sic. 23.4.1 (implicit; cf. Eckstein 1980c: 184); Roman recognition of Hiero as king of Syracuse and other communities: Diod. Sic. 23.4.1; fifteen-year term: Diod. Sic. 23.4.1 (renewal in 248: Zonar. 8.16.5; cf. Naev. fr. 47 V, with discussion at Eckstein 1980c: 184 n. 5).

¹⁴⁸ Cf. Polyb. 36.3.2, 6, 9, 4.2, 5.3, 9.13.

4.7.3) perhaps also alludes to a formal surrender. The abjectness of the suppliant Hiero certainly suggests the appropriate demeanor and posture of a *dediticius*, and we know from Zonaras, as well as from Orosius, that Hiero was “terrified” by Roman power (*Hiero rex . . . perterritus*: Oros. 4.7.2; ὁ Ἱέρων φοβήθεις: Zonar. 8.9.11). The thesis presented here must remain speculative, but the combination of Polybius’ periphrastic language, the thrust of what remains of the Livian tradition, and most importantly, the explicit statement of *De Vir. Ill.* 37.5 – which, after all, must have come from somewhere – points to the conclusion that Hiero performed a formal *deditio* in 263.

Some further discussion is necessary here because a tradition existed in antiquity, now visible to us only in Zonaras’ epitome of Dio’s account (Zonar. 8.6.14–15, 8.3; cf. Dio fr. 43.1), that Rome’s relationship with Hiero began somewhat earlier, ca. 270 BC, when the Romans were besieging their renegade Campanian auxiliaries at Rhegium. According to this tradition, the king supplied troops and grain for the besiegers, and the result was either that the king “was called a friend and ally” (καὶ φίλος Ῥωμαίοις ἐνομίσθη καὶ σύμμαχος: Zonar. 8.6.15), or that he established “friendship” with the Romans (φιλία: Zonar. 8.8.3; Dio fr. 43.1). The notion of a formal Roman–Syracusan alliance ca. 270 has never been taken very seriously,¹⁴⁹ but there has been significant scholarly support for at least informal *amicitia* stemming from Hiero’s assistance to the Romans at Rhegium.¹⁵⁰ Dio/Zonaras’ evidence does not merit the confidence placed in it, however. First of all, and perhaps most damning, it occurs in a context that is mired in the ancient controversy over the assignment of blame for the outbreak of the First Punic War. The ultimate source of the claim is undoubtedly a pro-Roman apologist, and belongs to the same spurious tradition as the alleged “accord” (ὁμολογία: Zonar. 8.6.14) that the Romans entered into with the Mamertines in precisely the same context as the purported first contact with Hiero – the siege of Rhegium ca. 270.¹⁵¹ The inventor of a story in which the Romans entered into friendship with Hiero and made an “accord” with the Mamertines ca. 270 will obviously have provided further

¹⁴⁹ Exceptions: De Sensi Sestito 1977: 53–54; Serrati 2006: 129.

¹⁵⁰ Cf. Thiel 1954: 30 n. 82, 144; Berve 1959: 13–14; Walbank 1957: 53; Eckstein 1987a: 78–79 n. 20. Hoyos 1998: 31, allows that “contacts between the besieging consuls and Hiero in 270, even a gesture like a shipload of grain, are plausible,” but believes no Syracusan troops were supplied and no friendship was forthcoming.

¹⁵¹ On the unlikelihood of Roman–Mamertine contact prior to 264 BC (as against, e.g., De Sensi Sestito 1977: 43–44; Eckstein 2006: 165 n. 202), see Hoyos 1998: 41: “obviously Roman tradition had an interest in presenting the Mamertines as allies first and aid recipients second, while blurring just when each occurred.” Hoyos 1998: 31 also suggests an “annalistic [read: pro-Roman, and therefore unreliable] source” for the story of Hiero’s aid in 270.

justification for the Roman intervention in Syracusan affairs later on in 264; indeed, the early Mamertine connection was probably manufactured to play the same trip-wire role for the beginning of the First Punic War as that actually played by Spanish Saguntum in the accepted Roman narrative of the outbreak of the Second Punic War. By suggesting that the Romans had preexisting *amicitiae* with both Hiero and the Mamertines, the Roman historical tradition could make the Roman decision to intervene in 264 less problematic: Hiero's betrayal of *fides* by attacking Messana will have provided a stronger moral pretext for Roman hostility against the king, while the Roman acceptance of the Mamertine *deditio* will have seemed less opportunistic, and less hypocritical. As we have seen, the Roman historical tradition, reflecting the concerns of a portion of the Roman senate, was already sufficiently uncomfortable with the ethical implications of the Romans helping out the Mamertine freebooters of Messana, after having punished their own Campanian garrison at Rhegium for a similar offense only a few years before, that it took pains to report a senatorial debate on the morality of doing so in 264.

Other arguments may be adduced to disprove the Roman–Syracusan *amicitia* ca. 270 BC, but these are necessarily from silence. It is surely significant, for example, that the subject of Rome's preexisting relationship with Hiero – and that with the Mamertines, for that matter – was apparently not raised in the senatorial debate of 264 (Polyb. 1.10.3–11.1); nor was it raised in Hiero's angry remonstrance with the Romans at the Straits of Messina for using their *fides* as moral cover for helping impious, bloodthirsty killers;¹⁵² nor indeed was it mentioned in the heated interview between the Roman commander, Ap. Claudius Caudex, and the Carthaginian envoys at Rhegium, where the latter threatened that if the Romans refused to abide by their friendship with Carthage, they would not even be allowed to wash their hands in the sea.¹⁵³ It would have certainly added weight to Hiero's position if he could have pointed out that the Romans were in fact violating their preexisting *amicitia* with him by supporting his enemies the Mamertines.¹⁵⁴

¹⁵² οἱ Μαμερτῖνοι Μεσσήνη ἀσεβέστατα κατειληφότες . . . θρυλοῦντες τὸ τῆς πίστεως ὄνομα, παντελῆς οὐκ ὀφείλουσι τοὺς μαιφόνους, μάλιστα πίστεως καταφρονήσοντας, ὑπερασπίζεν (Diod. Sic. 23.1.4).

¹⁵³ οὐδὲ νίψασθαι τὰς χεῖρας ἐκ τῆς θαλάσσης τολήσουσιν (Diod. Sic. 23.2.1; cf. Zonar. 8.9.1; Dio fr. 43.9).

¹⁵⁴ On the senatorial debate, see above, pp. 128–32; on Hiero's angry remonstrance, see Thiel 1954: 156; Berve 1959: 21; De Sensi Sestito 1977: 88–89; Eckstein 1987a: 94 n. 79; Hoyos 1989a: 51, 57; Nörr 1989: 103; Lazenby 1996: 48; Hoyos 1998: 31, 88; Goldsworthy 2000: 73; on the interview at Rhegium, see Eckstein 1987a: 94–96; Hoyos 1998: 90–91; Lazenby 1996: 49; Goldsworthy 2000: 73.

The Romans, for their part, could have responded much more effectively to the Carthaginians' insistence that they had no business interfering in the affairs of Sicily if they could have pointed to a preexisting relationship with the Mamertines. Had such a relationship actually existed, of course, there would have been no need for the pro-Carthaginian tradition to create a spurious Roman–Carthaginian treaty, the so-called “Treaty of Philinus,” allegedly confining Rome's sphere of interest to Italy and Carthage's to Sicily; the pro-Carthaginian Philinus manufactured the treaty, in Polybius' view, in order to fault the Romans for crossing the Straits of Messina in 264 BC.¹⁵⁵ Indeed, the invented “Treaty of Philinus” probably belongs to the same tainted apologetic tradition, once fully played out in pro-Roman and pro-Carthaginian sources no longer visible to us, as the alleged pre-264 treaties between Rome and Hiero, and between Rome and the Mamertines. There may even have been a deeper historiographical relationship, now obscure, between the invention of the Philinus treaty and the dubious early Roman *amicitiae* with Hiero and the Mamertines. Whatever the case, since Polybius apparently knew nothing of these latter, or alternatively, judged them to be no more historically believable than the “Treaty of Philinus,” and therefore beneath notice in a work of serious history, we should probably follow suit. There was no preexisting *amicitia* with Hiero before 263, when the Syracusan king surrendered to the Romans, just as there was no Roman *amicitia* with the Mamertines before their *deditio* of 264.

That the result of Hiero's *deditio* was informal *amicitia* rather than a formal treaty of alliance should be accepted as well, despite scholarly consensus to the contrary. Although Arthur Eckstein mounted a successful challenge to the consensus view over thirty years ago, the notion of a formal Roman–Syracusan *foedus* persists as an assumption in the scholarship.¹⁵⁶ What seems to have transpired in 263 BC was two separate negotiations resulting in two different status-relationships for the king. A treaty of peace there certainly was: it was to last fifteen years, and is described variously

¹⁵⁵ Polyb. 3.26.6–7. Unlike Polybius, the Roman annalistic tradition chose to parry Philinus' charge by inventing Carthaginian military assistance to the Tarentines in 272 BC, when the latter were at war with Rome (Livy *Per.* 14; Livy 21.10.8; Dio fr. 43.1; Zonar. 8.6.12–13; Serv. *Aen.* 4.628; Oros. 4.3.1). Few will dispute Polybius' opinion of the Philinus treaty: Walbank 1957: 354; Badian 1980; Eckstein 1987a: 77–79; Hoyos 1985, with earlier scholarship, *pro* and *contra*, cited at 92–93 n. 6. More recent attempts to prove Philinus correct: Scardigli 1991: 129–62; Forsythe 2005: 311–12, cf. 356; Serrati 2006: 120–29; Russo 2010: 79–87.

¹⁵⁶ *Amicitia*: Eckstein 1980c: 183–92, reiterated in 1987a: 119–24; 2006: 167; Eckstein is followed by Gruen 1984: 67–68; Hoyos 1998: 106–07; Burton 2003: 352 n. 94. For the *communis opinio*, see Berve 1959: 37; Dahlheim 1968: 129–31; Walbank 1957: 68–69; De Sensi Sestito 1977: 101–12; others listed at Eckstein 1980c: 185 nn. 6–7; Gruen 1984: 67 n. 69; Lazenby 1996: 52.

in the sources as “(a treaty of) peace,” a “truce,” and “agreements.”¹⁵⁷ The peace treaty duly expired after fifteen years in 248, and, according to Zonaras, was replaced with a “friendship for all time” (φιλία αἰδίου; Zonar. 8.16.2). No source, by contrast, ever refers to a *foedus* or συμμαχία, the usual formulation for “(formal) treaty of alliance,” to describe the relationship – either in 263 or in 248. Instead our best source, Polybius, characterizes the Syracusans as φίλοι καὶ σύμμαχοι of the Romans from 263,¹⁵⁸ which, as was seen at the outset of this chapter, is an instance of the literary sources’ “terminological inexactitude,” and need not prove the existence of a formal alliance with Hiero. It is therefore best to follow Polyb. 1.16.5: the relationship that emerged as a result of Hiero’s successful *deditio* in 263 was φιλία, a status that was confirmed “for all time” in 248, when the peace treaty expired. The *pax* of 263 was a mere temporary expedient that established the conditions upon which hostilities would cease; the relationship that was intended to endure was *amicitia*.

Further proof that Hiero’s relationship with Rome was informal *amicitia* derives from the nature of the king’s contribution to the Roman war effort in subsequent years. His assistance was fairly minimal: he never led armies against the Carthaginians, and, in Polybius’ careful formulation, provided “only a moderate amount of strictly necessary supplies,”¹⁵⁹ and did so on just two recorded occasions – in 262 BC (Polyb. 1.18.11; Zonar. 8.10.3) and 250 (Diod. Sic. 24.1.4); he may have also contributed siege equipment (Diod. Sic. 23.9.5), ships (Zonar. 8.14.4), and the use of Syracuse harbor as well (Diod. Sic. 24.1.7, where Roman ships reportedly sail from Syracuse). This is not to say that such favors were insignificant, but their purpose was strictly limited to demonstrating Hiero’s loyalty to Rome and nurturing their incipient *amicitia*. This is, in other words, another compelling example of the dynamics of the earliest phases of *amicitia* formation, extended to the international sphere, mirroring those first tentative, nervous steps that are taken towards engagement with potential friends in the interpersonal sphere (the “reconnaissance dance”). Rome did not hold Hiero to burdensome formal treaty obligations beyond the initial conditions for peace, but neither did they issue demands in the manner of a patron to a client by virtue of the king’s *deditio*. So far as we know, only

¹⁵⁷ (Treaty of) peace: Polyb. 1.17.1; Diod. Sic. 23.4.1 (διάλυσις); Diod. Sic. 23.4.1 (εἰρήνη); Livy *Per.* 16; Eutrop. 2.19; Oros. 4.7.3 (*pax*); truce: Polyb. 1.17.1; Zonar. 8.9.11 (σπονδῶν); agreements: Polyb. 1.16.9 (συνθήκας).

¹⁵⁸ Polyb. 1.16.9; cf. Plut. *Marc.* 8.6; App. *Sic.* 2: φίλος καὶ σύμμαχος.

¹⁵⁹ τὰ μέτρια καὶ τὰναγκαῖα: Polyb. 1.18.11; cf. Zonar. 8.10.3: ὁ Ἱέρων, ἀπροθύμως αὐτοῖς συναϊρόμενος πρότερον, “Hiero at first cooperated with [the Romans] only reluctantly.”

the siege engines were provided at Rome's specific "request" (μεταστέλλόμενος: Diod. Sic. 23.9.5); the rest may well have been purely voluntary – perhaps even "gifts."¹⁶⁰ The relationship between Syracuse and Rome that was initiated in 263 was informal *amicitia*: the (loose and detached) nature of their subsequent interactions ca. 263–248 proves it; so too, incidentally, does Polybius' remark at 1.20.1 (quoted earlier, pp. 128–30), that Roman aims in Sicily before 262 were strictly limited to protecting the Mamertines, and enjoying the advantages of the war (such as the indemnity Hiero was forced to pay). Becoming entangled in new, long-term formal alliances was not part of Rome's wartime strategy. Preventing the Carthaginians from using Sicily as a bridge for an invasion of Italy through a network of informal *amici*, on the other hand, was. By effectively neutralizing the hostility of one of the two significant powers on the island, thus eliminating the recent Carthaginian–Syracusan rapprochement, in addition to creating a pro-Roman sphere by accepting the *deditiones* of the sixty-seven Sicilian towns discussed earlier, the Romans attempted to transform the security situation in Sicily in a manner more congenial to their long-term self-interest.

Now that the nature of Hiero's relationship with Rome has been properly identified – *amicitia* established through *deditio* after defeat in war – we can now consider the more important issue of the internal discursive construction of the relationship, and its constitutive effects on the situation in Sicily. Despite Hiero's trenchant criticism of Roman *fides* during his earlier parley with Ap. Claudius in 264 BC (Diod. Sic. 23.1.4, quoted above, n. 152), the king evidently had a change of heart by mid-263, and the new Roman commanders, Valerius and Otacilius, were only too happy to accommodate him. According to Polybius, the consuls "gladly" or "eagerly accepted his friendship" (ἀσμένως προσεδέξαντο τὴν φιλίαν: 1.16.9). Of this there can be no doubt, for as we have seen repeatedly in this chapter, Rome was often in desperate need of local helpers in distant theaters of war, and in this case Polybius gives us a reason we would expect for the consuls' eagerness to have Hiero on their side: their armies had run badly short of provisions, which they supposed (and perhaps knew for certain, given the notorious fertility of the Syracusan plain) the king could provide in abundance

¹⁶⁰ On the early performance of favors by Hiero and its tentative nature, Burton 2003: 353. Eckstein 1980c: 188–91 paints far too benevolent a picture of the early stages of the relationship, and at 1985: 270, overstates Hiero's generosity by quoting only Polyb. 1.16.10 (Hiero "always supplied them [the Romans] with resources according to the needs of their situation," χορηγῶν ἀεὶ τοῦτοις εἰς τὰ κοτεπείγοντα τῶν πραγμάτων; cf. 1980c: 190 n. 24 for the correct translation of the passage). Surely Polyb. 1.18.11 (and Zonar. 8.10.3, for that matter: see previous note) are relevant here as well (as indeed Eckstein duly acknowledges in 1980c: 191).

(πολλήν ἔνδειαν γεγονέναι τῶν ἐπιτηδείων. διόπερ ὑπολαβόντες τὸν Ἱέρωνα μεγάλην εἰς τοῦτο τὸ μέρος αὐτοῖς παρέξεσθαι χρεῖαν: 1.16.7–8). A lacunose passage in Diodorus' surviving account indicates that the Romans had in fact been trying to court Hiero since the previous year. The passage, as it stands, reads: "[Ap. Claudius] sent envoys to Hiero and the Carthaginians to discuss raising the siege [of Messina] . . . but [or and] to state publicly that he would not go forward with war against Hiero" (πρὸς δὲ τὸν Ἱέρωνα καὶ Καρχηδονίους πρέσβεις ἐξέπεμψε περὶ διαλύσεως τῆς πολιορκίας. προσεπηγγέλετο . . . δημογορεῖν δὲ πρὸς Ἱέρωνα πολέμῳ μὴ ἐπιβήσεσθαι: Diod. Sic. 23.1.4). The result we already know: Hiero chastised the Romans for chattering on about good faith while protecting impious, bloodthirsty killers. But what deserves emphasis in this context is Ap. Claudius' eagerness to befriend Hiero – to such an extent the consul was (apparently) willing to give pledges of Roman *fides* (Hiero's response implies this) and even to proclaim publicly that Rome had no intention of making war on Hiero.¹⁶¹ This bears some similarity to Rome's later pledge to establish "friendship for all time" (φιλία αἰδίου: Zonar. 8.16.2; cf. above, p. 147) with the king. In any event, what emerges here is yet another example of Rome's apparent eagerness to have *amici* in foreign theaters of war where the Romans themselves felt vulnerable and on the defensive. The strategic situation facing the Romans in Sicily at this point was such that they could not undertake a (potentially lengthy) siege of Syracuse while at the same time fighting a (potentially long) war against the Carthaginian–Syracusan axis; they lacked a navy, a good harbor, as well as a reliable source of supply.¹⁶² That Hiero (eventually) agreed to meet these needs is surely important to the treatment he received post-*deditio*. Of course he had to pay restitution, in terms of both money and territory, for his recent war with Rome; those were the rules of the game in ancient Mediterranean warfare. But with that unpleasant transaction out of the way, Hiero was able to go on, in Polybius' words, "to rule the Syracusans in complete security for a long time after, winning crowns and honors from the Greeks" (ἄσμενῶς ἐβασίλευε τῶν Συρακοσίων τὸν μετὰ ταῦτα χρόνον, φιλοστεφανῶν καὶ φιλοδοξῶν εἰς τοὺς Ἕλληνας: 1.16.10).

¹⁶¹ The best analysis of the Diodorus passage is Hoyos 1998: 87–88.

¹⁶² See Eckstein 1987a: 117–18 for an analysis of the Roman consuls' strategic thinking in this context. Eckstein, however, too readily downplays the possibility of a long war with Carthage, and puts too much stress on Hiero's desire to make peace (1987a: 115, 118). He thus ignores the fact that it was the Romans who first sought peace in 264 BC – something Hiero (and the Romans, for that matter) probably remembered. This must have had some impact on the relative balance of negotiating power in the peace talks of 263.

But Hiero did this not by playing Rome's "sedulous client king."¹⁶³ Even Badian is prepared to admit that Hiero "remained a faithful friend of Rome. At the same time, while taking care not to offend his powerful friend, he discreetly pursued a foreign policy of his own . . . He did not become a mere puppet king."¹⁶⁴ This is an astute reading of the king's attitude and behavior throughout the 260s and 250s BC; as we have seen, Hiero was reluctant to contribute to the Roman war effort and limited his aid to what was strictly necessary to demonstrate his loyalty to the Roman cause (above and n. 160). As I have suggested, this is completely in line with behavior we would expect from a new *amicus* testing the waters of a partner's *fides*. But it is also typical of a state that, for the moment at least, has the upper hand in the relationship. Hiero knew that the Romans needed him more than he needed the Romans: the latter were now trying to wage two simultaneous transmarine wars (without much of a navy or local ports under their control) against Carthage and Syracuse (both naval powers), and the signs of strain were beginning to show – inadequate provisioning for the Roman legions, to name but one. So in terms of the inherent status-asymmetry in friendship, Hiero entered upon Roman *amicitia* with a slight edge over his former enemy: the consuls' eagerness to have the king on Rome's side proves it, as does Hiero's passivity in the subsequent Roman war effort. Badian is quite right to eschew the language of *clientela* in this case.

War reparations aside (standard ancient – and modern – practice, after all), Hiero's *deditio* under duress in 263 BC, therefore, resulted in treatment not so very different from that which the Romans extended to the Campanians, Mamertines, and the Sicilian and Illyrian states in 343, 264, 263, and 229, respectively, after their voluntary *deditiones*. We can go further: as in the non-*deditio* relationships Rome formed with the Camertes, the Aetolian and Achaean Leagues, and the Numidian leaders Masinissa and Syphax, explored earlier in this chapter, Hiero was able to exploit the momentary edge he enjoyed in the relationship arising from Roman momentary weakness and vulnerability in order to pursue a reasonably independent foreign policy thereafter. In Hiero's case, as in so many others, the construction of the relationship was dependent on the peculiar practical logics of friendship, the geostrategic realities on the ground, and the right of self-determination of the partners. As we will see in the next chapter, both Rome and Hiero continued to fashion the relationship as geostrategic necessity and geopolitical realities dictated for almost a further

¹⁶³ Green 1990: 224.

¹⁶⁴ Badian 1958a: 42–43.

fifty years. It was not the relationship they started out with, but it did not devolve into *clientela* either.

Finally, do the ancient sources give us any insight into the moral aspect of the Roman–Syracusan diplomacy of 263 BC, and its constructive effects on the international system? As has already been noted, Ap. Claudius' conciliatory demeanor towards Hiero in 264 – his apparent emphasis on the quality of Roman *fides* in his discussions with the king, and his promise to issue a public statement on Rome's cessation of hostilities against Syracuse (above, p. 149) – continued to be the policy of his successors, the consuls of 263, Valerius and Otacilius, who were "eager" for Syracusan help in the fight against the Carthaginians. Notwithstanding Hiero's negative reaction to Ap. Claudius' overture (a reaction no doubt prompted by the consul's conciliatory tone itself), by mid-263 he had apparently become more inclined towards peace with the Republic. What motivated this change of heart? Reasons of *Realpolitik* in the king's calculus naturally receive the greatest emphasis in the sources, and these are variously identified as Hiero's fear of the Romans' military might, his desire to respond to popular pressure at home to have the Roman siege of Syracuse lifted, his admiration for the Romans' early successes, his concern over the defection of many Sicilian towns – some of them his own subjects – to Rome's side, and his astute intuition that ultimately Rome stood a much better chance of winning the war than the Carthaginians.¹⁶⁵

On the other hand, Diodorus of Sicily, a source whose value this discussion has had repeated occasion to show, reveals a moral dimension to the king's decision-making process: "Hiero," he says, "believed that he had been betrayed by the Carthaginians in respect of the [Roman] crossing to Messina" (ὁ Ἱέρων νομίζων προδοθῆναι τὴν διάβασιν ὑπὸ Καρχηδονίων: Diod. Sic. 23.3). In other words, the king believed that the Carthaginians had been treacherous in allowing the Romans to cross to Sicily (or, at least, in not resisting their crossing very strenuously) in the first place, and began to consider that the Romans might be more trustworthy allies than the Carthaginians – if only by negative comparison with the latter. Evidently Hiero had changed his view of the quality of Roman *fides* that he had earlier expressed before Ap. Claudius in 264 (quoted above, n. 152) on the basis of his experience with Carthage in the interim. If the tradition of Hiero's mistrust of the Carthaginians and its

¹⁶⁵ Fear as Hiero's motive: Zonar. 8.9.11; Oros. 4.7.3 (both quoted above, pp. 143–44); *De Vir. Ill.* 37.5 (a tradition rejected, for no good reason, by Eckstein 1985: 270 n. 15; cf. 1987a: 115; 1995b: 208 n. 54); popular pressure at home: Diod. Sic. 23.4.1; admiration for Roman successes and belief in their better chances of winning: Polyb. 1.16.4; concern over defection of Sicilian towns: Polyb. 1.16.3–4.

impact on his decision to change sides is reliable (and there seems to be no reason to doubt it), it is a further indication of the moral considerations in deciding to initiate friendship – and its real-world, constitutive effects. Hiero's mistrust of the Carthaginians, of course, makes sense given the long history of Syracusan–Carthaginian antagonism;¹⁶⁶ but it is equally clear that the Romans had somehow impressed Hiero with their essential trustworthiness over the course of their first year of involvement in Sicilian affairs. Perhaps Hiero was impressed by the Romans' (presumably lenient) treatment of the sixty-seven surrendered Sicilian towns: they became free and autonomous Roman *amici* whose only apparent obligation was to provide military contingents on a temporary basis (τὸς δυνάμεις: Diod. Sic. 23.4.1), likely only for as long as the war in Sicily lasted. That the king remained circumspect about the quality of Roman *fides*, even after becoming a Roman *amicus* himself (as is shown by his reluctance to provide even minimal help to the Romans at first; above, and n. 160), makes perfect sense given the friendship dynamics in play here; as we have seen, during the "reconnaissance dance" phase of beginning friendship, feelings of vulnerability and the psychological pull towards self-sufficiency and non-engagement are particularly powerful. But, as will be seen in the next chapter, Hiero eventually overcame his reservations about Roman friendship – and especially Roman *fides* – over the course of his almost fifty-year friendship with the Republic. Indeed, he became one of Rome's great overseas *amici*: according to the Roman senate of a later day, Hiero had proved to be "the most loyal supporter of Roman power" (*fidissimus imperi Romani cultor*: Livy 26.32.4), and, according to Livy himself, "the singular mainstay of the Roman people" (*unicum subsidium populi Romani*: 23.21.5).

The evidence for the beginning of Hiero's *amicitia* with Rome enumerated here, in addition to the earlier discussion of the *deditiones* of the sixty-seven Sicilian towns, collectively suggests that the comparative "light touch" of Roman *amicitia* in a theater of war, and the demonstrable value of Roman *fides* towards her *amici*, had real-world, constitutive effects in Sicily. If Polybius is to be believed (and there seems to be no good reason to doubt him), that in the first two years of the war the Romans were concerned only with protecting the Mamertines while enjoying the advantages of the war (a fundamentally defensive stance), then they achieved their aims remarkably quickly and effectively. As the Realists emphasize, fear of Roman power certainly played a role in the calculus of Rome's new

¹⁶⁶ See Thiel 1954: 161–62; De Sensi Sestito 1977: 89–90; Eckstein 1987a: 115–16. Elsewhere, however, Eckstein emphasizes Hiero's political "realism" (1985: 268–73; 1995b: 208), only allowing that true feelings of *fides* came much later on (1987a: 124, 129).

amici, and self-interest drove decision-making on all sides. But the Roman construction of a more consensus-based, collective-security regime across a major section of Sicily was founded on the discourse of morality and *fides*, which gave Rome the edge over her regional rivals, who were less inclined towards self-restraint in exercising power over lesser states and exploiting opportunities for domination over them. The practical benefit for Rome was the establishment of a network of new international *amici*, and the effective neutralization of a number of potential enemies; the practical result for both Rome and others on Sicily was the creation of more effective control and greater security.

Unfortunately, further examples of the Romans establishing *amicitia* for the first time with *dediticii* after military defeat are hard to pin down precisely. It might be supposed that Rome's formative experience in Spain during and after the Hannibalic War is potentially fertile ground for this part of the investigation, but the sources' apparent indifference to Spanish affairs – to say nothing of their ignorance of Spanish geography, and of the location and identity of particular Spanish towns and tribes – makes such an investigation hazardous at best.¹⁶⁷ The presence of Rome's Carthaginian enemy in Spain prior to 206 BC, and Spain's status as a sphere (actually two spheres) of provincial administration after 198 further complicate the picture. In light of the former issue, it usually cannot be established with certainty whether those Spanish tribesmen who formerly fought on the Carthaginian side did so of their own volition, or at the behest of their Carthaginian rulers. Nor can it be determined, given the state of the evidence, exactly which tribal groupings were actually under Carthaginian control during their period of supremacy in the peninsula. So, to return to an example detailed at the end of the previous chapter, even if it could be established that the Spanish peoples of the area around New Carthage – and the Spanish inhabitants of New Carthage itself – who surrendered to Scipio Africanus in 209 had had no prior contact with the Romans, it would still be impossible to know whether the Roman commander's treatment of them (generous, by all accounts, but only after systematic Roman plundering of New Carthage and massacring of the inhabitants) was informed by his attitude towards the real enemy – the Carthaginians – or towards their local collaborators, if the Spanish inhabitants of New Carthage may reasonably be construed as such.

The second problem with using the Spanish *deditiones* as evidence for new relationships thus established relates to the early phases of Rome's

¹⁶⁷ Richardson 1986: 72, 77–78; 1996: 54–55.

provincialization of Spain after 198 BC: how did the Romans perceive those inhabitants of the areas of the peninsula as yet beyond their reach, or indeed those within the provincial boundaries as established in the early 190s but as yet unsubdued? It may be the case that the Romans regarded the entire peninsula as being under Roman jurisdiction, regardless of the actual depth of penetration of Roman power. On the other hand, as Frederik Vervaeke and Tony Naco del Hoyo have recently argued, the Roman geopolitical attitude towards Spain during the early years of provincialization needs to be reconceptualized as a “war in outer space” – an area that was simultaneously within and beyond the actual reach of Roman arms and influence.¹⁶⁸ In this scenario, Rome was on a permanent war footing throughout the two centuries of fighting in Spain that followed, that is, long after the two Spains became regularly assigned *provinciae*. The crucial question, however, remains unanswered – and also unanswerable: did the Romans regard those beyond their reach, but simultaneously within the conceptual (if not territorial) limits of the Spanish *provinciae*,¹⁶⁹ as rebels or *externae gentes*?

Matters are complicated further by the fact that the period for which we are best informed about the evolution of the provincialization of Spain – the governorship of Cato the Elder in 195–194 BC – may be thoroughly contaminated by later *apologia*, mostly originating with Cato himself,¹⁷⁰ and is decidedly light on the details that we are most interested in here, that is, the content of his diplomatic exchanges with the Spanish tribesmen. So, for example, after defeating some tribal enemies of Rome’s ally the Ilergetes in the vicinity of Spanish Emporion, and having received the surrender of the inhabitants of that city, and others who had fled there from the surrounding country, Cato, according to Livy, “addressed them all with kindness, cared for them with food and wine and dismissed them to their homes” (*omnes appellatos benigne uinoque et cibo curatos domos dimisit*; Livy 34.16.5). And that is all. These *dediticii* may indeed have been complete strangers to the Romans up to this point, if such may be inferred from the fact that Cato’s forces had repeatedly plundered them ahead of the battle.¹⁷¹ If that is the case – and if the consul’s kind treatment is not mere self-serving Catonian *apologia* – then this episode may reinforce what

¹⁶⁸ Vervaeke and Naco del Hoyo 2007.

¹⁶⁹ On the meaning of *provincia* in this period (an assignment given to an *imperium*-wielding magistrate rather than a territorial designation), see Richardson 2008: 10–62.

¹⁷⁰ Richardson 1986: 80–81, and nn. 83, 90 (cf. Richardson 1996: 52–53).

¹⁷¹ Livy 34.9.12–13, 16.4. So Richardson 1986: 84: “it may be excessively skeptical to suggest that these people were friendly to the Romans before Cato’s arrival.”

has already been shown in the case of the Spanish proxies of Carthage a decade earlier: defeated *dediticii* with no prior connection to Rome may have been treated almost as well, post-*deditio*, as those who surrendered to a Roman commander voluntarily. To go much further would be unwise, given the welter of historiographical problems surrounding Cato's Spanish campaigns.

To round out the discussion of Rome's Spanish *amici*, it will be worth examining one case for which there is relatively good information: the establishment of *amicitia* with Edeco, the chief of the Edetani. According to Polybius, after Scipio's storming of New Carthage, Edeco voluntarily surrendered to the Romans in order to secure the return of his wife and sons, who were present in the city at the time of its capture.¹⁷² Because Edeco's family members were among the 300 hostages of the Carthaginians captured by Scipio at New Carthage in 209 BC, it is probably safe to assume that the Edetani were formally in a state of war with Rome, if only reluctantly (hence the high-level hostages they had turned over to the Carthaginians), and by virtue of their subjection to Carthage. This is indeed the tenor of Polybius' description of Edeco's deliberations: "the king decided," according to the historian, "to seem to have taken up the Roman cause not under compulsion, but voluntarily" (δόξειν οὐ κατ' ἀνάγκην, ἀλλὰ κατὰ πρόθεσιν αἰρεῖσθαι τὰ Ῥωμαίων: Polyb. 10.34.3 [emphasis added]). Edeco, in other words, tried to exploit the gray area that he and his fellow tribesmen inhabited as former (reluctant) enemies of Rome in order to present himself to Scipio as a voluntary friend. He, along with many other Spanish tribesmen, "delivered themselves into the friendship and faith" of the Romans, that is, they performed *deditio*.¹⁷³ Scipio apparently treated the Carthaginians' former Spanish proxies as voluntary *dediticii* rather than former enemies, for no reparations or indemnities were demanded from Edeco or the others, as were demanded, for example, from Hiero in 263.¹⁷⁴

Perhaps more important for the present purposes is the prominence of moralizing language and friendly gestures in Polybius' account of Edeco's

¹⁷² Polyb. 10.34–35.3; cf. Livy 27.17.1–2. Discussion: Walbank 1967: 245–46; Errington 1971: 88–89; Bernhardt 1975: 416–18; Lazenby 1978: 140–41; Richardson 1986: 48; Eckstein 1987a: 211–16.

¹⁷³ Cf. Polyb 10.34.1: Scipio "received the Iberians into his friendship and good faith," τοὺς Ἰβηρας εἰς τὴν αὐτῶν φιλίαν καὶ πίστιν; Polyb. 10.34.6: Edeco "delivered not only himself, but also his friends and relatives into their friendship and good faith," [ὁ Ἐδεκὼν] διδοὺς οὐ μόνον αὐτόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς φίλους καὶ συγγενεῖς εἰς τὴν Ῥωμαίων πίστιν.

¹⁷⁴ Except for Mandonius and Indibilis, two powerful Spanish chieftains and prominent supporters of Carthage; these two were compelled to sign a treaty in which they promised "to follow the Roman commanders and obey their orders" (ἀκολουθεῖν τοῖς Ῥωμαίων ἀρχουσι καὶ πείθεσθαι τοῖς ὑπὸ τούτων παραγγελλομένοις; Polyb. 10.38.5).

surrender to Scipio. The chieftain promised to do Rome great future services (μεγάλην δ' εἰς τὸ μέλλον παρέξεσθαι χρεῖαν), and insisted that other Spanish peoples would follow suit once they learned of Scipio's great honor and kindness (τῇ τοιαύτῃ τιμῇ καὶ φιλανθρωπίᾳ); therefore all he asked of the Roman general was the return of his wife and sons, and Scipio's recognition of himself as a friend (φίλος), so that he might have reasonable ground for demonstrating to his people the goodwill (εὖνοιαν) of himself and his friends towards Scipio and the Roman state (Polyb. 10.34.7–10). Here the cycle of reciprocity is made explicit; not only do prestation-*beneficia* (Scipio's recognition of Edeco as a friend, and the release of his wife and sons) breed counter-*beneficia* (the pledge from Edeco to be of great service to Scipio at present and in the future), but the circle of exchange widens out further to encompass even more participants in the friendship (following his example, Edeco's fellow countrymen would flock to alliance with Rome too). The focus throughout the passage is on the moral qualities of the friendship (honor, kindness, and goodwill) that will emerge between Scipio and Edeco and his fellow countrymen.

This is not to deny, of course, that Edeco's original motivations were strictly practical and self-interested: his main concerns were to recover his wife and sons, and, Polybius reveals earlier in the passage, to be first off the mark as the leader of the incipient pro-Roman movement among the Spanish tribes.¹⁷⁵ But note too the implications of Polybius' statement, "through various means during their time together, Scipio won over the Iberian" (παρὰ τὴν συνουσίαν ποικίλως ψυχαγωγήσας τὸν Ἰβηρα: 10.35.2). This must refer to the charm of Scipio, which, as was seen in the case with Syphax discussed earlier (above, p. 95), was so decisive in cementing the relationship with the Numidian chieftain. The language that passed between the two men during their time spent together is unfortunately unknown, subsumed, as it is, in Polybius' summary comment at 10.35.2. But the historian also says, explicitly, that Scipio not only had already decided to return the hostages and make the Spanish tribes his friends, but also that he was in full agreement with the views of Edeco

¹⁷⁵ Edeco, "immediately calculating that there would be a change of heart among the Iberians [sc. against the Carthaginians], wanted to be seen to become the leader of this movement, being especially convinced that in this way he would recover his wife and children" (εὐθέως συλλογισάμενους τὴν ἐσομένην τῶν Ἰβήρων μεταβολὴν ἀρχηγὸς ἐβουλήθη γενέσθαι τῆς αὐτῆς ὁρμῆς, μάλιστα πεπεισμένος οὕτως τὴν γυναῖκα καὶ τὰ τέκνα κομειέσθαι: Polyb 10.34.2–3). Edeco also "told Scipio that he owed the greatest thanks to the gods that he was the first of the leaders in the area to come to him" (τῷ Ποπλίῳ ταύτην ἔφη τοῖς θεοῖς μεγίστην χάριν ἔχειν, ὅτι πρῶτος τῶν κατὰ τὴν χώραν δυναστῶν ἦκει πρὸς αὐτόν: Polyb. 10.34.5).

(ὁ δὲ Πόπλιος, καὶ πάλαι πρὸς τοῦτο τὸ μέρος ἔτοιμοις ὦν καὶ συλλελογισμένος παραπλήσια τοῖς ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἑδεκῶνος εἰρημένοις: 10.35.1). Such language holds out the possibility that some sort of basic moral and affective equivalence was established between the two men on this occasion, which, as has been seen, is so important in bringing potential friends together in the “reconnaissance dance” phase of initiating friendship.

Edeco and the other hostages at New Carthage, including the fiancée of Allucius (see [Chapter 1](#), pp. 73–75), compared their experience of harsh subjection to Carthage (hence their status as hostages) to the possibility of kinder treatment by Rome as *amici* under the conditions established by *deditio*. Scipio, for his part, was able to harness his natural charm, and the Roman reputation for establishing *amicitia* on generous rather than burdensome terms, to chip away at Carthaginian power in Spain, and establish more security and control in the area surrounding New Carthage. The construction of a collective-security regime in the region among an ever-widening circle of new Roman *amici* was as much a result of fear (the Romans’ systematic plundering of New Carthage, and the initially unrestrained massacre of its inhabitants) as of Scipio’s reputation for honor and kindness, and the benefits of Roman *amicitia*.

Such is the extent, then, of the evidence for the establishment of *amicitia* for the first time between Rome and foreign *dediticii* following their defeat in battle. What is especially noteworthy is that even here, amidst the harsh realities of warfare and the consequences of defeat, morality plays a critical constitutive role in the historical accounts of the period, which must be considered an authentic vestige of the actual diplomatic exchanges that took place following *deditio*. That morality and affect had an autonomous political impact on foreign-policy decision-making, rather than being mere literary constructions or add-ons by the source texts, also cannot be doubted. The example of Hiero II of Syracuse is particularly instructive in this regard; as has been seen, the king considered the Romans more trustworthy (if only by negative comparison) than the Carthaginians, and so switched sides, and thus transformed the political and strategic realities in the Sicilian theater of war from 263 BC. Similarly instructive, if only negatively, is the case of Syphax of Numidia: in his dealings with the Romans between 213 and 206, there was a studied reluctance on the part of the Romans to credit the king with any moral equivalence in the relationship. Small wonder, then, that Syphax abandoned the friendship and transformed the strategic situation facing Rome in Africa after 205.

The evidence enumerated in this section also suggests that the Romans were prepared to be restrained and generous towards *dediticii* against whom

they had fought brief actions. The pattern seems to be that after some initial punitive reparations (the standard practice under ancient wartime conventions), further Roman imposts were not onerous or extensive under the normative sanctions of international *amicitia*. If Polybius' report of Edeco's surrender to Scipio at Tarraco in 209 BC may be trusted, no reprisals or harsh demands followed the establishment of *amicitia*, despite the former adherence of the Edetani to the Carthaginian cause. Likewise, if Livy's account of Cato's treatment of the inhabitants of Spanish Emporion and the surrounding territory in 195 is credible in its basic outline, it serves only to confirm what is more reliably known about the Roman treatment of Hiero II of Syracuse, described earlier, after a brief period of hostility: the establishment of *amicitia*, performative demonstrations of protection and care, followed by benevolent detachment. The (admittedly small) accumulation of evidence seems to suggest that, despite what the later writers Livy and Valerius Maximus apparently believed (above, and n. 86), for the Romans of the Middle Republic there was no qualitative difference in the *amicitiae* that began voluntarily following surrender, and those that began after defeat in battle, except, in some cases, the imposition of short-term reparations as punishment for taking up arms against the Republic.¹⁷⁶

CONCLUSION

In this chapter, I have tried to demonstrate the proposition that the Romans established *amicitia* with their international partners during the Middle Republic in four basic ways: through military cooperation, diplomatic exchanges, solicitation of Roman protection, and following defeat by Rome in war. Along the way it has become apparent that the decisions to initiate friendship, on the parts of both the Romans and of their potential *amici*, were informed by both pragmatic and moral considerations. Alongside the practical, mutual need for protection and military aid, and the desire by all for more power and control, appear concern for character and moral virtue in potential *amici*. These concerns, in turn, had real-world, practical consequences – constructive consequences – for the structure of the Mediterranean international system in the third and second centuries BC. Thus the establishment of friendship between Rome and Masinissa was facilitated by a healthy, mutual respect by Masinissa and Scipio for each other's moral personality and character; the result was a significant alteration of the military-strategic realities in the North African theater

¹⁷⁶ *Contra* Val. Max. 6.5.1; Livy 39.54.6–7 (above, n. 86); Oakley 1998: 286.

during the closing phase of the Second Punic War. The one negative case examined in this chapter points in the same direction: it was Rome's failure to credit Masinissa's rival Syphax with basic moral equivalence that led to the latter's abandonment of his *amicitia* with Rome, with real-world (negative) practical consequences for Scipio's imminent invasion of Africa.

But are we to take the sources' attribution of these motives at face value? I would argue that there is no sound reason to doubt the ancient accounts either of the beginning of friendship between Scipio and Masinissa, or of any of the other episodes collected in this chapter, primarily because the practical logics of beginning international friendship resemble so precisely those of beginning interpersonal friendship; indeed this stands to reason, precisely because it is the same relationship under consideration in both cases. Just as in the interpersonal sphere, where feelings of vulnerability and anxiety propel potential new friends towards non-engagement during the "reconnaissance dance" phase of beginning friendship, so in the international sphere, the anxiety of potential *dediticii* arises, precisely, from concern over whether their pledge of *fides* will be met by an equivalent return, in the form of mercy and leniency. Such anxieties were by no means the preserve of Rome's friends and enemies, however. As we have seen repeatedly in this chapter, Roman needs and vulnerability in foreign theaters of war, so often overlooked in modern accounts of Rome's supposedly inexorable rise to world power, exercised a similarly constraining effect on Roman international behavior. The Romans often sought only minimal material support from their friends, preferring mere token gestures of loyalty, in the interest of enhancing the reputation of Roman *fides* and of the "light touch" of Roman *amicitia*. The result, and, in part, the goal of such conduct was to generate more friends, more security, and more control for Rome in areas subject to violent anarchy. Intentional or not, a beneficial side effect of Rome's diplomatic *modus operandi* was to generate more security for all. The Romans did not seek out opportunities for aggrandizement and aggression (thus generating more chaos and violence), but sought to contain and control violent systemic anarchy (thus creating more security).

In more general terms, as in the case of friendship in the domestic sphere, so in the realm of international relations—people(s) choose their friendships on the basis of similarity and difference, similarity usually involving issues of character (the "expressive" side), and difference, the practical needs individuals try to fulfill in the search for self-sufficiency (the "instrumental" side). Thus respect for the Other's inner qualities and virtues, as well as concern for what the Other can do for Self, inform all decisions to initiate

friendship. The Romans in particular appreciated and accounted for these factors in their friendship decisions, both in domestic life and, as this chapter has demonstrated, in the realm of international relations. Ancient Mediterranean societies of the historical period approximated an almost Homeric world of status-competition and cutthroat social practices, in which the trust of a friend was the only possible (regrettably precarious) guarantee of protection, empathy, and support, outside the narrow circle of one's own family. As in the domestic sphere, so too in the violent anarchy of the ancient Mediterranean international system the practical constraints of a self-help society dominated decision-making, though moral considerations also played an important role, since, in the absence of any externally mandated, formal security guarantees, it was imperative to find truly reliable partners, that is, those whose virtue and high moral character were perceived to be similar to one's own, and in whom one could place one's trust. The next task will be to explore how this trust was nurtured and amplified over time in the international sphere, with the exchange of material and symbolic capital between states, resulting in a distinctive internal construction of their relationships as *amicitiae*, which, in turn, had important constitutive effects on the international system.

CHAPTER 4

The duties of international friendship

INTRODUCTION

The present chapter shifts our primary focus temporarily from IR Constructivism to Maussian gift exchange in the international sphere, and attempts to provide a complete account of the wide range of duties – the gifts, favors, and services, both material and symbolic – that Rome and her international *amici* performed for each other. Such exchanges, as was seen in [Chapter 2](#), serve several purposes: to fulfill specific needs and desires (the “objective purpose” of exchanges), to advertise the existence of the relationship to the wider world, to acquire and assert power and status within the relationship, and to perpetuate the relationship through time by playing with the timing and tempo of reciprocity (the “subjective purpose” of exchanges). The strategies of misrecognition (*méconnaissance*) that friends employ in order to achieve situational advantage, which simultaneously preserve the illusion of symmetry and the pious wish of voluntary, disinterested, and spontaneous reciprocity, apply in the international sphere just as they do between individuals.

This matrix of meanings and rituals involved in exchanges between states has already been demonstrated in the earlier discussion of Scipio Africanus’ negotiations with the Spanish tribes following the Roman sack of New Carthage in 209 BC; on that occasion, the new friends/combatants exchanged competitively, continually raising the stakes of the exchange and redefining its nature as they jockeyed for status and power (above, pp. 73–75). Consider the following as well:

καὶ τὰ ἐξ ἀρετῆν ἐνηντιώμεθα τοῖς πολλοῖς· οὐ γὰρ πάσχοντες εὖ, ἀλλὰ δρῶντες κτώμεθα τοὺς φίλους. βεβαιότερος δὲ ὁ δράσας τὴν χάριν ὥστε ὀφειλομένην δι’ εὐνοίας ᾧ δέδωκε σῶζειν.

[Pericles addressing the Athenian *ekklesia*] In matters concerning virtue, we are opposed to the many: it is not by receiving benefits but by conferring them that we acquire friends. The one doing the favor is the firmer friend, aiming, through

continued goodwill towards the recipient, to preserve a sense of obligation in him. (Thuc. 2.40.4)

Beneficia gratuita esse populi Romani; pretium eorum malle relinquere in accipientium animis quam praesens exigere.

[The Roman senate to Cotys of Thrace] The kindnesses of the Roman people are free; the Romans prefer to leave the price of them on deposit in the hearts of the recipients rather than to collect it right away. (Livy 45.42.11)

Beneficia eo usque laeta sunt dum uidentur exolui posse: ubi multum anteuenero pro gratia odium redditur.

Kindnesses are welcome so long as it seems possible to repay them: they greatly exceed that point when hatred is repaid rather than gratitude. (Tac. *Ann.* 4.18)

The message resonates across several ancient Mediterranean cultures, from Thrace through Greece and Rome to Spain: bestowing gifts in the international context is in part a situational strategy used to perpetuate asymmetry and create obligation in the beneficiary. As the first two passages show, there was considerably less hesitation to articulate this strategy amongst state-friends than between individuals. Equally significantly, however, are the notional constraints on such gifting: an interval must occur before reciprocation, as the senate tells Cotys, and, as Tacitus indicates, there exists somewhere along the friendship continuum a tipping point that cannot be precisely identified in advance, but that must be intuited from within that continuum, when overbenefiting leads to hatred and resentment. One is reminded of Cicero's rich, honored, and happy men who wish to avoid receiving great favors lest their status slip from *amicus* to *cliens* (*Off.* 2.69, discussed above, p. 14).

This chapter aims to do more than simply provide a catalog of gifts exchanged and services rendered, or a series of case studies, although a certain amount of this sort of work must be undertaken, particularly at the outset. The main analytical focus instead will be on the broad thematic concerns of this study: to illustrate the operation of international *amicitia* by means of a processual analysis; to demonstrate the constitutive power of moral friendship discourse(s) both within individual international friendships and in the international system; and to test the hypothesis that *amicitia* was the preferred social analog for managing Rome's international relations because it was a more response-flexible diplomatic and operational tool than *clientela* would have been. To these ends I first present an analysis of the growth of *fides* and moral empathy between Rome and Hiero II, the king of Syracuse, over the course of their fifty-year relationship. The second part of the chapter consists of an "interpretative catalog" of the

duties usually performed by Rome's international *amici*. The third section concentrates the evidence on the issue of the flexibility of friendship reciprocity; the purpose here will be to try to establish some notional limits on Rome's friends' freedom of choice, action, and interpretation of the *amicitia* tie – their freedom of self-determination within the relationship, broadly speaking – owing to constraints imposed by the asymmetries of power within the Mediterranean system. Here we will be at the mercy of our sources and their peculiar emphases. Most of our evidence for the diplomatic history of the Middle Republic comes (or is derived) from Polybius, who, as a Greek politician himself, concentrated far more attention in his work on the affairs of the Greek East than on the West; any conclusions we draw in the first two sections, then, must remain provisional, and perhaps uniquely applicable to Rome's relationships with Greek states and Hellenistic monarchies. Finally, in the last section, after a very brief catalog of the duties that Rome is often seen performing for its *amici*, we will attempt to gauge the extent to which the Republic's leaders and policymakers were constrained by the obligations of the *amicitia* tie.

The question of response-flexibility in times of crisis – another key theme developed in this chapter – is worth pursuing since it may provide the key to understanding the erratic and, for outsiders, sometimes baffling rhythms in Roman imperial interventions overseas during the second and third centuries BC. Scholars of Roman imperialism under the sway of IR Realism are perhaps to be forgiven their focus on state self-interest and opportunism in accounting for this behavior; in this they have the support of Aristotle, who observed that “men call friends those who associate with each other for the sake of utility, just as cities can be friends, for alliances seem to be formed between cities for the sake of expediency.”¹ This must have been even more true of Aristotle's world than our own: in the anarchic, self-help international environment of the ancient Mediterranean, states routinely befriended other states for the practical purposes of securing protection against international predators, balancing threats (real or imagined), or simply reducing, by a zero-sum calculus, typical of the ancient mind-set, the number of potentially hostile states in the system.

Even for his world, however, Aristotle has exaggerated the role of utility in international friendship; it is yet another instance of his distorting ontology, discussed in [Chapter 2](#), that quarantines the ideal of virtuous friendship from those of utility and pleasure. As the previous chapter has shown, moral considerations at the outset, and the development of a shared

¹ οἱ ἄνθρωποι λέγουσι φίλους καὶ τοὺς διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον, ὥσπερ αἱ πόλεις δοκοῦσι γὰρ αἱ συμμαχίαι ταῖς πόλεσι γίνεσθαι ἕνεκα τοῦ συμφέροντος (*Eth. Nic.* 1157a25–27).

moral outlook over the lifespan of international friendships played real and constitutive roles in ancient international relations; the earlier discussion of *deditio in fidem* also demonstrated that the *habitus* of *fides* could serve as an effective constraint on self-interested behavior, compelling international actors to construct, and often enough to conduct their interactions in less self-regarding manner, with proper recognition of each other's status as states and showing respect for them as such. The present chapter will attempt to show that the mutual performance of services was, among many other things, a visible and material manifestation of the inherent moral *fides* binding international *amici* together, and as such, served moral, as much as practical, ends in constructing the relationship. Such concrete manifestations of trust were especially important in the ancient international environment, which lacked a standing diplomatic corps and mass media to disseminate this sort of information: in this context, the exchange of embassies headed up by high-status ambassadors, the bestowing of opulent gifts, and the performance of favors, such as responding to calls for help, were some of the few available means of prominently advertising a vibrant international friendship.

This chapter will also have ample opportunity to explore those corollary aspects of the performance of duties in friendship that have been a part of this study from the beginning, including unequal friendship, the high value placed on the spontaneous and voluntary performance of favors, the occasional reluctance to accept favors in order to stave off status-disequilibrium within the relationship, and, conversely, the desire to overbenefit *amici* in order to increase their indebtedness, and thus encourage and perpetuate disequilibrium. As is clear from the statements of the Roman senate and of Pericles earlier quoted, these factors were prominent in the thinking of all ancient politicians and an integral part of the foreign-policy calculus of all ancient states. But as the moralizing language into which these sentiments are cast also amply shows (note Pericles' emphasis on ἀρετή, "moral virtue" and εὖνοια, "goodwill") the performance of favors was considered in part a moral exercise, designed to instill a sense of devotion, loyalty, and gratitude in the hearts of its beneficiaries.

THE PROCESSUAL APPROACH: THE CASE OF HIERO II

As was seen in the previous chapter (and a preliminary version of this study),² from the time of the establishment of his friendship with Rome

² Above, pp. 147–48; Burton 2003: 352–56; see also Eckstein 1980c.

early in the First Punic War, Hiero II of Syracuse became “the singular mainstay of the Roman people” (*unicum subsidium populi Romani*: Livy 23.21.5), “the most loyal supporter of Roman power” (*fidissimus imperi Romani cultor*: Livy 26.32.4), and “a good man and an outstanding ally, one who from the time he entered the friendship of the Roman people, has uninterruptedly cultivated his loyalty, and has assisted the Roman state on every occasion and in every place.”³

This intimacy took a great deal of time to evolve from the early, tentative phase of “reconnaissance dance” behavior by the king during the First Punic War, when he provided for Rome “only a moderate amount of strictly necessary supplies” (τὰ μέτρια καὶ τὰναγκαῖα: Polyb. 1.18.11). The Romans made explicit provision for the ongoing security of Hiero and Syracuse in the Treaty of Lutatius that ended the war (Polyb. 1.62.8; App. *Sic.* 2; Zonar. 8.17.6), but the king’s minimalist interpretation of his obligations towards Rome persisted into the following decades. Only two further gifts of Syracusan grain are recorded in this period, one in 237 BC, and another in the 220s, during Rome’s war with the Celts (Eutrop. 3.1.3; cf. 3.2.1; Diod. *Sic.* 25.14). By the 220s, Hiero’s friendship with Rome had barely progressed beyond the loose, detached, but generally benign state of its opening stages.

Nor was Hiero’s *amicitia* with Rome apparently any impediment to his foreign-policy decisions either; thus in the late 240s/early 230s Carthage, embroiled in a bloody war with its former mercenaries, sought – and was granted – assistance from the king on more than one occasion. He did this, Polybius argues, as a result of a kind of power-balancing IR Realist calculus *avant la lettre*:

Ἰέρων δ’ αἰεὶ μὲν ποτε κατὰ τὸν ἐνεστῶτα πόλεμον μεγάλην ἐποιεῖτο σπουδὴν εἰς πᾶν τὸ παρακαλούμενον ὑπ’ αὐτῶν, τότε δὲ καὶ μᾶλλον ἐφιλοτιμεῖτο, πεπεισμένος συμφέρειν ἑαυτῷ καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἐν Σικελίᾳ δυναστείαν καὶ πρὸς τὴν Ῥωμαίων φιλίαν τὸ σῶζεσθαι Καρχηδονίους, ἵνα μὴ παντάπασιν ἐξῇ τὸ προτεθὲν ἄκοντι συντελεῖσθαι τοῖς ἰσχυροῖς.

Hiero at the time of the present war always showed great zeal in doing everything the Carthaginians requested, and now was even happier to oblige, convinced that it benefited himself as regards his kingdom in Sicily and his friendship with the Romans to preserve the Carthaginians, in order that it not be granted to the powerful to achieve its ends wholly without effort. (Polyb. 1.83.2–3)

³ *uirum bonum egregiumque socium Hieronem esse atque uno tenore, ex quo in amicitiam populi Romani uenerit, fidem coluisse ac rem Romanam omni tempore ac loco munifice adiuuise* (Livy 22.37.10).

Polybius praises Hiero for his “completely wise and sensible policy” (πάν φρονίμως καὶ νουνεχῶς λογιζόμενος: Polyb. 1.83.3), since, in the historian’s view, “we must never overlook such things, nor help to establish such great power for a single state with whom we cannot dispute about rights that have been agreed upon.”⁴ Whether the king actually thought in such power-balancing terms cannot be known, but it is at least plausible, given the relatively low level of Roman–Syracusan interaction during the same period.

The transformation of this cordial but remote relationship into one of deep intimacy and emotional investment took shape during the darkest days of the Second Punic War. This is the era when the senate began to style Hiero “the most loyal supporter of Roman power” and “the singular mainstay of the Roman people.” And for good reason: the crisis of the Second Punic War, and in particular the disastrous early years, evidently made a deep emotional impression on the king. At the start of the war in 218 BC, Hiero met Ti. Sempronius, the Roman consul, and offered him his fleet, some troops, and any useful intelligence he could obtain; at that time, the king also promised grain and clothing for the legions *gratis*, and reminded the consul of his help in Rome’s earlier war with Carthage (Livy 21.49.3–6, 50.7–11 [cf. Polyb. 3.75.7]). After the Roman disaster at Lake Trasimene in 217, Hiero satisfied a Roman request for military assistance by supplying 500 Cretan archers and 1,000 light infantry (Polyb. 3.75.7). The following year, the king sent by ship a further significant amount of supplies (*magno commeatu*: Livy 22.37.1), including 300,000 *modii* (a little under 2,000 tonnes) of wheat and 200,000 of barley (over 1,332 tonnes), a 220-pound statue of Victory in solid gold (Livy 22.37.5–6), and 1,000 archers and slingers.⁵

On this occasion, Hiero also had an important message to convey to Rome.⁶ His ambassadors expressed before the senate the king’s growing

⁴ οὐδέποτε γὰρ χρὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα παρορᾶν οὐδὲ τηλικαύτην οὐδενὶ συγκατασκευάζειν δυναστείαν, πρὸς ἣν οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ὁμολογουμένων ἐξέσται δικάϊων ἀμφισβητεῖν (Polyb. 1.83.4).

⁵ On these benefactions, see Meadows 1998: 127–28, 131. Meadows argues that the gold Victory statue would have been “welcome collateral against the gold coinage [Rome] was now producing [in 217/216 BC].” The silver coinage produced in the wake of Hiero’s gift duly emphasized the connection: one issue depicts a Nike/Victory crowning a trophy with a wreath.

⁶ *Legati [ab Hierone] in senatum introducti nuntiarunt eadem C. Flamini consulis exercitusque allatum adeo aegre tulisse regem Hieronem ut nulla sua propria regnique sui clade mouere magis potuerit. Itaque, quamquam probe sciat magnitudinem populi Romani admirabiliorem prope aduersis rebus quam secundis esse, tamen se omnia quibus a bonis fidelibusque sociis bella iuuari soleant misisse; quae ne accipere abnuant magno opere se patres conscriptos orare. Iam omnium primum ominis causa Victoriā auream pondo ducentum ac uiginti adferre sese. Acciperent eam tenerentque et haberent propriam et perpetuam. Aduexisse etiam trecenta milia modium tritici, ducenta hordei, ne commeatus deessent, et*

emotional and moral commitment to Rome, and his deep personal distress at the Roman disaster suffered at Trasimene: not even the destruction of himself or his kingdom could have disturbed the king more, said his ambassadors. Rhetorical extravagance, perhaps, but the earnestness of Hiero's sentiment is amplified, on the one hand, by the senate's reference, in response to the speech, to the long history of Roman–Syracusan relations (*ex quo in amicitiam populi Romani uenerit, fidem coluisse ac rem Romanam omni tempore ac loco munifice adiuisse*: Livy 22.37.10), and, on the other, by the ambassadors' mention of Hiero's personal knowledge of the strength of Roman character in adversity, as well as his first-hand experience of Roman military camps, where, he says, he has noticed the presence of light-armed foreign auxiliaries. All of this goes to show that the friendship had perhaps only recently achieved greater intimacy than was apparent down to the mid-220s BC. The king does not merely sympathize or empathize with the Romans, moreover, but "feels their pain" directly, through an emotional identification that arises from genuine affection.⁷ The shared adversity of the first few years of the Second Punic War had apparently brought Rome and Hiero closer together – a significant change from the distance and detachment that had characterized their relationship prior to this dark time.

A further indication of this increased intimacy is the candor with which Hiero expresses his views to the senate through his ambassadors. The king not only knows that the Romans use foreign-born, light-armed troops only reluctantly and exclude non-Italians from the legions – he tells them so, frankly and without hesitation. Mildly and only implicitly critical though this may be, it is nevertheless indicative of a level of comfort more typical of long-term intimate friends than of passive acquaintances or dependents. The king also presumes to advise the past masters of the art of warfare on tactics and grand strategy: the Romans must fight light-armed troops with light-armed troops, which is why he is giving them archers and slingers, and

quantum praeterea opus esset quo iussissent subuecturos. Milite atque equite scire nisi Romano Latinique nominis non uti populum Romanum: leuium armorum auxilia etiam externa uidisse in castris Romanis. Itaque misisse mille sagittariorum ac funditorum, aptam manum aduersus Baliares ac Mauros pugnaceque alias missili telo gentes. Ad ea dona consilium quoque addebant ut praetor, cui prouincia Sicilia euenisset, classem in Africam traiceret, ut et hostes in terra sua bellum haberent minusque laxamenti daretur iis ad auxilia Hannibali summittenda (Livy 22.37.2–9).

⁷ Cf. R. White 1999: 24: "[I]t is not simply that I am sad for my friend when he suffers a terrible disappointment, for this would mean that there is still a real distance between us; nor is it just that, by imagining how badly he must feel, I can empathize with my friend. In fact, I will tend to experience my closest friend's most significant disappointments and joys directly as if they were my own. And this is so because of the emotional identification and enlargement of personal concern that true friendship, as a form of love, must always entail" (emphasis in the original).

they should furthermore invade Africa at the earliest possible opportunity. This is not the behavior of a remote and detached friend, much less that of a “sedulous client king” – privileged or otherwise⁸ – whose role in conversation is restricted to listening to his patron’s advice, and expressing his approval and gratitude. Hiero was candidly expressing his views, no matter how potentially unwelcome or offensive to the Romans, as was his prerogative as an *amicus*.

One final point to note is that the anxieties arising from competitive gift-giving and the deployment of equalization strategies, which we have seen were important factors in the Roman–Syracusan relationship from the very beginning, are equally in evidence in the diplomatic exchange of 217 BC. In their speech, the Syracusan envoys find it necessary to beg the senate to accept Hiero’s gifts (cf. *orare*: Livy 22.37.4), knowing in advance, perhaps, what the senate tells them after they finish speaking: gold had been offered by other states, but the Roman people, though grateful for the gesture, refused to accept it (*aurum et ciuitatibus quibusdam allatum gratia rei accepta non accepisse populum Romanum*: Livy 22.37.11); they would accept Hiero’s, however, not because they wanted to, but only because they were duty-bound to do so (*id perinde ac deberet gratum populo Romano esse*: Livy 22.37.10). The senate’s dedication of the solid gold statue to Victory and placement of it in the temple of Jupiter Optimus Maximus – as opposed to, say, melting it down to pay for much-needed supplies and the recruitment and training of legionary replacements – are perhaps in themselves face- and status-saving gestures designed to impress upon Hiero that Rome, despite all its recent misfortunes, did not necessarily stand in need of the king’s bounty.

The Romans, of course, had good reason to be anxious about their status in the relationship, given the massive scale of the king’s generosity; it is difficult to imagine what a 220-pound solid gold statue looked like, much less the half a million *modii* (over 3,300 tonnes) of grain. It stands to reason that Rome was growing increasingly dependent on such gifts at this time: the ravages of war – the constant plundering of Italian agricultural lands by the marauding enemy, the continual requisitioning of supplies from Italian towns and farmers by the Roman armies on campaign, and the loss of a significant proportion of the Italian agricultural labor force in battle, and so on – all must have had a devastating impact on the landscape and economy of Italy. After Cannae was fought and lost, these problems only intensified. Immediately after the battle, the agriculturally

⁸ Green 1990: 224–26.

rich Campanian region defected to Hannibal (Livy 23.7), and the Roman praetor in Sicily, T. Otacilius Crassus, was forced into the humiliating position of having to rely on Syracuse to pay and feed the Roman armies stationed on the island (Livy 23.21.5). Crassus' status-anxiety is apparent in his desperate attempts to compensate for Rome's declining position within the relationship by taking special care to protect Syracuse and its harbors from the ravages of the Punic fleet (Livy 22.56.8), and promising to repay Hiero for his contributions (23.38.12). The following year, Rome's strategic position was further eroded after Hannibal struck his pact with Philip V of Macedon; the Republic was forced into opening up a third major front in the war with Carthage – and, once again, into accepting a further 200,000 *modii* of wheat and barley from Hiero. In addition, the money that had previously been earmarked to repay the king for feeding and paying the Roman troops the year before now had to be reappropriated to fit out the mothballed Roman fleet for the upcoming war in Greece (Livy 23.38.13).

This was to be the king's final act as a friend of Rome, for he died that same year. What followed was an unmitigated disaster for the kingdom of Syracuse: Hieronymus, Hiero's grandson and successor, refused to renew his grandfather's *amicitia* with Rome and struck a treaty with Carthage – decisions that set in motion a chain of events that would ultimately lead to the destruction of the Syracusan kingdom itself some years later. Apparently Hiero's dying request to his grandson's guardians was for them to ensure Hieronymus kept his *fides* with the Roman people, which he himself had cultivated so assiduously for almost fifty years (*precatus est [tutores] moriens ut fidem erga populum Romanum quinquaginta annos ab se cultam inuiolatam seruarent*: Livy 24.4.5). Note that Hiero continued to stand on moral principle, and on Syracuse's long "special relationship" with Rome instead of abandoning what was becoming an increasingly costly and dangerous friendship, as the fortunes of Carthage rose over the first five years of the Hannibalic War. Of course, enlightened self-interest also played a role, as it always does in international relations: Hiero was no doubt confident Rome could recover from its losses (recall his apparently sincere belief in Roman strength in adversity: Livy 22.37.3). But what needs emphasis here is that Hiero's actions cannot be accounted for by *Machtpolitik* alone; his calculus was more complex, his feelings of loyalty and sympathy towards Rome counting for more than mere political expediency.

The contrast with Hieronymus is instructive: the young king jokingly asked the praetor Ap. Claudius to declare how the Romans fared at Cannae so he could compare his account with Hannibal's, and so decide which side

he should pin his hopes on.⁹ Hieronymus' decision, in other words, would be based strictly on *Machtpolitik* – as indeed his grandfather's had been back in the late 240s BC, when Hiero decided to help Carthage in order to balance Rome. But unlike his dying grandfather, Hieronymus failed to recognize (or decided to ignore) that Syracuse and Rome had consumed the proverbial many sacks of salt together,¹⁰ and had become something more than just occasional helpers or strategic partners. Forged in the fires of the first war with Carthage, their friendship had been tempered and strengthened by the crisis of the early years of the second; its obligations could no longer be measured strictly in terms of rational political calculation. The IR Constructivist would recognize this as an instance of how the “problem of other minds” is, in fact, less stark than it appears in a Realist reading of international relations. Rome and Hiero had been through a lot together, they had engaged in mutual social learning of the nature and modes of interaction in their relationship, which in the end became one of Rome's “special relationships” in the western Mediterranean. The real-world practical effect of this was that Hiero stuck with Rome through the worst years of the Second Punic War – indeed, to some degree pulled them through the crisis – rather than defect to Carthage, as a strictly Realist logic would compel him to do.

A brief review is in order. The case of Rome's relationship with the kingdom of Syracuse illustrates the usefulness of the processual approach for analyzing and describing friendships in the international sphere. The approach results not only in a deeper appreciation of the dynamics of interaction between two states, but also facilitates a deeper understanding of their motives and the subtleties of relationship change, from the tentative “reconnaissance dance” phase of friendship through to its full maturity. As we have seen, Hiero's *amicitia* with Rome achieved its full potential slowly through a gradual increase in *fides* that accompanied an escalation in the exchange of gifts and services, which themselves assumed ever-greater, symbolic importance. At the same time (and largely as a result of these exchanges), the partners' intimacy, affection, and emotional identification intensified. At all points along the relationship continuum, and especially in its later phases, the perceived moral similarity between Rome and Hiero's Syracuse motivated the partners to action. The discursive construction

⁹ *ab [praetore] quaerente per iocum Hieronymo quae fortuna eis pugnae ad Cannas fuisset; uix credibilia enim legatos Hannibalis narrare; uelle quid ueri scire, ut ex eo utram spem sequatur consilium capiat* (Livy 24.6.5).

¹⁰ The proverb is mentioned in Arist. *Eth. Eud.* 7.1238a; *Eth. Nic.* 8.1156b27; Cic. *De Am.* 68. Discussion (and a modern Irish parallel): Powell 1990: 110.

of their relationship in terms of morality, friendly obligation, and *fides*, best seen in the diplomatic exchange reported at Livy 22.37, was no mere rhetorical superstructure designed to conceal the obvious self-interested and pragmatic motivations of each partner, but was in fact constitutive of the relationship – and of the strategic situation in the western Mediterranean. The argument gains strength through comparison with Hieronymus' policy shift – and its disastrous consequences for the Syracusan kingdom. The absorption of Syracuse and its possessions into the Roman *provincia* of Sicily effected a further shift in the regional balance of power in Rome's favor, which was precisely what Hiero had tried to prevent through his earlier policy of balancing Rome and Carthage.

Even more significant, from the perspective of the present chapter, is that the Syracusan case also attests to the inherent flexibility and bilateral self-determination within the *amicitia* framework, which allowed both parties to construct independently the content and obligations of their relationship across its lifespan. As we have seen, Hiero's aid to Rome was for the most part voluntary, spontaneous, and based on his own judgment of Roman and Syracusan needs and desires; the king further advised the senators openly and candidly, even to the point of spelling out in their presence Roman tactical and strategic deficiencies; finally, during Carthage's Mercenary War, Hiero was free to decide his own foreign policy with regard to Carthage, and to prioritize Syracuse's strategic and security interests (balancing Rome against Carthage) over and against a geopolitical outcome that the Romans would have found most congenial (the continued erosion of the strategic position of Carthage). This is the prerogative of a free friend, not the part of a submissive client.

Finally, a word about anxiety and tension. The friendship between Hiero and Rome was not fixed or static, but relative status fluctuated in accordance with the changing fortunes of each partner. As was noted in [Chapter 2](#), status-asymmetries between friends regularly alternate and fluctuate over time and according to changing circumstances: thus when one partner stands in greater need of assistance than the other, and is helped by the other, the former's status decreases while the latter's increases. During the First Punic War, as we saw in the previous chapter, the Romans gladly embraced Hiero's change of side in 263 BC because they were on the defensive in Sicily, caught between two significant regional powers in *terra incognita*, and trying desperately to prevent Sicily from becoming a Carthaginian bridge into Italy. The Roman victory in that war and provision for Hiero's continued protection in the Treaty of Lutatius articulate a shift in the balance of power within the relationship as a result of the

Roman victory over Carthage in 241. Subsequently, as has been seen here, when the Romans were again beleaguered and vulnerable during the early stages of the Hannibalic War, Hiero came to their aid again, thus improving his own position within the relationship while Rome's correspondingly sank. This international friendship, in other words, was subject to precisely the same sort of status-instability and fluctuation as interpersonal friendships. Throughout their association, however, both Rome and Syracuse attempted to mitigate momentary asymmetries through balancing behavior and equalizing strategies; so the Romans attempted to convert Hiero's gifts into cash payments, and dedicated (rather than melted down) the golden Victory, while the king attempted to balance Roman power by supporting Carthage during the Mercenary War. This is all very reminiscent of Scipio Africanus' interactions with the indigenous tribes of southeastern Spain in 209: in this latter case the family of the Spanish captive girl in Scipio's possession attempted to convert a cash ransom into a gift, and Scipio responded by converting the gift into a dowry for the girl. The case of Hiero similarly shows that perfect status-equality is as difficult to achieve in international friendship as it is in interpersonal friendship – perhaps more so; this is, paradoxically, both despite and because of the practical logics of the friendship bond, and in particular the instinctive equalization strategies undertaken by both sides.

BENEFICIA PERFORMED BY ROMAN AMICI

Provision of troops

The case of the Roman–Syracusan exchanges over the course of five decades has provided a suitable entry-point for a more general discussion of exchanges between the Romans and their partner states. Roman international *amici* are attested performing many different kinds of services for the Republic, and perhaps not surprisingly, most of these relate to warfare. The ancient record preserves evidence of others besides Hiero providing military contingents, supplies, matériel, and money, safe passage through non-Roman territory, ports for Roman fleets and supply vessels, military intelligence and advice to Roman commanders, diplomatic services such as mediation and arbitration of disputes, as well as many other miscellaneous services both at times of war and in peace. This section is an attempt to document and discuss many of the best-known, and well-attested instances of these services. The focus will be not so much on obligations that arise from treaty-relationships, largely because in those few cases where a Roman

amicus also has a treaty, it is rarely (if ever) to the obligations laid down by the *foedus* that the parties refer when offering each other aid, whether troops, money, or supplies.¹¹

First and foremost among the duties of Rome's friends was to provide military contingents to fight in Roman wars. As was noted in the previous chapter (p. 82), within Italy itself the Romans maintained a set of alliances mediated by a mixture of formal treaties and informal arrangements – the so-called *formula togatorum* – which mandated the unilateral provision of troops to fight in the Roman armies during times of war; this meant, in effect, that military levies were conducted by Roman commanders among the allies every year, and contingents of non-Roman Italian troops served under the direct command of Roman *imperium*-wielding magistrates. Rome's extra-Italian allies and friends, however, were usually bound by no such formal obligations, perhaps because, as Hiero II pointed out to the Romans (above, pp. 167–68), they preferred to fill the ranks of cavalry and infantry only with men of the Latin race. The survey that follows will attempt to document some of those exceptional cases where Rome's non-Italian *amici* provided military assistance in three different circumstances: when their help was completely voluntary and unsolicited by Rome; when mutual agreements on the provision of troops were worked out informally in the field with Roman commanders; and finally, when Roman commanders or the senate officially and unilaterally solicited military contingents from their *amici*.

We may start with a familiar example. As was mentioned earlier (above, p. 166), Hiero II of Syracuse twice supplied troops for Rome during the Second Punic War, providing 500 Cretan archers and 1,000 light infantry in 217 BC, and 1,000 archers and slingers in 216. Recall that in the latter case, according to Livy's account, Hiero was motivated by his personal assessment of Roman needs at that time, for he noted that the Romans lacked effective light-armed contingents, which were necessary to succeed against the Carthaginians, who used Moors, Baliares, and other tribes that were similarly armed. The main point to note here is that these troops were provided in accordance with Hiero's independent strategic assessment of Rome's manpower situation, and completely of his own volition. This was evidently a quality the Romans appreciated in their international *amici*, judging from the fulsome reply of the senate to Hiero's ambassadors.

¹¹ For the military obligations arising from treaties, see, conveniently, Ilari 1974; Ferrary 1990; Prag 2007; Rich 2008; for tax and tribute, see Naco del Hoyo 2003, with extensive bibliography.

The record contains a few more clear examples of voluntary contributions of troops by Rome's *amici*. The Achaeans, for instance, after deciding to abandon their alliance with Philip V in favor of the Romans in 198 BC, immediately voted that their entire force should be sent to Corinth to assist T. Quinctius Flaminius, the Roman commander, in his siege of that city. Some self-interest was involved here, for the Achaeans hoped to incorporate Corinth into the League, which indeed Flaminius promised them in exchange for their *amicitia*. In addition, as was noted in [Chapter 3](#) (above, pp. 102–03), there was a not inconsiderable element of Roman intimidation – and thus Achaean fear – in the decision to join Rome. But the point worth stressing here is that the specific nature of the Achaean contribution to the war effort was left entirely up to League officials. At no point did the Romans object to the Achaeans' opportunism or independent assessment of how best to exploit their new relationship with Rome; indeed, Flaminius encouraged them in this.¹²

Another example that manifests this same mixture of motives involves Philip V himself, who, after his defeat in the Second Macedonian War, attempted both to cultivate his restored *amicitia* with Rome and to pursue an independent foreign policy. The sources record that the king provided military support to Rome both in the war against Nabis of Sparta in 195 BC (1,500 troops: Livy 34.26.10), and again later on in the war against Antiochus (Zonar. 9.20; cf. Livy 37.39.12 [a mixed volunteer force of 2,000 Macedonians and Thracians]). Erich Gruen has argued that the king performed these services completely voluntarily: "the decision was his";¹³ indeed it was, but he no doubt felt some self-imposed pressure to demonstrate his loyalty to the Romans after so recently being their enemy. But this does not make Philip the Romans' lackey or their client. Polybius praises Philip for his vigor after 196 since the king "adapted himself to the reverses of fortune and faced the circumstances he found himself in with the greatest prudence" (μεταθέμενος τοῖς ἐκ τῆς τύχης ἐλαττώμασιν εὐλογιστότατα δοκεῖ κεχρῆσθαι τοῖς καθ' αὐτὸν καιροῖς: 18.33.7). Sheer pragmatism is not the whole story, however; in a later context, the historian further remarks on the king's policy following his defeat in 196:

Ὅτι Φίλιππος ὁ βασιλεὺς, ὅτε μὲν ἠϋξήθη καὶ τὴν κατὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐξουσίαν ἔλαβε, πάντων ἦν ἀπιστότατος καὶ παρανομώτατος, ὅτε δὲ πάλιν τὰ τῆς τύχης ἀντέπνευσε, πάντων μετριώτατος. ἔπει δὲ τοῖς ὅλοις πράγμασιν

¹² Achaean aid at Corinth: Livy 32.23.3; Flaminius' promise: Livy 32.19.4; 33.32.5; cf. 33.34.9; Achaean fear: Paus. 7.8.1–2; Livy 32.21.37, 22.6; App. *Mac.* 7; Zonar. 9.16; cf. Polyb. 18.13.8–9.

¹³ Gruen 1984: 400; cf. Gruen 1973: 129, 131.

ἐπιταίσει, πρὸς πᾶν τὸ μέλλον ἄρμαζόμενος ἐπειρᾶτο κατὰ πάντα τρόπον σωματοποιεῖν τὴν αὐτοῦ βασιλείαν.

When King Philip grew great and was powerful in Greece, he had the least regard of all men for good faith and law, but when the wind of good fortune changed, he was the most moderate of all men. For when he came entirely to grief in all his affairs, adapting himself to all contingencies, he attempted by every means to restore his kingdom to health. (Polyb. 25.3.9–10)

These are distinctly moral judgments. Polybius is not praising Philip for his abject obedience to Rome but for his vigor, moderation, adaptability – and, crucially, his independence – in rebuilding the power of Macedon after his defeat, and as a consequence of his efforts at balancing Rome's increasing power in the region, regardless of what the Romans' strategic preferences might have been. Polybius had praised Hiero's support of Carthage during the Mercenary War for precisely the same reason.

The key to understanding Philip's complex behavior – independent, yet solicitous of Rome's presumed wishes – is provided by the *habitus* of good friendship, ancient and modern. Cicero urges his readers in the *De Amicitia* that they “not wait to do honorable things for our friends until we are asked” (*amicorum causa honesta faciamus, ne exspectemus quidem, dum rogemur. De Am. 44*), while Janet Reohr has observed of modern friendship that it is the part of the good friend to anticipate a friend's wishes.¹⁴ Such independent initiative has no place in the dynamics of the patron – client relationship: the patron gives the orders, the client listens. Philip's provision of troops for Rome's wars against Nabis and Antiochus was a material demonstration of his *fides* towards Rome, an attempt to reinforce and publicize his ongoing commitment to the Roman side; it is thus of a piece with his rejection of the overtures of Antiochus and Hannibal to side with them against the Republic (Livy 36.8.6; cf. App. *Syr.* 16; Zonar. 9.19). After his defeat by Rome in 196 BC, Philip V acted, as indeed Hiero and the Achaeans had earlier, according to a universal code of friendship practice.

A further example of a Roman *amicus* voluntarily contributing troops for Roman wars reinforces some of these points. In the winter of 172/171 BC, Roman legates visited the Greek cities in the Aegean and in Asia Minor to drum up support for their upcoming war against Philip v's son and successor, Perseus. Hagesilochus, the *prytanis* of the Rhodians, strongly urged his fellow citizens to support the Roman cause, going so far as to have forty ships repaired even before the Roman ambassadors arrived

¹⁴ Reohr 1991: 56.

(Polyb. 27.3.3; Livy 42.45.3). The *prytanis* urged this course, according to Polybius, “in order that if the occasion should arise, they would not have to prepare when called upon, but would be ready to act upon their decision immediately.”¹⁵ The additional argument that Livy puts in the mouth of Hagesilochus – that the Rhodians especially needed to demonstrate their loyalty in order to fend off accusations against them by Eumenes of Pergamum (Livy 42.45.6; cf. 42.26.8–9) – is doubtless “fictitious,” especially because Polybius states clearly and unambiguously that the Rhodians needed little convincing at that time to stay loyal, and he describes the Roman *legati* as being very pleased with the Rhodians’ goodwill.¹⁶ Similarly fictitious, since it also does not appear in Polybius, is the strategic assessment of Livy’s Hagesilochus that “the Roman alliance is the only one in the world now that is stable – whether through force or loyalty” (*Romanam societatem, unam tum in terris uel uiribus uel fide stabilem*: Livy 42.45.4). The suggestion of Roman menace, and of the hopelessness of resisting Roman power paints a false picture, which is then amplified by Livy’s injection into the proceedings of a false note of panic (cf. *trepidaturos*: Livy 42.45.6) behind Hagesilochus’ justification for being in a state of readiness. Finally, as we know from Polybius’ version, it was for their own convenience and security that the *prytanis* advised the Rhodians to be prepared, rather than for that of the Romans: as Richard Berthold has noted, “the Rhodians always had a fleet in being, and with the possibility of war and a consequent surge in piracy, it behoved them to have such a fleet ready.”¹⁷ Thus if a Roman request came for Rhodian ships, or if piracy increased in the Aegean as a by-product of the upheaval of the upcoming war with Perseus, the Rhodians would not have to rush about at the last minute to fit out their navy properly. Once again it is the free choice of a Roman international *amicus*, and its conformity to the model of the good friend who anticipates his partner’s wishes that deserve emphasis here.

The evidence examined thus far reveals a consistent pattern: Rome’s international *amici* often took the initiative in contributing troops to

¹⁵ ἔάν τις ἐκ τῶν καιρῶν γένηται χρεία, μὴ τότε παρασκευάζωνται πρὸς τὸ παρακαλούμενον, ἀλλ’ ἐτοίμως διακείμενοι πράττωσι τὸ κριθὲν ἐξ αὐτῆς (Polyb. 27.3.4; cf. Livy 42.45.5–7).

¹⁶ καίπερ οὐ προσδεομένων τῶν Ῥοδίων κατὰ τοὺς τότε χρόνους . . . εὐδοκουμένους τοὺς πρεσβευτὰς . . . τὴν τῶν Ῥοδίων εὐνοίαν (Polyb. 27.3.3, 5). Livy’s statement is “fictitious”: Gruen 1975: 59; cf. Gruen 1984: 412 n. 78 (“worthless”), 565 n. 158. (“false”); Berthold 1984: 180–81 n. 3 (“an annualistic [*sic*] mistake”). *Contra* McShane 1964: 158 and Hansen 1971: 109, who rightly point out that anti-Rhodian innuendo is not at all untypical of Eumenes in this period, although they fail to prove the only thing that matters, that the Romans paid any attention to it.

¹⁷ Berthold 1984: 180 n. 3; on the military preparedness of the Greek *poleis* in the Hellenistic age generally, see Ma 2000; Prag 2007 (on the Sicilian *poleis*).

Roman war efforts, in many cases anticipating Roman wishes and wanting to be seen to be so doing. The general principle finds expression in the policy of the Achaean statesman Aristaeus of Dyme, who, Polybius says, advocated “doing whatever was useful to the Romans quickly, sometimes even before they so ordered [and] yielding whenever any law clearly opposed written Roman requests.”¹⁸ Such behavior is partly to be explained by the changed power dynamics in the eastern Mediterranean after Rome’s defeat of Philip and Antiochus, as indeed Polybius recognized.¹⁹ However, far from being a “preemptive cringe” on the part of the weak before the strong, the policy of Aristaeus and others in a similar position was positively motivated as well by the imperatives of the practical logics of friendship. As we have just seen, in the view of both ancient and modern thinkers, anticipating a friend’s wishes is one of the marks of a good friend. But in addition, as Marc Bloch points out, “reciprocal demands are characteristic of equals, while unsolicited gifts mark hierarchical relations.”²⁰ The unequal friendship typology, discussed in [Chapter 2](#), easily accommodates this logic. The eagerness of Roman *amici* to anticipate Rome’s desires, and to perform services for their superior partner was not simply a means of ingratiating themselves with the Republic, a kind of ritual groveling, but was an equalizing strategy designed to compensate for the gulf in power that separated them. Of course the result was the same: such behavior created a self-reinforcing inequality, and deeply embedded a psychological habit of dependence on Rome – unless and until Roman power endured a serious reverse. There is a striking parallel here with the “agentic” friendship practices between unequals, discussed in [Chapter 2](#). There it was seen that agentic friends are extremely active in performing services for each other, even attempting to outdo one another in generosity and spontaneity, because they regard the relationship as an opportunity for status-display and self-promotion. Rome’s friends’ competitive, voluntary, and often preemptive provision of military assistance is indeed a response to the changed power dynamic throughout the Mediterranean system by

¹⁸ πᾶν τὸ πρόσφορον Ῥωμαίοις ἐξ ἐτοίμου ποιεῖν, ἔνια δὲ καὶ πρὶν ἢ προστάξαι κείνους. . . . ἔκων, ὁπότε τούτων ἀντιτίπτοι τις προδῆλως τοῖς ὑπὸ Ῥωμαίων γραφομένοις (Polyb. 24.11.4–5). A more general discussion of the policy differences of various Achaean politicians – including Polybius himself – is best deferred until the next section of this chapter.

¹⁹ Polyb 24.11.3: “with Roman superiority now completely enmeshed in the affairs of the Greeks after their successes against Philip and Antiochus . . .,” τῆς γὰρ Ῥωμαίων ὑπεροχῆς ἤδη τοῖς Ἑλληνικοῖς πράγμασιν ἐμπλεκομένης ὁλοσχερῶς κατὰ τε τοὺς Φιλιππικοὺς καὶ τοὺς Ἀντιοχικοὺς καιροὺς . . . This period corresponds to the point at which Rome achieved unipolarity in the eastern Mediterranean, according to Eckstein 2006: 1–2, 306, 314; Eckstein 2008: 1, 25–27, 336–81.

²⁰ Cited in Mannoni 1990: xviii.

the late 170s BC, but it is also a manifestation of the practical logics of unequal *amicitia*, which compel partners to deploy equalization strategies.

It is now time to consider some other circumstances in which Rome's friends contributed troops to Roman war efforts. Although the sources are rarely explicit on the matter, it seems that Roman *amici* often provided military assistance on the basis of some mutual, informal agreement between themselves and the Roman commanders on the spot. Thus in his speech of 189 BC, Eumenes II of Pergamum noted that his father Attalus I "took part in" (ἐκοινώνησε: Polyb. 21.20.4) all of Rome's wars, providing greater naval and military contingents, and more supplies than any other of Rome's allies (Eumenes claimed the same for himself as well: Polyb. 21.20.9). Polybius' use of the verb κοινόω, with its suggestion of common action, receives support from the account of the beginning of Attalus' friendship with Rome, described in the previous chapter. There it was seen that the joint campaign of Attalus and P. Sulpicius Galba, the Roman commander in Greece, against Philip V in 208 BC was most likely coordinated and planned in private meetings between Galba and the king during the previous winter on Aegina (above, pp. 84–85). In a retrospective passage in connection with the summoning of the Great Mother goddess in 205, Livy also remarks that the Romans "had entered into friendly relations with King Attalus because of their common war against Philip" (*cum Attalo rege propter commune aduersus Philippum bellum coeptam amicitiam esse*: 29.11.2). Eumenes himself is said to have consulted with Flamininus in 192 on the strategy for the impending war against Antiochus, the result of their discussion being that the king sent troops to garrison Chalcis.²¹

Pergamum was not exceptional in striking informal battlefield agreements with Roman commanders to coordinate strategy. Another important example is the Thessalians, who in 171 BC sent several hundred horsemen to assist the Romans in their war against Perseus,²² although, Livy notes, "the whole force had been hoped for" (*omnis equitatus speratus erat*: 42.55.10). Livy's comment may indicate that the Romans and Thessalians had earlier agreed, perhaps in informal talks, that the full complement would be sent, but that the Thessalians later decided to scale back their

²¹ Eumenes' comments on Attalus' contributions: Polyb. 21.20.3–5; Livy 37.53.8–10; Eumenes' comments on his own contributions: Polyb. 21.20.6–10; Livy 37.53.11–19; Attalus and Glabrio winter at Aegina in 209/208 BC: Livy 27.33.4–5; campaign of 208: Polyb. 10.41–42; Livy 28.5–8; App. *Mac.* 3; Dio fr. 57.57–58; Zonar. 9.11; cf. Just. *Epir.* 29.4; Eumenes' consultation with Flamininus and garrison at Chalcis: Livy 35.39.1–2; cf. *Syll.*³ 605B.

²² The figure is 300 at Livy 42.55.10; 400 at 42.58.14.

commitment – without even informing the Romans before the campaign began. Such independence was of course their prerogative as Roman *amici*; had they or the Romans thought of them as *clientes*, this would not have been an option: as I have shown in Chapter 2 and elsewhere, the mutual right of self-determination is one of the defining characteristics of friendship and a crucial *locus* of difference between *amicitia* and *clientela*.²³ The *amicitia* reading of this episode gains support from the sequel: no Roman remonstrations or repercussions followed. Quite the contrary – after sustaining heavy losses in a battle near Pherae in 171, the Romans praised the Thessalians before an assembly, and even rewarded their leaders for their valor (*uirtutis causa*: Livy 42.60.10) since they had been “of the greatest use” (*maximo usui*: 42.59.4) in covering the Roman retreat. Whatever disappointment the Romans felt when the Thessalian cavalry first arrived (and, as we saw earlier in the case of Hagesilochus of Rhodes, Livy is not above spicing up his source material with a dash of Roman menace), Rome’s Thessalian *amici* acquitted themselves well, and were duly and appropriately praised in public for their assistance, which, it should be noticed, was not only of great practical use (*usus*) but, perhaps more importantly, demonstrated their moral *uirtus* as friends.

Finally, a further method whereby the Romans gained access to foreign troop contingents is when these were explicitly requested by the senate or the Roman commander on the spot. These requests differ from the bilateral arrangements just discussed in that the realities of power in a particular theater of operations, which in most of these circumstances favored the Romans, left the foreign *amicus* less room for maneuver. Rome’s Spanish campaigns during the Hannibalic War furnish some of the most prominent examples. In 218 BC Cn. Scipio called on his Spanish *amici* to provide troops for his initial campaign in the peninsula, although they were apparently not obliged to do so by any binding or formal agreement;²⁴ rather, they seem to have provided them as a condition (whether explicit or implicit) of their (likely) original *deditio*.²⁵ We are also told that the future Scipio Africanus mustered troops for his Ilipa campaign of 206 from among his

²³ Burton 2003: 347–48; above, p. 34.

²⁴ Livy refers to “renewing alliances and establishing new ones” (*renouandis societatibus partim nouis instituendis*: 21.60.3) and “an alliance of armed men” (*societas armorum*: 21.60.4), and Polybius in a later retrospective passage refers to these arrangements as *φιλία καὶ συμμάχια* (3.97.5), but both authors must be using “alliance” in the usual loose sense (above, pp. 79–81) since we know of little more than a handful of Spanish *amici* who had formal treaties with Rome: Knapp 1977: 42; Bernhardt 1975; followed by Eckstein 1987a: 193 n. 23.

²⁵ Thus Livy describes them as being under *Romana dicio* (Livy 21.60.3). On *deditio* establishing the conditions (in the absence of a *foedus*) for Roman troop requests, see Rich 2008.

Spanish *amici*, who went on to form perhaps as much as a third of his army.²⁶

A final example adds considerable nuance to the picture. In 210/209 BC, Scipio Africanus called out 5,000 Spanish troops by edict (*euocatis edicto... sociorum auxiliis*: Livy 26.41.1), but evidently decided not to expose them to the dangers of his upcoming New Carthage campaign, and instead assigned them to guard duty in the area north of the Ebro under the command of the propraetor, M. Junius Silanus. Apparently even in circumstances where Roman power had been firmly established and asserted, and where there was no question of an equal partnership between Rome and her *amici*, the Romans hesitated to treat their friends as subject inferiors or cannon fodder – even though this was their prerogative as receivers of *deditio*. Scipio's careful treatment of the Spanish tribes is thus perhaps a further indication that the quality of *fides* that arose from the *deditio* ritual was not the unanswerable sort extended by a patron towards a client, but the mutual and mutually respectful kind that established moral equivalence between *amici*, and discouraged exploitation.²⁷

This pattern seems to have been repeated in North Africa where, just before the Second Macedonian War broke out in 200 BC, the Romans requested from Masinissa some Numidian cavalry, and in return thanked him for his services in the earlier conflict with Carthage, bestowed on him the same trappings and symbols of royalty that Scipio had earlier given him in 203 – the ivory staff, curule chair, and the embroidered toga and tunic (Livy 31.11.11; cf. 30.15.11), endorsed the forcible expansion of his kingdom at his enemy Syphax's expense, and promised to do whatever else they could to expand his kingdom further (Livy 31.11.8–12). When Masinissa delivered the promised 2,000 horsemen to the Roman ambassadors upon their arrival in Africa, they accepted only half that amount, and Masinissa personally oversaw their embarkation on ships bound for Greece, along with unsolicited gifts of two million *modii* of wheat (over 13,300 tonnes) and some barley (Livy 31.19.3–4). There is a precise analogy here with Scipio Africanus' earlier treatment of Rome's Spanish friends ahead of his New Carthage campaign. Once again the senators showed their concern not to exploit their Numidian *amicus* or to make him feel exploited – hence their generous offer to let him draw down his troop commitment. An additional motive may be adduced: just as in the early stages of the

²⁶ Polyb. 11.29.6; Livy 28.13.1; the figure: Eckstein 1987a: 219–20.

²⁷ It was perhaps the case that Scipio did not trust his Spanish allies enough to include them on this dangerous campaign, as indeed was the case in the later Baecula and Ilipa campaigns: Eckstein 1987a: 214 (Baecula); Polyb. 11.20.6; Livy 28.13.2 (Ilipa). This does not, however, affect the crucial point that keeping them out of harm's way was a great boon to Rome's Spanish allies.

Hannibalic War when the Romans used equalization strategies to resist Hiero of Syracuse's attempts to overwhelm them with his generosity, so too in 200 the *patres* probably feared becoming (or appearing to become) too dependent on Rome's Numidian *amicus* by accepting too many favors from Masinissa, and thus undermining Rome's current superior status in the relationship. I doubt very much that in the time between the senate's initial request to Masinissa and his delivery of the cavalry Roman military planners had revised downward by a factor of precisely a thousand the number of horsemen they required for their Macedonian campaign; it is far more likely that the senate had developed a case of "borrower's remorse" in the interim, and decided to counter the impression of neediness that their initial request may have created with a self-confident gesture. This was, in other words, a ritual performance designed to assert and affirm Rome's current status in the relationship. The senate's promise to expand significantly Masinissa's kingdom, of course, points in the same direction.

Masinissa's response is also noteworthy – and predictable – in terms of the practical logics of gift exchange between *amici*. His attempt to counter the senate's refusal to accept the full complement of cavalry with abundant gifts of Numidian grain was a transparent equalization strategy designed to cancel out the Roman assertion of superiority. Galba, the commander in charge of the Macedonian War, may well have been surprised – perhaps unpleasantly – by the unsolicited and unexpected gift of grain. In bypassing the senate (and perhaps the Roman ambassadors) and placing the grain on board the ships bound for Greece, Masinissa was probably exploiting the difficulties and delays associated with ancient long-distance communication to ensure that Galba, the Roman commander on the spot, accepted a gift that the senate could not possibly refuse.

Finally, it should be noted that Rome's request for Numidian cavalry, like the Scipios' request for troops from Rome's Spanish *amici*, was grounded in the obligations of friendship rather than the terms of a treaty of alliance. As was seen in the previous chapter (above, p. 108), there is no evidence that Masinissa ever had a formal treaty with Rome.

A final set of examples, involving the Achaean League, is somewhat more complicated since the League did, in fact, possess a formal treaty of alliance with Rome in our period, by 184 BC at the latest.²⁸ During

²⁸ See Badian 1952b, who dates the Achaean *foedus* to late 192 or early 191 BC (followed by Ferrary 1988: 95, 122; 1990: 222; Eckstein 2008: 287 n. 56, 332–33, 348). Gruen 1984: 34 (with citation of older literature at n. 108) prefers the period shortly after the striking of treaties with Aetolia (189) and Antiochus (188); Sherwin-White 1984: 61–62 prefers an early date (198/197). The earliest mention of the Achaean treaty occurs in the year 184 in a speech of Lycortas (Livy 39.37.10), and Polybius mentions its renewal in 183 (Polyb. 23.4.12). The Achaeans had asked for a treaty with Rome in 197/196: Livy 32.23.2–3.

the Third Macedonian War – that is, after the Roman–Achaean treaty was struck – the Romans explicitly requested troops from the League on only one recorded occasion, in 172, when the Roman commander Q. Marcius Philippus asked the Achaeans to send 1,000 League troops to garrison Chalcis (Polyb. 27.2.11–12; cf. Livy 42.44.7–8). Shortly after this, 1,500 Achaean light troops are found in the Roman camp at Tripolis (Livy 42.55.10), but whether these were explicitly requested by Rome is unknown. Similarly, in 169 the Achaeans placed the full complement of their military forces at Philippus’ disposal (Polyb. 28.12.1–4), but again it is unclear whether this was in accordance with an explicit Roman request.

Was the Achaeans’ compliance with Roman requests, as in the first case, based on the specific terms of their *foedus* with Rome or by virtue of their status as a Roman *amicus*, which they continued to enjoy even after their treaty was in effect (cf. Polyb. 24.12.1: φιλικόν)? If the former, were their obligations any more burdensome or inflexible than those of other states that enjoyed only informal *amicitiae* with Rome? In none of the three instances just enumerated are we told explicitly that the Achaean troops were supplied according to the specific terms of the Roman–Achaean *foedus*. On the other hand, all these notices are extremely brief and perhaps abbreviated, so the possibility that the treaty was invoked cannot be ruled out unless there is good evidence to suggest otherwise.

There are, in fact, two further passages that may shed some light here. In the first, Livy tells us that when a Roman delegation arrived in the Peloponnese, ahead of the campaign against Perseus, to request the support of the states there “without discrimination” (*sine discrimine*: Livy 42.37.7), the Achaeans were angry with the Romans for doubting their loyalty and placing them on the same level as the unreliable Messenians and Eleans, who had earlier fought alongside Philip V, and then Antiochus III against Rome; the Achaeans asserted, inaccurately, that they had assisted the Romans against Macedon from the very beginning, that is, from the time of the First Macedonian War.²⁹ Once again, there is no mention here of the treaty, merely an assertion of long-standing loyalty. It is also strange that the Roman delegation felt compelled to request Achaean support on the same terms as they requested it from other Roman *amici* in the Peloponnese who lacked treaties; if the Achaean treaty enshrined a mutual defense pact, as Gruen rightly infers from the earlier Achaean request of 183

²⁹ Livy 42.37.8: *Achaeis indignantibus eodem se loco esse, qui omnia a principiis Macedonici belli praestitissent Romanis, quo Messenii atque Eliae, qui et Macedonis Philippi bello hostes fuissent Romanis et pro Antiocho postea arma aduersus populum Romanum tulissent.*

for Roman help against the Messenians “in accordance with the alliance,”³⁰ then it was completely unnecessary for them to invoke only their *amicitia*. The key, I think, lies in the ambassadors’ language: they exhorted all the cities indiscriminately “to help the Romans against Perseus with the same spirit and loyalty with which they helped them in the war against Philip and then in the war with Antiochus.”³¹ At issue was the *fides* governing the *amicitiae* Rome had with the various states of the Peloponnese, including the Achaeans; the issue of treaties was quite beside the point. *Fides*, as always, required confirmation through action; this was, as we have seen, the only way of demonstrating that friendship was ongoing – hence, on this occasion, the Roman request for demonstrations to that effect on the part of all the Peloponnesian states, *foederata* or not.

The second passage is even more revealing. An important fragment of Polybius preserves a policy debate within the Achaean League that took place in 170/169 BC. The debate was over the specific issue of the League’s proper role in Rome’s war against Perseus: some politicians, notably Polybius’ father Lycortas, advocated a position that amounted to neutrality; others proposed a strategy of “soft balancing,” that is, adhering to Roman requests only so long as these did not damage Achaean laws and interests, and restraining those men, such as the Achaean statesman Callicrates of Leontium, who might go further;³² a third group, which included Polybius himself and the Achaean statesman Archon, argued for full cooperation with Rome (Polyb. 28.6.1–8).³³ Polybius and Archon won the day; Polybius was then elected hipparch, and Archon *strategos* of the League (Polyb. 28.6.9). Under their influence the Achaeans voted enthusiastically to commit their entire army to the Roman cause, and further decreed that Archon should prepare and muster the League’s troops immediately; an embassy, headed by Polybius, was to be dispatched to the consul Philippus informing him of the decree, and asking where the Achaean troops should be sent (Polyb. 28.12.1–4). In the event, however, Polybius delayed approaching the consul until the latter had completed the difficult and dangerous task of

³⁰ Gruen 1984: 34–35; κατὰ τὴν συμμάχϊαν: Polyb. 23.9.12.

³¹ *sine discrimine omnes ciuitates adhortarentur ut, quo animo qua fide adiuiuisent Romanos Philippum primum, deinde Antiochi bello, eodem aduersus Persea iuuarent* (Livy 42.37.7).

³² On “soft balancing,” whereby lesser powers “use nonmilitary tools to delay, frustrate, and undermine aggressive unilateral . . . military policies” of the hegemon, see Press-Barnathan 2006: 272 with the relevant IR literature cited there.

³³ The views of Archon and Polybius are not entirely clear at Polyb. 28.6.7, but as Eckstein 1985: 279 (cf. 1995b: 5 n. 20, 209) points out, clarification may be found at Polyb. 28.7.1, where Archon is said to be fully prepared to work with the Romans and their friends (συμπράττειν Ρωμαίοις); contra Pédech 1969: 254–55; Gruen 1984: 508.

moving his legions down from Perrhaebia east to Heracleium, thus securing the crucial coastal access into Macedonia. Once assured that the danger had passed, Polybius presented the League decree to the consul, and reminded him that the Achaeans had complied with all Roman requests made during the war thus far. Philippus responded positively to the hipparch, but said that he no longer needed allied assistance, and did not wish to burden the Achaeans further with the expenses of the war (Polyb. 28.13.4–5). Polybius is careful to point out that although the other envoys returned to Achaea, he himself remained to share with the consul the dangers of the Macedonian campaign (28.13.2, 6).

Perhaps the most important fact to emerge from the Achaean debate and its aftermath is that at no point did the Achaeans – or the Roman commander, for that matter – cite the Achaeans' existing treaty obligations to Rome. The existence of the treaty, evidently, had no impact on policymaking within the League; if it did, then the debate would probably have never taken place, and any question of policy would have simply been referred to the specific terms of the *foedus*.³⁴ It is especially odd that the strict neutrality advocated by Lycortas' faction evidently did not make reference to the only possible means of achieving it under the terms of their treaty – the famous “escape clause,” common in Greek treaties, and probably included in the Roman–Achaean pact, which only mandated mutual military assistance “if it is possible” (κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν in Greek).³⁵ Moreover, precisely the same pattern of Roman behavior is evident here as in the cases of the Scipios in Spain and Masinissa's offer of cavalry in 200 BC, discussed earlier: as in those instances, the Romans in 169 expressed their reluctance to burden their Achaean friends with onerous troop commitments or dangerous campaigning, and were apparently satisfied with a mere demonstration of loyalty and evidence of commitment to the Roman side – and the continued firmness of their friendship.³⁶ That Polybius, the

³⁴ As Gruen 1984: 36.

³⁵ Gruen 1984: 34–35. Polybius did not invoke the clause to explain his dilatoriness in putting League troops at the consul's disposal either.

³⁶ A more cynical interpretation will suggest that Philippus turned down the Achaeans' help because he distrusted them, just as Scipio had done with respect to the Spanish tribes before his New Carthage campaign (above, n. 27). Polybius reveals that at the time of the Achaean meeting of 170/169 BC, the Romans were already wary of Achaean reliability, and had made accusations to that effect (τὰς ὑπονοίας καὶ διαβολάς; Polyb. 28.12.1). There is also an air of excessive protest in Polybius showing Philippus the Achaean decree committing the League's entire force to the Roman cause, and insisting that the League had complied with every Roman request received thus far during the war (28.13.4; cf. 28.12.3–4). Gruen 1984: 509 suggests “Philippus saw through it well enough [and] declined Achaean aid with feigned courtesy.” An alternative, but equally cynical (IR Realist) view would regard Philippus' polite refusal as an expression of Roman contempt for the League's

League hipparch in 170/169, took the initiative in playing with the tempo and timing of fulfilling the League's commitment – such play, as we have seen repeatedly, is a hallmark of gift exchange between friends³⁷ – is a further indication that it was the dynamics of friendship, rather than the legalistic framework of a treaty – to say nothing of the rigid asymmetry of the patron–client relationship – that presided over the Roman–Achaean diplomacy of 169 BC.

During the Roman–Achaean interactions of the late 170s BC, the League's treaty with Rome was never invoked, and individual Achaean statesmen did not hesitate to question whether they should offer military assistance to Rome at all in her war against Perseus. The entire process was governed by the dynamics of *amicitia* and the language of *fides*. Unlike, for example, the Roman–Aetolian treaty of 211 BC, which, as was seen in the previous chapter (above, pp. 90–92), was most likely envisioned as being of limited duration and for the specific purpose of fighting Philip V in the First Macedonian War, the Roman–Achaean pact of the 180s was permanent – and largely symbolic, little more than “a showpiece” designed to publicize Achaea's relationship with Rome.³⁸ It is thus not surprising that its terms were easily ignored during times of war, when the optimal policy response was to deal flexibly with the military-strategic realities on the ground. This response-flexibility arose from that aspect of the Roman–Achaean relationship that apparently mattered most to both parties, and to which both made constant reference – not their treaty, but the *amicitia* it embodied. As befits a partner in a relationship that credits its participants with the power of choice and some degree of autonomy and self-determination, the Achaeans based their decisions throughout the late 170s on their independent assessment of both Roman expectations and their own obligations in the relationship. Roman behavior was also response-flexible: Philippos' decision to refuse Achaean help when it arrived was guided at least in part by consideration for the League's limited resources; it was certainly not driven by an estimate of the maximum amount of assistance that the treaty permitted him to demand. Clearly the only frame

irrelevance in the contemporary geopolitical climate; the parallel case here is the refusal of the US to accept European military support when it was offered in the early stages of the Afghanistan campaign in late 2001: Press-Barnathan 2006: 297. As in the case of Scipio and the Spanish tribes, however, the crucial point is that Rome's reluctance to use the Achaean troops – regardless of what motivated it – was surely a great boon to the League.

³⁷ See above, pp. 64–65. The interpretation of Gruen 1984: 509 – “no better example could be desired of the policy of waiting on events” – is unduly cynical and in fact misconstrues the policy of Polybius and his group (cf. above, n. 33).

³⁸ Gruen 1984: 38.

of reference informing Achaean and Roman interaction in 169 BC was *amicitia*.³⁹

Other examples of Rome's *amici* providing military assistance could be cited, but most are given only the barest of notices in the sources. In any case, enough has been said by now to show that Rome's *amici* regularly provided troops to assist the Roman armies, whether on a voluntary basis, through informal consultation with Roman commanders, or in accordance with official, unilateral Roman requests. Regardless of which scenario was in operation at any given time, the result was usually the same: the friendly states providing the troops enjoyed varying degrees of free choice in deciding whether to supply troops, when to supply them, and the number to be supplied. The Romans, moreover, often chose to ignore the specific requirements of treaties, or the inferior status of those in their *dicio*; indeed, their requests were not very onerous to begin with, and they often refused to accept contingents of troops from their *amici* partly out of a desire not to exploit them or to make them feel exploited. This is not to say that these interactions were wholly benevolent: as will be seen below, the realities of power in any given sphere of conflict, usually asymmetrical in the Romans' favor, compelled Rome's friends sometimes to act within a fairly "circumscribed arc of political possibility," and exchanges and favors were often designed to assert superior status or achieve situational advantage within the relationship; hence the equalization strategies such as over-compensating for and refusing *beneficia*. All of this makes sense in terms of the dynamics of friendship interaction as examined in [Chapter 2](#): all gift-exchange-based relationships, including friendship, generate tension, anxiety, and competitive reciprocity.

In terms of the constitutive effects of these practical logics of interstate *amicitia* on the international system, as we have seen, the Romans often made themselves unnecessarily more vulnerable by not wishing to exploit (or to be seen to exploit) their friends. The Romans, as was their prerogative as the superior *amicus* in an asymmetrical friendship, could have pressured their friends into providing far more military support than they actually did, whether by invoking the specific terms of a treaty (in the Achaean case), or by reminding former *dediticii* of their moral obligations. The practical, real-world effects of such behavior stand out most strongly in 171 BC, when the Thessalians provided fewer cavalymen than they had initially promised, which was likely decisive in the Roman side losing the

³⁹ For further discussion on Achaean–Roman relations of the late 170s BC, see Larsen 1968: 470–72; Errington 1969: 210–11; 1971: 186–92; Deininger 1971: 177–84; Gruen 1984: 507–09; Eckstein 1985: 277–81; 1995b: 5–7.

initial cavalry skirmish, and then the battle itself, against Perseus at Pherae (Livy 42.59).

The provision of military supplies, matériel, and money

The second most frequently attested service performed by Rome's international *amici* is the provision of supplies, matériel, and money for Roman war efforts. It is again appropriate to begin with the by now very familiar case of Hiero II of Syracuse. As was seen earlier, the king contributed emergency supplies to the Roman army at Heraclea in 262 BC, grain in 250, 237, and again at some point in the 220s, a substantial gift of grain and clothing in 218, a combined 500,000 *modii* of wheat and barley, the 220-pound golden statue of Victory, and a six-month supply of grain and pay for the Roman troops on Sicily in 216, and a further 200,000 *modii* of wheat and barley in 215. Some of these *beneficia* were voluntary and spontaneous, while others were in response to specific Roman requests, much like Hiero's occasional troop contributions. Moreover, in the cases of the supplies in the 220s and the grain and pay in 216, the Romans repaid (or promised to repay) the king for his services. As was seen earlier, Hiero's munificence increased significantly during the crisis of the opening stages of the Hannibalic War, and his *amicitia* with Rome became more equalized; the Romans tried various equalization strategies (promising to repay Hiero, protecting Syracuse from naval attack, and dedicating the statue of Victory), in order to avoid becoming (or seeming to become) dependent on Hiero, and to maintain their position of superiority in the relationship.

This same Roman reluctance to accept their friends' openhanded generosity is apparent in an episode a few years later, involving, among others, another lifelong royal *amicus* of Rome, the Numidian king, Masinissa. After providing significant supplies of grain to the Roman armies during the Second Macedonian War on his own initiative (the "surprise" two million *modii* of wheat and some barley in 200 BC: Livy 31.19.4, discussed above, plus another 200,000 *modii* of wheat two years later: Livy 32.27.2), in 191 Masinissa promised to send 500,000 *modii* of wheat and 300,000 of barley to the Roman armies in Greece, as well as 300,000 *modii* of wheat and 250,000 of barley to the city of Rome (he also promised 500 cavalry and 20 elephants for the upcoming campaign against Aetolia: Livy 36.4.8). The gifts were offered voluntarily and spontaneously, but the Romans agreed to accept the grain only if the king accepted payment for them (Livy 36.4.9). Again, the Roman reluctance to become (or seem to become) too

dependent on their *amici* is on show here. In the typical practical logics of gift exchanges between asymmetrical friends, what was here offered as a generous and spontaneous gift from an *amicus* was effectively transformed into a commercial transaction by the superior partner.⁴⁰

On this same occasion, Livy tells us, a virtual flood of embassies from Ptolemaic Egypt, Antigonid Macedon, and Carthage arrived on the doorstep of the *curia* to volunteer supplies for the wars against Antiochus and Aetolia (Livy 36.4.1–4). Philip V of Macedon and Ptolemy V of Egypt promised military aid, grain, and money, including 1,000 pounds of gold and 20,000 of silver from Ptolemy. The senate refused all, but thanked the kings anyway. When both promised to come to Aetolia with all their forces, they were again turned down, although Philip was told that “it would please the senate and Roman people if he did not fail the Roman consul, M.’ Acilius Glabrio,” the commander in Greece (*gratum eum senatui populoque Romano facturum, si M’. Acilio consuli non defuisset*: Livy 36.4.4). What this latter request meant is anyone’s guess – perhaps deliberately so, since the Romans were probably trying to keep their options open while at the same time not wanting to be seen as too reliant on the king’s help. The significance of the senatorial directive, however, is clear: Philip was “on notice” that much more than simply a momentary demonstration of his good faith was required; the king would have to demonstrate his loyalty to the Roman cause on an ongoing basis, to stand ready for the day when the *patres* might ask him for a favor. Thus what may have been behind the senators’ vague request that Philip not fail the consul was that they simply did not yet fully trust him to adhere to his recently restored *amicitia*. The treaty of peace ending their earlier war with him, it should be noted, was apparently not mentioned.

The same dynamic may lie behind the only gift that the Romans actually accepted on this occasion – the Carthaginian grain. In making the offer, the Carthaginians may have been motivated by the need to distance themselves from the recent activities of Hannibal, Rome’s former adversary who had

⁴⁰ It is perhaps worth noting a parallel case, but one fraught with problems. Sometime between 215 and 210 BC, a Roman delegation arrived at Alexandria to purchase grain from Ptolemy IV (Polyb. 9.11a; cf. Livy 27.4.10). The success of the embassy, so Meadows 1998 argues, is indicated by Roman coins issued in this period depicting the distinctive Ptolemaic eagle and thunderbolt motif on the reverse. If the Ptolemaic regime had been a Roman *amicus* since 273 (likely: above, pp. 107–08) – albeit a remote and inactive one – it would have been just as easy for the Romans to request a favor from Ptolemy as to make a “business deal” on this occasion (Eckstein 2008: 202). Either the general looseness of the *amicitia* bond, or merely the looseness of this particular *amicitia* may explain why the Romans acted as they did. Regardless, this interaction conforms to the pattern established here: the Romans were demonstrably reluctant to ask for gifts from their *amici*. On Polyb. 9.11a (with older literature), see Walbank 1967: 137–38.

lately reemerged as an adviser at Antiochus' court (Livy 33.49.6–7); Rome's acceptance of the gift, on the other hand, was an assertion of status over a formerly defeated foe, a demonstration of the power relationship between them, and a test of Carthaginian *fides*.

Finally, as was mentioned earlier, the gifts from Ptolemaic Egypt were refused *in toto*. There was simply no need to test the *fides* of Ptolemy V on this occasion – and for good reason: the Egyptian king represented no real threat to Rome, and besides, he had himself once been the target of a predatory pact between Rome's current enemy Antiochus and their former adversary, Philip V.⁴¹

These examples, like those discussed in the previous section, demonstrate that the Romans seem to have been generally reluctant to accept gifts of grain, making exceptions only when they were in dire need, as in 218–215 BC, the dark early days of the Hannibalic War, when they accepted Hiero's donations, or when their benefactors insisted, as Masinissa and Hiero sometimes did, and when the senate was in no position to refuse, or when the *patres* required a visible demonstration of loyalty from former enemies, shown by their directive to Philip V and their acceptance of Carthaginian grain in 191. In every instance enumerated thus far, the sources are oddly silent on the motives of both sides, but, as we have seen, it is likely that Roman pride, an empathetic desire not to overburden their *amici*, or perhaps some combination of both played a role. But a deeper, more compelling motive emerges from the practical logics of friendship governing these diplomatic exchanges: the Romans tried hard to maintain their status and superior position by not accepting (and not being seen to accept) generous and spontaneous gifts, while their *amici* were probably consciously trying to reduce the disequilibrium between themselves and their superior Roman friends – balancing behavior, in other words, along the lines practiced by Hiero II after 241 and Philip V after 196 (see above, pp. 165–66, 174–75). Rome clearly preferred to be in the position of benefactor, dispensing a steady stream of favors and building up a store of

⁴¹ There can now be little doubt, thanks to Eckstein 2008: 129–80 (cf. 2006: 271–75), that this pact existed, was struck in 203/202 BC, and that the majority of states within the Mediterranean system knew about it, and acted diplomatically and militarily on the basis of its existence; the discovery and publication of a Rhodian decree from Bargylia on the coast of Caria (see Blümel 2000: 94–96) is the pact's "smoking gun," but scholars as early as Holleaux 1935: 306–22 believed the pact existed on the basis of Polyb. 3.2.8, 15.20, 16.1.8–9, 24.6 alone (others listed at Eckstein 2008: 129 n. 32). The vast majority of scholars (listed at Eckstein 2008: 130 nn. 34–38) have yet to follow the Holleaux–Eckstein thesis. The historicity of the pact is not a concern here except insofar as so many – Attalus of Pergamum, Rhodes, Athens, and the Roman senate, to say nothing of Polybius himself – believed it existed, which led to a flurry of diplomatic activity (a "diplomatic revolution," according to Eckstein) involving Rome and her *amici* in 201–200.

obligation in others, as revealed by the senate's comment to Cotys of Thrace mentioned at the outset of this chapter. Once again, the constitutive consequence of the Romans' self-restraint and discrimination in accepting favors from their carefully differentiated *amici* was to deprive themselves of significant advantages in manpower and logistics in a major war against a troublesome ally and the voraciously expansionistic Antiochus the Great. Whether they did this to demonstrate the attractiveness of Roman friendship (over that of Rome's system competitors), or to perpetuate their status-superiority in these relationships matters less, in international-systemic terms, than the effects of such behavior: once Aetolia and Antiochus were defeated, and Rome's friends appropriately rewarded, peace broke out in the East for an unprecedented fifteen years or more.

Facilitating Roman troop movements and intelligence-gathering

During times of war Roman armies often had to pass through hostile, dangerous, or unknown territory, and so relied on their *amici* to facilitate their movements. These services may be conveniently grouped into four distinct categories: providing a safe port for Roman ships and supplies, providing safe escort for Roman armies, serving as guides for Roman movement into *terra incognita*, and authorizing Roman military transport through foreign territory.

An example of the first category is already familiar: during the First Punic War, Hiero II of Syracuse allowed the Romans the use of Syracuse harbor (cf. Diod. Sic. 24.1.7 [implicit]). Similarly, during the First Illyrian War several coastal towns, such as Rome's new *amicus* Epidamnus, provided safe shelter for the Roman fleet (Polyb. 2.11.17).⁴²

In the second category, the provision of safe conduct through the territory of an *amicus*, belongs the action of Philip V, who in 190 BC dispatched Macedonian troops to escort Roman armies safely through Macedonia to the Hellespont, and to build bridges and roads for them, in addition to providing supplies. On this occasion, according to Livy, the Roman commander in the East, L. Scipio, and his brother, Scipio Africanus, were impressed by the king's "efficiency and courtesy" (*dexteritas et humanitas*: Livy 37.7.15), after hearing that the reconnaissance mission of T. Sempronius Gracchus had discovered that Philip had everything prepared for the Romans even before his arrival (Livy 37.7.11–13). Once again, the ideal of

⁴² For the importance of these ports in Rome's subsequent eastern wars, and for further examples, see Derow 1991: 267.

“the good friend” who anticipates a partner’s wishes may have informed Philip’s behavior on this occasion.

A second example in this category recalls another familiar aspect of international gift exchange. Around 164 or 163 BC, King Ariarathes V of Cappadocia offered to provide armed escorts for Roman envoys traveling to Syria; the Romans thanked him, but refused his help, calling him “one of the true friends of Rome” (ἐνα τῶν ἀληθινῶν Ῥωμαίοις φίλων: Polyb. 31.8.8). As will be seen shortly, the “true friend” of Rome has a very specific meaning in Polybius – and a special significance for the nature of the relationship under discussion here. For now what requires notice is the refusal of Ariarathes’ help. Once again, Roman self-deprivation here was simultaneously a genuine attempt to spare a friend the trouble of performing a favor as well as an assertion of superior status in the friendship – just as the king’s initial offer of assistance, conversely, was in part a situational strategy designed to mitigate the prevailing status-asymmetry between the king and Rome. Perhaps the Romans’ use of the “true friend” formulation on this occasion was a means of preempting any offense Ariarathes might take at the Romans’ refusal of his help. Moreover, the Roman envoys’ use of a term denoting special privilege and status – a “special relationship” with Rome – may be a tacit acknowledgment (and hence, tacit proof) of Ariarathes’ pressing concern to achieve status-equivalence (or at least to mitigate the inequality) in a deeply asymmetrical relationship.

The last two categories of assisting Roman troop movements may conveniently be dealt with together. An example of the third category, the provision of guides through *terra incognita*, is already familiar from the previous chapter (above, pp. 88–90). In 310 BC M. Fabius, the brother of the consul of that year, established *amicitia* with the Umbrian Camertes in order to secure their assistance in negotiating the thick Ciminian forests northwest of Rome in Etruria. A similar dynamic is apparent in an instance of the fourth and final category under analysis here. During the great Celtic War in 223 BC, the Romans invited the Celtic Anares to become Roman *amici* in exchange for the right of passage through their territory, which was necessary if the Romans were to outflank their enemies, the Insubres (Polyb. 2.32.1–2). Note here that, as in the case of the Umbrian Camertes in 310, Roman *amicitia* itself merged into the prestation, the initial *beneficium* that Rome was able to bestow on its new friend. The fact that in both instances the *amicitia* was taken up, apparently eagerly in the case of the Camertes (the senate of Camerinum accepted Roman friendship “with amiable hospitality,” *comi hospitio*: Livy 9.36.7), indicates that unlike

some modern scholars, these ancient peoples did not regard Roman international friendship as a cynical ploy by Rome to entrap other peoples into a relationship of subservience (that is, *clientela*), or to furnish Rome with a convenient pretext for further wars of aggression with their new friends' neighbors.⁴³ These were genuine friendships without predetermination of status (as always, that would come later, as the friendship evolved), and were improvisations by commanders on the spot in response to contingent circumstances rather than pre-planned steps in a forward-looking and coherent grand strategy of imperial expansion.

These observations impinge upon the next service Roman friends performed for the Republic under consideration in this section – the gathering and reporting of military intelligence for Roman commanders.⁴⁴ This was a particularly important service in antiquity given the pervasive “opacity of states” in the Mediterranean system – the Political Science concept of “the uncertainty principle,” whereby states can only guess at the capabilities and intentions of other states.⁴⁵ The fact is that there was even less accessible information about the plans, capacities, and capabilities of other states in antiquity than there is today because of the primitiveness of ancient diplomacy, and the absence of modern intelligence-gathering technology and methods. The Romans valued highly those friends who could provide useful intelligence since it could mean the difference between smashing victory and overwhelming defeat for Roman forces. Thus at the outset of the Hannibalic War, Hiero of Syracuse learned from captive Punic sailors that the Carthaginians had launched a fleet of twenty ships bound for Italy and thirty-five bound for Sicily with the ultimate object of seizing Lilybaeum. He duly wrote an account of what he heard and dispatched it to M. Aemilius Lepidus, the Roman commander in Sicily, and further advised him to place a strong garrison in Lilybaeum (Livy 21.49.4–6). The result was that the Carthaginians saw that “they would hardly be struggling with unprepared troops” (*Carthaginienses . . . rem fore haud cum imparatis cernebant*: Livy 21.49.11), and the Roman position in western Sicily was secured. Once again, Hiero's by now well-known candor in advising the past masters of the art of war on strategy is on show here (see above, pp. 167–68).

⁴³ Cf. Harris 1979: e.g. 202 on Rome's pact with Saguntum in the 220s BC: “the [Roman] action fell into the tradition of establishing connections with friendly lesser states, a tradition which had tended to hasten wars, not to prevent them. The Senate was more interested in pretexts than in bases.”

⁴⁴ Discussion: Austin and Rankov 1995: 89–94 (Republican examples).

⁴⁵ Also known as “the problem of other minds”: above, Chapter 1, p. 20. On “the uncertainty principle” in the ancient Mediterranean, see Eckstein 2008: esp. 242–44.

Shortly after this, when Ti. Sempronius Longus, one of the consuls of 218 BC, crossed to Sicily, Hiero once again provided valuable intelligence, informing him of the general situation on the island, the movements of the Carthaginians (Livy 21.50.9), and the urgent need to build on Lepidus' earlier success at Lilybaeum, since that city and the nearby maritime towns were endangered by the possibility of internal revolution (*grande periculum Lilybaeo maritimisque ciuitatibus esse et quibusdam uolentibus nouas res fore*: 21.50.11). Hiero was determined to prove as useful as he had been when he was young, despite his advancing age (*pollicitus . . . est, quo animo priore bello populum Romanum iuuenem adiuiisset, eo senem aditurum*: 21.50.9). Evidently his confidence and capacity to advise the Romans on what their military strategy should be was also undiminished in old age.

Other *amici* in the West also kept the Romans abreast of Carthaginian developments in the late third century BC. During the 220s the Spanish city of Saguntum "kept sending embassies to Rome . . . desiring that the ongoing success of the Carthaginians in Spanish affairs not escape the Romans' notice."⁴⁶ This information may have been the catalyst for Rome's second major war in Illyria in 219 since, according to Polybius, the senate feared that a much larger war with Carthage was coming, and so wished to deal with Illyria first (3.16.1, 5).⁴⁷

Perhaps even more important was the information furnished by the Massiliotes in winter 208/207 BC, when they reported that Hasdrubal, the brother of Hannibal, had crossed the Pyrenees into Transalpine Gaul ahead of a plan to link up with his brother in Italy. Livy reports that two Romans, Sextus Antistius and M. Raecius, returned with the ambassadors to do some reconnaissance, and the value of the Massiliote intelligence-gathering network was proven a second time: the ambassadors established communication with some Celtic chieftains friendly to them, and learned that Hasdrubal was awaiting the spring thaw before attempting an Alpine crossing (Livy 27.36.1–2). The Romans were thus able to tap into a crucial intelligence network run by the Massiliotes, and perhaps even to take advantage of their services as translators to extract information from the Celts. This information was invaluable for Rome's preparations for the Metaurus campaign the following year; without it, the arrival of Hasdrubal could well have been a nasty surprise for the Republic. Nor was this the first time that the Massiliotes' intelligence-gathering had proven its

⁴⁶ οἱ δὲ Ζακανθαῖοι συνεχῶς ἔπεμπον εἰς τὴν Ῥώμην . . . βουλόμενοι μὴ λαυθάνειν Ῥωμαίους τὴν γινομένην εὐροίαν Καρχηδονίους τῶν κατ'Ἰβηρίαν πραγμάτων (Polyb. 3.15.1).

⁴⁷ Some scholars, however, have questioned this interpretation: see below, Chapter 5, pp. 262–63. The Romans' infamous relationship with Saguntum will be discussed later in this chapter.

importance: it was they who first reported to the senate that Hannibal had crossed the Ebro in arms in 218 (Livy 21.25.1), thus provoking the Romans to revise their plans forward to deal with the threat.⁴⁸ The evidence presented here puts it beyond doubt that given the pervasive operation of “the uncertainty principle” in the ancient Mediterranean, the intelligence provided by Rome’s *amici* was an invaluable asset – and often essential to the Republic’s very survival.

Diplomatic services: providing advice and mediation

The Romans appear to have been far more genuinely consultative with their international *amici* than, say, the Hellenistic kings were with their allied communities and organizations.⁴⁹ As I have tried to show in [Chapter 2](#) and elsewhere, candor was one of the distinguishing markers of a friend as opposed to a client.⁵⁰ And as the case of Hiero earlier demonstrated, the Romans expected – indeed appreciated – open and honest advice from their international friends as well. This respectful deference towards her friends paid dividends for Rome, in the form of solidifying loyalty to the Republic. The constitutive impact of this behavior was the gradual transformation of the eastern Mediterranean from a permanent war zone dominated by Hellenistic “empires of conquest” into a consultative Roman “empire of trust,” to use Thomas Madden’s terms.⁵¹

Particularly instructive in this regard is the advice given to the Roman commander in Greece, T. Quinctius Flaminius, during and after the Second Macedonian War, as the Romans sought a coherent policy position on the status of the Greek *poleis*, and to formulate the terms of the peace settlement with Philip V. The eventual policy that Flaminius and the Commission of Ten in charge of the postwar settlement in Greece decided upon – “the Freedom of the Greeks” – was evidently formulated by Flaminius on the basis of a speech given by Aristaenus of Dyme before the Achaean assembly in 198 BC (the meeting that led to the Achaeans joining *amicitia* with Rome: above, pp. 102–05), and of a speech by some Greek envoys before the Roman senate in winter 198/197 that played on

⁴⁸ On Massiliote intelligence-gathering generally, see DeWitt 1940; Kramer 1948; Austin and Rankov 1995: 90.

⁴⁹ Eckstein 2008: 286 n. 50 (a comparison with Philip V’s unilateral decision-making within his alliance system, the Hellenic Symmachy); cf. 294, 344. John Ma, by contrast, has consistently argued for the consultative nature of Hellenistic royal diplomacy with the Greek *poleis*: Ma 1999: 167–71, 178; 2000: 360; 2003: 182–83, 186, 191–92. For a response, see Eckstein 2005 (a review of Ma 1999).

⁵⁰ Burton 2003: 345–46 and above, p. 66. ⁵¹ Madden 2008; discussion: above, [Chapter 1](#), p. 23.

the theme.⁵² Later, in June 197, Flamininus met with the assembled Greeks at Tempe in order to lay the groundwork for a postwar peace, and “invited them each to say on what terms peace should be made with Philip” (ὁ τῶν Ῥωμαίων στρατηγὸς ἐκέλευε λέγειν ἕκαστον ἐφ’ οἷς δεῖ ποιεῖσθαι τὰς πρὸς τὸν Φίλιππον διαλύσεις; Polyb. 18.36.2). It was on this occasion that Amynder, the king of Athamania (a Roman *amicus* since autumn 200; Livy 31.28.2), first articulated Flamininus’ position that the Greek states should be given their freedom (ἐλευθερία; Polyb. 18.36.6), to which the Aetolians responded that Philip should be deposed if the freedom Amynder spoke of was to become reality. As Kenneth Sacks has shown, Amynder’s remarks were a “stalking horse” for Flamininus’ own by now fully formulated view on the postwar status of the Greek states,⁵³ but just because the policy outcome at Tempe was in a sense predetermined does not detract from the genuine consultative procedure Flamininus followed throughout the development of the policy. Besides, as we will see, he had good reasons to ignore the Aetolians’ advice (see below, pp. 269–72). But the very fact that the Aetolians felt free to express opinions they knew were not congenial to Roman strategic thinking at this stage is surely significant as well. At the Tempe conference “opinions were forthrightly expressed [by Rome’s friends] both to each other and to the Romans.”⁵⁴

The same pattern reemerges during and after Rome’s war against Antiochus III. As I have tried to show elsewhere,⁵⁵ Roman consultation with the republic of Rhodes during the war shaped Roman strategy from the very beginning. When the joint Roman–Rhodian–Pergamene fleet was positioned at Samos, the Romans included the Rhodians in their war councils, solicited their advice, and agreed with the view of the Rhodian admiral, Epicrates, that half of the joint fleet should leave its station at Ephesus and sail to Lycia to attempt to win over the town of Patara (Livy 37.15.6–8). This was of course a patent ploy to shift Roman military resources to the Rhodian sphere of strategic interest,⁵⁶ but the Romans were nevertheless eager to oblige, and indeed continued operations in the area for some time, despite ultimately failing to take Patara. Around this same time, the Rhodians persuaded the Romans to lift their siege of Iasus in order to gratify a request to them from some exiles of that city (Livy 37.17.5–7). The Romans

⁵² Discussion and sources: Eckstein 1990; 2008: 283, 290–91. On the broader implications of “the Freedom of the Greeks,” see the next section.

⁵³ Sacks 1975: 102–03, followed by Eckstein 1987a: 296–97; 1990: 49. ⁵⁴ Eckstein 2008: 294.

⁵⁵ What follows is based on Burton 2003: 359–60; cf. Berthold 1984: 153–62; Grainger 2002: 288–306; Eckstein 2008: 330–31.

⁵⁶ Cf. Gruen 1984: 546.

continued consulting the Rhodians on crucial matters, and the Rhodians, for their part, spoke freely and without reservation, even when their advice was patently uncongenial to Roman planning and strategy. Thus when Antiochus sued for peace, and the Romans held a council of the allies to debate the issue at Elaea, the Rhodians advocated peace, even though the Romans clearly favored the advice of Eumenes of Pergamum that the war should continue (Polyb. 21.10; Livy 37.18.12–19.6). Finally, when L. Aemilius Regillus, the praetor in charge of the fleet, was bogged down in operations around Samos, and was desperate to get to the Hellespont to help the consul, L. Scipio, transport his armies to Asia, the Rhodians prevailed on him to stay put, very much against his will (Livy 37.26.9–13).

The sequel confirms the pattern. After the battle of Myonessus when Antiochus began his retreat from the sea, the Rhodians were released from service by the praetor Regillus and rewarded with spoils and trophies. But they refused to return home, preferring instead to go to the Hellespont to help the consul transport his army into Asia (37.31.6–7). Note that in this instance the Rhodians simply refused what Livy perhaps tendentiously calls a Roman “order” (*iubet*: 37.31.6); despite Livy, this was no unanswerable demand delivered to a client bound to obey, but, in line with the rewards of trophies and spoils given them, an expression of gratitude for their help, and a sincere attempt to relieve a particularly energetic and helpful friend from the burden of further military service. As we have seen throughout this chapter, however, Regillus may too have been made increasingly uncomfortable by the Rhodians’ energy and initiative during the campaign; after all, without the Rhodians’ help at Myonessus the Romans would have surely been defeated in the battle, and their invasion of Asia Minor would have been delayed by at least a year.⁵⁷ However grateful the Romans were and however desirous of relieving their friend of a burden, there must also have been some anxiety here on the part of the Romans about the shrinking asymmetry between themselves and the Rhodians. The Rhodians’ aggressive pursuit of a strategy of overbenefiting (helping transport Scipio’s troops across the Hellespont) was, by inverse logic, a situational strategy designed to press the advantage and reduce the asymmetry in the relationship for as long as the situation in the Aegean favored it.

These anecdotes reveal with stark clarity that the Rhodians felt completely unconstrained in giving the Romans advice throughout the war with Antiochus: they spoke their minds honestly and with the openness and candor of friends rather than displaying the submissiveness of *clientes*.

⁵⁷ Berthold 1984: 157–58.

The Romans, out of respect for their friends, listened to the Rhodians and took their advice seriously, sometimes acting on it even when it was not necessarily convenient or congenial to themselves and their broader strategy in the naval campaign against Antiochus the Great. Their “nonfederate *amicitia et societas*,” Berthold concludes, provided the Rhodians “with the greatest possible freedom of action.”⁵⁸ But it is the Romans’ reception of that advice, and its constitutive effects, that bear notice: they were willing to alter their own strategic goals and plans – up to and including diverting precious resources to the pointless action around Patara, lifting the siege of Iasus, negotiating peace with Antiochus prematurely, and even preventing Regillus from leaving the quagmire around Samos to help Scipio cross the Hellespont – all in order to gratify a friend. Thus while it may be true that the Rhodians’ assistance at Myonessus had the effect of pushing the Roman invasion of Asia Minor ahead by a year (as Berthold suggests), their advice, and Roman willingness to take it, effectively dissipated any strategic or temporal gains to the Republic.

The postwar peace negotiations with Antiochus further demonstrate the consultative nature of Roman *amicitia* and its constitutive effects. Vast territories were given to both Rhodes and Eumenes of Pergamum in Asia Minor “as a gift” (ἐν δωρεᾷ: Polyb. 22.5.4; 25.4.5 [Rhodes]; τὰς δωρεάς: 21.45.10 [Eumenes]) by senatorial decree in 189 BC and confirmed at the conference of Apamea the next year.⁵⁹ On the occasion of the passage of the *senatus consultum*, Eumenes of Pergamum and a delegation from Rhodes delivered lengthy speeches before the senate offering their congratulations and requesting favors – as well as taking the opportunity to play out their own long-standing rivalry. As was seen in the previous chapter (above, p. 86), the Pergamene king delivered a speech which included a recital of the long history of collaboration with the Romans by both himself and his father, Attalus I.⁶⁰ Although Eumenes was invited by the *patres* to speak “frankly” (μετὰ παρρησίας: Polyb. 21.18.4) – as indeed they expected of their *amici* – the king was evasive at first, saying that he sought no favors, but would leave any decisions about himself and his brothers to the senate. The *patres* told Eumenes not to be afraid but to say what was on his mind. Eumenes again refused, however, and abruptly

⁵⁸ Berthold 1984: 153.

⁵⁹ Polyb. 21.24.6–8; Livy 37.55.5–6, 56.1–4 (*senatus consultum*); Polyb. 21.46.2–3, 9–10; Livy 38.39.7–8, 14–16; Diod. Sic. 29.11; App. Syr. 44 (Apamea settlement).

⁶⁰ On what follows, see above, pp. 86, 178; Polyb. 21.19–21; cf. Livy 37.52–53; discussion: Will 1967: 188–89; McShane 1964: 149–50; Hansen 1971: 92–94; Errington 1971: 181–83; Walbank 1979: 111–14; Briscoe 1981: 372–79; Gruen 1984: 152–53, 547–48; Ferrary 1988: 119–20, 157; Eckstein 2008: 345.

departed the *curia* (Polyb. 21.18.4–7). The confused senators enticed the king back with a promise of a closed-door session, and he now spoke with great candor – and at length – informing the senators of Rhodian aggrandizement, and suggesting that he himself deserved greater rewards than Rhodes, given his own and his father’s past services to the Republic. He sternly warned the senators against unwittingly strengthening one of their friends at the expense of another, and conferring favors on enemies while neglecting and making sport of their true friends. Polybius again uses the term “true friends” (ἀληθινούς φίλους: 21.19.12) here, which, as will be seen shortly, has a very specific meaning in his history (and perhaps in the Roman diplomatic vocabulary as well). Eumenes then issued a further stern warning to the senators – this time falling into hypocrisy: it would be “most shameful” (δεινότατον: Polyb. 21.21.2) if the same senators who rewarded Masinissa of Numidia and Pleuratus of Illyria with entire kingdoms for no real services to the Republic, other than simply maintaining their good faith, should fail to reward someone such as himself, who, along with his father, fought alongside Rome in every war since the inception of their friendship (21.19–21).

What is particularly striking about these last few statements by the Pergamene king is just how absurdly false and gratuitously offensive they are: he accuses Rome’s friends, Masinissa and Pleuratus, of lukewarm loyalty and laziness – to the Roman senators’ faces. The senators, of course, knew that this was simply not the case.⁶¹ Similarly offensive was the king’s initial coyness and walking out on the senators, to say nothing of the patently self-serving tone of his subsequent speech, and the implicit accusation that the Romans might engage in “most shameful” behavior by listening to the Rhodians – another dubious slander against yet another Roman *amicus*. The only consequence that followed, however, was that the senate received both the king and his speech “kindly” (φιλοφρόνως: Polyb. 21.22.1), and offered to grant whatever favor the king wanted. And, of course, the massive territorial grants in Asia Minor soon followed. Once again this shows the high value the Romans placed on candid advice and frank speaking by their international friends, and that this was indeed a genuine friendship rather than a submissive *clientela* where speaking truth (or a version of it) to power was not an option. Were Eumenes a foreign *cliens*, it would have

⁶¹ Pleuratus had served on the Roman side in both the First and Second Macedonian Wars (he is an *adscriptus* on the Roman side in the Peace of Phoenice: Livy 29.12.14; Galba secured his help in the second war: Livy 31.28.2; see further below, p. 266). Masinissa had been very active in the closing stages of the Second Punic War and, as we have noted (above, pp. 180–81), had provided cavalry and grain for the Second Macedonian War, and offered grain for the war against Antiochus.

been highly presumptuous for him to recount in detail and at length his past services to his Roman patrons, to say nothing of his gratuitous insults to Rome's friends – and indeed to the Romans themselves. As was seen in [Chapter 2](#), it would have been equally tactless even for a greatly inferior friend to so behave: the superior friend should remember favors done; the inferior friend should not constantly remind him that he has done them (*[officia] meminisse debet is in quem collata sunt, non commemorare qui contulit*: Cic. *De Am.* 71).

It was now the turn of the Rhodians, and true to past form, they delivered some brutally frank advice to their Roman *amici*. Just as Eumenes had done, the Rhodians, like status-similar friends rather than clients or greatly inferior friends, recounted their own past services to Rome, and openly criticized their Pergamene rival.⁶² Like Eumenes as well, the Rhodians were not shy about frankly pointing out the moral failings of the king to the state that was a friend to them both, even going so far as to say that Eumenes exhibited the typical profile of kings, who by nature despise equality and want to subject as many as possible to their rule. The Rhodian envoys then dwelled on the glory and nobility of the Roman enterprise in the East, attributing to them world dominion (ἐξουσία), praise (ἔπαινος), glory (δοξή), and honor (τιμή). They ended their presentation, appropriately enough, by dwelling on their own qualities – their candor, the value of their friendship, and the duties they performed for Rome, including the ability to point out what is best for their friends:

Ἡμεῖς μὲν οὖν, ὧ ἄνδρες, καὶ τῆς προαιρέσεως γεγονότες αἰρετισταὶ καὶ τῶν μεγίστων ἀγώνων καὶ κινδύνων ἀληθινῶς ὑμῖν μετεσχηκότης, καὶ νῦν οὐκ ἐγκαταλείπομεν τὴν τῶν φίλων τάξιν ἀλλ' ἅ γε νομίζομεν ὑμῖν καὶ πρέπειν καὶ συμφέρειν, οὐκ ὠκνήσαμεν ὑπομῆσαι μετὰ παρρησίας, οὐδενὸς στοχασάμενοι τῶν ἄλλων οὐδὲ περὶ πλείονος οὐδὲν ποιησάμενοι τοῦ καθήκοντος αὐτοῖς.

And so we, men of Rome, who have been eager supporters of your undertakings, and who have truly taken part in all your greatest struggles and dangers, do not now abandon the ranks of your friends, but have not hesitated to remind you with frankness what we think is suitable and advantageous for you, aiming at nothing else nor considering anything else of greater importance than our duty. (Polyb. 21.23.11–12)

Again, despite the clearly self-serving tone of the Rhodian speech, its heavy criticism of Rome's *amicus* Eumenes, and its implicit anticipation of bad

⁶² For what follows, see Polyb. 21.22–24; Livy 37.54–56.10; discussion: Schmitt 1957: 81–84; Will 1967: 189–90; Errington 1971: 181–83; Briscoe 1981: 379–89; Walbank 1979: 114–18; Gruen 1984: 152–53; Berthold 1984: 162–64; Ferrary 1988: 156–58; Eckstein 2008: 345.

faith on the part of the senators in the final settlement, the senate thought the Rhodians expressed themselves extremely well and with due moderation (μετρίως καὶ καλῶς: Polyb. 21.23.13). Rhodian behavior on this occasion, like that of Eumenes immediately before, is not that of a grateful and submissive client, but of a friend who demands recognition of his status arising from his invaluable services to the Roman state.

Perhaps even more instructive for the true nature of Rhodes' relationship with Rome is the addendum to Polybius' account of the senatorial deliberations of 189 BC. After the senate had finished consulting with Antiochus' delegation, and passed the *senatus consultum* establishing the division of Antiochus' former Anatolian possessions between Rhodes and Pergamum, the Rhodians requested that they receive in addition the town of Soli, with which they claimed kinship (συγγένειαν: Polyb. 21.23.10). The senate duly recalled Antiochus' ambassadors and put the Rhodian request to them. The king's envoys naturally balked, so the *patres* recalled the Rhodian ambassadors and told them the disappointing result, but added that they would try to persuade Antiochus' envoys further if the Rhodians insisted, since they would go to any lengths in this matter for the Rhodians' sake. The ambassadors politely refused, being pleased enough by the honor (φιλοτιμία: Polyb. 21.24.15) the senate paid them by entertaining their request.

What is truly remarkable about this pendant to the senatorial deliberations and diplomatic exchanges of 189 BC is not so much the failure of the Rhodians to add Soli to their existing possessions, but the lengths to which the Romans were prepared to go in order to gratify their request – up to and including emending the finalized *senatus consultum*, and changing the terms of the treaty with Antiochus, thus potentially jeopardizing months of delicate negotiations with the Seleucid king. The Rhodians, for their part, were apparently satisfied – and pleased – with the honor and status that accrued to them through the extraordinary public effort by the senators to fulfill their request. For the Rhodians, this was enough – and perhaps even better than gaining Soli. For the IR Constructivist, what stands out most starkly here is the potential real-world effects of the Rhodian request, and the Roman reaction: on the basis of a claim of συγγένεια alone, the Romans were willing to upset plans and arrangements that were already in train, and to go to extremes to gratify a deserving *amicus*.

The final diplomatic service to be discussed here – third-party mediation of Roman disputes – has become one of the most hotly contested issues in the study of Roman diplomacy in recent years, largely because of the

scholarly controversy surrounding the notorious Rhodian offer to mediate Rome's dispute with Perseus of Macedon just as the Roman victory over the king at Pydna was announced in 168 BC. On that occasion, as is well known, the Romans decided to interpret the mediation offer as a sign of Rhodian treachery, and took various punitive measures against the island republic in the years that followed. Discussion of the particulars of this case is best left to the next chapter on the breakdown and dissolution of international *amicitia*. All that needs to be established here is whether the Romans generally welcomed offers of third-party mediation as friendly acts by their *amici*, or disdained them as being contrary to Roman international policy and practice.

The controversy began in the mid-1970s when Erich Gruen argued that the Romans were not in principle opposed to offers to mediate their conflicts from their Eastern *amici*; the Rhodian case was exceptional, Gruen argued, and took everyone – including the Rhodians themselves – by surprise. A decade later, Adele Scafuro argued on the basis of the Rhodian debacle, and the senate's treatment of Prusias of Bithynia after Pydna, that in fact "Rome was not prepared to allow any other nation to serve as negotiator when Rome was involved as a principal adversary in a major war." The following year, Arthur Eckstein, using the same body of evidence as Scafuro, published a paper in support of Gruen's thesis, but with additional nuance: whereas the Romans rejected quasi-judicial binding arbitration of their conflicts, they were not averse in principle to their friends offering informally to mediate their conflicts; the Rhodian case (and another involving Eumenes of Pergamum) were mere "aberrations, called forth by very unusual circumstances." In 1991, Sheila Ager argued for what might be called the minimalist position on the issue: "*in general*, Rome displayed a certain tolerance towards those states which attempted to make peace between her and her enemies, even if she refused their offers" (emphasis in the original). More recently, Eckstein has revised his position in the light of the Political Science concept of "compellence diplomacy:" because ancient diplomacy was so primitive, wars were difficult to avoid by diplomatic means, and serious attempts at mediation were bound to fail because of the pervasive aristocratic ideology of prestige and honor, which was rarely, if ever, conducive to the peaceful settlement of disputes. Another, more recent contribution by Ager suggests that in modern terms, ancient third-party mediation amounts to nothing more than "good offices" or "conciliation," mere encouragement for the parties to sit down and talk rather than actively prodding them into a workable peace settlement. Ager

also adds a further important observation: ancient mediation often consisted of mere “(apologetic) deprecation,” attempts to mollify the anger of one of the belligerents against the other.⁶³

Leaving aside the special case of Rhodes after Pydna for the moment, a sufficient body of evidence exists to show that the Romans were not in principle opposed to their friends offering to mediate their conflicts – and indeed often welcomed these attempts, if “mediation” is understood in Ager’s minimal sense of “good offices” or “conciliation.” Ager has compiled a list of nine instances when the Romans allowed their *amici* to intercede diplomatically between Rome and its adversaries: in 212 BC, when various Sicilian *amici* of Rome offered to mediate between the Roman commander, M. Claudius Marcellus, and the besieged Syracusans; between 209 and 207, when numerous attempts were made to mediate between Aetolia and Philip V (with Rome considered only incidentally); in 205, when the Epirotes brokered the peace talks that issued in the Peace of Phoenice ending Rome’s first war against Philip V; the Aous conference of 198, when the Epirotes again brought the Romans and Philip V to the negotiating table; in 196, when the Achaeans and Aetolians intervened between the Romans and Boeotians; in 190, when Heraclea Pontica intervened between Rome and Antiochus III; between 190 and 189, when both Athens and Rhodes tried to “deprecate the anger” (Latin *deprecari*, Greek παραίτεομαι τὴν ὀργήν)⁶⁴ of the Romans against the Aetolians; and in 188, when the Ilians attempted to “deprecate the anger” of the Romans against Lycia.⁶⁵

This is a substantial list – perhaps thirteen attempts to mediate Roman conflicts in the space of twenty-four years, and during all five major wars Rome fought in the East across the period.⁶⁶ Sorting these various cases according to the relevant criterion under consideration here – whether existing Roman *amici* intervened in ongoing conflicts between Rome in the first instance and its adversaries – the list is cut by over half.⁶⁷ This

⁶³ Gruen 1975: esp. 78–80; cf. Gruen 1984: 117–18; Scafuro 1987: 37 (the quotation); Eckstein 1988: 444 (the quotation); Ager 1991: 30 (the quotation); above, Chapter 1 n. 45 (on Eckstein’s “compellence diplomacy”); Ager 2009.

⁶⁴ E.g., Livy 37.6.4; Polyb. 22.5.6; other passages listed at Ager 2009: 32 n. 49.

⁶⁵ Ager 2009: 27–28 (some based on Ager 1996: nos. 57, 75, 84, 93, 94, 102), with ancient and modern sources listed at n. 35.

⁶⁶ The figure of thirteen is arrived at by counting severally the multiple attempts of Athens and Rhodes to mediate between Rome and Aetolia in 190–189 BC, and of several parties to mediate between Aetolia and Philip (and incidentally Rome) between 209 and 207 (but not counting the mediation of 206 that led to Aetolia’s “separate peace” with Philip); good discussion of the latter cases: Eckstein 2008: 91–116; cf. 2002.

⁶⁷ Excluding three of the four attempts between 209 and 207 BC to negotiate between Aetolia and Philip, which did not involve Rome directly; the Epirotes’ brokering of the Peace of Phoenice,

is still a substantial number, but what was the Roman attitude towards these attempts? In only one case – the attempt at a “comprehensive peace” between Rome/Aetolia and Philip V in 207 BC, brokered by Rome’s *amicus* Ptolemy (among others not in *amicitia* with Rome) – is outright Roman hostility attested: the Roman commander in the East, P. Sulpicius Galba, deliberately derailed the mediation by claiming that he did not have the legal authority to commit Rome to a peace – and wrote secretly to the senate that it was advantageous for Rome for the war to continue (App. *Mac.* 3).⁶⁸ The reliability of Appian’s notice can be challenged on various grounds: for one thing, the opening chapters of the *Macedonica* contain numerous demonstrable errors of fact, and this “first negotiation” of 207 looks suspiciously like a doublet. In addition, of the first four attempts to negotiate a peace in the so-called “First Macedonian War,” this is the only one aimed at including the Romans in a peace to resolve what was, from the Greek point of view, an Aetolian–Macedonian war. Livy, moreover, tells us that it was precisely in the years 207–206 that the Romans were inactive in Greece (Livy 29.12.1); why, then, include the Romans in a “comprehensive peace” now after they had been excluded from such peacemaking attempts in 209 and 208, when they were far more active in the war? Finally, as we have noted (above, p. 107), the status of Ptolemaic Egypt as a Roman *amicus* as early as 273 is debatable, and although there is no reason to doubt the relationship (as was indeed argued in the previous chapter), by this point it was at best dormant – which may explain why the Romans attempted to purchase grain from Ptolemy in 211 or 210 rather than asking for it as a favor (above, n. 40). In other words, it is possible that no (active) *amici* were involved after all in the “comprehensive peace” attempt of 207. This may account for Galba’s hostile reaction. And, as we will see, he was a man prone to fits of temper anyway (below, n. 70).

There are thus too many problems with the “comprehensive peace” attempt of 207 BC to make it the foundation upon which to build a pattern of Roman hostility to her *amici* offering to mediate her disputes with other states. In any case, there is much positive evidence from Ager’s cases that shows precisely the opposite: thus after the Sicilian *amici* of Rome offered

since they were neutrals in the conflict and appear amongst the *adscripti* on the Macedonian side in the peace treaty; the Epirotes’ facilitation of the Aous conference in 198, since they were still neutrals; the attempt of Heraclea Pontica to mediate between Rome and Antiochus, since *amicitia* with Heraclea only followed the attempt; and the Ilia intercession on behalf of Lycia, since it is unknown whether Ilium was a Roman *amicus* at this time (unlikely: Eckstein 2008: 114 n. 147).

⁶⁸ See, most recently, Eckstein 2008: 103–11 (cf. Eckstein 2002) on the peace attempts of 207 BC (upon which some of the following discussion is based).

to mediate between M. Claudius Marcellus and Syracuse, the Roman commander continued to think of them as “loyal allies” (*socii fideles*: Livy 25.40.4); in 192 Flamininus actually requested that the Athenians intervene between the Romans and Aetolians; in 190 the Romans rewarded Heraclea Pontica with Roman *amicitia* for attempting to mediate between themselves and Antiochus – a fact not in dispute, despite the falsehoods and exaggerations of our main source for the story;⁶⁹ Scipio Africanus “kindly received and attended to” the Athenian ambassadors (ἄσμενως ἀποδεξάμενος ὁ Πόπλιος ἐφιλανθρώπει τοὺς ἄνδρας: Polyb. 21.4.3), who came to offer mediation in Rome’s dispute with Aetolia in 190, and immediately took steps to ensure the negotiations got under way (Polyb. 21.4.6). And, as we will see in the next chapter’s discussion of the notorious Rhodian mediation attempt of 168, it was at the request of a Roman consul that the attempt was made in the first place.⁷⁰ All of this suggests more than the “certain tolerance” for mediation attempts that Ager attributes to the Romans. The Romans were not, either in principle or in practice, opposed to offers by their *amici* to mediate their conflicts; as Eckstein and others have recognized, Roman reaction to such offers depended greatly on timing and context, and as we have seen in the case of Galba (if App. *Mac.* 3 is to be trusted), on the temperament of individual Roman commanders. Just because mediation more often than not issued in failure (only one of seven cases under scrutiny here succeeded) does not mean that the attempts were not appreciated: the Romans accepted and approved of friendly attempts to end costly and destructive wars; their friends, moreover, took pleasure in the enhanced prestige and status accruing to them as a result of their peacemaking attempts, and the often public Roman expressions of approval for their actions, such as the reward of Roman *amicitia* granted to Heraclea Pontica. Third-party mediation was one of the few means available for mitigating the violent anarchy of the ancient Mediterranean international system, and even though such diplomacy often ended in failure, the

⁶⁹ On the problems with Memnon, *FGrH* 434 F18.6–10, see Gruen 1984: 735–37; on the exaggerated self-importance of the Heracleotes, see Ager 1996: 257–58; Ager 2009: 28–29. As for the *societas* and *amicitia*, which are clearly distinguished in Memnon’s account (“the agreements in the end progressed for the Romans and Heracleotes that they be not only friends but allies of one another,” καὶ τέλος συνθήκαι προήλθον Ῥωμαίοις καὶ Ἑρακλεώταις, μὴ φίλους εἶναι μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ συμμάχους ἀλλήλοις: *FGrH* 434 F18.10), either Memnon himself or his source has perhaps misunderstood the “terminological inexactitudes” of earlier sources (above, pp. 79–81).

⁷⁰ As will be also seen, we need not follow Polybius’ cynical post-eventum speculation about the consul’s request – “and by doing this he might give the Romans a sensible starting point for deciding about them whatever seemed good to them,” καὶ τοῦτο πράξαντας δοῦναι τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις ἀφορμὰς εὐλόγους εἰς τὸ βουλευέσθαι περὶ αὐτῶν ὡς ἂν αὐτοῖς φαίνηται (Polyb. 28.17.8) – an analysis about which even Polybius himself had doubts.

Romans and their partners took such interventions seriously, seeing them as opportunities for peace, status-enhancement, and, perhaps most importantly from an IR Constructivist standpoint, the extension of the circle of *amicitia* to encompass more states within the Romans' collective-security framework, thereby reducing the number of potential enemies in distant places.

In the brief space available here, I have attempted to provide a fairly comprehensive review of the services Roman *amici* performed in the third and second centuries BC. My reading of the evidence suggests that the practical logics governing these transactions were those of *amicitia* rather than *clientela*, and that the moral imperatives of the friendship bond had constitutive effects on the growth and consolidation of Roman power against the Republic's system competitors. The burden of service under Roman *amicitia* was not terribly onerous, and Rome's foreign relations were more truly consultative than those of other states. Reinforcement of these points may be gained by examining more closely the extent to which Rome's friends enjoyed freedom of action during times of crisis, a topic to which we may now turn.

THE FREEDOM OF ACTION OF ROME'S AMICI

Sufficient evidence has accumulated here and in the previous chapter to demonstrate that Rome's *amici* continued to enjoy some degree of freedom of political action and self-determination even after their *amicitia* with the Republic had been established, often in circumstances that would seem to guarantee their *de facto* subordination – that is, after they performed *deditio*, or in war zones where Rome's military presence was preponderant. Thus, as we have seen, Attalus I unilaterally withdrew from the fight against Philip V in 208 BC; Syphax established an alliance and *hospitium* with the Carthaginian Hasdrubal, son of Gisco, in 206, when Rome was in the last, dangerous phase of its great war with Carthage; Demetrius of Pharos expanded his power in Illyria throughout the 220s and even violated the terms of the peace of 229 between Rome and the Ardiaean kingdom; Hiero II of Syracuse provided only minimal support for Rome during the First Punic War, and engaged in balancing behavior thereafter, supporting the Carthaginians in their Mercenary War; the Thessalians unilaterally drew down their troop commitment to the Roman war against Perseus in 171, with disastrous consequences for Rome; Masinissa forced a “surprise” gift of grain on the Romans in 200; the Achaean League and its hipparch of 170/169, Polybius, successfully pursued a policy of “soft balancing” towards

Rome; the Rhodians manipulated the Roman commander into pursuing their strategic goals at the expense of Rome's own in the eastern Aegean, and even refused to depart from the battlefield when the Romans dismissed them in 190; and Ptolemy IV attempted to mediate the conflict between the Roman–Aetolian alliance and Philip V in 207 against Rome's declared best interests.

As we have also seen, Rome's *amici* enjoyed a certain amount of response-flexibility in times of crisis as well: thus the Achaean League in 170/169 BC debated whether to support Rome in its war with Perseus – this in spite of the League being not just an *amicus* of Rome, but also in possession of a treaty with the Republic which, presumably, mandated military assistance “if it is possible” (κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν: above, p. 184). Similarly, one of the consuls of 200, P. Sulpicius Galba – a man not generally known among the Greeks for his delicacy and tact – felt it necessary to court the Ardiaean ruler, Pleuratus, ahead of Rome's second war with Philip V, despite the fact that Pleuratus had inherited Roman *amicitia* from his father, Scerdilaidas.⁷¹ Later on, in 195, Galba's successor, T. Quinctius Flaminius, was unable to bring any of Rome's long-standing Greek *amici* – Rhodes, Aetolia, or Pergamum – into the Roman “coalition of the willing” against Nabis of Sparta; only the recently defeated Philip V (who had his own reasons for opposing Nabis), and Rome's most recent Greek *amici*, the Achaeans (who made no secret of their hostility towards Sparta, which they wanted to incorporate into their League), joined in.⁷² Roman declarations of war, apparently, did not automatically trigger an obligation in Rome's *amici* to flock to the Republic's legionary standards.

Some further examples are necessary to test this hypothesis. A particularly striking example of independent action by a Roman *amicus* belongs to the winter of 189/188 BC. During this time the senate, acting on the advice of Flaminius, wrote to the Boeotians asking them to restore a group of Boeotian exiles under Zeuxippus, a friend of Flaminius who had secured the execution of the anti-Roman Boeotian politician Bracchyles at Aetolian instigation (and with Flaminius' acquiescence) in 196.⁷³ The

⁷¹ Livy 31.28.2; on Scerdilaidas' *amicitia*, see below, p. 266. On Galba's intemperance and brutality in Rome's first war against Philip, see, e.g., Livy 28.8.13 (plundering of Oreus on Euboea by Galba's forces in 208 BC); Polyb. 9.42.5–8 (Galba initially refuses to allow the ransoming of Aeginetan prisoners, preferring to sell them all into slavery); App. *Mac.* 3 (Galba's sabotaging of the comprehensive peace talks of 207). Later on, in 194, Galba would issue a blunt ultimatum to Antiochus' envoys in Rome: Livy 34.59.1–2 (discussed below, p. 341). For his “brutally frank” nature, see Ma 1999: 50. Grainger 2002: 137 oddly regards Galba's bluntness in 194 as being “hardly in character.”

⁷² Livy 34.24.1–5 (Achaean), 26.10 (Philip V).

⁷³ Polyb. 18.43; Livy 33.27–28; discussion: Badian 1958a: 75; Walbank 1967: 608–09; Briscoe 1973: 300–03; Eckstein 2008: 284. Derow 2003: 61 typically puts the worst construction on Flaminius' role in the Bracchyles affair.

Boeotians outright refused to restore Zeuxippus and his group, citing their inability to contravene an internal court decision that found Zeuxippus guilty, so the senate simply delegated the task of overseeing the restoration to the Aetolians and the Achaeans. The Achaean Philopoemen urged the Boeotians to comply with the senate's wish, and added a request to settle some outstanding Boeotian–Achaean property disputes. The Boeotians dragged their feet, and Philopoemen secured the passage of a bill in the Achaean assembly authorizing those Achaeans involved in property disputes with the Boeotians to take their possessions back by force. “Had the senate followed up on its decree concerning the restoration of the exiles of Zeuxippus’ party,” says Polybius, “war would have quickly blazed forth,” but “the senate kept silence”,⁷⁴ and it was left to the Megarians to mediate the dispute. The Boeotians thus felt perfectly comfortable refusing a direct Roman request, Philopoemen took advantage of Roman inaction to transform a strictly internal Boeotian matter into an international incident involving Achaean claims on Boeotian property, and a war was averted only when the Megarians offered to mediate the dispute, in traditional Greek fashion. Nowhere in this story did fear of contravening a Roman request affect the decision-making of Rome's *amici* – not the Boeotians, nor the Achaeans, nor the Megarians. Only the Romans showed any hesitation in order to avoid a war in Greece.⁷⁵

In fact, the only reported constraint on Rome's friends' response-flexibility in crisis situations was an occasional self-imposed reluctance on the part of Rome's friends to support Rome's enemies. Thus when the Carthaginians solicited a loan of 2,000 talents from Ptolemy II Philadelphus at some point during the First Punic War, the king refused, citing the fact that he enjoyed friendship with both Rome and Carthage, and was thus obliged to remain neutral.⁷⁶ On the other hand, according to Livy, the Cretans apparently had no compunction about supplying both Rome and Perseus with archers during the Third Macedonian War (Livy 43.7.1–4). In neither of these cases were Rome's *amici* bound by any formal treaty stipulation “to have the same friends and enemies” as the Roman people;⁷⁷ they were thus *de iure* free to be friends with Rome's enemies, and to provide them with the same kinds of services they provided for Rome. Precisely

⁷⁴ εἰ μὲν οὖν [ἡ] σύγκλητος προσέθηκε τάκλουθον περὶ τῆς καθόδου τῶν περὶ τὸν Ζεύξιππον, ταχέως ἂν ἔξεκαύθη πόλεμος· νῦν δ' ἐκείνη παρεσιώπησεν... (Polyb. 22.4.17)

⁷⁵ On this episode, see Polyb. 22.4; discussion: Will 1967: 206; Larsen 1968: 446–47; Errington 1969: 153–54; Walbank 1979: 179–81; Gruen 1984: 484–85.

⁷⁶ App. *Sic.* 1. As we have seen (above, pp. 107–08), the *amicitia* with Ptolemaic Egypt originating in 273 BC is controversial but probably not ahistorical. Gruen 1984: 676 defends the authenticity of the Carthaginian embassy against, e.g., Dahlheim 1968: 145.

⁷⁷ On this clause, see Ilari 1974: 38; Ferrary 1990: 227–31; de Libero 1997.

this point was made, following the crossing of Antiochus to Greece in 192 BC, by the Aetolians to the Chalcidians (for self-interested reasons of their own, of course): “you can preserve your friendship with the Romans,” the Aetolians argued, “at the same time as taking on the king as an ally and friend” (*salua Romanorum amicitia regem quoque adsumerent socium atque amicum*: Livy 35.45.5). And of course the League ambassadors were not wrong in this: thus the Chalcidians responded that they “did not spurn the friendship of the king nor of the Aetolians themselves” (*amicitiam regis non aspernari nec ipsorum Aetolorum*: 35.46.12). But the remainder of the Chalcidians’ response also deserves emphasis: “we will not conclude even an alliance except in accordance with the authority of the Romans” (*ne societatem quidem ullam pacisci nisi ex auctoritate Romanorum*: 35.46.13). Thus the same self-imposed reluctance to help Rome’s enemies that Ptolemy Philadelphus apparently showed in the 260s was in operation here as well.

It is surely also significant, however, that the Romans could not simply demand that their *amici* deny services to Rome’s enemies; this kind of treatment is simply not part of the *habitus* of friendship. Rather, the Romans expressed their desires in a roundabout way: thus, in the case of the Cretans in 170 BC, the senators informed their ambassadors that if they preferred Rome’s friendship to Perseus’ they would be treated as “true allies” (*certis sociis*), and that it was “the senate’s pleasure” (*placere senatui*: Livy 43.7.4) that they recall their soldiers from the ranks of Perseus’ army. This is, of course, not the unanswerable order of a patron to a submissive client, but neither is it a blank check giving their friends complete power of choice: the *patres* expected the Cretans to consult the Romans’ best interests and wishes – perhaps to have anticipated these in the first place, as the good friend is expected to do (above, p. 175) – and to act accordingly. As was seen in [Chapter 2](#), this is not incompatible with the dynamics of friendship in general; as was noted there, the *De Amicitia* states explicitly that “friendship determines what is best for” individuals as well as states (*[amicitia] etiam populos uniuersos tueri eisque optime consulere soleat*: *De Am.* 50). To this extent, apparently, the freedom of action of Rome’s non-Italian *amici* was circumscribed.

There is another important dimension to the issue of Rome’s friends’ response-flexibility during times of crisis: the extent to which they were able unilaterally to declare and make war on other states that also happened to be Roman *amici* in good standing. In general, the evidence seems to suggest that the Romans preferred that such differences be settled peacefully. So, for example, before the outbreak of the Second Macedonian War, Ptolemy V, a Roman *amicus*, sent ambassadors to Rome to inquire of the

senate whether he should comply with an Athenian request for the king to protect them from another Roman *amicus*, Philip V.⁷⁸ Ptolemy's envoys told the *patres* that the king had already refused to oblige the Athenians without the authorization of the Roman people (*nisi ex auctoritate populi Romani*: Livy 31.9.2). As we have just seen, this was precisely the reaction of the Chalcidians to Aetolia's request that they become friends of Antiochus in 192 BC. In the case of Ptolemy's embassy in early 200, the senate thanked the ambassadors, gave them lavish presents, and "responded that they intended to protect their allies, but if anything was needed for the war they would let the king know, recognizing that his kingdom's resources were firm and trustworthy supports of the Republic."⁷⁹ Once again, the senate indicated its approval of the instinct of their *amicus* to consult and advise, but rather than directly ordering Ptolemy not to interfere for the moment, the *patres* simply dodged the question, made vague statements about his loyalty, and informed him of their own preferred policy. Overall, the evidence presented here would seem to suggest that, just as they were expected not to become friends with Rome's enemies, at least without consulting Rome first, Rome's friends were expected not to wage war unilaterally on other Roman *amici* either.

On the other hand, there exists a veritable mountain of evidence to the contrary. In many cases, Rome's friends simply ignored the senate, and the Romans themselves often passively acquiesced in their friends' unilateral actions. One of the most prominent examples involves the Achaean League, which in the 190s and 180s BC, under the leadership of Philopomen, pursued an aggressive policy of expansion against its neighbors in the Peloponnese that the Romans seemed powerless (or disinclined) to stop.⁸⁰ The Achaean policy began in 195, when the League joined in Flamininus' war against King Nabis of Sparta. By 193, Nabis was attacking Gytheum and other cities on the coast of Laconia that had been given to the Achaean League by Flamininus in the settlement following the Spartan War of 195. The Achaeans responded by sending troops to Gytheum and an embassy to Rome to complain of the attack. Early in 192, Rome mobilized a fleet to make a show of force in Greece against Antiochus and the Aetolians, and Flamininus was simultaneously sent on a diplomatic mission. By this point

⁷⁸ On Philip's status as a Roman *amicus* after 205 BC, see previous chapter (above, p. 81).

⁷⁹ *responsumque tutari socios populo Romano in animo esse: si qua re ad id bellum opus sit indicaturos regi, eius opes scire subsidia firma ac fidelia suae rei publicae esse* (Livy 31.9.4; cf. Paus. 1.36.5).

⁸⁰ On what follows, see Heuss 1933: 101–03; Will 1967: 204–06; Larsen 1968: 410–13, 422, 448–53; Errington 1969: 90–172; Deininger 1971: 108–24; Texier 1975: 97–103; Gruen 1984: 463–75, 481–90; Baronowski 1990: 354–55; Grainger 2002: 112–16; Champion 2007: 259–60; Eckstein 2008: 332–33, 348, 350–52, 367.

Nabis was laying waste Achaean territory, while the Achaeans were patiently waiting for the senate's response to their earlier embassy. The Achaeans now decided to consult Flamininus; his advice was for the Achaeans to wait for the Roman fleet to arrive. In the end, however, and at Philopoemen's prompting, the League voted to go to war against Nabis without awaiting Rome's help or further advice. Philopoemen's subsequent campaign was only moderately successful, but nevertheless drew the ire of Flamininus, whose hands were effectively tied since he lacked senatorial authority to instruct the Achaeans on the matter. A major crisis loomed in the Peloponnese until late in the year, when fate took a hand: Nabis was assassinated by some Aetolians at Sparta. Philopoemen then swooped down on the southern Peloponnese, and after a single successful campaigning season, simply absorbed all of Lacedaemon into the Achaean League.⁸¹

At this point Achaean supremacy was effectively established in the Peloponnese, and it had all been achieved unilaterally, except for some initial consultation with Rome. The Roman reaction was to do nothing. Flamininus, already frustrated by his inability to prevent Achaean aggression in 192 BC, was again thwarted by the League in 191. In that year Diophanes, the Achaean *strategos*, attacked Messene, and despite the fact that the Messenians appealed to Flamininus for help, and even performed a formal *deditio* before him, his order that Diophanes cease his attacks was simply ignored, and he eventually had to acquiesce in the absorption of Messene into the Achaean League as well (Livy 36.31). Shortly after this, the Eleaens too were coerced into joining the League; with the tragic example of Messene before them, rather than soliciting Roman protection and performing *deditio*, they simply joined the confederacy of their own accord, knowing full well that they could not compete with Achaean might – or with Roman indifference (Livy 36.35.7; 35.36.2–3).

Nor was this the end of Achaea's independent behavior. When an embassy of Spartans arrived in Rome in winter 189/188 BC to complain about Philopoemen's massacre of eighty Spartiates at Compasium, the consul, M. Aemilius Lepidus, sent a letter advising the Achaeans that "they had not done right by the Lacedaemonians" (οὐχ ὀρθῶς αὐτοῦ κεχειρικέναι τὰ κατὰ τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους; Polyb. 22.3.3), but the League simply ignored the communiqué. What is more, when an embassy of Eleans came to Rome

⁸¹ Nabis' attack and Achaea's reaction: Livy 35.13.2; 38.31.2; show of force: Livy 35.20.13–14, 22.1–2, 23.4; Flamininus' mission: Livy 35.23.5; Nabis devastates Achaean territory: Livy 35.25.2; Flamininus' advice: Livy 35.25.5; Achaean decision: Livy 35.25.5–12; cf. Just. *Epit.* 31.3.3; Flamininus' anger: Plut. *Phil.* 15.1; *Flam.* 13.2, 17.1; Livy 35.47.4; assassination of Nabis: Livy 35.35–36; absorption of Lacedaemon: Livy 35.37.1–2; Plut. *Phil.* 15.2; Paus. 8.50.10–51.1; cf. Zonar. 9.19.

to plead on Sparta's behalf in the next year, the *patres* refused to alter any of their original decisions, the issue was shelved, and the *status quo* that was established at the end of the 190s was allowed to stand: Sparta, Messene, and Elis were to remain in the League. In 185, all that could be done by Q. Caecilius Metellus, an ex-consul of enormous prestige, and in this year a Roman ambassador to the court of Philip V, was to visit Achaea and reiterate the senate's displeasure at the Achaeans' treatment of Sparta. His first meeting with the League magistrates did not go well: Metellus "called upon them to put right their earlier mistake" (παρέκαλει διὰ πλειόνων διορθώσασθαι τὴν προγεγενημένην ἄγνοιαν: Polyb. 22.10.1), but the Achaeans "did not readily comply with his requests" (μὴ κατακολουθεῖν ἐτοίμως τοῖς ὑπ' αὐτοῦ παρακαλουμένοις τοὺς συνελθυθότας: 22.10.7). When Metellus requested an extraordinary meeting of the League assembly to air the matter, he was officiously rebuffed – and then stormed off in frustration.⁸²

In the year following, Metellus' successor, Ap. Claudius Pulcher (cos. 185 BC), could do no more than express senatorial displeasure (*displicere senatui*: Livy 39.36.3) over the Spartan situation yet again, and wring a few concessions from the Achaeans, including the commutation of the death sentences of two Spartan exiles, plus a promise to give any future Roman envoys a respectful hearing in a formal meeting. Meanwhile, Claudius had to endure the invective of Lycortas, the father of the historian Polybius and a lifelong supporter of Philopoemen, the architect of Achaean imperialism in this period. Lycortas complained that his own defense of Achaean conduct was not the sort of speech "of allies before allies, nor of a free people, but of slaves before masters" (*neque sociorum apud socios, neque liberae gentis esse, sed uere seruorum . . . apud dominos*: Livy 39.37.9). He then went on to equate Greek freedom with Roman power (*libertas apud Romanos etiam imperium est*: 39.37.13) – in other words, freedom bestowed by a superior power is subject to the hegemon's unrestrained pleasure⁸³ – and to charge the Romans with hypocrisy for criticizing Achaea's war on Sparta, citing the uncomfortable parallel of Rome's punishment of Capua after its recapture from Hannibal: "I don't ask about what you Romans did after Capua was captured . . . Did you not decapitate Campanian senators?" (*cur ego, quid Capua capta feceritis Romani non quaero . . . uos senatores Campani securi non percussistis?*: 39.37.10–11). These were fighting words, and Polybius,

⁸² Spartan embassy and consul's letter: Polyb. 22.3.1–3; Eleans' embassy and response: Polyb. 22.7.5–7; Metellus' embassy: Polyb. 22.10; Paus. 7.9.1; Livy 39.33.5.

⁸³ As Heuss 1933: 102, notes, Lycortas' charge is not a technical description of an international-legal situation, but a comment on the realities of Roman power in this period.

Livy's source for the speech, evidently reported with glee that "the majority listened to Lycortas with approval, and all thought he spoke in accord with the majesty of his office such that it was readily apparent that if the Romans responded gently to his charges, they would be unable to preserve their dignity."⁸⁴ All Claudius could do, therefore, was ignore Lycortas' insulting language, and warn the Achaeans "to get into [the Romans'] good graces while they still could of their own free will, so that they would not have to do so unwillingly and under compulsion later on" (*dum liceret uoluntate sua facere, gratiam inirent, ne mox inuiti et coacti facerent*: 39.37.19).

The recurring theme of the candor of Rome's *amici* is on show here, as are, of course, the menace of Claudius' demeanor, and the implicit threat behind his statement. The personality of Claudius more than anything else may be important here; like Glabrio before the Aetolians in 191 BC, and Galba and his intemperate attitude towards the Greeks in the First Macedonian War (above, p. 203), Claudius was a prickly personality, and his response may be a reflection of the sort of man he was rather than of the general Roman attitude towards their friends. Undoubtedly Lycortas struck a nerve with his interpretation of the nature of Roman friendship, but then went even further and did what friends are specifically not supposed to do: discuss the relationship's rules, parameters, and balance of accounts explicitly and openly (see above, [Chapter 2](#)). The argument that Rome's relationship with Achaea was that of a master to a slave was perhaps too frank an assessment for the Romans to accept – and completely false, of course; after all, how could the Achaeans, of all people, complain of being restrained by their masters? Claudius objected to Lycortas' exaggeration of the asymmetry of the relationship, just as the senate would later do when Masgaba exaggerated the power differential between the Numidian kingdom and Rome (see above, pp. 112–13). But, once again, what deserves emphasis here is Lycortas' freedom to formulate and openly express his interpretation of the friendship – up to and including gratuitously bringing up the unsavory details of Rome's treatment of the Campanian senators following the forcible repatriation of Capua in 211 by Rome (on which, see below, pp. 253–54).

The following winter, the senate was faced with four different Spartan embassies representing four different groups of Spartan exiles; clearly exasperated, the *patres* referred the whole matter to Flamininus, Caecilius Metellus, and Ap. Claudius; they decided that Sparta was to remain part of

⁸⁴ *cum adsensu maximae partis auditus, et locutum omnes pro maiestate magistratus censebant, ut facile appareret molliter agendo dignitatem suam tenere Romanos non posse* (Livy 39.37.18); Polybian derivation: Briscoe 2008: 341.

the Achaean League, but the exiles were to be recalled and have their property restored; also, the walls of Sparta, which had been earlier torn down by the Achaeans, were to be rebuilt.⁸⁵ Subsequent complaints by Spartan exiles fell on deaf ears at Rome; the senators felt, Polybius says, that “the matter no longer concerned them” (οὐ νομίζουσιν εἶναι τοῦτο τὸ πρᾶγμα πρὸς αὐτούς; Polyb. 23.9.11). This last statement indeed seems emblematic of Rome's Peloponnesian policy in general throughout this period: the Romans sat back and watched as their *amici* squabbled, issued the occasional request (not demands, it should be noted: their Greek partners were not clients, after all), blustered a bit at their friends' intransigence, and departed the scene. Meanwhile, Achaean aggrandizement in the Peloponnese proceeded apace, and eventually the Achaean conquest of a massive amount of territory occupied by three Roman *amici* – Sparta, Messene, and Elis – became a *fait accompli* that the senate could only rubber-stamp after the fact. In this case, then, the Achaeans benefited enormously from Rome's inability, or at least unwillingness, to bring an *amicus* to heel. The League was not a submissive client (much less a slave) following Rome's orders – something the Romans themselves seemed careful to recognize – but a friend that enjoyed, to a significant degree, the freedom of self-determination permitted by the *amicitia* tie.

It is worth pursuing the Achaean League's activities further since the pattern of Roman indifference to them persisted for at least another decade – and gave rise to the significant policy differences between Achaean politicians that have already been discussed. As we have already seen (above, pp. 183–85), there was a constellation of opinion among the leading statesmen of the Achaean League in winter 170/169 BC over the decision to join Rome in the Third Macedonian War. One group, led by the frank speaker of 184, Lycortas, advocated neutrality; others advocated a “soft balancing” approach, while opposing the immoderately pro-Roman faction led by Callicrates of Leontium; and a third group, including Polybius himself and the Achaean statesman Archon, argued for full cooperation with Rome. Some politicians had modified their positions from the era of Philopoemen's leadership – a reflection of Rome's growing influence in the East after the defeat of Antiochus III. Thus Polybius began his political career as an adherent of his father's policy of dealing with the Romans “on more or less equal terms” (κατὰ ποσὸν ἰσολογίαν; Polyb. 24.10.9), wrote a laudatory biography of Philopoemen, carried his ashes

⁸⁵ Claudius' embassy: Livy 39.36–37; cf. Paus. 7.9.4; Spartan embassies of 184/183 BC and Roman decision: Polyb. 23.4; Livy 39.39.4; cf. Paus. 7.9.5.

in his funeral procession, and praised his policy in his *Histories* as “prudent” and “noble” (καλήν . . . ἀσφαλεῖς: 24.13.8), and was critical of the League politician Aristaenus of Dyme, who, as has been seen (above, p. 177), recognized Achaea’s inferior position with regard to Rome, and advocated submitting to all Roman requests, sometimes even anticipating their wishes. At some point during his career, however, Polybius came to recognize that Aristaenus’ policy, while not exactly his cup of tea, was also “honorable” and “prudent” (εὐσχήμονα . . . ἀσφαλεῖς: 24.13.8), given the changed realities of power in Greece as a result of Roman victories over Macedon and Antiochus. In the debate of 170/169, Polybius broke with the Lycortas group, and advocated submitting to all Roman requests. In his *Histories* he praises the broadly similar contemporary policy of Cephalus of Epirus as “the best policy” (τῆς ἀρίστης . . . γνώμης: 27.15.10).⁸⁶ Thus while not going quite as far as Aristaenus, who, like the “good friend” (see above, p. 175), advocated anticipating Roman wishes, and only making a show of protest when Roman requests contravened Achaean law, Polybius was nevertheless aware that over time the freedom of action of Rome’s *amici* – their arc of political possibility – had been reduced amid the changed international situation in the East.

When did Polybius (and Cephalus of Epirus) come to this realization? According to Polybius, an embassy of the Achaean politician Callicrates, to Rome in 180 BC was pivotal. On that occasion, Callicrates advised the senate actively to support Greek politicians who advocated always obeying Roman instructions, for, as he himself believed, no laws or agreements should be considered more binding than the will of Rome. Thus, says Polybius (echoing Homer and Herodotus), Callicrates “became the instigator of great evils for all the Greeks, and especially for the Achaeans” (μεγάλων κακῶν ἀρχηγὸς γέγονε πᾶσι μὲν τοῖς Ἑλλησι, μάλιστα δὲ τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς: 24.10.8), since the Achaeans could hitherto deal with Rome “on more or less equal terms” (κατὰ ποσὸν ἰσολογίαν: 24.10.9), while after the embassy of 180, Rome “had plenty of flatterers, but lacked true friends” in Greece (κολάκων μὲν εὐπορεῖν, φίλων δὲ σπανίζειν ἀληθινῶν: 24.10.5). As Arthur Eckstein has shown, “true friends” in Polybius is code for those who practice “independent friendship,” that is, supporting Rome according to the terms of alliance, while at the same time not giving gratuitous offence (as Lycortas had done in 184 in his speech before Ap. Claudius

⁸⁶ Polybius’ original policy: Polyb. 24.10.8–11; his biography of Philopoemen: Pédech 1951; Walbank 1967: 222–23; Eckstein 1995b: 30–32, 34, 77 n. 77; funeral: Plut. *Phil.* 21.5; Aristaenus’ policy: Polyb. 18.13.8–9; 24.11.4–5, 12. On Cephalus, see Walbank 1979: 315; cf. Eckstein 1995b: 41, 206, 209 n. 58; Eckstein 2008: 370.

Pulcher) or “complying more than was necessary” (μήθ' ὑπηρετεῖν μηδὲν παρὰ τὸ δέον: 27.15.12); this is, precisely, “the best policy” of Cephalus of Epirus.⁸⁷ In the event, the senate took Callicrates' advice, and sent letters to various states in Greece, including Achaea, commending certain pro-Roman politicians to their citizens, a move that immediately resulted in some Aetolian politicians being rounded up and deported to Italy for perceived anti-Roman behavior.⁸⁸

Despite his recent adoption of a moderately pro-Roman stance, Polybius tried in his year in office as hipparch of the Achaean League to negotiate a precarious middle ground between cooperation with Rome, preserving Achaean independence, and “soft balancing” behavior; thus, as has been seen (above, pp. 183–85), he put the full complement of Achaean troops at the Roman consul's disposal, but held them back until just when the consul no longer needed them (28.12–13.6). Similarly, before the Achaean League assembly he announced that the Achaeans would not send troops to assist Ap. Claudius Centho, the Roman commander in Illyria, since only the requests of the senate in Rome should be honored – without revealing that he was in fact acting on a request against Centho by the consul Philippus himself (28.13.7–14).

The same mixture of overt Roman support while preserving the appearance of Achaean independence continued to be Polybius' policy beyond his year as hipparch. In winter 169/168 BC an embassy arrived from Ptolemy requesting the League's help against Antiochus IV, who was currently attacking Egypt in force. Debate followed, with Lycortas, Polybius, and Archon arguing in favor of sending troops in accordance with the League's existing formal alliance with Egypt, while the pro-Roman Callicrates and his associates argued that the Achaeans should not interfere in such matters, but instead give Rome their undivided support in their current war against Perseus. Polybius responded that, based on his experience the previous year, the Romans had no need for Achaean troops, which could therefore be deployed elsewhere. Arguments on both sides proliferated as the debate moved before the Achaean assembly, but the arrival of a letter from the consul, Q. Marcius Philippus, like a *deus ex machina*, put a stop to everything: he “called upon” (παρεκάλει: Polyb. 29.25.2) the Achaeans to follow the Roman policy of making peace between Ptolemy and Antiochus.

⁸⁷ Eckstein 2008: 368 n. 100. Note that *clientela* is not the issue: the dispute is between independent friends and Rome's flatterers, still characterized as Roman *amici* rather than *clientes* – even by their political enemies.

⁸⁸ Callicrates' embassy: Polyb. 24.8.9–10 (discussion: Derow 1970; Walbank 1979: 260–64); his policy: Polyb. 24.8.6; Aetolian deportees: Polyb. 28.4.6.

Polybius promptly withdrew from his position, not wishing to contravene Philippos' request directly, and the Achaeans voted to send an embassy to Egypt, headed by Archon, to bring about a reconciliation of the kings (29.23–25).⁸⁹ Unfortunately for Polybius, however, his attempts at soft balancing left him vulnerable to the attacks of his political enemies, notably Callicrates, who very shortly after this branded the future historian's behavior as "anti-Roman." The result was Polybius' career-ending deportation to Italy (Polyb. 30.13; Paus. 7.10.7–10).

It has been worth dwelling on the experience of the Achaean politicians generally, and the political career of Polybius specifically, in this section since they reveal with a clarity unparalleled in the ancient sources the complete lack of clarity, in the eyes of Rome's *amici*, about what exactly the Republic expected of them. All interpretations – from the hard-line independent "Philopoemenic/Lycortan" position, through the "soft balancing" but ultimately pro-Roman stance of Polybius and others, to the abject submissiveness of the Callicratean position – were available to politicians vehemently opposed to each other on these and other issues. The only baseline common ground shared by all was that the Achaean League should be treated as a respected friend and ally rather than a subject – the position Lycortas, the politician most resistant to cooperation with Rome, advocated in his speech before Claudius Pulcher in 184 BC. But, as we have seen, that he could so assert with a frankness verging on the offensive is the important point: this was his prerogative as the representative of an international *amicus*, and all Claudius could do when confronted with such candor was to acknowledge the Achaeans' free will to choose to remain in Rome's good graces while they still could. Once again, the Romans could advise, as good friends should, but they stopped short of delivering unanswerable orders, as a patron would.

As Domenico Musti observed, the Achaean statesmen – and, judging from the long list of pro-Roman Greek politicians at Polyb. 30.13.3–4, every other state involved in international *amicitia* with Rome – had to operate within a "circumscribed arc of political possibility" when interpreting their obligations and privileges as Roman *amici*.⁹⁰ The nature of these relationships changed as Roman power grew, obviously, but the length of the arc of political possibility occasionally contracted at times of significant Roman intervention, such as in the Third Macedonian War and especially after Pydna. Does this necessarily mean the arc was permanently

⁸⁹ The embassy, however, failed to put an end to Antiochus' invasion; see discussion at Larsen 1968: 472–73; Errington 1969: 211; Walbank 1979: 396–402; Gruen 1984: 510–11.

⁹⁰ Musti 1978: 73; cf. 78, 87.

so circumscribed? Brian McGing has recently argued that after Pydna, “for all the peoples of the [Mediterranean world], the parameters of what was politically possible was now seriously circumscribed: obey Rome’s orders or face destruction in war.”⁹¹ It is time to put this statement to the test by examining two further crisis situations on either side of the Pydna divide.

In the late 180s BC all Asia Minor was convulsed in a major regional war between Eumenes of Pergamum and Pharnaces of Pontus.⁹² In winter 183/182 Rhodian and Pergamene ambassadors arrived in Rome to complain of an attack by Pharnaces on the town of Sinope, which was allied to Rhodes. The senate promised to send commissioners to look into the matter. The commission was duly sent and reported back to the senate, praising Eumenes’ “moderation in all things” (μετριότητος ἐν πᾶσιν), and condemning Pharnaces’ “greed and general arrogance” (πλεονεχίας καὶ καθόλου τῆς ὑπερηφανίας; Polyb. 24.1.2). The senate authorized another embassy to Asia Minor to investigate the kings’ dispute “with greater vigor” (φιλοτιμότερον: 24.1.3), which probably issued in a peace or truce (συνθηκῶν: 24.5.1) being struck between Pharnaces, Pergamum, and the other combatants. Eumenes then dispatched his brothers to Rome for yet another interview. Upon their arrival, they were wined and dined by Eumenes’ personal friends amongst the Roman aristocracy, “who had become intimate with the royals during the Roman campaigns in Asia” (ἄτε συνήθειαν ἐσχηκότες ἐν ταῖς περὶ τὴν Ἀσίαν στρατείαις: 24.5.5).⁹³ The senate also lavished official presents on the brothers, but when the latter requested that the *patres* punish Pharnaces according to his just deserts, all they got in return was a promise to send out another group of commissioners to try to end the war.⁹⁴

Meanwhile, Pharnaces, “paying no heed a second time” to the senate-brokered truce (ὁ βασιλεὺς, πάλιν ὀλιγορήσας τῆς γεγενημένης ἐπὶ Ῥωμαίους ἀναφορᾶς; Polyb. 24.14.1), carried the war into Cappadocia and Galatia, while Eumenes marched into Galatia to confront him, bringing Ariarathes IV of Cappadocia onto his side in the process. When the next set of Roman legates arrived in Asia, Eumenes sent his brother Attalus

⁹¹ McGing 2003: 72, following Derow 1979 (cf. esp. 6: “what the Romans sought . . . was to be obeyed by everyone with whom they dealt”).

⁹² On what follows, see McShane 1964: 161–63; Will 1967: 242–45; Hansen 1971: 101–05; Walbank 1979: 254–55, 257–58, 267–69; Gruen 1984: 553–54; Eckstein 2008: 353, 379.

⁹³ Cf. Hiero’s growing intimacy with Rome and familiarity with Roman military camp life, discussed above, p. 167).

⁹⁴ Embassy of 183/182 BC: Polyb. 23.9.1–3; Livy 40.2.6–8; Strabo 12.3.11 (546C); commission’s decision: Polyb. 24.1.1–3; Livy 40.20.1; cf. Polyb. 24.14.1; truce and embassy of Eumenes’ brothers: Polyb. 24.5; Diod. Sic. 29.22.

out to receive his Roman guests while “he himself stayed with the army, doubling it in size and energetically training [his troops] both for the purpose of meeting the actual danger and in order to show to the Romans that he was capable of warding off and defeating Pharnaces by himself.”⁹⁵ When the Roman ambassadors reached the war zone, and “called upon” (παράκαλούντων: 24.15.1) Eumenes and Ariarathes to end the war and withdraw their armies, they agreed on the condition that Pharnaces come to the negotiating table. The Roman legates then asked (ῥηξίσουν: 24.15.7) Pharnaces to discuss peace, but the king “dug in his heels and finally refused” (ἀντιβαίνοντος καὶ τέλος ἀπειπαμένου: 24.15.8). The Pontic king consented, however, to send a high-level delegation to Pergamum empowered to make peace on the terms the Romans requested, but the delegates quarreled with Eumenes and the Romans present there on every point, and refused to abide by their agreements, issuing new demands and withdrawing their former concessions. At this point the Romans gave up, “and the war,” says Polybius, “became permanent” (πόλεμος ἐγγένητο κατὰμονος: 24.15.12). By 180 BC, Eumenes had cobbled together a new grand coalition of Anatolian powers consisting of Ariarathes IV of Cappadocia, Prusias II of Bithynia, and perhaps Morzizus of Paphlagonia; Pharnaces bowed to their combined pressure, and the war was soon ended.⁹⁶

Once again what is notable here is the free hand the Romans gave their *amici* in their squabbles with each other – and the lack of concern shown by the senate over the prevailing chaos in Asia Minor. Eumenes clearly would have preferred a more muscular Roman response (his brothers all but explicitly asked for it from the senate) to mere fact-finding missions and embassies, but all the *patres* were willing to do was to pursue the peace option “with greater vigor” (φιλοτιμότερον: Polyb. 24.1.3). To the extent that they did engage, but only when pressed, the Romans indeed eventually displayed some energy and determination in their diplomatic efforts to reconcile their *amici* – even sending high-level senators into a very hot war zone, and begging the belligerents to reconcile. They were apparently unwilling, however, to commit time or resources to far-flung wars over issues that meant very little to them. Also noteworthy is Pharnaces’ outright defiance of the senate’s requests for a meaningful peace, to say nothing of

⁹⁵ αὐτὸς δὲ τὰς δυνάμεις ἐδιπλασίαζε καὶ διεκόσμει φιλοτίμως, ἅμα μὲν ἀμαρζόμενος πρὸς τὰς ἀληθινὰς χρεῖας, ἅμα δὲ βουλόμενος ἐνδείκνυσθαι τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις ὅτι δι’ αὐτοῦ δυνατὸς ἐστὶ τὸν Φαρνάκην ἀμύνασθαι καὶ καταπολεμεῖν (Polyb. 24.14.11).

⁹⁶ Warfare: Polyb. 24.14.1–9; Diod. Sic. 29.23; new Roman embassy arrives: Polyb. 24.14.10–11; negotiation and failure: Polyb. 24.15; Eumenes’ new coalition: Polyb. 25.2.

the behavior of Rome's *amicus* Eumenes, who had to be cajoled by the Roman ambassadors into withdrawing his armies ahead of the peace talks. This is not the behavior we would expect if Eumenes were Rome's "client king," bound to obey Roman requests. Rather, what we see here conforms to a by now familiar pattern: Rome's friends, operating on the principle of friendly consultation, sought senatorial advice either before or during their attempts at self-help and self-defense. This was a token gesture of esteem, a performative expression of their respect for the senate's opinion – but it was little more than that.

The second case takes us beyond the Pydna dividing line of 167 BC when, according to Polybius, Roman domination of the Mediterranean world had been achieved (Polyb. 3.4.2–3). Upon the death of Antiochus IV in 164, the Seleucid throne passed to his son, a child of only eight or nine, Antiochus V. In detention in Rome was Antiochus V's cousin Demetrius, son of Antiochus IV's predecessor Seleucus IV, a mature man of twenty-three. When Demetrius asserted his claim to the Seleucid throne before the senate, he was denied the right to return, in Polybius' view, because the *patres* "were suspicious of the man in the prime of life and believed that the young age and helplessness of the boy who had succeeded more suited their purposes."⁹⁷ However, we need not credit what Polybius admits is only his opinion (ὥς ἔμοι δοκεῖ), one informed by both the benefit of hindsight and his own bitter personal experience of detention in Rome. Moreover, if the senators were so committed to keeping Demetrius away from the Seleucid throne, they certainly did not show it in the sequel. Acting on his friend Polybius' advice and with his approval, Demetrius slipped out of Rome, made his way back to the East, and deposed Antiochus V.⁹⁸ The new Seleucid king swiftly proceeded to his next project – the replacement of Rome's *amicus* Ariarathes V of Cappadocia – "one of the true friends of Rome," according to Polybius (ἓνα τῶν ἀληθινῶν Ῥωμαίοις φίλων: 31.8.8) – with the pretender Orophernes. When Ariarathes pleaded with the Romans to restore him, the senate responded with the rather unhelpful suggestion that he should share the kingdom with Orophernes (now also a

⁹⁷ τοῦτο δ' ἐποίησεν, ὥς ἔμοι δοκεῖ, ὑπιδομένη τὴν ἀχμὴν τοῦ Δημητρίου, μᾶλλον δὲ κρίνασα συμφέρειν τοῖς σφετέροις πράγμασι τὴν νεότητα καὶ τὴν ἀδυναμίαν τοῦ παιδὸς τοῦ διαδεγμένου τὴν βασιλείαν (Polyb. 31.2.7).

⁹⁸ Senate's appointment of Antiochus V: Polyb. 31.2.1–6; App. *Syr.* 45–46; Zonar. 9.25; Granius Licinianus 10; Demetrius' escape: Polyb. 31.11–15; seizure of throne: 1 Maccabees 7:1–4; 2 Maccabees 14:1–2; Joseph. *AJ.* 12.389; App. *Syr.* 47; Zonar. 9.25; Livy *Per.* 46; Just. *Epit.* 34.3.8–9; cf. Polyb. 33.19; discussion: Heuss 1933: 51–52; Will 1967: 306–07; Errington 1971: 255–56; Cimma 1976: 148–50; Gruen 1976b: 83–84; Paltiel 1979; Walbank 1979: 465–68, 478–84; Gruen 1984: 664–65; Sherwin-White 1984: 48; Ferrary 1988: 308–09.

Roman *amicus*), but refused to assist him in achieving even that. Ariarathes turned to Attalus II of Pergamum instead, who restored him militarily in 157 or 156.⁹⁹

Rome's relations with Demetrius, while perhaps never completely normalized, were at least informally established shortly after he reached Syria in 162 BC. Ti. Sempronius Gracchus (cos. II 163, and now an ambassador in the East), according to Polybius, "was very well disposed" to the usurper in 161/160 (καὶ γὰρ ἦν ὁ Τιβέριος εὖνους αὐτῷ διαφερόντως: Polyb. 31.33.4), and gladly received his overtures "to do everything for the Romans" (πάντα ποιήσιν Ῥωμαίοις ἀναδεχόμενος: 31.33.3).¹⁰⁰ Whatever his status in the eyes of Rome, Demetrius quite simply had become an agent of chaos and disruption in a situation the Romans were either unable or unwilling to control: the fugitive king was left to wreak havoc in Asia Minor for several years, which, as we have seen, eventually saw Attalus, a Roman *amicus*, assisting another Roman *amicus* (Ariarathes) in his war against a third Roman *amicus* (Orophernes).

Is this simply another case of Roman indifference to an area the senate still considered beyond their immediate security interests?¹⁰¹ This would seem to be suggested by a curious incident that occurred soon after Demetrius' return. The usurper captured and dispatched to Rome a certain Leptines – the alleged murderer of Cn. Octavius, a former consul (165 BC) and senatorial ambassador to the East in 162 – along with Isocrates the grammarian, a vocal anti-Roman. When Demetrius' ambassadors arrived in Rome, the senate barely gave them an audience, but instructed them to tell their king, "he would get kind treatment from them if he performed in a trustworthy and respectable fashion during his reign."¹⁰² The senate's

⁹⁹ Ariarathes' *amicitia*: Polyb. 31.3.3, 8.8; Livy *Per.* 46; Diod. Sic. 31.19.8; Zonar. 9.24; renewal: Polyb. 31.3.1–5, 7.1; Diod. Sic. 31.19.8; Demetrius sets up Orophernes: Polyb. 3.5.2; Diod. Sic. 31.32, 32a; Livy *Per.* 47; App. *Syr.* 47; Zonar. 9.24; Just. *Epit.* 35.1.1–2; cf. Trogus *Prol.* 34; Orophernes' *amicitia*: Polyb. 32.10.4; senate responds to Ariarathes, and Attalus restores him: Polyb. 32.10.1–8, 12; cf. 3.5.2; Zonar. 9.24; Diod. Sic. 31.32b; App. *Syr.* 47; Livy *Per.* 47 (wrongly attributing restoration to Rome); discussion: McShane 1964: 187–88; Will 1967: 312–13; Hansen 1971: 130–31; Walbank 1972: 169; Walbank 1979: 530; Gruen 1976b: 88–90, Cimma 1976: 151; Badian 1983: 404; Sherwin-White 1984: 48; Gruen 1984: 584–85, 666; Kallet-Marx 1995a: 98.

¹⁰⁰ Polyb. 31.33; cf. 31.15.10; Diod. Sic. 31.28. Demetrius' official recognition by the senate cannot be confirmed, but seems to be implied by Polyb. 31.33.4; cf. 32.3.3.

¹⁰¹ This is the thrust of Gruen's account (cf. Gruen 1984: 670: Seleucid affairs "were not worth bothering about").

¹⁰² τὴν ἀπόκρισιν ἔδωκε τοιαύτην τῷ Δημητρίῳ, διότι τεύχεται τῶν φιλανθρώπων, ἐὰν τὸ ἱκανὸν ποιῇ τῇ συγκλήτῳ κατὰ τὴν τῆς ἀρχῆς ἐξουσίαν (Polyb. 32.3.13). Sources for this episode: Polyb. 31.2.9–14, 11.1–3; 32.2.4–3.13; App. *Syr.* 46–47; Zonar. 9.25; Cic. *Phil.* 9.4; Plin. *HN* 34.24; Obsequens 15; discussion: Will 1967: 307; Walbank 1979: 465–68, 478–79, 519–21; Gruen 1984: 127–28, 664; Sherwin-White 1984: 48.

coolness here was apparently directed at the prisoners (whom they probably released), and the sordid nature of the embassy, rather than against Demetrius himself. Moreover, given the senate's apparent recognition of Demetrius (as an *amicus*?) on this occasion, and Gracchus' kind treatment of him earlier on, we should probably not credit Polybius' interpretation, once again distorted by hindsight, that the senate preferred "to keep the cause of complaint open so that they would have the opportunity to make use of the accusations whenever they wished" (ἐτήρει δὲ τὴν αἰτίαν ἀκέραιον, ὥστ' ἔχειν ἐξουσίαν, ὅτε βουλευθεῖη, χρήσασθαι τοῖς ἐγκλήμασι: Polyb. 32.3.12–13). Polybius' statement probably looks ahead to the senate's recognition in 153/152 of the project of another Seleucid pretender, Alexander Balas, whom Attalus II of Pergamum sponsored in his bid for the Syrian throne, and eventually succeeded in installing in 150, resulting in Demetrius' fall. But as in the restoration of Ariarathes V to the Cappadocian throne in 157 or 156, it was clearly Attalus who was driving these events, not the senate. And besides, Polybius tells us that in 153/152 "the more sensible of the senators took none of this seriously, but recognized the construction of the plot" by Attalus and Balas (τοῖς μὲν οὖν μετρίοις τῶν ἀνθρώπων οὐδὲν ἤρεσκε τούτων, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν κατασκευὴν τοῦ δράματος ἐνενόουν: 33.18.10). If anybody was responsible for the end of Demetrius it was Demetrius himself: he was an inveterate drunk (31.13.8, 33.19). All this would seem to suggest Roman indifference to Seleucid – and Pergamene – affairs, rather than the artful engineering of the Seleucid kingdom's disintegration by a section of the senate.¹⁰³

On the other hand, we have already seen that Polybius states at the beginning of the story that "it better served the senate's interests" (μᾶλλον δὲ κρίνασα συμφέρειν τοῖς σφετέροις πράγμασι: Polyb. 31.2.7) that the boy-king Antiochus V inhabit the Seleucid throne. This policy had borne fruit just before Antiochus was deposed, when the Roman embassy that included the soon-to-be-murdered senator, Cn. Octavius, oversaw the burning of the Seleucid fleet, the hamstringing of the king's war elephants, and the general destruction of the kingdom's power (31.2.11). This was probably done not out of fear of what the boy-king himself might do, but rather out of concern that the weakness at the political center of the Seleucid kingdom – a weakness the *patres* actively fostered – might attract the attention of more vigorous adventurers, who might seize the kingdom's military

¹⁰³ Senate's recognition of Alexander Balas' project: Polyb. 33.15.1–2, 33.18; Balas' usurpation: sources listed in Gruen 1984: 667 n. 256; discussion: Will 1967: 314–16; Gruen 1976b: 91–93; Walbank 1979: 558, 560–61; Gruen 1984: 585–86, 666–67; McGing 2003: 76–77.

resources; such things had threatened to happen before, of course.¹⁰⁴ After Demetrius usurped the throne, it was probably not a lack of concern over the situation that caused senatorial lethargy, but rather their inability to control distant events. The *patres* calculated, wrongly as it turned out, that their preference for a particular arrangement in the East with a weak king on the Seleucid throne, and their well-known expectation that their *amici* would respect that arrangement and consult them before taking any action would suffice to keep the region stable in a manner congenial to their own particular interests. But the nature of long-distance interaction meant, as in the case of the Achaean absorption of the Peloponnese (above, pp. 209–10), that consultation frequently took the form of the presentation by Rome's *amici* of *faits accomplis*.

In other words, things remained pretty much the same after Pydna as before: the Romans continued to rubber-stamp the ever-changing geopolitical realities brought about by their *amici*, who vigorously took advantage of Roman indifference to exploit the wide room for maneuver – a not very circumscribed arc of political possibility – that the distant hegemon allowed. Attalus II is a perfect example. As has been seen, the Pergamene king took it upon himself to place his own candidates on the Cappadocian and Syrian thrones in the 150s BC without fear of interference or reprisals from Rome. We are fortunate to possess evidence for Attalus' own view of the arc of political possibility in the region from precisely this same period, for a letter from the king to Attis, the priest of Cybele at Pessinus, survives on an inscription, dated to ca. 156.¹⁰⁵ In response to the priest's request that Attalus help him make war, probably on the neighboring Galatians, the king asserts that he is unable to take any action without seeking Rome's advice since if he does not do so, the Romans will be overjoyed if he fails and envious if he succeeds. Attalus' stated policy here indeed conforms to Rome's expectation of her friends, as we have seen in the cases of the Chalcidians in 192, Ptolemy V in 200, and Attalus' predecessor, Eumenes, in the late 180s. But, as in the latter case, Attalus' inclination to consult the senate by no means meant that he was content simply to forego the opportunity for further Pergamene aggrandizement and await the *patres'* advice; as he tells Attis in the letter, he would begin his preparations for war while awaiting the senate's reply. Like his brother Eumenes before

¹⁰⁴ Notably the predatory pact of Antiochus III and Philip V in 203/202 BC, directed against the boy-king Ptolemy V, which destabilized the entire Mediterranean world for decades: above, n. 41, with Eckstein 2008: 121–381.

¹⁰⁵ *OGI* 315 = Welles 1934: 245–46, no. 61; further discussion: McShane 1964: 186–87; Hansen 1971: 132; Badian 1983: 405; Gruen 1984: 195–96, 591–92 n. 87.

him, who in the end refused to await yet another senatorial fact-finding mission before making further attacks on Pharnaces of Pontus, Attalus was poised for action, should the pattern of Roman indifference to affairs in Asia Minor persist.

Thus neither the Pydna dividing line nor the distance of Asia Minor from Rome's "sphere of influence" in themselves can account for the changes in the "arc of political possibility" for Rome's eastern *amici*. Rome flexed some military muscle in Syria in 163 BC by incapacitating Seleucid power, but seemed unable to control the sequence of events thereafter. For Rome's friends, there seem to have been no hard and fast rules for gauging how their behavior would be judged and responded to by Rome. And this is the crucial point: the only consistent factor across all the examples discussed in this section is that it was up to Rome's *amici* as *amici*, regardless of their actual physical location, to intuit the appropriate limits to their independent action. As is clear from the dispute of Claudius Pulcher and Lycortas in 184, as well as from the spectrum of opinion among Achaean statesmen regarding the Achaean League's responsibilities towards Rome, the practical logics of Roman *amicitia* – even one backed up by a formal treaty, such as the League possessed – were extremely fluid, and the relationship itself was subject to interpretation by both parties. Rome's *amici* needed to be acutely sensitive to Roman attitudes – and even the personalities of individual senators – in different sets of circumstances, in order to strike the right attitude and respond appropriately to Roman requests. Feelers had to be tentatively extended and courses shifted as Roman attitudes and interests waxed and waned, and Roman personnel on the ground changed over time. All foreign states that enjoyed Roman *amicitia* operated within, and sometimes benefited from, this inherent response-flexibility of the Romans. The crucial problem was how to calculate precisely the limits on their own response-flexibility to the resulting opportunities and crises, which, as was seen in [Chapter 2](#), is always a crucial calculus in the practical logics of friendship. But in the international context, in the face of overwhelming Roman power, it took political, and sometimes even physical, courage on the part of the inferior *amicus* to test the limits of his freedom of action. The Greek states discussed here rose to the challenge again and again – as would be expected of fiercely competitive, proud, and warlike honor- and shame-based cultures – and pursued their own agendas.¹⁰⁶

As free friends of Rome, mostly without treaties, the states and minor kingdoms of the Greek East had only one concrete indicator of just how

¹⁰⁶ On the pride of the Greek states well into the Hellenistic era, see Ma 2000.

circumscribed their arc of political possibility was at any given time: the declaration of Greek freedom by Flamininus and the Romans at the Isthmian Games in 196 BC. Scholars have endlessly debated – just as the Greeks of the time did – whether and to what extent there were limitations or conditions placed on this freedom.¹⁰⁷ While the answers to this question are inevitably time- and context-specific (and thus insoluble on a theoretical level), there can be no debate over the specific terms as declared in 196: the Greeks were to be “without garrisons, without tribute, and governed by the laws of their own states” (ἀφρουρήτους, ἀφορολογήτους, νόμοις χρωμένους τοῖς πατρίοις; Polyb. 18.46.5). And the Romans meant it. In terms of judicial autonomy, inscriptions honoring Polemaeus and Menippus of Colophon for preventing encroachments by Roman governors in local jurisdictional matters show that even in the era of provincialization in the East (the inscriptions are dated to just after 120 BC), Greek freedom retained meaning and salience.¹⁰⁸ In terms of freedom from garrisons, the last Roman soldiers were evacuated from the East by the end of 194, even though Flamininus and others well knew that a war with Antiochus III was looming.¹⁰⁹ The reason for this extraordinary move, as Flamininus stressed again and again (cf. Livy 34.49, discussed below), was the Romans’ *fides* as *amici*: they had come to Greece to free its inhabitants from Macedonian oppression, and would make good on their promise to leave when the war with Philip was over. That Flamininus seriously misjudged some of the Greeks’ willingness or ability to maintain their own good faith to Rome

¹⁰⁷ Sources for the declaration of Greek freedom: Polyb. 18.46; Livy 33.32; Plut. *Flam.* 10; cf. Just. *Epit.* 30.4.17; Val. Max. 4.8.5; App. *Mac.* 9.4; Zonar. 9.16. An extensive bibliography exists on the topic, but see especially Heuss 1933: 83–84; Larsen 1935; Badian 1958a: 69–88; Balsdon 1967; Will 1967: 140–52; Walbank 1967: 609–20; Dahlheim 1968: 83–107; Badian 1970; Errington 1971: 151–55; Briscoe 1972; 1973: 304–17; Eckstein 1976; Gruen 1984: 132–57; Eckstein 1987a: 268–317; Ferrary 1988; Mandell 1989; Ferrary 1990: 220–21; Eckstein 1990; Grainger 2002: 73, 125–26; Pfeilschifter 2005: 278–324; Eckstein 2008: 283–302. For Greek freedom from the perspective of the Greek *poleis* under the domination of the Hellenistic kings, see Ma 1999: 150–74.

¹⁰⁸ *Claros* I, Menippus, Polemaeus (*SEG* 39.1243–44); discussion: Ferrary 1991; Kallet-Marx 1995a: 128–30; Eilers 2002: 124–37; S. Mitchell 2005: 199–202. Menippus secured exemption for Colophonians from giving bail to Roman proconsuls, and from the power of Roman proconsuls generally; he also secured the right of a Colophonian accused of murdering a Roman (or a Roman accused of murdering a Colophonian; the Greek is ambiguous) of having a trial in Colophon according to Colophonian law; Polemaeus successfully argued for the overturning of a conviction in the Roman proconsul’s court on the ground that the Colophonian charged with the crime should have been tried in his own city.

¹⁰⁹ Flamininus had been conscious of Antiochus’ designs on Greece since at least 197 BC: Polyb. 18.39.3; 33.13.15; Plut. *Flam.* 9.5–8; Dio fr. 60; the king had already been in Thrace for two years by the time the Romans evacuated Greece: Livy 33.38.10–14; Polyb. 18.39.3; and Scipio Africanus knew the danger of having the king in Europe, and for this reason warned the senate not to give up the “Three Fetters” (the traditional optimal garrison points of Chalcis, Demetrias, and Acrocorinth on the Greek mainland): Livy 34.43.4.

when the next crisis came is beside the point;¹¹⁰ what matters is that the Romans were willing seriously to jeopardize their international-strategic position in Greece in the face of the impending threat posed by Antiochus the Great simply for the sake of preserving Roman *bona fides*. This was a compliment to Rome's Greek friends in that it credited them with moral qualities the Romans approved of as a reflection of their own.

An IR Realist reading of this situation is baffled by the Romans' apparent lack of prudence in effectively abandoning Greece to the Great King.¹¹¹ For the IR Constructivist, on the other hand, Roman behavior makes perfect sense. By crediting their *amici* with equivalent moral worth (measured in terms of *fides*), and by making the Greeks actually feel their freedom in a way they had not experienced for a long time by fulfilling their promise (*fides* again) to remove all Roman troops from Greece after the war with Philip V, the Romans were attempting to construct an imperial hierarchy in the East that was more attractive to lesser states than Philip's hegemony had been (an "empire of trust" as opposed to "an empire of conquest"), with the intended effect of generating greater security for all. That they failed, and in fact ended up creating more insecurity in the region, should not obscure or belittle their intent; as in the case of Demetrius of Pharos, examined in the previous chapter, the new security sphere was only as stable as those who were entrusted to maintain it. But that the Romans were willing to take such risks – especially given their already tense relationship with the Aetolians, who would go on to overturn Roman arrangements by inviting Antiochus to invade Greece (see below, [Chapter 5](#)) – is what deserves emphasis above all. The Roman construction of their relationship with the Greeks – and their entrapment within that discursive construction – had significant, real-world effects, unexplainable in strictly IR Realist terms. The (unintended) chaos that the Roman commitment to constructing an empire of trust unleashed in Greece – as in Asia Minor in the 180s and 150s BC – was not only a product of systemic forces pressuring states into certain behaviors; it was as much a function of Rome's discursive construction of the situation in the East.

¹¹⁰ Demetrius defected to Antiochus and the Aetolians in 192: Livy 35.34.11; as did Amynder of Athamania: Livy 35.47.8; App. *Syr.* 13; so too Boeotia: Polyb. 20.7.5; Livy 35.51.1–4; 36.6.1–5; App. *Syr.* 12–13; and Chalcis as well: Livy 35.51.6–10; in the same year an Achaean garrison had to be installed in Athens to ensure that city's loyalty: Livy 35.50.3–4; Epirus wavered in 192/191 BC: Polyb. 20.3.1–4; Livy 36.5.1, 3–7; parts of Acarnania went over to Antiochus in spring 191: Livy 36.11.8–12.11; 42.38.3; App. *Syr.* 16; as did all of Thessaly: Livy 36.9.11–10.14; discussion: Deininger 1971: 76–96; Gruen 1984: 475–79; Eckstein 1987a: 314; Grainger 2002: 209–27; Eckstein 2008: 324–26.

¹¹¹ Eckstein 2008: 299: "the Romans were still in the midst of a ferocious hegemonic rivalry, this time with the Selucid empire [so] complete withdrawal . . . was certainly not a prudent decision."

In terms of the nature of *amicitia*, however, freedom from garrisons and tribute and the Greeks' use of their own laws is less important than what was left unsaid in Rome's declaration of Greek freedom. The freed Greeks were Rome's *amici*. As has been argued here, as Roman *amici* they were not made subject to formal Roman *dicio* (except insofar as some had performed *deditio* but, as we have also seen in Chapter 3, even those who had done so were not bound to obey Roman orders). Nor were the Greeks reduced to the status of *clientes*; were this the case then surely the Romans would have been more comfortable issuing orders rather than "requests," as they habitually did, and their Greek friends would have been more wary about giving candid advice to them – or indeed going their own way, as some did after 193 BC. Nor as a rule did the Greeks even have to consult Rome's best interests, or stop themselves from trying to balance Roman power – much less follow the advice of Roman magistrates and senators when they did take the trouble to consult them. As Roman *amici*, however, the Greek states were expected to consult the senate on important matters (as they often did), to refrain from actively threatening Rome's national security (apparently adhered to by the Achaeans when conquering the Peloponnese in the 180s, but not by the Aetolians when inviting Antiochus to Greece in 192), to voice their concerns openly and frankly (as Eumenes II was encouraged to do in 189: above, pp. 197–99) to the extent of even chastising the Republic when they felt that the Romans were not doing the right thing (as Lycortas did in 184), and to treat the Romans with respect and dignity *qua* friends (as the Achaeans had not done for Metellus in 185). The Romans, on the other hand, could only issue advice and encourage compliance and proper conduct (as they did to the Achaeans and Demetrius of Syria), issue requests (not orders), and make their displeasure known when the occasion demanded (as Metellus to the Achaeans in 185, Claudius in 184).

It is time to draw out the implications of the evidence presented in this section. The freedom of Rome's Greek friends was not a sham or a cover for Roman supremacy in Greece,¹¹² nor was it a form of *clientela manqué*,¹¹³ but neither was it an obligation-free relationship of equals. The Romans, by virtue of bestowing the unrepayable *beneficium* of freedom on the Greek states, had become the entrenched superior partner in an asymmetrical friendship.¹¹⁴ This is surely the significance of Flamininus' valedictory oration to the Greeks when he was about to depart the East with the remainder of Rome's forces in 194 BC: "use your freedom with

¹¹² As Harris 1979: 142; Mandell 1989: 94.

¹¹³ As Badian 1958a: 74–75; Errington 1971: 151–55; Mandell 1989: 91.

¹¹⁴ Gruen 1984: 158–200; Burton 2003; Eckstein 2008: 298.

moderation since it is a good thing when slightly restrained for individuals and states alike, but is dangerous in excess"; maintain harmony internally, and avoid discord and sedition lest the losing party appeal to outside tyrants and kings; and "defend and preserve in your care the freedom gained for you by force of foreign arms and returned to you by the good faith of an outsider; thus the Roman people will know that freedom was gained for men worthy of it, and their gift was well bestowed."¹¹⁵ This was not a threat to punish misbehavior nor a demand for obedience, but the articulation of the moral obligation for Rome's *amici* to "do the right thing" by their friends, who had demonstrated their good faith as friends by giving the Greeks the (unrepayable) free gift of freedom.

On the other hand, nobody could have doubted that "enjoying their freedom responsibly" entailed an obligation to provide counter-*beneficia* for the Romans when required. Thus in the immediate aftermath of the war against Philip, the people of Corinth had to cede their freedom so Flamininus could reward Rome's Achaean *amici* for their help (Livy 32.19.4; 33.32.5; cf. 33.34.9); the freedom of Phthiotic Thebes, Phocis, and Locris was the price for Aetolia's support (Polyb. 18.38.4; Livy 33.32.5; cf. 33.34.8); Lynchus and Partha were given to Pleuratus of Illyria (Livy 33.34.10); and Phthiotic Achaea was handed over to the Thessalian *koinon* (Livy 33.32.5; cf. 33.34.7). Under normal circumstances, however, as we have seen here, the Romans expected at most such reciprocal acts as consulting the senate rather than acting unilaterally, not overtly threatening Rome's national security interests, speaking frankly and openly, and treating the Republic's representatives with the respect friends deserve. The trick for Rome's friends was to determine when and to what extent it was appropriate to reciprocate Roman *beneficia*; this was their prerogative – and their curse – as autonomous entities with the power of choice and self-determination, but at the same time inhabiting a position of inferiority in a reciprocal relationship. As was seen in [Chapter 2](#), friendship indeed has a dark side, a product of the anxiety and uncertainty surrounding the reciprocity calculus that all friends undertake (but under no circumstances, except imminent breakdown, should articulate).

¹¹⁵ *libertate modice utantur: temperatam eam salubrem et singulis et ciuitatibus esse, nimiam et aliis grauem et ipsis qui habeant praecipitem et effrenatam esse. Concordiae in ciuitatibus principes et ordines inter se, et in commune omnes ciuitates consulerent. Aduersus consentientes nec regem quemquam satis ualidum nec tyrannum fore; discordiam et seditionem omnino opportune insidiantibus facere, cum pars quae domestico certamine inferior sit externo potius se applicet quam ciui cedit. Alienis armis partem, externa fide redditam libertatem sua cura custodirent seruarentque ut populus Romanus dignis datam libertatem ac munus suum bene positum sciret* (Livy 34.49.8–11).

BENEFICIA POPULI ROMANI: ROME'S DUTIES

It remains to consider the duties, services, and favors that the Republic performed as an international *amicus* for other states. Fortunately this will not occupy us for long since most of these *beneficia* and *officia* have already been incidentally enumerated, either implicitly or explicitly, in the cases of friendly interactions already discussed in this and the previous chapter. One important theme that must be pursued at this stage, however, is the extent to which Rome enjoyed freedom of action as a matter of course, and response-flexibility in times of crisis under the normative, and in particular the normatively moral, constraints of the *amicitia* relationship.

It should be overwhelmingly clear by now that Rome's chief duty towards her *amici* was to respond to requests for intervention in dangerous situations, usually involving armed conflict, which directly threatened the interests, or indeed even the very existence, of their friends. Strong systemic, but also moral pressures existed in antiquity to respond positively to such requests amid the prevailing violent anarchy of the Mediterranean system. These pressures originated from multiple sources, but they all pushed states in the same direction, that is, into accepting calls for help. Thus the interstate system as a whole compelled all states – small, medium, and large – to balance each other and especially the great powers in the system, leading to calls for military support and war. “Bandwagoning,” whereby smaller states tried to appease dominant powers, or even to gang up with these powers in their aggressive wars of expansion, usually did not occur for internal (that is, unit-level) reasons: most ancient states were run by slave-owning aristocrats who placed a high value on ideals of honor and status; “such cultural ideals militated against both appeasement and ‘bandwagoning,’ since such conduct might be seen as in itself dishonorable and/or ‘slavish,’ therefore ignoble, and hence to be avoided.”¹¹⁶ In addition, the “prevailing militaristic, bellicose, and diplomatically aggressive internal cultures” of ancient polities discouraged bandwagoning behavior.¹¹⁷ Responding positively to calls for help also satisfied these elites’ natural tendency to display their *megalopsychia*, their “greatness of spirit,” and to display it publicly in order to earn honor and prestige in the eyes of others.¹¹⁸ “The desire to dominate, the habit of command, and the tendency to respond positively to pleas for help from weaker states can all be seen as arising from a

¹¹⁶ Eckstein 2008: 23 (definition of “bandwagoning”), 219–20 (systemic pressures towards balancing and the quotation).

¹¹⁷ Eckstein 2008: 229. ¹¹⁸ Eckstein 2008: 246.

militaristic and aggressive unit culture,”¹¹⁹ thus pushing ancient states in the same direction as system-level pressures, that is, towards balancing behavior, and responding positively for pleas for help from victims of aggression.

The moral imperatives, however, should not be overlooked. The Romans responded to calls from their *amici*, as we have seen, not just because of systemic pressures, but also because there was a moral obligation to do so, which arose from the *fides* governing their *amicitiae*. Part of the purpose of this and the following section is to explore this moral compulsion more systematically.

First it will be appropriate to recap briefly the duties performed by Rome. As was seen in the previous chapter, the establishment of *amicitia* itself often arose in the context of another state, hitherto unconnected to Rome, seeking protection from the aggression of others: thus Capua in 343 BC and the Lucanians in 298 (against Samnite aggression); the Mamertines in 264 (against Syracusan aggression); Epidamnus, Apollonia, Corcyra, and Issa in 229 (against the aggression of the Illyrian Ardiaei);¹²⁰ and perhaps Athens in 201 (against the aggression of Philip V). On the other hand, Rome often established *amicitia* with others who had recently suffered from Roman aggression: thus Hiero II and the Sicilian cities in 263, Masinissa in 206, and the Spanish tribes during Scipio's descent on New Carthage in 209. In most of these latter cases, however, the Romans' moral obligations towards these new friends were triggered by the *fides* governing the *deditio* ritual through which these relationships were established.

Naturally the Romans were expected to respond in some way to calls for protection from existing *amici* regardless of circumstances – ideally with military force, but most often with embassies, commissions, and fact-finding missions as the first – and often the only – resort. Thus after unsuccessful attempts to dissuade Philip V from attacking Roman *amici* in the East, Rome declared war on the Macedonian king in 200 BC; in 214 when Philip attacked Apollonia on the Illyrian coast, the Romans quickly brought up their fleet, which caused the Macedonian king to flee inland;¹²¹ on the other hand, as we have seen, the Romans failed to protect the Illyrian Atintani from the attacks of Demetrius of Pharos in the 220s, and

¹¹⁹ Eckstein 2008: 247.

¹²⁰ All were under attack by the Illyrian Ardiaei prior to Roman involvement in Illyria in 229 BC: Polyb. 2.10.7–11.9; App. *Ill.* 7 (Epidamnus, Apollonia, Corcyra); Polyb. 2.8.5 (Issa).

¹²¹ Livy 24.40.7–8; Zonar. 9.4; Plut. *Arat.* 5.1; discussion: Badian 1952a: 90; Hammond 1968: 17–18; Errington 1971: 111–12; Gruen 1984: 376; Eckstein 2008: 86; Philip's attack on the Parthini, Atintani, and Dimallum: Livy 27.30.13–14 (retrospective).

Eumenes II's requests that the senate stop the aggression of Pharnaces of Cappadocia in the late 180s generated perhaps as many as four senatorial embassies – including one sent into the heart of a war zone – but no tangible results, except to perpetuate rather than stem the violence in Asia Minor. As will be seen in the final section of this chapter, Roman decision-making, like that of their friends, was often compelled to travel along a “circumscribed arc of political possibility.”

Duties performed by the Romans of a specifically diplomatic nature, and intended as such, include submitting to offers of mediation, which they willingly did in most of the cases between 212 and 188 BC outlined earlier, and, as in the case of Rhodes during the war with Perseus (examined in the next chapter), sometimes even inviting such offers. The Romans also made specific provision for their *amici* in peace treaties ending their major wars: thus, as has been seen, Hiero II was specifically protected by the terms of the Treaty of Lutatius in 241 and, as will be seen in the next chapter, Masinissa was similarly protected by the treaty that ended the Hannibalic War in 201; the interests of both Rhodes and Pergamum were explicitly encoded in the Peace of Apamea in 188, and according to one clause, Eumenes was to receive 477 talents and 1,208 drachmas in compensation for damage done to his kingdom during the war (Polyb. 21.42.16–17, 20–21). A further example we know only from an inscription: a Lampsacene called Hegesias undertook an exhausting and hazardous journey from Asia Minor to Greece, then to Massilia, then to Rome, then back to Greece, and home again to Lampsacus – all in order to convince the Romans to include Lampsacus in the final peace with Philip V following the Second Macedonian War (the senate agreed).¹²² Another diplomatic service performed by the Republic was to try to broker peace between its *amici* and others, which, as in the case of the Roman attempt to make peace between Antiochus III and Ptolemy V in 200, resulted in new friends for the Republic (in this case, Antiochus). Rome also sent out courtesy embassies to peripheral states after major regional conflicts, or when such conflicts threatened to break out; a good example of the former may be seen in the embassies sent around to the Greek states after the First Illyrian War in 229 (Polyb. 2.12.4–6, 8), and of the latter in the several missions to the East of Ti. Sempronius Gracchus in the mid- to late-160s, which included his amicable encounter with Demetrius of Syria in 161.¹²³

¹²² *Syll.*³ 591; discussion: Gruen 1984: 621 n. 42; Ferrary 1988: 133–41; Ma 1999: 95–96, 99; Erskine 2001: 169–72; Grainger 2002: 60–62, 68; Battistoni 2009: 83–87 (with older scholarship there cited).

¹²³ For the full list of Gracchus' various ports of call between 165 and 162 BC, see Gruen 1984: 126–28.

The presence of very high-level senatorial ambassadors on such missions must also be counted as an *officium* in itself since the very prestige of the ambassadors was a tangible sign of respect – a gift of symbolic capital, in the language of gift exchange: thus the Roman embassy to the court of Ptolemy Philadelphus at Alexandria in 273 BC, headed by Q. Fabius Maximus Gurgus, a man who had held the consulship twice;¹²⁴ the “substantial heavyweight trio”¹²⁵ of C. Claudius Nero (the victor of the battle of the Metaurus River in 207), P. Servilius Tuditanus (censor 209, cos. 204), and the future consul (187), *pontifex maximus* (from 180), and *princeps senatus* (from 179), M. Aemilius Lepidus to Greece in 200; the embassies of the very senior Q. Caecilius Metellus (cos. 205) in 185, and of Ap. Claudius Pulcher (cos. 185) in 184 to the Achaean League; the missions of the twice-consul Sempronius Gracchus just mentioned in the 160s; not to mention Scipio’s hazardous journey into the heart of enemy country in 206 to visit Syphax the Numidian. Other such symbolic tokens of esteem include the ivory staff, curule chair, and the embroidered toga and tunic given to Syphax by the senate in 210, and to Masinissa in 200 (Livy 30.15.11), the senate’s willingness – and very public demonstration to that effect – to jeopardize months of delicate peace negotiations with Antiochus III in order to try to secure Soli for the Rhodians, and the lavish gifts given to the Rhodians and Eumenes of Pergamum on that same occasion, as well as those given to Eumenes’ brothers in 181/180, and to Ptolemy V’s ambassadors in 200. To be reckoned among symbolic benefits as well are the senate’s expressions of gratitude to Roman *amici* for their help in major wars; thus Hiero was thanked for his assistance and gifts in 217, Masinissa for his help during the Second Punic War in 200, and Ariarathes was called a “true friend” of Rome in 164 or 163.

Not all rewards were purely symbolic, of course. Time and again we have seen the Romans bestowing massive amounts of territory on their *amici* in return for loyal service in Rome’s wars: thus Demetrius of Pharos was rewarded with an expanded kingdom for his loyalty during Rome’s first war in Illyria; Hiero II was given “spoils of the Gauls and Illyrians” as a gift, which may also have been part of a repayment for a Syracusan gift of grain during the Celtic War of the 220s;¹²⁶ Philip V greatly expanded

¹²⁴ The others were a relation of Fabius, Numerius Fabius Pictor, and the future consul of 269 BC, Q. Ogulnius – “a fairly distinguished set of men” (Grainger 2002: 8).

¹²⁵ Grainger 2002: 24.

¹²⁶ The “spoils of the Gauls” that Hiero received from Rome after 222 BC (Plut. *Marc.* 8.6), and later dedicated (along with “spoils of the Illyrians”) in the temple of Olympian Jupiter at Syracuse (Livy 24.21.9), may be the repayment, mentioned at Diod. Sic. 25.14, for the king’s gift of grain during

his kingdom after his defeat in 196, acquiring in 189 Dolopia, Perrhaebia, Aperantia, Demetrias, several Thessalian cities, and all of Athamania as a result of his help in Rome's war against Antiochus III and Aetolia; and Rhodes and Pergamum were richly rewarded with great chunks of Asia Minor after the defeat of Antiochus III. And, as has also been seen, Rome's friends sometimes simply helped themselves to rewards for loyalty as the senate turned a blind eye to their expansionistic activities: thus the Achaeans in the Peloponnese in the 180s; the Attalids in Asia Minor in the 180s and the 150s; and Masinissa of Numidia against both Syphax after 201 and, as will be seen in the next chapter, Carthage during the 150s.

Other Roman services that have received special emphasis in this chapter include sparing their friends the burden of ongoing military service in Rome's wars: thus the troops of his Spanish *amici* that Scipio excused from service in the New Carthage campaign in 209 BC; the drawing down of Masinissa's cavalry commitment in 200; the dismissal of Achaean League troops in 169, and of the Rhodian fleet in 190; and the escorts of Ariarathes of Cappadocia turned down in 164 or 163. Consultation with friends on wartime and postwar policy may also be reckoned as a gift of symbolic capital, whether their advice was solicited (Aristaenus of Dyme's contribution to Flamininus' "Freedom of the Greeks" policy; Flamininus' consultation with the Greek states at Tempe in 197; Rhodes' contribution to Rome's Aegean naval strategy in 190; the advice of Rhodes and Pergamum on the settlement with Antiochus in 189), or unsolicited (Hiero II's advice on the advantages of protecting Lilybaeum and surrounds in 218, and on using foreign, light-armed troops in 217; the advice of Rhodes and Pergamum on how the Romans should reward each of them in 189). We have also noticed a pattern of *politesse* in Roman communiqués to their friends; most Roman needs and wants are couched in the form of requests, as opposed to demands, and these requests (and occasional warnings) are delivered in a circumlocutory fashion, demonstrating a tendency on the part of Roman officials not to want to ruffle feathers or to be seen as behaving too imperiously. Thus, as has been seen, the normally bad-tempered P. Sulpicius Galba gracefully courted the loyalty of Scerdilaidas in 200; in the same year, Ptolemy's inquiry as to whether to protect Athens from Philip was politely refused; in the late 180s, senatorial legates "pleaded with" Eumenes

the Celtic War after the war ended. But Diodorus seems to imply that Hiero was repaid in cash, and Plut. *Marc.* 8.6, that the spoils of the Gauls were a gift (discussion: Eckstein 1980c: 196 n. 40). Eckstein 1980c: 196–97 and n. 42 (cf. 2008: 33–34) assumes that the mere presence of Illyrian spoils among Rome's gift/repayment implies that Hiero provided material aid in one of Rome's Illyrian wars, but this is perhaps reading too much into what Livy says at 24.21.9.

and Ariarathes to end their war with Pharnaces; in 194, Flamininus complimented the Greeks by crediting them with the same quality of *fides* as the Romans liked to attribute to themselves; in 170, the senate's preference that the Cretans withdraw their archers from the Macedonian army was expressed in terms of the Cretans' power of choice in deciding the outcome; in 168 Q. Marcius Philippus "called upon" the Achaeans to pursue a peaceful settlement between Antiochus IV and Ptolemy V; in 160/159 the fugitive usurper Demetrius was told that he would be treated kindly if he remained trustworthy and respectful throughout his reign; and even Claudius in 184 could only respond to the intemperate words of Achaea's Lycortas with advice that the Achaeans should get into the Romans' good graces while they still could of their own accord. The discourse of requesting and suggesting, empowering and choosing, wishing and promising was a further kind of symbolic capital that Rome conferred on her friends – a token of esteem as well as an acknowledgment of their prestige.¹²⁷

One final Roman service worth mentioning here was of course less benign for some than for others. The Romans occasionally intervened politically in the internal affairs of other states at the request of particular interest groups and individual politicians. As we have seen, the Achaean League statesman Callicrates of Leontium and similarly minded Greek politicians were especially favored by the senate, which eventually resulted in their political enemies in various states being rounded up by their fellow citizens or the Romans, and either liquidated or exiled. Also mentioned earlier was Flamininus' acquiescence in an Aetolian plot to eliminate the Boeotian politician Bracchyles, and his later attempt to have the Boeotians recall the party of Zeuxippus from exile. As will be seen shortly in the final section of this chapter, the catalyst for Rome's *amicitia* with the Spanish city of Saguntum may indeed have been a Saguntine request for the Romans to mediate an internal dispute.

This is a not-insubstantial list of duties performed by an international friend that was, in most of these circumstances, manifestly the superior partner. Given the sometimes wide asymmetry of power separating Rome from its friends, the Republic behaved as we would expect, prioritizing her own best interests and performing with considerably less alacrity than her

¹²⁷ It is perhaps worth noting here that Polybius' word for "direct orders" (προστάγματα) is never used of Roman senatorial decrees or ambassadorial requests; of the nine occurrences of *προστάγματα* in the *Histories*, one refers to the orders that a Roman commander gives to his troops (1.21.3), two describe demands made of the Romans to a belligerent enemy (1.31.7; 21.15.3), and one is a description by the Rhodians of Roman requests (30.31.8); other occurrences refer to the orders of Philip V (10.26.3; 23.10.10), Hannibal (11.19.5), Antiochus III (21.41.2), and some Spanish tribes (35.2.15). For discussion of *προστάγματα*, see Ma 1999: 106–07, 122.

friends would have liked; the Spartan exiles, for example, would have preferred that the Romans not wash their hands of their case; and Ariarathes of Cappadocia would certainly have preferred not to be told to share his kingdom with the usurper Orophernes. But just as often we witness behavior less predictably hegemonic: the Roman willingness to jeopardize the delicate negotiations with Antiochus III in order to gratify Rhodian designs on Soli immediately springs to mind, as does Galba's polite solicitude towards Scerdilaidas, and Ti. Gracchus' towards the fugitive usurper Demetrius. Such phenomena call for explanation, and once again, a useful way to approach the general problem of response-flexibility is through the filter of the *amicitia* dynamic. The final task of this chapter is to assess Rome's freedom of action in light of the evidence gathered here and of some further important cases, and finally to give an account of the constitutive effects of this behavior on the international system.

ROME'S FREEDOM OF ACTION

It is obviously beyond the scope of this chapter to explore the issue of Roman response-flexibility in all its various manifestations; after all, one way of reading Erich Gruen's massive two-volume study on Rome's involvement in the Greek East is as a response to precisely this question.¹²⁸ And as we have seen here, no single set of fixed variables – what might be usefully called exogenous factors – was predictive or determinative of Roman behavior: neither chronology (that is, on one side or the other of the Pydna divide), nor geography (distance from Rome, from Italy, or outside a putative “sphere of influence”), nor security-seeking (seen especially in the case of Rome's withdrawal from Greece in 194 BC) explains Roman conduct fully. Contingent factors – the personalities of individual Roman commanders and ambassadors “on the spot,” the combination of personalities in the senate, the foreign-policy disposition of whatever senatorial group happened to be dominant at any given moment – just as often played a significant role.¹²⁹ The only constant in these situations was the nature of

¹²⁸ Gruen 1984: 3: “the principal question [pursued here is] what were the circumstances that Romans encountered in the East and how did they adjust to them?”

¹²⁹ The importance of the commander “on the spot”: Eckstein 1987a; individual personalities: above, n. 71, on Galba; above, pp. 211, 220, on Metellus and Gracchus; above, p. 119, on Glabrio; senatorial factions: above, pp. 128–32, with Polyb. 33.8.10 on the “more sensible senators,” who recognized the plot of Attalus II and Alexander Balas to seize the Syrian throne for what it was; the debate over whether to accept the Mamertine *deditio* in 264 BC (above, pp. 128–32); the debate between Cato and Scipio Nasica in 150 over whether to make war on Carthage (below, pp. 307–23).

Rome's relationship with her international partners – *amicitia*. That relationship thus has a reasonable claim to be the most important subject of analytical focus when trying to determine the nature of Roman power and its impact on the international system.

It is perhaps appropriate to begin with a question asked earlier in [Chapter 3](#): did the circumstances under which other states became Roman *amici* affect their subsequent treatment by the Republic? The results are, predictably, mixed. It will be appropriate to begin with the apparent principle established by the Romans and Campanians in 343 BC, on the occasion of the Campanian *deditio* (above, pp. 124–25): if equal friendship is established, no standing friendship or alliance, such as the Samnites already enjoy, may be violated (*ita uobiscum amicitiam institui par est, ne qua uetustior amicitia ac societas uioletur*), and all that can be done is for the Romans to send an embassy to the Samnites asking them to stop harming the Campanians; if *deditio* takes place, on the other hand, the Campanians become the property of Rome, and are immediately entitled to military protection (Livy 7.31.1–3). Certainly the Romans responded swiftly and with force to Samnite attacks on the Campanians after their *deditio* in 343 – as they would do again for the surrendered Lucanians in 298.¹³⁰

A further example is Apollonia, which performed *deditio* in 229 BC during Rome's first war against the Illyrian Ardiaei: as we have seen, when Philip V attacked the Apollonians in 214, the Romans immediately brought up their fleet and put the Macedonian king to flight. This is the incident that precipitated what modern scholarship, somewhat inaccurately, labels the “First Macedonian War.”¹³¹ It is further significant that this was the first time since Philip struck his treaty with Hannibal that the Roman fleet temporarily abandoned its defensive position guarding the eastern shores of Italy to strike out across the Adriatic. It was, as Arthur Eckstein notes, “a highly risky operation” along a coast where the only suitable berths were currently under attack by Philip. Responding to the appeal of an *amicus* was, in this instance, taken very seriously indeed. Other factors were at work, of course: Livy stresses the importance of Apollonia (and Oricum – also under attack by Philip) as potential bases for the king's planned invasion of Italy (Livy 24.40.5). But it is the combination of motives and opportunities

¹³⁰ Campanian *deditio*: Livy 7.30–31; declaration of war: Livy 7.32.1; Dion. Hal. 15.7–9; cf. 15.10.2; Lucanian *deditio* and declaration of war: Livy 10.11.11–12.3; Dion. Hal. 17.18.2–4; cf. above, p. 82.

¹³¹ It is more accurately a renewal of the Social War between Aetolia and Macedon, which began in 220 BC and ended in 217 (Gruen 1984: 378). It may well have been known as “the Aetolian War” in antiquity: Eckstein 2008: 91–93 and n. 57 (with relevant passages from Livy, based on Polybian material). On the incident of 214 as the precipitating cause of the war proper, see Eckstein 2008: 86 with App. *Mac.* 1; Livy 24.40.1 (as against, e.g., Gruen 1984: 378).

that deserves emphasis here: a Roman fleet was in the neighborhood to protect against the attack of an aggressor, a Roman coastal *amicus* needed help, and so it made sense for the Romans to answer the call on both the strategic and moral levels. However, the same cannot be said of the sequel: when Philip attacked Rome's surrendered *amici* the Parthini, Atintani, and Dimallum in the Illyrian interior during 213 and 212, the Romans did not respond. Unlike the Apolloniates, these *amici* did not call on Rome for help, but this is probably incidental to the reality that the Romans were in no position to protect them for the simple reason that they as yet lacked the necessary ground forces to confront Philip on land.¹³²

It appears, then, that despite the assertion in Livy 7.31.1–3, those states that entered Roman *amicitia* by performing *deditio* were not automatically entitled to more energetic and muscular Roman responses to calls for help than those who did not perform *deditio*. Two further examples reinforce the point. First, we return to the Mamertine *deditio* examined in the previous chapter. Unfortunately, this case is a tangle of chronological problems and source inconsistencies, but the broad outlines of what basically happened in 264 BC have by now been established (above, pp. 128–33). The tradition almost unanimously records a two-stage process of senatorial decision-making after the Mamertine embassy arrived in Rome seeking protection from the attacks of Hiero II: the first was a debate over whether to accept the Mamertine offer of *deditio*, and the second, over whether to send an army to relieve the siege of Messana. After the first debate ended and the *deditio* was accepted, the Mamertine embassy apparently returned to Sicily, discovered a Punic garrison in Messana, expelled it, and then underwent a siege by the combined forces of Carthage and Syracuse, who in the meantime had formed an alliance. Thus on any reconstruction of these events, it must be concluded that even after the long debate in the senate (cf. Polyb. 1.10.3: πολλὸν . . . χρόνον) over whether to accept the Mamertine *deditio*, the senate continued to drag its feet, apparently waiting several months (given all the activity that took place in Sicily in the meantime), before sending the consul Ap. Claudius Caudex with military forces to relieve the Mamertines.¹³³

¹³² Apollonian *deditio*: Polyb. 2.11.8 (with discussion above, p. 136); Philip's attack and the Roman response: Livy 24.40.7–8; Zonar. 9.4; Plut. *Arat.* 5.1 (discussion at Badian 1952a: 90; Hammond 1968: 17–18; Errington 1971: 111–12; Gruen 1984: 376; Eckstein 2008: 86 [whence the quotation]); Philip's attack on the Parthini, Atintani, and Dimallum: Livy 27.30.13–14 (retrospective) with Eckstein 2008: 87 and n. 38, 97 and n. 76.

¹³³ Diod. Sic. 23.1.1–4; cf. Livy *Per.* 16; Flor. 1.8.3; *De Vir. Ill.* 37.2; Oros. 4.7.1. Polyb. 1.10.3–11.3 is considerably abbreviated and compressed, and so gives the impression that the second Roman decision followed hard upon the first, but Polyb. 3.26.6 seems to indicate more protracted

It was only when news of the joint siege of Messana by Carthage and Syracuse reached Rome that the consul Claudius was dispatched to Sicily, probably after further debate in the senate. But, as one late source explicitly reveals (Frontin. *Str.* 1.4.11), the consul was not armed with a declaration of war against Hiero – or the Carthaginians for that matter. The tradition is unanimous, furthermore, that Claudius' assignment was simply to cross to Messana and to assist the Mamertines – in other words, to raise the siege of the city, either by force or negotiation. He chose the latter. Once arrived at Rhegium, the consul sent an embassy to Hiero demanding that he raise the siege, stressing that the Romans wished to avoid war. After he was refused, Claudius attempted to cross the straits in arms, but was apparently forcibly turned back by the Carthaginian fleet. Subsequently the Carthaginian commander Hanno sent legates to discuss the situation, and Claudius agreed – a remarkable decision by the commander on the spot, given that the forces of Hanno and Hiero were in the midst of jointly besieging what was now a Roman *amicus* with a significant claim on Roman protection arising from *deditio*, and because some form of military clash had already taken place in the Straits of Messina. At the parley, Claudius once again reiterated his demand that the siege be raised, but the conference broke up in acrimony, with the Carthaginian envoys threatening (as was seen in the previous chapter) that they would not allow the Romans even to wash their hands in the sea. Claudius then attempted another crossing, this time with success. Remarkably, however, the consul may have tried to negotiate a solution to the crisis for a third time, sending envoys to the besiegers to discuss peace. Only when these negotiations broke down did Claudius fully pursue the military option.¹³⁴

deliberations between decisions ("since they accepted the Mamertines into their friendship and after this helped them when they were asked. . . , " ὅτι καθόλου Μαμερτίνους προσέβαλον εἰς τὴν φιλίαν καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα δεομένοις ἐβοήθησαν. . .); discussion: Walbank 1957: 355; Petzold 1969: 135–48; cf. Eckstein 1987a: 331–32, 335–37, 339. If there is anything to the tradition of a certain "military tribune, C. Claudius" (Dio fr. 43.5–11; Zonar. 8.8–9; cf. Diod. Sic. 23.1.2), he was probably a junior officer in the consul Claudius' army appointed by the senate to escort the Mamertine embassy back to Sicily. If this is so, upon his arrival, "C. Claudius" apparently engineered the expulsion of the Punic garrison from Messana, and rejected a Carthaginian demand that he evacuate the city. He does not seem to have had a Roman military force of any consequence with him, for he was probably not sent to begin hostilities against Hiero, but only to announce to the Mamertines (and perhaps to Hiero as well) that Rome had accepted their *deditio*; discussion: Petzold 1969: 165–66, with citation of earlier literature (mostly against); cf. Eckstein 1987a: 332 n. 11, 333, 337–8.

¹³⁴ Claudius' assignment: Polyb. 1.11.3, 11; Oros. 4.7.1; *De Vir. Ill.* 37.2; embassy to Hiero: Diod. Sic. 23.1.4; attempt to cross: Diod. Sic. 23.2.1; Polyb. 1.20.13–16; cf. Frontin. *Str.* 1.4.11; Zonar. 8.8 (who attributes the crossing to "C. Claudius"); parley with the Carthaginians: Diod. Sic. 23.2.1; cf. Zonar. 8.9; Claudius' response: Diod. Sic. 23.2.1; *Ined. Vat.* 3 (= *FGrH* 83a); Dio fr. 43.9

This complex chain of events reveals a distinct deliberateness and carefulness, to say the least, in the responses of both the senate and the Roman commander on the spot. The senate debated for a long time, and at an interval of perhaps several months, two separate proposals (whether to accept the Mamertine *deditio* and whether to send help), while Claudius tried negotiations perhaps as many as three times while the siege of Messana dragged on. Even though Claudius was well aware that Rome's *amicus* was in increasingly desperate straits (indeed, from his vantage point at Rhegium he could probably see events unfolding at Messana – and the massive siege works being constructed before the city walls), he persisted in pursuing a negotiated solution. This must decisively refute the validity of the principle Livy articulates at 7.31.1–3: *deditio* did not necessarily ensure timely Roman military protection; as in cases involving their “equal friends,” Rome preferred, as has been seen repeatedly in this chapter, to pursue the diplomatic option – “compellence” or otherwise – before committing forces to open conflict, even as conditions for their *amicus*, with a significant claim on their *fides* and protection, worsened.

The second case is the infamous appeal of the Spanish city of Saguntum, which played a similar trip-wire role in the matrix of causes leading to the Second Punic War as Messana had played in the First. The timing and circumstances of the Saguntines' *amicitia* is, notoriously, shrouded in controversy, which arose directly from competing partisan historical traditions assigning blame for starting the Second Punic War either to the Romans or to the Carthaginians.¹³⁵ That the city performed voluntary *deditio* is not in doubt: thus Polybius states that the Saguntines “placed themselves under the protection of Rome” (ἐδεδώκεισαν αὐτοὺς εἰς τὴν τῶν Ῥωμαίων πίστιν: Polyb. 3.30.1; cf. 3.15.5 [the Romans speaking]: “for [the Saguntines] are under our protection,” κείσθαι αὐτοὺς ἐν τῇ σφετέρᾳ πίστει). But there are several candidates for when, precisely, the surrender occurred: as early as between 237 and 228 BC, according to some scholars, but as late as between 226 and 220, according to others.¹³⁶ Of course much

(cf. Zonar. 8.9, who attributes the response to “C. Claudius”); Punic insult: Diod. Sic. 23.2.1; cf. Dio fr. 43.9; Zonar. 8.9; second crossing: Polyb. 1.11.9; Frontin. *Str.* 1.4.11; third negotiation: Polyb. 1.11.11–12.

¹³⁵ The bibliography is vast, but see the exhaustive study of Hoyos 1998: 176–232, with full citation of older literature there; Scardigli 1991: 245–96 is indispensable on the Ebro treaty and related matters, and contains a full bibliography.

¹³⁶ Eckstein 1984: 52–57 (who opts for an early date, between 237 and 228 BC); Walbank 1957: 170; Sumner 1972: 475–76 (by 228); Goldsworthy 2000: 144 (after 226); Hoyos 1998: 178–84 (225); Scardigli 1991: 275 (224/223); Badian 1958a: 50 (between 224 and 221); Errington 1970: 42–44; Errington 1971: 55 (ca. 223); Thiel 1994: 141 (220). Badian 1958a: 51, 293 recognized long ago that Saguntum had no formal *foedus* with Rome, but only informal *amicitia*; cf. also Hoyos 1998:

of the controversy has to do with where these various scholars stand on the issue of Roman aggressiveness in the Spanish peninsula: if the Romans established the Saguntine connection before the pact with Hasdrubal, ca. 226, that ceded Spain south of the Ebro River as the sphere of legitimate Carthaginian military activity, then the friendship with Saguntum appears less aggressive on Rome's part; it was, rather, a typical Roman *amicitia* – that is, an intentionally loose and detached diplomatic relationship with no significant Roman military-aggressive intent behind it. If, on the other hand, the connection was made after the pact of ca. 226, then the Roman–Saguntine friendship may appear more aggressive: the Romans knew that the connection violated the spirit, if not the letter, of the agreement with Hasdrubal, and Hannibal was perfectly within his rights to attack a Spanish polity south of the Ebro line.

Fortunately, the timing of the Saguntine *deditio* to Rome makes little difference to the issue under discussion here. What does matter, first of all, are the probable circumstances under which the Romans accepted their appeal: according to Polybius, the Romans intervened in a violent internal political dispute at Saguntum, put to death several leading men of the city, and apparently installed an anti-Carthaginian government in power;¹³⁷ this is thus broadly similar to the Romans' intervention in Boeotian politics in the 190s BC, which saw the murder of the pro-Macedonian Bracchyles, and the attempted restoration of the pro-Roman Zeuxippus and his party (see above, pp. 206–07). This is therefore another example of the sorts of service the Romans perform for their *amici* (or, at least, a portion of them).

Turning to the more urgent question of this section: does the Saguntine appeal and the Roman response confirm or deny the validity of the assertion at Livy 7.31.1–3, that those states that entered Roman *amicitia* by

175–78 (with full citation of earlier literature, for and against). Astin 1967b: 590–93 doubts that the Saguntines originally performed *deditio*, but at 3.15.1 and 3.30.1 Polybius uses an expression – a form of δίδωμι plus εἰς ἣν πίστιν – that he insists in his discussion of the Aetolian *deditio* of 191 means the same thing as surrendering to Rome (cf. above, p. 116).

¹³⁷ Roman intervention in civil dispute at Saguntum: Polyb. 3.15.7, 30.2; murder of leading men: Polyb. 3.15.7. According to Eckstein 1984: 63; cf. 2006: 171, the anti-Carthaginian political position of the party in power is implied by Polyb. 3.15.7–8, where Hannibal alleges that the Saguntines are wronging people subject to Carthage, and Polyb. 3.30.2, where Polybius says that the Saguntines (a particular faction of the Saguntines?) made a conscious decision not to call in the Carthaginians, but rather the Romans, to mediate their dispute. The faction out of power may not necessarily have been anti-Roman, or even particularly pro-Carthaginian, but merely in favor of an accommodation with Hannibal: Hoyos 1998: 184–87 (with older literature cited at 186 n. 23). Badian 1958a: 51 and Astin 1967b: 593–94 (among others) argue that *amicitia* was established at the same time as the request for Roman arbitration, but others believe that the *amicitia* preceded the request for intervention: Walbank 1957: 320, 322; Sumner 1972: 235–36; Eckstein 1984: 62–63; Hoyos 1998: 179 (with other literature *pro* and *contra* cited at 179–180 n. 10).

performing *deditio* were automatically entitled to a more robust Roman response to calls for help than those that did not? If the Romans had, in fact, responded quickly to the earlier Saguntine appeal to settle an internal dispute in the city (which could, after all, be an illusion created by the brevity of Polybius' retrospective notices at 3.15.7–8, 30.2), then such alacrity was not destined to last. As is well known, when the Saguntines began appealing for Roman protection in the late 220s BC against the increasing aggression of the Carthaginians, they were persistently ignored by the senate. Indeed, Polybius reveals that the Romans ignored their continuous entreaties “many times” (πλεονάκις: 3.15.2), before the decision was finally made to intervene diplomatically in 220. At that point the Romans sent an embassy to Hannibal in Spain in order to negotiate a solution to the conflict, but the attempt failed, and the envoys returned to Italy. Hannibal attacked Saguntum with the full brunt of the Carthaginian army in summer 219 – and the Romans did nothing. It was not until the city fell, in December 219/January 218, after having endured a siege for about eight months, that the Romans finally declared war. Still, Roman armies did not reach Spain until late in the following summer.¹³⁸

Again, this series of events (or non-events, at least as far as concerns Roman military activity) manifests an odd indifference on the part of the Romans to the solicitation of Roman protection by a *dediticius* and *amicus*. Why did the Romans wait so long to act? According to Polybius, Carthage was on the senate's “to do” list, but had to await a resolution to the crisis caused by the aggression of Demetrius of Pharos during the late 220s BC (Polyb. 3.16.1). Perhaps Rome's major war with the Celts in the second half of the 220s (an existential threat to Rome: Polyb. 2.35.2), a war that was reignited in 218, after the foundation of the Roman colonies of Cremona and Placentia on formerly Celtic land (Polyb. 3.40.6–8; Livy 21.25.2), affected Rome's ability to respond to the situation in Spain. On the other hand, the continued indifference of the senate during the eight-month siege by Hannibal cannot be explained solely by a theory of imperial overstretch. Perhaps, as in the Mamertine case, the Romans were aware of the sensitivity of the situation, and wished to avoid all-out war with Carthage by acting too precipitously. The evidence for this is admittedly

¹³⁸ Rome ignores Saguntum in 220s BC: Polyb. 3.15.1; embassy to Hannibal: Polyb. 3.15.2–9 (with Walbank 1957: 319–24; Eckstein 1989; 1995b: 144–45, 210, 255–56); cf. Livy 21.6.2–8, 9.3–11.2; App. *Hispan.* 40–43; Zonar. 8.21; Eutrop. 3.7; Oros. 4.14.2; Flor. 1.22.5 (misdated to 219); siege and fall of Saguntum: Polyb. 3.17.1–9 (the annalistic tradition, best represented by Livy 21.6–9, conflates the siege with the parley of the previous year, to apologize for Roman indifference throughout 219; Merten 1965: 11–12, 72; Hoyos 1998: 202–04); on the chronology of these events see Astin 1967a; Eckstein 1983; Hoyos 1998: 198–232; Levene 2010: 56–60.

thin, but it stands to reason, given that Rome's relations with Carthage were already strained by this time; after all, the Romans' acrimonious encounter with an angry Hannibal at New Carthage – precisely over the Saguntum issue – had already taken place, in 220 (Polyb. 3.15). Additionally, some senators apparently had serious doubts as to whether Saguntum was worth a full-scale war with Carthage; as Livy reports, the senatorial group that advocated a cautious policy argued that “such a grave matter must not be entered upon lightly” (*non temere mouenda in rem tantam*: 21.6.7) – and won the day.

In any event, what matters for the present purpose is that the Saguntum crisis (like the earlier Mamertine crisis) once again demonstrates the inherent flexibility of the *amicitia* tie – for Rome as for her considerably less powerful *amici*. The Romans exploited the room for maneuver in responding to calls for help that the inherently flexible friendship bond permitted. This is not to say, however, that the Romans did not take the claims of their friends or their *fides* seriously. After all, they “went to war for a city that no longer existed,”¹³⁹ and there can be no doubt that the senators felt guilty in retrospect for leaving Saguntum in the lurch: they would later expend a great deal of time, energy, and money searching for the scattered population of Saguntum, buying them out of slavery, and restoring them to their city after its recapture from the Carthaginians in 212/211 BC (Livy 24.42.9–10 [misdated to 214]; cf. 28.39.5). The Romans tried to atone for their earlier inaction by restoring the community as a free *amicus* of Rome, and significantly expanding its territory (28.39.12). At this late stage, the Saguntines were told that the Romans' actions would be a shining example of their *fides* to their allies (28.39.17), while the Saguntines themselves acknowledged Roman services on their behalf (*merita . . . erga nos*), as well as their own *fides* towards Rome (28.39.1). The deep impression the destruction of Saguntum had on the minds of the senators may be seen in 200, twenty years after Hannibal's attacks on the city began, when the consul of that year, P. Sulpicius Galba, could credibly deploy the example of Saguntum in a speech to convince the Roman *populus* to declare war on Philip V. On that occasion, the consul begged the Romans not to abandon their Greek friends as they had previously forsaken the Saguntines, thus appealing to the Romans' sense of collective guilt over their earlier conduct (31.7.6–7).¹⁴⁰ But this was all in the future. For the moment, what matters

¹³⁹ Eckstein 2006: 173.

¹⁴⁰ This same sense of guilt over Saguntum also lies behind the subsequent historical tradition where, as was mentioned earlier (above, n. 138), Roman annalists telescoped and compressed events in order to make the Roman delay in responding to Saguntine appeals not seem so long.

most here is that at the time the Saguntine crisis was developing in the late 220s/early 210s, the Romans were almost completely passive. Their delay might be explained (but not justified) by the inherent response-flexibility and looseness of the international friendship bond. Once again, *amici dediticii* had no automatic claim on robust Roman responses to situations where their friends were under threat.

Thus far these were all *dediticii*; what about those instances when Roman military assistance was sought by a friendly state that had not performed *deditio*? That is, is Livy right in claiming that non-*dediticii amici* were not entitled to energetic and muscular Roman responses to calls for help? Again no definitive pattern is apparent, except that the Romans almost always attempted a diplomatic solution first, but if this failed (as it almost invariably did), might then pursue a military option. But just as (more?) often, as we have seen, the Romans simply allowed the situation to escalate until Rome's friends were forced to look after themselves, or until matters spun so far out of control that Rome's own security interests were threatened and Roman military intervention became imperative. As has been seen, Ariarathes of Cappadocia – a “true friend” of the Romans who had not performed *deditio* (so far as we know) – was left to his fate, and to the machinations of Demetrius of Syria and Orophernes in the late 160s/early 150s BC. A further example occurs in 201, when Pergamene and Rhodian ambassadors appeared before the senate to complain about the aggression of Philip V in Asia Minor.¹⁴¹ The senate promised to look into the matter, but nothing materialized at that time. While Attalus and the Rhodians were in Athens the following year, trying to build an anti-Macedonian coalition, the Pergamene king was overjoyed to find Roman envoys there demanding that Philip submit his differences with himself to arbitration. Philip continued to make inroads in Asia Minor, and while he was besieging Abydus, M. Aemilius Lepidus approached him, objected to his attacks on Attalus and the Rhodians, and demanded that he submit his differences with them to an impartial tribunal. Philip's refusal to grant satisfaction and agree to arbitration meant that an (informal) state of war now existed between the king and Rome.¹⁴² This episode is further proof that when

¹⁴¹ On these campaigns, see Walbank 1940: 108–27; 1967: 497–512, 529–33; Berthold 1984: 111–19; Ma 1999: 74–82; Eckstein 2008: 150–78.

¹⁴² Embassy of 201 BC: Livy 31.2.1–2; cf. Just. *Epit.* 30.3.5; Attalus and the Rhodians in Athens: Polyb. 16.25–26; Livy 31.14.11–15.6; Roman envoys' ultimatum: Polyb. 16.27.1–2, 34.1–4; Livy 31.18.1–5; Diod. Sic. 28.6; Aemilius' parley: Polyb. 16.34.4–5; Livy 31.18.1–2; conditional declaration of war: Polyb. 16.34.4; discussion at McDonald and Walbank 1937: 187–97; Walbank 1940: 127–35; Balsdon 1954: 39–41; Badian 1958a: 62–69; Will 1967: 110–16; Dahlheim 1968: 234–59; Hansen 1971: 57–60; McShane 1964: 122–27; Errington 1971: 131–40; Cimma 1976: 60–62; Berthold 1975/1976; 1984:

the interests of Roman *amici* (as Pergamum and Rhodes) who had not submitted themselves to Roman protection were threatened, the Romans preferred to negotiate a solution, and only after the passage of a significant amount of time would they resort to more forceful measures to protect their *amici*. As will be seen in the next chapter, the Roman preference for negotiating solutions to crises achieved its ultimate expression in the diplomacy with Antiochus III throughout the 190s.

Finally, what were the constitutive effects of the Roman style of international crisis management? Once again, Roman intentions must be carefully distinguished from the consequences of Roman behavior. It was certainly laudable – and designed to demonstrate their *fides*, and thus their attractiveness as international partners – that the Romans did such things as entertain requests from all quarters and listen patiently to the long speeches of ambassadors, send out delegation after delegation of high-level ambassadors, consult their *amici* on major issues and try to satisfy all their requests, lavish gifts on representatives of friendly states, allow their differences with other states to be mediated by others, deny themselves the use of other states' slim military resources, and sometimes physically protect their *amici* from the aggression of others. Self-interest drove this behavior, certainly; after all, by trusting that their Greek *amici* would remain loyal, even in the absence of Roman legions – thus crediting them with moral equivalence – Flamininus and the Roman commissioners were hoping to secure Roman control over the East “on the cheap.” But moral imperatives must be given their due weight as well: by withdrawing completely from Greece against all rational calculus, the Romans were discharging a (self-imposed) obligation to live up to their claims of *fides*.

On the other hand, the paradoxical consequence of Roman behavior was often to create less security, not more. This arose from the inherent flexibility of the *amicitia* bond, which allowed the Romans to react slowly and deliberately to calls for help, lose interest in the petty details of regional interstate rivalries (the Spartan exile issue, for example), and to leave it up to their *amici* to work out how circumscribed their “arc of political possibility” was at any given moment. The moral pressures exerted by *amicitia* and the systemic pressures generated by the nature of the international environment sometimes worked together (compelling the Romans to answer positively to calls for help, for example), but at other times

119–24; Gruen 1984: 534–37 (who, however, argues that a state of war did not exist until the fall of Abydus); Twyman 1986; Ferrary 1988: 53–54; Twyman 1992: 97–98; 1999 (who denies that the appeals of Attalus, Rhodes, and Athens had any impact on the Roman war decision); Ma 1999: 81. Eckstein 2008: 181–270 provides a definitive discussion on the diplomacy (“diplomatic revolution”) of 201–200 BC.

worked in tension (such as when the Romans withdrew from Greece in the midst of their hegemonic rivalry with Antiochus III). Rome's intention, for a mixture of self-interested and other-regarding reasons, was always to make the system more predictable, more secure for themselves and others, through ideational and discursive practices less typical of their closest system rivals; the consequences were, however, more often than not – and precisely because Roman power and its exercise were so exceptional – substantially otherwise.

CONCLUSION

The intent of this chapter has been to explore the variety of services, or *beneficia*, that the Romans and their international *amici* performed for each other. Perhaps not surprisingly, given the violent anarchy of the ancient Mediterranean system, most of these related to the conduct of warfare in some respect. Thus, Rome's friends are most often seen contributing manpower, matériel, and money to Roman war efforts, offering safe conduct through their territory and safe ports for Roman ships, as well as engaging in mediation of Roman disputes. The Romans, for their part, are most frequently seen intervening diplomatically on behalf of their friends and providing military protection. This is not to deny the importance of exchanges of strictly symbolic capital, however: in addition to the tangible gifts Rome extended to her *amici* as rewards for their loyalty and service, the Romans are seen soliciting, and their *amici* offering, frank and unconstrained advice; and both Rome and her friends mutually exchange tokens of esteem (such as the trappings of royalty given to Syphax by the senate in 210 BC, and to Masinissa by Scipio in 203, and the 220-pound solid gold Victory statue given to Rome by Hiero II in 217), as well as high-level embassies staffed by individuals of enormous prestige (former Roman consuls sent abroad and eastern potentates, such as Eumenes II in 189, and his brothers in 181/180, coming in person to Rome).

Recurring themes of this survey have been the response-flexibility of both Rome and her *amici* to crisis situations, as well as the mutuality of their (sometimes different) interpretations of their obligations; both phenomena are by-products of the inherent bilateralism (as opposed to the rigid unilateral hierarchicalism of *clientela*) and practical logics of the *amicitia* tie. The normative construction of international friendships – the associated protocols, content, and performative utterances, in addition to its practical manifestations – dominate the partners' interactions. Thus, even in those cases where treaties set forth explicitly and in detail the obligations

of both partners, these were rarely invoked, and the discourse of interstate diplomacy, for the most part, continued to be cast in terms of informal obligations arising from *amicitia* and *fides*. The inherent asymmetries in many of these friendships, coupled with the informality of *amicitia*, meant that the Romans' interpretation of their duties towards others was often decisive. But as we have also seen, Roman *amici* enjoyed some latitude of interpretation as well, and indeed often put it into practice, judging the obligations of friendship according to their own calculations of advantage as well as in terms of moral imperatives. Both Rome's friends and the Romans themselves to some degree had to make decisions along a "circumscribed arc of political possibility"; the difficulty was in determining where precisely each party was on that arc at any given time, and precisely how circumscribed the arc actually was in a given set of circumstances.

Because of the essential looseness of interpretation, and broad discretion afforded to the partners, the Romans' and their friends' assessment of the obligations of *amicitia* often sharply differed. This disjuncture in perception often led to diplomatic disputes, and sometimes to the breakdown, if not the complete dissolution, of the *amicitia* bond, which is the subject of the next and final chapter of this study.

CHAPTER 5

The breakdown and dissolution of international friendship

INTRODUCTION

It remains to consider the evidence for the two distinct but closely related (and sometimes overlapping) processes of friendship breakdown and dissolution in the international sphere during the first great age of Roman overseas expansion. As was seen in [Chapter 2](#), friendships in the interpersonal sphere in ancient Greco-Roman culture frequently broke down over perceived changes in one or both of the partners' *mores*, or over perceived betrayals of the essential *fides* binding them together. A friendship in crisis could be resolved either by attempts at reconciliation, which involved confronting the relationship's ground rules, cost-to-benefit ratios, and moral parameters, or by a refusal by one or both parties to reconcile, in which case dissolution quickly followed. The analysis in [Chapter 2](#) also revealed that, whereas modern friendships usually conform to a pattern of abrupt breakdown, followed by gradual dissolution and disengagement, the ancient evidence suggests that among the Romans, breakdown and dissolution were equally abrupt, almost simultaneous processes, so egregious were slights to honor considered – especially when they came from former friends and intimates.

The primary purpose of this study's final chapter is to determine whether international *amicitiae* in crisis followed a pattern similar to that of their interpersonal counterparts. The point of doing this, as has been the case throughout the previous two chapters, will be to show that *amicitia* (rather than *clientela*) is the appropriate paradigmatic relationship filter through which to view Roman imperialism and diplomacy. The much more difficult task here will be to demonstrate that the sanctioning moral language that passed between the Romans and their *amici* in times of relationship stress – the inverse correlate of the moralizing language that helped construct the initiation of *amicitiae* (above, [Chapter 2](#)) – was not “mere discourse,” but was both reflective and constitutive of the situational realities in which

these states found themselves. It has been all too easy for scholars of Roman imperialism under the sway of IR Realist interpretations to dismiss ancient constructions of friendship breakdown and dissolution using the language of trust betrayal as moral cover or specious pretext for what was actually – transparently – aggressive, self-interested behavior.

This was certainly the view of Ernst Badian, who embedded in his discussion of Rome's post-Pydna eastern policy a Cold-War-inspired power-balancing explanation. During the period of Roman "domination" after 167 BC, Badian argues, Rome's friends were:

safe . . . only so long as they [were] reasonably successful . . . , yet not so strong as to threaten Rome's balance of power; and the Senate [was] on the watch for chances of weakening the kingdoms of even its most faithful allies, and ready to transfer its support (without provocation) to their enemies, as soon as it suspect[ed] them of excessive power.¹

Peter Derow, looking at the same evidence, concluded that the Romans "were on the lookout for suitable occasions and handsome pretexts, once they had decided that a war was what was needed."² More recently, Sheila Ager has argued that it was inherent in the unique *iustum bellum* mentality of the Romans that Rome's friends-turned-enemies were always in the wrong, that is, guilty of breaking *fides*, and that the Romans always had right and justice on their side.³ It appears to be the case, in the view of many modern scholars, that "those who talk most insistently about *fides*" – which, as will be seen here, the Romans certainly did – "are not always its most conscientious practitioners."⁴

This view is not uniquely modern, however; it originates in the analysis of the earliest historian of Rome's rise to power, Polybius. Indeed, Derow's comment just quoted is his assessment of the ancient historian's interpretation of Rome's relations with friendly states after 167 BC. As was seen in the previous chapter, Polybius is the source of the view that the senate kept the vigorous young adult, Demetrius, from the Syrian throne since it better served Rome's interest to have an incapable boy, Antiochus V, in power. From Polybius also comes the opinion that when Demetrius sent Leptines, the assassin of the Roman legate, Cn. Octavius, to Rome, and the *patres* released him, they did so in order to hold in reserve a grievance against the king. Using the same logic, Polybius also asserts that Rhodes was

¹ Badian 1958a: 111. ² Derow 1979: 14. ³ Ager 2009: 17–24, 40.

⁴ Badian 1970: 53, borrowing a formulation by Thiel 1954: 14: "the Romans used to *speak* far too much of *fides*, which is a very bad sign" (emphasis in the original); Thiel 1994: 131: "if an individual strikes his lily-white breast and declares emphatically that, unlike others, he is an honest man, then (apart from exceptional cases) there is good reason to be suspicious."

invited by the Roman consul, Q. Marcius Philippus, to mediate Rome's conflict with Perseus so that the Romans could do whatever they wished to the Rhodians later on. This pattern of interpretation persists in Polybius' insistence that the Roman senate made it a point of policy to support such abjectly pro-Roman Greek politicians as Callicrates of Leontium against more independent-minded statesmen – such as Polybius himself. In addition, as will be seen in this chapter, in Polybius' view, Eumenes II was weakened after Pydna because it was in Rome's practical best interest to do so, and that Rome decided in favor of the Numidian king Masinissa in his conflicts with Carthage from the 190s to the 150s not because his cause was just, but because it suited Rome's best interest to do so.

This is a damning indictment of Roman international behavior after Pydna, certainly, but it must be emphasized, as Gruen notes, “that this *is* an interpretation” after all,⁵ often of an *ex post facto* sort (not the best methodology for an historian), and Polybius, of course, had a good, deeply personal reason for cynicism and disillusionment: the Romans, in consultation with men like the Achaean League's Callicrates, engineered his career-ending exile to Italy – a traumatic and depressing experience for any ancient politician, more so for one so conscientious and recently successful as Polybius. Not coincidentally, Polybius' cynical remarks tend to cluster in his narrative of events immediately following his detention, and many of his informants were his coexiles in Italy, embittered former partisans of Rome's most recent enemy and the last king of Macedonia, Perseus.⁶ It is also no coincidence, moreover, that the era in which Rome cynically manipulated lesser states corresponds precisely to the period when Polybius regarded Rome's planned world supremacy as having been achieved – an interpretation that is notoriously problematic on several counts.⁷ Nor is Polybius' interpretation of events after Pydna entirely self-consistently anti-Roman: as will be seen in this chapter, he can be equally condemning of those states that were on the receiving end of Roman sharp practice.

This chapter adopts a less jaundiced view of Roman behavior and language than Polybius did in his more cynical moods, and his modern IR

⁵ Gruen 1976b: 75 (emphasis in the original).

⁶ Callicrates' engineering of Polybius' exile: Polyb. 13.9–11, 32.1–2; cf. Livy 45.31.5; Paus. 7.10.11; Polybius' informants: Polyb. 29.8.10; cf. 30.1.6; discussion: Green 1990: 275–76; Ferrary 1988: 291–306; Eckstein 1995b: 204–05; Ferrary 1997: 117–18; Champion 2007: 258–59. For the evolution of Polybius' thinking about Roman power, see Walbank 1963: esp. 10–12; 1972: 166–83; 1974; 1977: 151–59; followed by Momigliano 1977: 71; Pomeroy 1986: 418; Green 1990: 283, 285; critiques of Walbank's view: Shimron 1979/1980; Ferrary 1988: 306–18; Eckstein 1995b: 107–09, 194–236.

⁷ Gruen 1984: 343–51.

Realist-inspired descendants continue to do. As was seen earlier, the predominantly moralizing discourse and the normative practices it enshrines often exerted a constraining effect on the powerful: thus the Romans allowed the Aetolians to reconsider their *deditio* in 191 BC, and guilt over failing to protect Saguntum from Hannibal in 220 and 219 compelled Roman officials to search for survivors of the sacked city, buy them out of slavery, and rebuild their homeland on a grander scale than before – all of this while Roman resources were stretched to the limit during the Second Punic War. The Romans were probably not alone in feeling the constraints of their discursive practices. As John Ma has demonstrated, even the great Hellenistic kings were constrained by the discourse of status and privilege in their relations with the relatively weak Greek *poleis*; thus, the “freedom” Antiochus III extended to the Greek city-states of Asia Minor: “the language of euergetism . . . creat[ed] a process of dialogue, and hence an interaction where language was polity, where both parties had a right to speak back to each other, on the basis of shared assumptions and values, implying some form of parity.”⁸ And, as was seen in [Chapter 3](#), moral parity, whatever the concrete asymmetries of power, had a real and constitutive effect on the initial stages of international friendship formation. This chapter will attempt to test the inverse proposition: did moral imperatives have a real-world impact on how and when the Romans, and their international friends, broke and chose to dissolve their partnerships, interrelated processes that frequently issued in war? To put it another way: to what extent was the moralizing discourse of friendship breakdown actually constitutive of foreign-policy decision-making, and thus, the international system; in other words, when was language something more than mere discursive cover for the cynical pursuit of practical self-interest?

The analysis will proceed in three stages. The first two sections treat some representative cases where friendship breakdown, and occasionally its termination as well, are clearly attributed by the sources to serious violations of *fides* or some other significant moral failing, sometimes on the part of Rome’s *amici*, and sometimes on the part of the Romans themselves. The third section examines more closely the processes of the friendship breakdown and dissolution, in order to determine whether, in the international context, the deterioration of *amicitia* more generally follows a pattern of gradual or sudden breakdown and disintegration, as discussed earlier in [Chapter 2](#). There will also be ample opportunity

⁸ Ma 1999: 241; cf. 50, 217, 227, 238–39, 242, 244.

to explore the recurring themes of asymmetrical friendship, the inherent flexibility of international *amicitia*, the power of self-determination and choice permitted to *amici*, and how all these factors may have contributed to conflicts of interpretation and perception which, in turn, played some constitutive role in friendship breakdown.

CAUSATION: VIOLATIONS OF *FIDES* BY ROME'S *AMICI*

As in the previous chapter, the focus here will be not so much on providing a comprehensive catalogue of cases, but rather an interpretative analysis with broader thematic emphases. In this case, the initial organizing principle will be a comparative phenomenology of *fides*-violations between states that had initiated friendship with Rome through *deditio in fidem* and those that had not. The point of this approach is to determine whether there was any difference between the pattern of the breakdown of friendship in those relationships where Roman *fides* was explicitly engaged by the *deditio* ritual on the one hand, and those where surrender had not taken place, and *fides* was merely implicit in the initiation of the *fides*-based *amicitia* relationship on the other. This initial approach to the evidence will broaden out to encompass the pursuit of a set of interconnecting themes, many of them familiar from earlier chapters: the language used to describe friendship breakdown; the bilateral right of self-determination and sometimes conflicting interpretations of the relationship's obligations and constraints; the manner in which perceived *fides*-violators were treated by the Romans; the relative importance of ethnic kinship to the Romans, and the salience of Roman power in international friendship breakdown situations; the impact of this last factor on friendship asymmetries; and the impact of asymmetry on Rome's friends' arc of political possibility and freedom of action.

Because the necessary condition of *deditio* performance was the surrendering party's granting of full discretionary power to the Roman commander receiving it, such that the *dediticius* committed itself to doing whatever the Romans demanded, it is perhaps to be expected that any subsequent violation of this commitment – that is, *fides* – would instantly transform the relationship from friendship to enmity. It is appropriate to begin with a familiar example from the lower chronological limit of this study, the great Italian city of Capua in the rich and highly coveted *ager Campanus*, the history of whose relationship with Rome was often contentious – so much so that its severe punishment by Rome for disloyalty became a byword, in the minds of Rome's critics, for the Republic's brutal treatment of her

former friends and allies.⁹ Recall that Capua became a Roman *amicus* after performing *deditio* in 343 BC (above, pp. 122–27). Only a few years after this, according to the Livian tradition, the Campanians, in conjunction with Rome's Latin allies, betrayed the Romans and attacked their *amici*, the Samnites – “so much closer was the memory of the Samnite injury than the kindness of the Romans,” as Livy puts it in typically moralizing language (*adeo iniuriae Samnitium quam beneficii Romanorum memoria praesentior erat*: Livy 8.2.7). When Samnite envoys came to the senate in 341 to complain of joint Latin–Campanian aggression against them, the *patres* were reluctant to admit to their momentary inability to restrain the Latins (whose “equal treaty” with Rome – the Cassian treaty of 493 – allowed them to make war on whomever they wished), but agreed that they were obliged to order Capua to cease its attacks, since the city had entered Roman protection by surrender (*per deditionem in fidem uenissent*: 8.2.13). The senate's response, once it was reported at Capua, “alienated the Campanians with fear” (*responsum . . . Campanos metu abalienauit*: 8.3.1), but they nevertheless decided to continue their new war “against their preservers” (*aduersus seruatores suos*: 8.3.2) – note once again the highly morally charged language. Once they were defeated in battle, the Campanians were forced to surrender to the Romans (*deditionem*: 8.11.12). They were stripped of some of their territory – containing some of the richest land in Italy – which was then turned over to the Roman plebs; but the Campanian *equites*, which at the time were serving with the Roman legions, and had remained loyal to Rome, were granted honorary Roman citizenship and paid a stipend in perpetuity from a tax assessed on the rest of their fellow citizens. By 338, when the Latin revolt had been completely suppressed, all the Campani were granted Roman citizenship without the vote (*ciuitas sine suffragio*). The city of Capua itself was annexed to Rome, although it maintained its internal autonomy under the *de facto* leadership of the Campanian *equites*.¹⁰

⁹ Cf. the Achaean Lycortas' question to Ap. Claudius Pulcher on Rome's treatment of Capua after its recapture from Hannibal, quoted above (p. 211): “I don't ask about what you Romans did after Capua was captured . . . Did you not decapitate Campanian senators?” (*cur ego, quid Capua capta feceritis Romani non quaero . . . uos senatores Campani securi non percussistis?*: Livy 39.37.10–11); cf. also an embassy of Macedonians to the Aetolian League in 199 BC, attempting to persuade the Aetolians not to support Rome in its war against Philip V (Livy 31.29.10–11, quoted below, p. 268).

¹⁰ Seizure of Campanian territory: Livy 8.11.13; honorary citizenship for Campanian *equites*: Livy 8.11.15–16; discussion: Salmon 1982, 49, 163; Frederiksen 1984: 191–92; *ciuitas sine suffragio*: Livy 8.14.10; discussion: Salmon 1982: 79–80, 162–63, 165, 167; Frederiksen 1984: 192–98. The fact that Capua was annexed at this time should not be in doubt: see most conveniently Salmon 1982: 165–67 for references and arguments. For a larger, more general discussion of Roman–Campanian relations in this period, including a full account of the Latin revolt, see Oakley 1998: 393–571.

This pattern repeated itself a generation later. In 318 BC, civil strife broke out in Capua, and one of the factions involved requested that a Roman praetor be sent to the city in order to mediate the conflict. E.T. Salmon has argued that the political fragmentation of the community (a common problem in the Italian towns in this period) may indeed have been exacerbated by Rome's settlement of 338, which privileged the *equites* at the expense of the rest of the Campani. General discontent over Capua's subordinate status, effected by the annexation of 338, may also have been a factor.¹¹ The Campanian request for Roman intervention in 318 was granted, and soon after Roman prefects began to be sent to Capua on a regular basis. It was probably these men who uncovered rumors of Campanian disaffection a short time later, which Livy calls part of the "general disloyalty" (*omnia infida*: Livy 9.26.5) in the city. A Roman dictator was appointed to launch an investigation, and one tradition reports that the chief conspirators committed suicide out of fear of Roman reprisals. The pro-Roman *equites* were restored to primacy, and Capua to Roman *societas*.¹²

The Roman historiographical tradition's emphasis on Campanian faithlessness culminates, famously, in the city's defection to Hannibal in 216 BC, after the devastating Roman defeat at Cannae.¹³ In contrast to Salmon's rationalization of Campanian disaffection in the years around 318, the reasons for their defection in 216 are put in strictly moral terms by both Polybius and Livy, who argue that through a long period of prosperity (πλοῦτον: Polyb. 7.1.1; *longa felicitate atque indulgentia fortunae*: Livy 23.2.1) – always a perilous situation in the Greco-Roman aristocratic ideology (cf. Polybius' comments on Carthaginian enervation in the 150s: Polyb. 31.21.3, discussed below, p. 312) – Capua fell into decadence and luxury (τρυφήν καὶ πολυτέλειαν: Polyb. 7.1.1; *luxuriantem*: Livy 23.2.1). Livy also cites the general corruption and the license of the Campanian plebs, who enjoyed excessive freedom in this period (*corrupta omnia licentia plebis sine modo libertatem exercentis*: 23.2.1; cf. 23.4.4). A bane to aristocratic ideology, excessive freedom was precisely what Flaminius would warn the Greeks against when he took his leave of them in 194 (Livy 34.49.8,

¹¹ Salmon 1982: 49–50, 167.

¹² Praetor sent to Capua: Livy 9.20.5; praetor and prefects sent to Capua: Livy 9.20.5; Fest. 262 L; disaffection: Livy 9.25.2–3, 26.5; Diod. Sic. 19.76.3–5; dictator's investigation and suicides: Livy 9.26.6–7; Diod. Sic. 19.76.5; discussion: Frederiksen 1984: 228–30.

¹³ Sources: Polyb. 7.1; Livy 23.2–10; cf. Plut. *Fab.* 17.3; Diod. Sic. 26.10; Zonar. 9.2; discussion: Heuss 1933: 64–65, 74–75; Salmon 1967: 298–302; Dahlheim 1968: 16–17; Dorey and Dudley 1972: 74–79; Lazenby 1978: 112–15, 120–24; Frederiksen 1984: 238–63; Levene 2010: 224–25, 354–75.

discussed above, pp. 226–27).¹⁴ In the wake of Hannibal's success in 216, the Campanians began to disparage Roman power, and grew proud and faithless (*superbis atque infidelibus*: 23.4.8). This attitude was only exacerbated by an abject plea from the Roman consul, Terentius Varro, a survivor of the disaster at Cannae, that Rome's Campanian allies must now fight Hannibal on Rome's behalf since Rome herself was all but lost after her recent defeats. Livy reports that Varro told a delegation of Campanian aristocrats, "it would be wonderful if Roman power was retained and restored by your loyalty and by your resources" (*pulchrum erit, Campani, . . . Romanum imperium uestra fide, uestris uiribus retentum ac recuperatum esse*: 23.5.14). The Campanians only became more contemptuous of Roman power as a result of Varro's pleas for aid, and the Campanian plebs, under the influence of Pacuvius Calavius, a demagogic aristocrat (*nobilis idem ac popularis*: 23.2.2) and chief magistrate of Capua (*in summo magistratu*: 23.2.3), engineered a coup, handed the city over to Hannibal, and oversaw the slaughter of all Roman citizens in the city by having them corralled into the public baths and suffocated there.¹⁵

As soon as they were able, the Romans attacked Hannibal's troops in the area around Capua, established field superiority, and then sat down for a lengthy siege of the city. After two grueling years, the Romans finally broke through the city's walls. The Roman commanders stripped the citizens of their arms, threw the senators in chains, confiscated all their gold and silver, and sent the most anti-Roman of them to Teanum and Caeles, where they were imprisoned, and later scourged and beheaded. Most of the remainder of the Campanian citizenry was sold into slavery, and Campanian territory became *ager Romanus*, worked by the surviving population of resident aliens, freedmen, tradesmen, and craftsmen. The city government was also dismantled, and a Roman *praefectus* was henceforth sent out each year as a matter of course to administer justice. Livy believes that "the affairs of Capua were settled by a policy in every way praiseworthy" (*ita ad Capuam res compositae consilio ab omni parte laudabili*: 26.16.11), for the city was left untouched, while those most guilty of lack of *fides* had been punished swiftly and harshly. The historian adds that Hannibal could only acknowledge "what great power the Romans had in exacting punishment from

¹⁴ On the moral failings of the Campanians in Livy's causal sequence, see Levene 2010: 361–66; cf. 224–25.

¹⁵ Levene 2010: 354–59, 364 observes that in Livy's account, Pacuvius is an ambivalent figure: in his first appearance (Livy 23.2.3–7), he is depicted as fully responsible for causing the revolt while not behaving as if he is, but then (at Livy 23.8–9), he seems to oppose the revolt while at the same time accepting it and all it implies as an unintended consequence of his policy.

faithless allies" (*quanta uis in Romanis ad expetendas poenas ab infidelibus sociis*: 26.16.13).¹⁶

The history of Roman–Campanian relations shows a variety of Roman responses to violations of friendship, or more specifically, the *fides* that was engaged by the Campanians' original and subsequent *deditiones* to the Romans. Roman reprisals in the fourth century BC were harsh but discriminating, falling on those considered most deeply anti-Roman – a policy that remained in effect even after the defection of the city between 216 and 211, after which the resident aliens, freedmen, tradesmen, and craftsmen were permitted to remain on the *ager Campanus*. A year later the Roman senate finessed some of the details of the settlement: amongst other provisions, two pro-Roman Campanian women, Oppia and Cluvia, had their property and freedom restored; others had their property confiscated, and they and their families were sold into slavery (except for those daughters who had been married to outsiders before Capua came into Roman power); some Campanians were imprisoned pending judgment, while all the others were allowed to keep their movable property (excepting their horses and adult male slaves); all except those who worked with Hannibal were declared free, but were not allowed to be Roman citizens or have Latin status; and all who had been in Capua during the siege were expelled from the city and the *ager Campanus*, and resettled elsewhere (Livy 26.34). As Livy says, in the context of the settlement of the Latin revolt in 338, "rewards and punishments were meted out to each according to his just deserts" (*praemiis poenaeque pro cuiusque merito persolutis*: 8.12.11).¹⁷

The nature of the Roman–Campanian relationship, however, permits a more complex analysis, especially in light of Livy's comment that the Romans pursued a "policy in every way praiseworthy." The Romans' decision to punish the guilty with severity in 211 no doubt partly arose from their sense of moral outrage at how the ringleaders had chosen the worst possible time to revolt, after the Roman loss at Cannae, and targeted Roman citizens who were ultimately subjected to a particularly gruesome form of execution. But the harshness of Roman reprisals in the Campanian case was certainly also motivated by the sense of betrayal the Republic must have felt, particularly at the hands of the Campanian elite that oversaw the execution of Romans and the defection of Capua, a group that was especially privileged, enjoying Roman favor, protection, and hereditary Roman

¹⁶ Sources for the recovery of Capua: Livy 26.14.2, 14.6–16; App. *Hann.* 40–43; Zonar. 9.6.

¹⁷ On Livy's account and opinions of the Roman distribution of punishments after the fall of Capua, see Levene 2010: 370–75.

citizenship, as well as the right of intermarriage with the Romans (*ius conubium*). The ringleader of the revolt, Pacuvius Calavius, was himself actually related by marriage to the Roman noble families of the Appii Claudii and the Marcii Livii. Although some members of the pro-Roman Campanian elite and the families of the privileged Campanian *equites* tried to maintain their loyalty to Rome,¹⁸ sending a deputation to the consul Varro to ask for help against the anti-Roman faction, most of them were overcome either by the threats of Pacuvius and his party, or, less forgivably, by their contempt for the consul's abject pleas for help; indeed, one of the legates to Varro, Vibius Virrius, once he witnessed Varro's tears, quickly turned against the Romans, and persuaded the other members of the delegation to defect to Hannibal without much difficulty. After Hannibal took control of Capua, the Ninnii Celeres, a family distinguished by nobility and wealth (*nobilitate ac diuitiis*: Livy 23.8.1), invited the Carthaginian general to stay at their house.¹⁹

D.S. Levene has recently shown that the "causal sequence [in Livy's account of the revolt] makes sense only on the moral level."²⁰ The fury of Roman reprisals after the Capuan revolt, I would suggest, was triggered by the sense of moral outrage that the Romans usually felt when *amici* violated *fides*, made much worse not only by the blatant opportunism the citizens of Capua had displayed by abandoning the Romans when they were most desperately in need of friendly assistance, but especially by the defection of the chief supporters of Rome who enjoyed *civitas Romana* as well as *ius conubium* with the Romans – and thus were also their personal friends and family members as well. This is not to say that Rome's attitude towards and treatment of the Campanians were objectively appropriate; after all, as we have seen, Roman punishment of the Campanians in the Hannibalic War became the paradigm case, in the eyes of the Republic's enemies, for Roman cruelty. The Campanian perspective should also be considered: the Campanians were a very rich and fiercely proud people who, it should be recalled, shed bitter tears when the Romans told them that the only way

¹⁸ So Decius Magius actively opposed the defection of Capua, demonstrated against Hannibal's regime, and was deported to Carthage for his ongoing loyalty to Rome (Livy 23.7.4–12, 10.3–13); and 300 of the Capuan *equites* who were loyally serving with the legions in Sicily at the time of the revolt were given full Roman citizenship, and later citizenship at Cumae in order that they might escape the punishment that would be meted out to their fellow Campanians in the future (Livy 23.31.10).

¹⁹ *Civitas Romana* and *ius conubium*: Livy 23.4.7, 5.9; Pacuvius' connections to the Appii Claudii and the Marcii Livii: Livy 23.2.6; pro-Roman faction's delegation: Livy 23.4.8; pro-Romans intimidated by Pacuvius: Livy 23.4.2–3; Virrius' defection and delegation to Hannibal: Livy 23.6.1–5; Ninnii Celeres: Livy 23.8.1. J. von Ungern-Sternberg 1975: 24–62 is the best account of the internal factional struggles in Capua ca. 216 BC.

²⁰ Levene 2010: 365.

they could secure Roman protection against the Samnites in 343 BC was by surrendering themselves and all they possessed to Rome (above, p. 125). They no doubt chafed under the treatment they received from the Romans as *dediticii* – so different from the Latins, whose revolt against Rome the Campanians joined in 341, and who enjoyed greater autonomy down to 338 by virtue of their *foedus aequum* with Rome.

Does the Campanian example suggest, therefore, that Rome's Italian *dediticii* were held to a higher standard of loyalty than those, such as the Latins, who had not performed *deditio*, and that they deserved much harsher reprisals for perceived betrayals of *fides*? Or is the Campanian example a special case arising from the fact that Capua was Rome's closest regional competitor in terms of wealth, territory, and population in southern Italy? Clearly the Campanian case needs to be tested against others to draw any firm conclusions. All that can be safely concluded for the moment is that violations of good faith by Capua, a city that had performed *deditio* to Rome and thus engaged the Republic's *fides*, were consistently met with appropriate and symmetrical responses – responses that may be considered harsh (the decapitation of individual Campanians) but fair (the privileging of those who remained loyal to Rome).

Some light may be shed by a comparison with Rome's earliest experiences of the Celtiberian peoples of Spain during the Hannibalic War. Cases of *fides*-violation – on both sides – abound here, but, as was seen in [Chapter 3](#) (above, pp. 153–54), matters are complicated considerably by such factors as the ongoing presence of the Carthaginian enemy in the peninsula and Spain's status as a Roman province, and thus *terra Romana*, while at the same time being, in a very real sense and from the Roman perspective, “outer space,” and thus *terra incognita*. One case in particular will be instructive, not only for how these complications played out in the Spanish theater during the Second Punic War, but also for Roman and native Celtiberian moral expectations.²¹ In 209 BC, two powerful chieftains of the Ilergetes, Mandonius and Indibilis, defected from the Carthaginian side, pledged their loyalty to Scipio (*fides accepta*), and made a treaty with the commander (*foedere*: Livy 27.17.17). A few years later in 206, however, when Scipio fell ill and rumors circulated that he was dead, resulting in mutiny among the Roman legions, Indibilis and Mandonius seized the opportunity to pursue their own imperialist agenda against Rome's other Spanish *amici* (Livy 28.24–29). When Scipio recovered, the mutiny lost its

²¹ On what follows, see Bernhardt 1975: 418; Lazenby 1978: 152–54; Richardson 1986: 53–54; Eckstein 1987a: 225–26, 228–31; Baronowski 1990: 359–60; Richardson 1996: 33, 35–40; Levene 2010: 346–54.

momentum, and the Roman commander began preparing his troops for a campaign of revenge against the Celtiberian chiefs. Livy reports that Scipio informed his men that he looked forward to the slaughter of Ilergetes “with joy and high spirits” (*laeto et erecto animo*: 28.32.4), for they were not “born in the same land or bound to himself by any alliance,” as the rebel legionaries were, but “their only bond to him was one of loyalty and friendship” (*non enim eos neque natos in eadem terra nec ulla secum societate iunctos esse; eam quae sola fuerit fidei atque amicitiae*: 28.32.5). In Livy’s account of the speech, Scipio also repeatedly characterizes the Ilergete violation of *amicitia* and *fides* as a crime, or an action performed by criminals (*scelus, scelerata defectio, hominibus scelestis*: 28.32.5, 11, 12). Regardless of whether the speech is authentic, Livy’s Roman readership is expected to agree with this highly emotionally charged description of *fides*-violation.²²

Scipio then led his armies against the Ilergetes, and soundly defeated them in pitched battle (Livy 28.33; App. *Hisp.* 37). Indibilis sent his brother, Mandonius, to Scipio to beg for mercy and forgiveness; Mandonius, referencing the Ilergetes’ first *deditio* to Rome, promised that the Ilergetes “would return their life to the same P. Scipio from whom they had received it, or, having been spared a second time, would devote their life to the one man to whom they owed it, forever and on his behalf” (*reddant spiritum P. Scipioni ab eodem illo acceptum, aut seruati bis uni debitam uitam pro eo in perpetuum deuoueant*: Livy 28.34.5). Livy clarifies this rather baroque description of the stark choice facing a commander receiving *deditio*:

mos uetustus erat Romanis, cum quo nec foedere nec aequis legibus iungeretur amicitia, non prius imperio in eum tamquam pacatum uti quam omnia diuina humanaque dedidisset, obsides accepti, arma adempta, praesidia urbibus imposita forent.

It was the ancient custom among the Romans in cases where friendship was established neither by treaty nor on equal terms not to exercise power over him as a conquered enemy until all his possessions, human and divine, had been surrendered, hostages given, arms confiscated, and garrisons placed in their cities. (Livy 28.34.7)

This would seem to conform to the pattern of expectations arising from *deditio*, as discussed in [Chapter 3](#). On this occasion, however, after harshly attacking the Ilergete chieftains in words, Scipio decided that “although Mandonius and Indibilis both deserved to die because of their wicked

²² Mandonius and Indibilis come over to Scipio: Livy 27.17.3, 9–17; cf. Dio fr. 57.42; attack Rome’s amici: Livy 28.24.2–4; cf. Polyb. 11.29.3; Zonar. 9.10; App. *Hisp.* 37; Scipio’s address to his troops: Livy 28.32.

crime, he would overwhelm them with his own kindness and that of the Roman people.” He demanded from them neither hostages nor arms (nor, apparently, a further formal *deditio*), but only pay for his soldiers. The Roman commander also issued a stern warning: the Ilergetes could keep their weapons and men so that if they revolted again, they would experience for themselves savage reprisals; it was entirely up to them, who had experience of both, whether they preferred the Romans to be favorable or wrathful.²³

The Ilergete chieftains’ renewed loyalty to the Roman cause was short-lived, however, for in 205 BC, when Scipio left Spain, and was replaced by L. Cornelius Lentulus and L. Manlius Acidinus, they revolted again, thinking that Scipio’s departure left them free to act. They believed, so the sources say, that Scipio’s withdrawal meant that they could now aspire to full independence, since the Romans had no more generals left to send who were worthy of Scipio’s virtue, or armies that were as experienced as his. Indibilis and Mandonius began by inciting the Ilergetes, Ausetani, and other Spanish peoples to revolt. Although the Romans at first held back from attacking the Ausetani, and tried to negotiate with the Ilergetes, matters eventually came to a head in a pitched battle, which resulted in the death of Indibilis, and the surrender of the ringleaders of the rebellion, including Mandonius, who was promptly executed. The rebels were then allowed to perform another *deditio* to the Romans. Thirty communities of the Ilergetes were ordered to hand over cash, grain, supplies, as well as hostages, and pro-Roman Ilergetes were put in charge of political affairs (Livy 29.1.19–3.5; App. *Hisp.* 38).

Some aspects of the foregoing account of Rome’s troubled relations deserve closer attention. Not surprisingly, Scipio explicitly characterizes the first Ilergete rebellion as a violation of both *amicitia* and *fides*, concepts so closely linked that they are used virtually as synonyms in the Roman commander’s speech to his men at Livy 28.32. A portion of the speech, however, embodies a seeming paradox: on the one hand Scipio argues that the treachery of Mandonius and Indibilis amounts to “criminal” behavior, and yet he also suggests that their friendship with Rome is somehow a lesser bond than those of blood and alliance. It might be tempting to see here the

²³ *Scipio multis inuectus in praesentem Mandonium absentemque Indibilem uerbis, illos quidem merito perisse ipsorum maleficio ait, uicturos suo atque populi Romani beneficio. Ceterum se neque arma iis adempturum <neque obsides imperaturum> – quippe ea pignera timentium rebellionem esse: se libera arma relinquere, solutos animos – neque [se] in obsides innoxios sed in ipsos, si defecerint, saeuaturum, nec ab inermi sed ab armato hoste poenas expetiturum. utramque fortunam expertis permittere sese utrum propitios an iratos habere Romanos mallent* (Livy 28.34.8–10; cf. App. *Hisp.* 37).

mask of Roman politeness momentarily slipping, and the moral cover for aggressive Roman behavior and sharp practice temporarily blown. Such a reading, however, makes little sense given the link Scipio makes between the blood ties and bonds of alliance – both of which, he implies, are more constraining. As we have recently seen in the case of the Latin–Campanian joint revolt against Rome, allies with treaties by definition enjoyed greater freedom of action than those whose *amicitia* was established by *deditio*. Clearly Scipio's phrases, *natos in eadem terra* and *secum societate iunctos*, are meant to be read very closely together – almost as hendiadys – and refer to the Roman citizen and Italian auxiliary units of Scipio's legionary army; after all, as we have seen (above, p. 180), Scipio was particularly reluctant to use native troops in his Spanish campaigns. So the contrast here is more precisely between the ties that bind blood kin (broadly conceived to cover all Italians) to each other, and those that bind foreign *amici* to Rome. This is by no means a denigration of the *amicitia* bond or the bond of *fides* – after all, Scipio uses strong language (“criminal” and its cognates) to characterize those who would violate them; rather, this is a simple statement of fact: as was seen in Chapter 2, the bond of friendship, *qua* a voluntary and achieved relationship, is weaker than the ascribed tie of kinship.

Scipio's strong emotional language at Livy 28.32, however, indicates that Roman anger at those who would violate *fides* and *amicitia* was proportionally greater the less secure, and hence more anxiety-inducing the ties that bound; as was seen in Chapter 2 (above, pp. 39–40), the sacrifice of some measure of personal autonomy and self-sufficiency by the act of entrusting to a potential friend (on the basis of no guarantee that an equivalent quality of trust would be returned, or even the possibility that he would be repaid with hostility rather than gratitude) was a tremendous source of anxiety for the proud, supremely status-conscious Roman aristocrat, and Seneca, for one, knew well that fierce anger and sweet revenge were appropriate responses to perceived betrayals of trust. Of course, the authenticity of Scipio's speech at Livy 28.32 cannot be proven, but this is less important than the fact that it reflects, precisely, the ancient theoretical understanding of the consequences of *fides*-betrayal. Whether Scipio ever spoke these words, then, matters less than Livy's audience's normative-cultural expectation – that violations of *fides* and *amicitia* bordered on criminal behavior, and that cruel vengeance was a suitable response, as indeed Scipio apparently promised Mandonius and Indibilis should they revolt again (*saevitutum . . . poenas expetiturum . . . iratos*).

The Roman–Ilergete interactions of these years are also noteworthy in the present context since they touch on a theme explored in the previous

two chapters: the entitlement of both parties in a friendship to freedom of choice and self-determination, including the bilateral right to interpret the relationship as each wishes. As we have seen, in 205 BC the *amicitia* with Mandonius and Indibilis broke down, from the Roman point of view at least, because of Ilergete misunderstanding and misinterpretation not so much of the obligations of friendship, but over to whom exactly those obligations were owed. Believing that their relationship was with the warlord Scipio alone (whom they – and other Spanish tribesmen – once tried to acknowledge as their king²⁴), the Ilergete chiefs simply assumed the bond was broken when Scipio and his veteran troops withdrew from Spain. According to Livy, Indibilis believed that “Scipio was the only Roman general left, the rest having been killed by Hannibal, and that only the names of Roman commanders were now being sent to Spain” (*eum [sc. Scipionem] superesse unum ducem Romanis ceteris ab Hannibale interfectis . . . nomina tantum ducum in Hispania Romani habeant*: 29.I.20–21); he also misconstrued the replacement of Scipio’s veteran army with a leaderless throng of raw recruits (*inconditam turbam tironum*: 29.I.22) as an implicit Roman invitation to the Spanish tribes to take back their liberty. The (mis)interpretation by the Ilergetes of the precise nature of their relationship with Rome (that is, friendship with a particular Roman – whom they further misconstrued as a king – rather than with the Roman state in the abstract), and of the nature and structure of Roman state institutions (*prouvinciae*, republican government, rotating magisterial appointments) – as was indeed their prerogative as *amici* – led directly to the breakdown of the Roman–Ilergete friendship in 205. In fact, this is one of the few clear instances in the ancient record where the concept of *amicitia* between abstract entities, that is, states, resulted in misunderstanding by a foreign *amicus*; Scipio’s attempt to correct the misunderstanding – he told Edeco, the chief of the Edetani who similarly erred, *non sum rex sed imperator*, in effect (Polyb. 10.40.5) – also shows that the Romans took pains to prevent conceptual slippage between individuals as friends and states as friends.

Despite their misconceptions on the finer points of the relationship, and about the nature and functioning of the Roman state, however, the Spanish tribesmen never misconstrued the basic nature of the relationship itself. As the stories of Scipio, Allucius, and the Spanish captives discussed in [Chapter 2](#), of Edeco and Scipio discussed in [Chapter 3](#), and of Mandonius and Indibilis discussed here all demonstrate beyond doubt,

²⁴ Polyb. 10.38.3; cf. 10.40.2–3 (Edeco); Livy 27.19.2–6; Zonar. 9.8.

the chieftains of these tribes and the elite families beneath them were completely familiar with the protocols, gestures, attitudes, and behaviors associated with friendship and its complex processes. Gift, counter-gift, mutual pledges of *fides*, competitive escalation of favors, status-anxiety, equalization strategies – all of these were practiced by the Romans and their Spanish *amici* automatically and instinctively during their early diplomatic interactions.

Finally, something should be said about the Roman response to Ilergete violations of loyalty and trust. What is truly remarkable here is that Rome's response was not overly severe either in 206 or 205 BC – or not as severe as it deserved to be, at least in Scipio's view.²⁵ In the first case, despite Scipio's fulminations about "criminal" Ilergete behavior, after defeating them in battle, the Roman general merely reprimanded the survivors and demanded only pay for his soldiers. In 205, the Romans once again defeated Ilergete rebels in battle, and despite Scipio's earlier threat that if they revolted again they would suffer the full savage violence of Roman vengeance, the surviving Ilergetes were left unharmed except for those most responsible for the revolt. Indeed, before putting down the second revolt, the Roman commanders were careful to avoid devastating the country of the rebellious Ausetani as they marched through it, and then tried negotiation with the Ilergetes – even though they were known to be the instigators of the revolt. Of course it was politically necessary to adopt an attitude of mildness and clemency in Spain in this period, when Roman control was by no means well established and the Carthaginians had only recently been expelled from the peninsula. But, just as in the cases of the reprisals that followed the Campanian revolt of 341 and the betrayal of Capua to Hannibal in 216, Scipio took pains in 205 to isolate and punish only those of the Spanish tribesmen most responsible for inducing their people to violate their *fides* with Rome. This surely deserves emphasis as a measured response to betrayals of *fides* and *amicitia* – especially when all of the individual Roman aristocrat's cultural instincts and normative practices tended to encourage a much more violent response. Once again, the anger-restraining element of *fides* governing the *deditio* ritual that established friendship in the first place proved a durable guarantee of mercy even after *fides* had been violated.

²⁵ This is not to say that Scipio was above committing atrocities in Spain; cf. Livy 28.19–23 for the horrific and indiscriminate slaughter of the people of Iliturgi in 206 BC (as revenge not only for that town's defection to the Carthaginians, but also its citizens' "crime" [Livy 28.19.2, 7] of slaughtering the refugees from the defeat of the Scipios in 211).

Our next case can amplify these points, and reveal the constitutive effects of Roman treatment of *fides*-violators. Demetrius of Pharos, having surrendered himself, Pharos, and Corcyra to Rome in the earliest phases of the First Illyrian War, was rewarded at the war's end with control over "the greater part of the Illyrians" (τοὺς πλείστους . . . τῶν Ἰλλυριῶν: Polyb. 2.11.17), largely at the expense of the Illyrian king, Pinnes, and his regent, Teuta.²⁶ By the late 220s BC, Demetrius was wreaking havoc all up and down the Adriatic coast of Greece with impunity, until in 220, in company with another Illyrian dynast, Scerdilaidas, he made a piratical naval expedition south of the Lissus (Polyb. 3.16.3; 4.16.6), thus raising the specter of Agron's and Teuta's predatory raiding on Roman shipping in the late 230s. Demetrius was now in technical violation of the terms of the peace treaty Rome had sworn with Teuta in 228, and the Roman declaration of war duly followed.²⁷

According to Polybius, however, the Romans declared war on Demetrius for two reasons, one strategic, and one moral: the Romans needed to secure their position on Italy's eastern flank (Polyb. 3.16.1, 4) against a prospering Macedonian kingdom (3.16.4), and in anticipation of an impending clash with Carthage over Saguntum (3.16.1, 7), and they thought it appropriate to punish Demetrius for his ingratitude and rashness (3.16.2, 4). The strategic considerations, in Polybius' account, are a muddle. In the first place, because his narrative of the Second Illyrian War at 3.16 appears as a mere digression to the main story, the worsening relations between Rome and Hannibal over Saguntum, narrated at 3.15, the historian at first gives the impression that the impending war with Carthage compelled the Romans to action against Demetrius; later, however, at 3.16.4–7, Polybius seems to say that Roman plans for making war on Demetrius were already in train, but then had to be accelerated after word came that Saguntum had fallen to Hannibal. The latter causative sequence is probably to be preferred since Polybius states quite clearly that the Romans "had been convinced

²⁶ Derow 2003: 53 accuses Polybius of exaggerating the generosity of Rome's rewards to Demetrius (Polyb. 2.11; cf. App. *Ill.* 8) in order to highlight the king's later ingratitude.

²⁷ Violation of the treaty, 220 BC: Polyb. 3.16.3; 4.16.6 (explicit); terms of the treaty of 228: Polyb. 2.12.3. I assume here that the breach is factual, rather than apologia that Polybius has unthinkingly exported from his pro-Roman source(s), and that Demetrius was bound by the conditions of the treaty of 228, although it was agreed to by his predecessor as regent of the Ardiaei, Teuta. Discussion of these and other issues, and of the Second Illyrian War generally: Holleaux 1935: 130–39; Fine 1936: 34–36; Badian 1952a: 81–88; Walbank 1957: 324–26; Badian 1958a: 46–47; Will 1967: 66–70; Hammond 1968: 10–15; Dell 1970; Petzold 1971: 211–13; Errington 1971: 102–08; Gruen 1984: 368–73; Cabanes 1988: 287–89; Wilkes 1992: 163–64; Coppola 1993: 85–100; Eckstein 1994a; Feig Vishnia 1996: 42–43; Derow 2003: 54; Eckstein 2008: 60–76; Dzino 2010: 51–52.

that they could [punish Demetrius] in good time" (πεπεισμένοι κατατ-αχῆσιν: 3.16.4), but Hannibal "anticipated" (κατετάχῃσε: 3.16.5) them by taking Saguntum.²⁸ The sequence of tenses here between the pluperfect participle, πεπεισμένοι, and the perfect indicative verb, κατετάχῃσε, seems to indicate that the Romans' confidence that they could punish Demetrius came before the fall of Saguntum.²⁹ And, as Walbank pointed out, Hannibal had not yet even begun to attack Saguntum when Roman armies were dispatched to Illyria in spring 219 BC.³⁰

As for the second strategic reason for the declaration of war on Demetrius – Roman concern over the prosperity of Macedon – this has been the source of considerable controversy for some time. Maurice Holleaux saw no good reason to dispute it, especially in light of the fact that Demetrius had fought on the side of Antigonos Doson against Cleomenes of Sparta in the Sellasia campaign of 222 BC (cf. 2.65.4), and that for this reason, according to Polybius, in 220 Demetrius was "pinning all his hopes on the royal house of Macedon" (πάσας δ' ἔχοντα τὰς ἐλπίδας ἐν τῇ Μακεδόνων οἰκίᾳ: 3.16.3).³¹ Others have disputed this claim, however, on the basis that 220/219 is simply far too early for Macedon to be on Rome's radar, that Macedon under its new 17-year-old king, Philip V, was not a very stable kingdom for Demetrius to pin his hopes on at this time, and that Polybius' analysis is infected by *ex post facto* apologia derived from his pro-Roman sources.³² It might be pointed out in response, however, that there is nothing inherently implausible about Rome being concerned with one of the three major (and aggressive) Hellenistic kingdoms of the period, especially one that bordered on a sphere – Illyria – in which Rome now had a significant strategic interest; that Macedon under the new leadership of a vigorous teenage king may have seemed a greater rather than a lesser threat – especially if Philip V was already advertising his links to the house of the world-conquering Macedonian Argeads (the family of Philip II and Alexander the Great);³³ and finally, it is always dangerous to argue that a

²⁸ For the different translations of κατατάχῃω here, see LSJ, s.v., II (Polyb. 3.16.5), II.2 (Polyb. 3.16.4).

²⁹ Polybius' attribution to Demetrius of contempt for Rome because of the dangers she faced first from the Celts and now from Carthage (Polyb. 3.16.2 cf. App. *Ill.* 8; Dio fr. 53 = Zonar. 8.20.11) has no independent value as evidence for the causative sequence – except insofar as its very weakness as evidence gives the lie to Polybius' very similar (implied) first causative sequence, in which the confrontation with Hannibal causes the war against Demetrius.

³⁰ Walbank 1957: 327–28; cf. Errington 1971: 106; Eckstein 1994a: 49; 2008: 63.

³¹ Holleaux 1935: 131–46.

³² Badian 1952a: 86; Errington 1971: 103–06; Gruen 1984: 370; Eckstein 2008: 62–66, 71.

³³ Walbank 1993. Walbank argues that Polybius' use of ἡ Μακεδόνων οἰκία – as at Polyb. 3.16.3 – is a coded reference to both the Antigonid and Argead houses, and we know that Philip invoked

historian as careful and critical of others for such failings as Polybius would unthinkingly reproduce the fictions and biases of his sources.

Fortunately, for our purposes, the issue of Macedon in Rome's calculus in 220 BC matters little because it, along with Rome's ongoing war with the Celts and the impending one with Carthage, is, in Polybius' analysis, subsumed under the larger, more important – and explicitly moral – reason for the declaration of war on Demetrius. Polybius, in fact, bookends the specific charges against Demetrius between two moralizing comments, one his own, and one attributed to the Romans. The historian himself condemns Demetrius for being “forgetful of earlier benefits conferred upon him by the Romans” (ἐπιλεησμένον μὲν τῶν προγεγονότων εἰς αὐτὸν εὐεργετημάτων ὑπὸ Ῥωμαίων: 3.16.2), and for being “contemptuous” (καταπεφρονηκότα: 3.16.2) of the Republic's current difficulties in its war with the Celts, and in her impending conflict with Carthage. The Roman senators, for their part, wished to punish Demetrius for his “ingratitude and rashness” (ἀχαριστίαν καὶ προπέτειαν: 3.16.4), and to correct the Illyrians' “mistake” (ἄγνοια) – all of this evidently before consideration of the Carthaginian situation entered their calculus, as was argued above. In this context, ἄγνοια has similar moralizing connotations to the “error difficult to defend” that, as we have seen (above, p. 131), so vexed the senate when debating whether to take up the Mamertine appeal for an alliance in 264.³⁴ A late and otherwise problematic source concurs with the Polybian analysis: the Romans chastised Demetrius for abusing his friendship (φιλία: Dio fr. 53 = Zonar. 8.20.11). This same source, for what it is worth, says in addition that the Roman consuls gave Demetrius one last chance to repair the breach. If Dio/Zonaras is to be trusted, then, Rome once again displayed its inclination to stay its own hand against a friend who violated *fides*,³⁵ which is of course why the moral aspects of Demetrius' informal Roman *amicitia* receive greater emphasis in the sources than do the terms of the Illyrian peace treaty of 228 (which is never mentioned by either side), or the Romans' own political-strategic calculus.

his kinship to Philip II and Alexander the Great as early as 218 BC (Polyb. 5.10.10). Coppola 1993: 149–64 argues that Demetrius of Pharos was crucial in stoking Philip's ambitions, but it is unlikely that the Macedonian needed encouraging.

³⁴ LSJ, s.v., on Polyb. 27.2.2, where ἄγνοια = “mistaken conduct” or “mistake.”

³⁵ On the Dio–Zonaras passage, see Eckstein 2008: 69. Although, as Eckstein argues, this is a classic instance of “compellence diplomacy” (whereby nonnegotiable demands are issued, resulting in an escalation of hostile actions), the passage also shows, as Eckstein himself allows, that the Romans' insistence on *iustum bellum* was exceptionally self-restraining behavior in the Mediterranean anarchy of the period (above, pp. 77, 121).

Thus, the IR Realist explanation for the Second Illyrian War – that Demetrius “had grown over-powerful,” broke the treaty of 228 BC, and as a result endangered Roman security in the prevailing violent anarchy of the Mediterranean³⁶ – seems less important to our ancient sources than the moral explanation – as indeed a Constructivist reading would expect. If the Realist explanation were the correct one, then why did Rome not act the first time Demetrius breached the Lissus line, in 222, when he brought troops to support Antigonus Doson in his Sellasia campaign against Cleomenes of Sparta?³⁷ Rome’s preoccupation with the Celtic War may perhaps account for Roman inaction in 222, but it cannot account for their vigorous response in 219, when, as we have seen (above, p. 240), they were still dealing with the Celtic threat. The simplest explanation is that in 222, Demetrius was acting in the capacity of an ally and friend to Antigonus – as was his prerogative as the leader of an independent state. Roman *amicitia*, even backed up by the terms of an existing peace treaty, was apparently no obstacle to Demetrius conducting an independent foreign policy in the region. In 220, however, he was acting in his capacity as a pirate chieftain – a less elevated, morally suspect occupation, evocative of Teuta’s actions in the late 230s, and thus deserving of Rome’s attention, moral censure, and correction. Once again, the moral construction of the *amicitia* relationship makes better sense of the evidence than can a strictly Realist reading.

It could be argued, however, as indeed Ernst Badian does, that these moral violations were the sins of an ungrateful client rather than a friend, and arose from Demetrius’ “misunderstanding of a peculiarly Roman category of social and political thought.”³⁸ As was seen earlier, Badian ascribes a similar confusion to Masgaba in his debate with the Roman senate in 168 BC (above, pp. 112–13), but as in that case, so here, the fact that there was any difference of opinion at all indicates that the relationship is more properly construed as *amicitia*, which allows for such conflicting interpretations, as opposed to *clientela*, which credits only one side – the patron – with the right to interpret obligations. Demetrius, in other words, understood the situation – and the nature of his relationship with Rome – perfectly well. The chief purpose of international *amicitia*, as indeed of Hellenistic φίλια, was to secure as much response-flexibility as possible for the partners during times of crisis; and, as was demonstrated in greater detail in the previous chapter, by this time small states and powers in the Greek East were used

³⁶ Eckstein 2008: 75. ³⁷ Polyb. 2.65.4, with Gruen 1984: 371.

³⁸ Badian 1952a: 82; cf. 1958a: 46–47; Holleaux 1935: 132; Petzold 1971: 212; Errington 1971: 107–08.

to testing the limits of political possibility imposed by the great Hellenistic kingdoms of Macedon, Syria, and Egypt. The testing of those limits in his Roman *amicitia* by Demetrius of Pharos throughout the 220s, coupled with Rome's apparent indifference to Illyrian affairs for most of that decade – to say nothing of the fact that the diplomacy of 229 issued, explicitly, in relations of *amicitia* – strongly suggest that the international politics of friendship, not *clientela*, presided over Rome's earliest relationships across the Adriatic.

That the Romans themselves viewed matters in these terms is apparent from the sequel to the Second Illyrian War. Demetrius was to spend the rest of his life as an exile from his kingdom at the court of Philip V (Polyb. 3.19.8). The impregnable and dangerous stronghold of Pharos was razed to the ground, apparently (3.19.12), but soon revived.³⁹ But what of Demetrius' associate, Scerdilaidas, with whom the Illyrian king sailed south of the Lissus line in 220? No punishment for him appears in the record. In fact, what little we do know of Scerdilaidas suggests the Romans were completely unconcerned with his role in the breach of the treaty of 228. Scerdilaidas remained comfortably on his Illyrian throne after Demetrius lost his kingdom, and even sailed south of the Lissus again, in 218, with fifteen warships in support of Philip V (Polyb. 5.4.3). No Roman reprisals followed, not so much because Rome was now preoccupied with her war with Hannibal,⁴⁰ but more likely for the same reason Demetrius had been given a free pass to sail south of the Lissus in 222 to support Antigonos Doson; that is, it was Scerdilaidas' prerogative as an independent ruler to conduct his own foreign policy (the fact that he was not a Roman *amicus* put him in an even stronger position of autonomy vis-à-vis Rome in 218 than Demetrius in 222). Scerdilaidas continued to intrigue on behalf of and against Philip V, eventually securing Roman help (and *amicitia*, presumably) against the king in 216 (Polyb. 5.110.8), and an invitation, in 211, along with his son Pleuratus, to join the Roman–Aetolian alliance as *amici* (Livy 26.24.9). Pleuratus, probably having inherited *amicitia* with Rome from his father, is found among the signatories to the Peace of Phoenice in 205 on the Roman side (Livy 29.12.14), and later went on to fight on Rome's side against Philip in the Second Macedonian War.⁴¹

³⁹ Pharos is mentioned as a going concern in the treaty between Hannibal and Philip V in 215 BC (Polyb. 7.9.13); this coheres well with the content of the Pharos inscriptions, which point to a revival of the fortunes of the city after a period of "disturbance and death" (discussed above, pp. 136–39).

⁴⁰ As Eckstein 2008: 73. ⁴¹ Cf. Livy 31.28.1–2, 34.6, 38.7, 40.10.

All of this is to demonstrate that had Demetrius' treaty breach been the specific issue that so annoyed the Romans in 220, then surely Scerdilaidas and the cities under his control, like Demetrius and his stronghold of Pharos, would also have been punished in some fashion when the war ended in 219. What accounts for the difference in treatment? The answer, I would suggest, is *amicitia*. Demetrius was punished not because he violated a treaty, but because he was a Roman *amicus* who violated a treaty; Scerdilaidas, by contrast, was not a Roman *amicus*, and violated the treaty with impunity. As in the case of the Spanish tribes and the Campanians discussed earlier, Roman discretion in punishing the worst offenders of *fides* – in this case Demetrius, whose status as a friend made his treaty breach more morally outrageous than Scerdilaidas' – is an indication of Rome's self-restraint, and interest in containing violence rather than indiscriminately spreading or extending it. But the more important point is that the Romans looked at other states not through the lens of treaty clauses and legal statutes, but through the moralizing filter of *amicitia* and its obligations. And in this case, at least, Rome's decision to punish Demetrius arose just as much, or if my reading of Polybius 3.16 is correct, perhaps more, from moral outrage than an IR Realist-style security-seeking calculus.

Some preliminary conclusions may be drawn from the three cases dealt with thus far. The same pattern of repeated perceived betrayals of *fides* dominates the story of Rome's relations with the Campanians, the Spanish Ilergetes, and Demetrius of Pharos, the same moralizing language of *fides*-violation dominates our various accounts of their friendship breakdowns, and their relations are frequently normalized and restored through *deditio*, or the imposition of new conditions. More remarkable are the detailed correspondences, such as Rome's attempt to discriminate between leaders, followers, and the innocent in meting out punishment for disloyalty. At Capua, on various occasions, the Campanian *equites*, resident aliens, freedmen, tradesmen, and craftsmen benefited from Roman preferential treatment. In the case of the revolt of the Spanish Ilergetes in 205 BC, Mandonius and the ringleaders were rounded up and executed – like the decapitated Campanians in 211 – while their followers were allowed to perform *deditio*, thus reengaging Rome's *fides* and securing their survival. In the case of the Second Illyrian War in 219, the non-*amicus* Scerdilaidas was allowed to go scot-free, while Rome's *amicus*, Demetrius, lived out his years in exile, and Pharos was razed to the ground.

The similarities should not be pushed too far, however. As Scipio's distinction between the bonds uniting Roman-Italian blood kin and those

uniting Rome to its foreign *amici* makes clear, there was a significant difference, in the Roman mind, between the kinds of punishment an Italian *dediticius* who had broken faith should receive, and what was appropriate for a non-Italian *dediticius* to suffer in similar circumstances. Roman reprisals after the first Iltergete revolt in 206 BC were relatively minor (defeat in battle, followed by a warning and some financial compensation) compared to the treatment received by Capua after its first revolt in 338 (defeat in battle, followed by confiscation of territory for the majority of the population and annexation of their land). The story repeats in the second pair of revolts. After defeat in battle in 205, the rebel Iltergete ringleaders were rounded up and executed, and a portion of the Iltergete towns had to surrender money, grain, supplies, and hostages, and accept pro-Roman leaders. In 211, the Campanians lost their civic identity entirely, most of them lost their freedom, and some of them lost their heads; the city was left an empty shell, “headless, without senate, without people, without magistrates, a monstrosity, more cruelly left to be lived in than if it had been completely destroyed,” according to a professedly disgusted Macedonian ambassador to Aetolia in 199 (*urbs trunca sine senatu, sine plebe, sine magistratibus, prodigium, relictæ crudelius habitanda quam si delecta foret*: Livy 31.29.11). It should not be forgotten, moreover, that as early as 318 the Campanians had already been formally subjected to Roman judicial investigations on a permanent basis, culminating in a Roman dictatorship, a wave of suicides of some anti-Roman Campanian politicians, and the forcible installation of a pro-Roman political establishment.

Finally, it cannot yet be determined, on the basis of the investigation thus far, whether the difference in treatment that an *amicus* of Rome received after the friendship broke down was informed by a state’s status as *dediticius* or non-*dediticius*; nor, obviously, did the Romans apply some sort of objective litmus test for egregious faithlessness in any of the Campanian, the Iltergete, or Illyrian cases. Is ethnicity a factor? Scipio seems to imply this in his speech at Livy 28.32.5: the Romans have a stronger bond with Italians than with foreigners, and so may treat *fides*-violations by each group differently. But the distinction Scipio draws here has more to do with the Roman emotional involvement in the punishment than with ethnicity *per se*: it is delightful to punish foreigners (by definition strangers), not so happy a task to kill one’s own kin and comrades, which Scipio likens to a knife thrust into his own chest accompanied by groaning and tears (*tum se haud secus viscera secantem sua cum gemitu et lacrimis*: Livy 28.32.4).

The more crucial factor, as IR Realists might acknowledge, may be the salience of Roman power. Rome’s *imperium* in Spain was precarious after

the deaths of Scipio's uncle and father in 211 BC until the Carthaginian evacuation ca. 206, and remained tenuous thereafter – hence Scipio's conciliatory policy with all and sundry among the tribes, even the most unreliable, from 209 onwards. In the case of the Second Illyrian War, the Romans had a concurrent war on with the Celts in Italy, and by the time of Demetrius' final defeat, may even have been able to anticipate a war with Carthage over Saguntum – to say nothing over their growing concern over Macedonian prosperity under a vigorous, new young king. In Italy, by contrast, Rome had grown used to having her Italian allies obey her *imperium* over the course of many centuries, and even in the darkest early days of the Hannibalic War, expected firm loyalty from them. Here it is useful to recall Polybius' observation, quoted in [Chapter 2](#) (above, p. 82), that by the time of Pyrrhus' invasion, the Romans regarded Italy as their own private property, and accordingly pounced on anyone who challenged their supremacy there. Provisionally, then, the most we can conclude on the basis of this comparative survey of three cases is that Roman power, proximity to it, and length of time under it, rather than the particular circumstances under which one entered Roman *fides*, affected how the Romans responded to perceived *fides*-violations.

Further refinement may be sought by a closer consideration of instances of friendship breakdown between Rome and states that entered Roman *amicitia* without performing *deditio*. The most obvious place to begin is with the Aetolian League, Rome's earliest ally in the Greek East, whose reputation for faithlessness among the Romans was sufficiently widespread that, at about the same time that Roman–Aetolian antagonism was at its height in the early second century BC, the comic playwright Plautus could stage a play in Rome whose plot revolved around the theme of *fides*, but part of whose comic impact came from its setting in Aetolia – a masterstroke of absurdist irony.⁴² Here we will be less concerned with whether the Aetolians' reputation for *mala fides* was deserved, that is, whether the prevailing Roman view of the Aetolians was in some sense objectively valid. As in the Campanian case, the Aetolians were perhaps equally justified in regarding the Romans rather than themselves as chronic *fides*-violators; after all, as we have seen (above, [Chapter 3](#) n. 38), the surviving inscription that records the Roman–Aetolian alliance of 211 belies Flamininus' assertion to the Aetolians in 197, in response to their demand for possession of Larisa Cremaste, Pharsalus, Echinus, and Phthiotic Thebes, that the League had no claim on cities that surrendered to the Romans voluntarily, as these had

⁴² On this aspect of Plautus' *Captivi*, see Franko 1995: 167–74.

done, because the 211 treaty only mandated turning over to the Aetolians those cities captured by force; the treaty, as we have seen, likely made no such distinction.

However that may be, the foundation of the Romans' anti-Aetolian prejudice was the League's infamous "separate peace" with Philip V in 206 BC, an overt violation not only of the specific terms of the treaty of 211 (Livy 26.24.12), but also, more seriously, of the sacred oaths both sides swore before the gods when the treaty was struck. The *fides* that was supposed to have presided over Roman–Aetolian relations (that is, the *fides* that was the foundation of their *amicitia*) was irreparably damaged, in the view of Rome's representatives, by the Aetolian separate peace, and Roman anger and resentment over the League abandoning them at a stage in the war against Philip when the Romans could not possibly fight him on their own gave rise in subsequent years to a pattern of uncomfortable and prickly diplomatic interactions between the Republic and the League. This history is worth examining in some detail.⁴³

We begin with an episode that has caused some controversy in the scholarship. When Aetolian ambassadors came to Rome in 202 BC, probably seeking help against Philip V's attacks on the League's dependencies on the coasts of Thrace and Asia Minor, they were rebuffed in no uncertain terms, and charged by the *patres* with bad faith for making a separate peace with the Macedonian king (Livy 31.29.4; App. *Mac.* 4.2). Aside from controversy over its correct date, the very existence of this embassy has often been doubted, but a consensus seems to be emerging in favor of its authenticity.⁴⁴ Indeed, a subsequent episode seems to be predicated on the historicity of the embassy of 202: in 199, after a long debate in Aetolia, at which representatives of Philip, the Romans, and the Athenians spoke (Livy 31.29–32; this was the occasion on which Philip's ambassadors brought up Rome's harsh treatment of the Campanians in 211: above), the Aetolians refused a Roman request for aid against Philip. Apparently, the *patres'* rebuff to the Aetolians in 202 still rankled. But in summer 199, despite their earlier refusal to assist Rome, the Aetolians duly joined in the war against Philip

⁴³ On what follows, see Heuss 1933: 41–43; cf. 83, 88; Holleaux 1935: 236–57, 293–97; 1957; Badian 1958a: 73–86; 1958b; Will 1967: 138–44, 150–51, 166–83; Dahlheim 1968: 66–67, 193–200; Larsen 1968: 378–47; Deininger 1971: 58–80, 96–108; Derow 1979: 6–8; Gruen 1984: 17–21, 26–32, 440–62; Eckstein 1987a: 287–317; Grainger 2002: 76–77, 147–55, 163–91; Pfeilschifter 2005: 134–80; Eckstein 2008: 286, 288–89 and n. 62, 334.

⁴⁴ Inauthentic: Badian 1958b: 208–11, followed by Ferrary 1988: 51 and n. 26; authentic: Dahlheim 1968: 196 n. 45; Briscoe 1973: 130; Gruen 1984: 396–97 n. 214 (the latter two citing older literature); cf. 79, 441; Twyman 1999: 1284 (dating the embassy to 201 BC; cf. Briscoe 1973: 130 [with older literature there cited]; Derow 1979: 7–8); Eckstein 2008: 211–17 (dating it to autumn 202, following Holleaux 1935: 293–97).

on the Roman side (Livy 31.40.9–41.1). The League army, however, was worsted in Thessaly by Philip's forces (Livy 31.41.13–42).

If the Roman courtship of the Aetolians in 199 BC showed the League's ongoing attractiveness to Rome as an ally (and as a perennial enemy of Macedon) in times of war,⁴⁵ despite its growing reputation as a compulsive *fides*-violator, by the end of the Second Macedonian War the Romans had reverted to a position of distrust and suspicion of the Aetolians. Much of this had to do with the personal reaction to Aetolian conduct in the war by the Roman commander, T. Quinctius Flaminius. At the battle of Cynoscephelae in 197, he personally witnessed the Aetolian contingent under his command breaking rank and plundering the Macedonian camp while the battle was still raging. When the battle was over, the Roman troops ran to plunder the Macedonian camp, arriving to find the Aetolians already in possession of the booty. The legionaries complained to their commander that it was they, rather than the Aetolians, who had done most of the difficult work in the battle, but the Aetolians had now deprived them of their just reward. Flaminius agreed: Polybius says that the commander was upset over the Aetolians' greed (τῇ . . . πλεονεξίᾳ; Polyb. 18.34.1), and by their boasting and taking equal credit with the Romans for the battle (τὴν ἀλαζονείαν αὐτῶν, ἀντεπιγραφόμεν[οι] τὸ νίκημα; 18.34.2). A more judicious analysis would give the Aetolians more credit: first their skirmishers, then their cavalry intervened at crucial moments in the battle, and turned it around for the Romans; Polybius, no friend of the Aetolians, says the Aetolian cavalry in particular fought with distinction.⁴⁶

In discussions leading up to the Tempe conference, Flaminius froze the Aetolians out of his council, giving only harsh replies to their requests, and the atmosphere soon grew toxic ("unpleasant," δυσχρηστίας; Polyb. 18.34.4). The Aetolians pressed on, however, and openly criticized Flaminius at Tempe for being too soft on Philip; they already suspected that the Roman commander must have been bribed in order to allow Philip to retain his throne (18.34.7–8). In response, Flaminius accused the Aetolians of bad faith in attending the peace conference since they seemed more determined to get revenge on the king than to make peace with him. When Phaeneas, the Aetolian *strategos*, continued to harp on the League's unhappiness with the lenient treatment granted to Philip, the exasperated Flaminius finally snapped: "'Shut up, Phaeneas!' he said. 'I'll arrange peace terms such that Philip will be unable to wrong the Greeks even if

⁴⁵ Eckstein 2009: 256–57.

⁴⁶ The Aetolians at Cynoscephelae: Polyb. 18.21.5–8, 22.4–6 (φιλοτιμία); Polybius' view of the Aetolians: Mendels 1984/1986, vs. Sacks 1975.

he wants to” (“παῦσαι” φησί “Φαινέα, ληρῶν· ἐγὼ γὰρ οὕτως χειρῶ τὰς διαλύσεις ὥστε μηδὲ βουληθέντα τὸν Φίλιππον ἀδικεῖν δύνασθαι τοὺς Ἕλληνας”: Polyb. 18.37.12; cf. Livy 33.12.12–13). On the following day, the Aetolians issued their demand, mentioned earlier, that the towns captured from Philip during the war (Larisa Cremaste, Pharsalus, Echinus, and Phthiotic Thebes) be handed over to them, in accordance with the terms of the treaty of 211 BC. Flamininus responded that discussion of the treaty was irrelevant since it was nullified by the League’s separate peace with Philip in 206, but he would nevertheless grant them Phthiotic Thebes since the others had all surrendered voluntarily to Rome, and thus had a claim on Roman *fides* (ἐθέλοντὴν σφᾶς εἰς τὴν Ῥωμαίων πίστιν ἐνεχέρισαν).⁴⁷

Although perhaps incorrect on the details (and maybe guilty of bad faith himself), Flamininus was indeed correct in a larger sense since, as we have seen (above, pp. 91–92), the terms of the 211 BC treaty itself are rather too context-specific to suggest a purported long-term treaty of alliance. But this is of less concern here than the fact that the atmosphere had become so poisoned by mutual suspicions of bad faith and open recrimination – Flamininus faulting the Aetolians over their plundering of Philip’s camp and their insufferable bragging, and raising the issue of the separate peace yet again; the Aetolians believing that the Romans had not punished Philip enough, and that they themselves had been instrumental in Rome’s success at Cynoscephelae, but not properly rewarded for it – that constructive dialogue was at an end. Roman–Aetolian *amicitia* was now on the slippery slope towards complete breakdown, and there was little anyone was willing or able to do to retrieve it. Even though the Aetolians did receive Phthiotic Thebes, plus the entire regions of Phocis and Locris in the final settlement of 196 (Polyb. 18.47.9; cf. Livy 33.34.8), “all the Greeks were happy and pleased” in the preliminaries to the Isthmian Declaration of Greek freedom, “except the Aetolians, who spoke ill of the decree” (οἱ μὲν ἅλλοι πάντες εὐθαρεῖς ἦσαν καὶ περιχαρεῖς, μόνοι δ’ Αἰτωλοὶ . . . κατακάλουν τὸ δόγμα: 18.45.1), and who continued to complain without end (κατακόρως: 18.45.7) that Flamininus had no intention of giving up the “Three Fetters,” and was thus deceiving the Greeks with his lofty rhetoric of Greek freedom (Polyb. 18.45.1–6; cf. Livy 33.31.1–3). Aetolian anger, in other words, rose to a new pitch and could

⁴⁷ Polyb. 18.38.9. Aetolians plunder Macedonian camp: Polyb. 18.27.3–4, 34.1; Livy 33.10.6; Aetolians criticize Flamininus for lenient treatment of Philip: Polyb. 18.36.6–7, 37.8–9; Livy 33.11.7, 12.3–4, 10; App. *Mac.* 9.1–2; Flamininus’ response: Polyb. 18.37.1–12; Livy 33.12.5–13; Aetolians demand Larisa Cremaste, Pharsalus, Echinus, and Phthiotic Thebes, Flamininus’ response: Polyb. 18.38.3–9; Livy 33.13.3–13.

not be appeased, no doubt because Flaminius refused to grant them three of the four towns they requested at Tempe. Of course, like the town of Soli, which the Rhodians requested from the senate in 189 BC (above, p. 200), actual possession of the towns was less important than what they represented – they were tokens of honor (that is, symbolic capital) that the Aetolians felt was their due, and Flaminius' refusal to hand them over was a deliberate insult to them, and a devaluation of their importance as allies. In the Aetolians' view, this was treatment unworthy of friends.

The disintegration of cordial relations continued apace when one of the ten commissioners in Greece, P. Cornelius Lentulus, addressed the Aetolian assembly at Thermae shortly after the Isthmian Declaration of 196 BC (Polyb. 18.48.5–9; Livy 33.35.9–12). Cornelius spoke mildly, using the moralizing language of friendship; he urged the League to maintain its original “goodwill” (εὐνοίαν: Polyb. 18.48.6) towards Rome. In response, some Aetolians too spoke “lightly and tactfully” (πρῶως καὶ πολιτικῶς), mildly criticizing the Romans for not using their success “in a partnerly way” (κοινωνικῶς) or observing the original treaty, but others spoke “abusively” (λοιδορούντων) about how the Romans would never have been able to conquer Philip, much less secure a berth in Greece, without Aetolian help. Lentulus “begged” (παρεκάλουν) the Aetolians to send an embassy to the senate, from whom he promised they would receive justice (δικαίωσιν) (18.48.7–9).

Subsequent events witnessed the further disintegration of trust between the Romans and the Aetolians. The constant public carping of the Aetolians about the insincerity of Rome's “Freedom of the Greeks” rhetoric was a constant irritant to Flaminius – and an insult to his honor – since the implication was that the Roman commander was lying about his intentions to evacuate Greece. But Aetolian anger (ὄργη) continued to fester even after the evacuation, and is the explicit reason Polybius gives – three times (Polyb. 3.3.3, 7.1–2; 18.39.1) – for the Aetolian invitation to Antiochus to come to Greece to avenge the Roman insult to their honor. Neither the Boii nor the Spanish, Livy remarks, were as “hostile and dangerous” (*inimice infesti*: Livy 35.12.1) to the Romans as the Aetolians were in 193 BC, for in that year the League sent out embassies to Philip V and Nabis of Sparta, in addition to Antiochus, urging them all to make war on Rome at once. At this point the Athenians and Flaminius intervened, the former reminding the Aetolians of all Flaminius had done for the Greeks, and of the Aetolians' long-standing *societas* with the Romans – a reference not to the 211 treaty, apparently (as we have seen, Flaminius believed it was no longer in force), but to the *amicitia* established at the time it was

struck. Flamininus, for his part, recalled again “how often the good faith of the treaty had been broken” by the Aetolians (*quotiens ab iis fides mota foederis esset*: Livy 35.33.4) – a further reference, no doubt, to their separate peace of 206, but also to their plundering of Philip’s camp, and their public insults to Flamininus’ honor. The Roman commander concluded by telling the Aetolians, as Lentulus had done at Thermae in 196, that they would be better off taking up their grievances with the senate in Rome, rather than inviting the Syrian king to Greece as a possible solution to the problem. Apparently Flamininus’ personal aversion to the Aetolians (who, after all, had accused him of being a liar, and insulted the Romans by claiming for themselves the principal role in Rome’s success in Greece) precluded a conciliatory stance at this point, and his acid comments served only to inflame Aetolian anger further. Despite the Athenians’ advice, the Aetolians soon acted, inviting Antiochus to Greece, and taking over the city of Demetrias after engineering the restoration of the anti-Roman exile Eurylochus there. One of the leading Aetolian politicians, Thoas, urged immediate war, and Antiochus was elected *strategos* of the League for 192/191.⁴⁸

It is unnecessary to narrate the course of the subsequent war here; one episode – the Aetolian attempt to surrender to Rome in 191 BC – has already received detailed treatment in [Chapter 2](#) (see above, pp. 116–19), and we will deal with the deterioration of Antiochus’ relationship with Rome presently. More important to discuss at this stage is how the simmering Roman–Aetolian hostility was finally resolved at war’s end in 189, with a new treaty featuring the famous opening clause, obliging the Aetolians now “to preserve the power and majesty of the Roman people without fraud.”⁴⁹ Ernst Badian, following Eugen Täubler, perhaps not surprisingly regarded the “*maiestas* clause” as embodying a kind of “legalized *clientela*” – an attempt “to express in pseudo-legal terminology that obligation of

⁴⁸ Aetolian complaints about Greek freedom: Livy 34.23.5–11; Aetolian meeting and embassies of 193: Livy 35.12; intervention by Athenians and Flamininus: Livy 35.32.12–14, 33.4–6; restoration of Eurylochus and takeover of Demetrias: Livy 35.34.5–12; Thoas’ enthusiasm for war and election of Antiochus: Livy 35.45.5–9; App. *Syr.* 12.

⁴⁹ ὁ δὲ δήμος ὁ Αἰτωλῶν τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ τὴν δυναστείαν τοῦ δήμου τῶν Ῥωμαίων: Polyb. 21.32.2; the phrase “without fraud” (something like ἀνευ τε δόλου τε ἀπάτης: cf. Hdt. 1.69.2 with Walbank 1979: 132; Gruen 1984: 29 n. 85), which has fallen into the gap in Polybius’ text that follows Ῥωμαίων at Polyb. 21.32.2, can be supplemented from Livy’s straight translation of his Greek: *imperium maiestatemque populi Romani gens Aetolorum conseruato sine dolo malo*: Livy 38.11.2 (Polybian derivation: Briscoe 2008: 54). Discussion of the *maiestas* clause generally: Ilari 1974: 34–41; Brunt 1982: 142; Baronowski 1990; Ferrary 1990: 231–34; S. Mitchell 2005: 187–89; discussion of the treaty of 189 specifically: Walbank 1979: 131–36; Gruen 1984: 26–32; Sherwin-White 1984: 59; Baronowski 1990: 359–60; Ferrary 1990: 226–28; Kallet-Marx 1995a: 26; de Libero 1997: 278–82; Grainger 2002: 340; Eckstein 2008: 348 and n. 20.

clientship which [the Aetolians] would not otherwise recognize.”⁵⁰ But why, then, did the Romans not simply use the terminology of *clientela* to describe the relationship? If Badian is correct, then surely it is the Romans’ avoidance of such terminology that requires explanation.

Erich Gruen has argued against Täubler and Badian that the *maiestas* clause was “an overt acknowledgement of inequality between the partners,” whereby “Rome required . . . of Aetolia [an] explicit renunciation of her former faithlessness and treachery.”⁵¹ In other words, it was a moral stricture, not a legal one. The term *maiestas* itself, in our period, belongs to Roman religious vocabulary, or is used to describe the power of kings in early Roman tragedies derived from Greek models popular in the Hellenistic East;⁵² it is thus not part of the Latin legal vocabulary – or, *pace* Täubler and Badian, the vocabulary of interpersonal relationships. With its predominantly sacral connotations, then, the *maiestas* clause must bear some relationship to the religious oaths and sanctions – such as *fides* – that were supposed to have governed the Roman–Aetolian *amicitia* from the beginning. I would suggest, therefore, that the *maiestas* clause in the Roman–Aetolian treaty of 189 BC did not reduce the relationship to a kind of institutionalized or legally rationalized foreign *clientela*, nor was it designed to shut down or close off the League’s right of self-determination in conducting its own foreign policy. It was, rather, an attempt (a clumsy one, to be sure) to reduce the vagueness and complexity of the largely unspoken obligations arising from *deditio* – especially Roman *fides*, in which, as we know, the Aetolians had to be instructed on more than one occasion⁵³ – to a less imprecise conceptual framework familiar to Greeks of the period from the awesome “majesty” of Hellenistic kingship, and which eliminated any possibility of ambiguity or misunderstanding. In a sense, then, *maiestas* acts as a kind of exegesis on or conceptual parallel to the more concrete *imperium*, the term with which *maiestas* is coupled in the treaty’s opening clause.

How can the foregoing discussion of Roman–Aetolian relations be integrated into the processual model of friendship breakdown, and what were the effects of the moral and discursive aspects of this process on the international system? The strongly emotional and moralizing language into which the sources cast the various Roman–Aetolian disputes, and the unusual

⁵⁰ Badian 1958a: 84, 86–87, following Täubler 1913: 62–63.

⁵¹ Gruen 1984: 29–32 (quotation from 30).

⁵² OLD s.v., 1a; TLL., s.v II.A.2.b, citing Andr. 13 R (of Aegisthus); OLD., s.v 1b; TLL., s.v II.B.1.b.α, citing Acc. Trag. 648 R (of Tereus).

⁵³ In 197BC (Polyb. 18.38.3–9; Livy 33.13.6–12), and in 191 (Polyb. 20.9.9; Livy 36.27.6).

maiestas clause that appears in the final treaty of 189 BC are indicative of the relationship's true nature. The disputes were, in essence, disputes between friends over the significance and meaning of the Aetolian separate peace of 206, a disagreement that was only partially resolved during the brief period of Roman–Aetolian cooperation in the Second Macedonian War (after, of course, refusals by both partners – Rome in 202, Aetolia [initially] in 199 – to respond to a call for help from an *amicus*). Once the emergency of the war against Philip was over, the contentious issues dividing Rome and Aetolia reemerged and then escalated as issues of honor, pride, and status came into play as attempts were made to renegotiate and redefine the boundaries and obligations of the friendship. The Aetolians were proud of the significant, perhaps heroic role they had played at Cynoscephelae in 197, but the Romans refused to acknowledge this – a source of great humiliation and wounded pride for the Aetolians. Their emotional reaction is not dissimilar to how Syphax reacted to Rome's peculiar reluctance to credit him with any moral equivalence over the course of his *amicitia* with Rome between 213 and 206 (see above, pp. 98–102).

The Romans, on the other hand, and Flamininus in particular, who seems to have developed a strong personal aversion to the Aetolians, grew weary of Aetolian (and in Flamininus' view, unjustified) boasting about their accomplishments in battle. The process of arriving at a settlement with Philip was especially humiliating to Aetolian pride: Flamininus consistently refused to consult the League leadership on the terms of peace, and deprived them of what they regarded as their right to enjoy a special high standing among Roman *amici* by not sufficiently rewarding them for their services. The practical logics of the process of friendship breakdown were now well and truly engaged, and neither side seemed willing (or able) to arrest the decline; in fact, the dispute only grew worse as the Aetolians publicly accused Flamininus of acting in bad faith by questioning his commitment to Greek freedom. What began as a dispute over whether the Aetolians or the Romans broke faith, the former by making a separate peace with Philip in 206, or the latter by not providing enough military support for the Aetolians in the First Macedonian War between 211 and 206 – in other words, a dispute over which friend's interpretation of their relationship and its obligations should be privileged – degenerated into public exchanges of insults and recriminations, an open breach of *amicitia*. No serious attempt was made by either party to arrest the downward spiral – there was no “state of the relationship address,” no good faith attempt to articulate or renegotiate the friendship's “rules,” no attempt to bring in a mediator – and in the end, Aetolian anger with Rome resulted in war with Antiochus, as

well as with the League itself. In other words, the discursive trap in which the Romans and Aetolians found themselves triggered a self-reinforcing downward spiral in relations, and acted as a catalyst for the final, violent stage in the long-standing hegemonic rivalry between Antiochus III and Rome. The real-world, constitutive effects of what was in essence a dispute over the parameters and moral obligations of *amicitia*, involving rival claims to honor and prestige, contributed to the undoing of an already unstable and violent systemic anarchy. This was certainly not the Romans' intention – or hope – given their good faith evacuation of Greece, despite the looming threat posed by Antiochus. The Aetolians, by contrast, saw in Antiochus an opportunity to settle scores with the Romans, and perhaps to improve their own position in Greece as things returned to normal, and the Greek states returned to the business of playing out their age-old rivalries in warfare and violence.

It will be useful, finally, to investigate how Rome's interactions with the Aetolians discussed here can contribute to solving the problem posed at the outset, that is, whether it was Roman power, proximity to it, and length of time under it, or the particular circumstances under which one entered Roman *fides*, that affected how the Romans responded to perceived violations of *amicitia* and *fides*. As we saw in the case of the Campanians, Ilergetes, and Illyrians – all of whom had initiated their relationships with Rome via *deditio* – Roman sanctioning of perceived violations of *amicitia* was “hard but fair,” and the robustness of Roman reprisals depended on the salience of Roman power in particular contexts. The same goes, I would suggest, for the Aetolian case, even though the League had not entered *amicitia* via *deditio*. Glabrio's treatment of the Aetolians in 191 BC when they tried (but failed) to perform *deditio*, as we have seen in [Chapter 3](#), may have been harsh in terms of his personal comportment towards them, but was ultimately merciful in allowing the League to reconsider its actions; this, therefore, may pass the “hard but fair” test. I would also suggest that the Romans' solicitation of Aetolian help against Philip V in 199, despite their earlier snubbing of the Aetolians in 202, reflects not just the Aetolians' ongoing attractiveness as allies, but also the politico-strategic realities confronting the Romans in Greece in the early stages of the Second Macedonian War. The initial Roman strategy against Macedon, coordinated by the Roman commander P. Sulpicius Galba in 199, may be judged, on any estimate, to have been a complete failure. After some heavy but indecisive fighting around the Pindus mountain range, by the end of the season, the Romans were right back where they began, at Apollonia. The impact on Roman morale was devastating: Galba even had to deal with a

mutiny in his army.⁵⁴ Although Galba had solicited Aetolia's support ahead of this campaign, in winter 199, his urgent courtship of the League was probably motivated by his knowledge in advance of just how difficult that campaign would be. As in the case of Rome's faithless Spanish *dediticii*, what determined Rome's reaction to violations of *fides* – or indeed whether there was a reaction at all – depended on the salience of Roman power, that is, whether they were negotiating with their *amici* from a position of strength and confidence, or from one of weakness and insecurity. In terms of the practical logics of friendship, the asymmetry between the Romans and Aetolians in 199 was considerably smaller than it would become after the defeat of Philip V, when the Romans' status, prestige, and ability to reward (Phthiotic Thebes, Phocis, Locris were given to the Aetolians), and to withhold (Larisa Cremaste, Pharsalus, Echinus were denied) were considerably greater. The Aetolians, apparently, failed to intuit that their *amicitia* with Rome had become more unequal between Galba's solicitation of their support in 199 and after Cynoscephelae, which is why they failed to realize that their boasts and claims of status-equivalence were no longer appropriate or characteristic of their relationship with Rome.

Two final examples of *fides*-violations by Roman *amici* reinforce these latter arguments precisely, and can carry the analysis a bit further since they demonstrate more clearly the distinction between the friendship breakdown and friendship dissolution processes. The first is the notorious Rhodian offer to mediate the conflict between Rome and the Macedonian king Perseus in 169 BC.⁵⁵ As we have seen in the previous chapter (above, pp. 200–05), the Romans were not in principle opposed to offers of mediation of the “good offices” or “conciliatory” type, provided there was enough “(apologetic) deprecation” on the part of the would-be mediator, and indeed in the case of the mediation offer in 169, the Rhodians were apparently acting on the explicit request of the Roman consul, Q. Marcius Philippus. Why, then, did the senate react with such anger towards the Rhodians when they learned of their mediation attempts the next year? As will be seen here, there are many possible answers to this question: Polybius suspected sharp practice on the part of the senate; the *patres* suspected lukewarm loyalty, and perhaps even pro-Macedonian sentiment on the part of

⁵⁴ The campaign: Livy 31.33–40.6; the mutiny: Livy 32.3.2; discussion: Hammond 1966: 42–45; cf. Eckstein 1976: 126–27; Gruen 1984: 206–07; Eckstein 2008: 279.

⁵⁵ On what follows, see generally Heuss 1933: 106–07; Holleaux 1935: 31; Schmitt 1957: 137–72; Badian 1958a: 100–01; Will 1967: 232–33, 248–53; Errington 1971: 219–20, 249–52; Gruen 1975; Maróti 1983: 229–231; Gruen 1984: 563–72; Sherwin-White 1984: 30–36; Berthold 1984: 179–212; Scafuro 1987; Ferrary 1988: 183–86; Eckstein 1988; Ferrary 1990: 229–31; Ager 1991; Feig Vishnia 1996: 188; Ager 1996: 327–36; Ager 2009: 34–38.

Rhodes; Rhodian factionalism along pro- and anti-Roman lines perhaps also played a role.⁵⁶ For clarity's sake, like the story of Roman–Aetolian relations just told, the Rhodian offer of mediation in 169 needs to be contextualized within the broader stream of Roman–Rhodian relations over a longer period, beginning in the late 170s.

Roman suspicion of Rhodian disloyalty pre-dated the war with Perseus. A Roman diplomatic mission appeared in Asia Minor in 172 BC, and uncovered rumors of pro-Macedonian sympathizers at Rhodes (Livy 42.26.8–9), but by the time the Roman envoys arrived on Rhodes, the pro-Roman faction was discovered to be firmly in control under the leadership of the *prytanis*, Hagesilochus. This was the same man who, as was seen in the previous chapter (above, pp. 175–76), successfully persuaded the Rhodians to have forty ships fitted out and ready for action in the upcoming war – for their own convenience as much as for that of the Romans (Polyb. 27.3; Livy 42.45.1–7). The Roman *legati* departed Rhodes quite satisfied with the Rhodians' continuing goodwill. The friendliness of Rhodes – or at least the continuing dominance of the pro-Roman faction on the island – was confirmed in the sequel: when some Macedonian envoys arrived in Rhodes seeking Rhodian neutrality, or at least mediation of the conflict between Perseus and Rome, they were politely rebuffed by the Rhodians, “constrained,” Polybius says, “by their goodwill towards the Romans” (προκατεχόμενοι δὲ τῇ πρὸς Ῥωμαίους εὐνοίᾳ: Polyb. 27.4.9); they also asked the Macedonian king that he not try to persuade them do anything contrary to their friendship with Rome.⁵⁷

Despite protestations of Rhodian loyalty, and the equipping of forty Rhodian ships in 172 BC, during the actual war with Perseus, Rhodes'

⁵⁶ The best discussion of the Rhodian political factions in this period is Berthold 1984: 182–84, who, however, argues that “it is misleading to speak of pro- and anti-Roman or pro- and anti-Macedonian parties,” and instead uses “the Roman group” to describe the former and “the Macedonian group” to describe the latter. In what follows, I use the earlier convention to describe these factions. Gruen advocates jettisoning the language of partisan politics along pro- and anti-Roman lines altogether, arguing that Polybius has exaggerated Rhodian political divisions with the benefit of hindsight: Gruen 1975: 60–61, 77, 81 (cf. 1984: 566 and n. 163). Cf. also Ager 1991: 31; 1996 332 and n. 8.

⁵⁷ Sources for Perseus' embassy and Rhodian response: Polyb. 27.4.3–10; cf. Livy 42.46.3–6. It may be significant that Polybius suggests some disingenuousness in the Rhodian response: they asked Perseus not to request anything that would make them *appear* to be acting against the wishes of the Romans (φανήσονται πρὸς τὴν Ῥωμαίων ἀντιπράττοντες βούλησιν: Polyb. 27.4.9 [emphasis added]). Livy, on the other hand, has the Rhodians ask the king “not to attempt to separate them from the Romans for the sake of their ancient friendship with them, and the many and great services they provided them in peace and war” (*peteret rex quod ueterem amicitiam, multis magnisque meritis pace belloque partam, diiungeret sibi ac Romanis*: Livy 42.46.6). Polybius' cynical tone here, if that is what it is, appears to be of a piece with his dubious thesis of a pattern of Rhodian deception during this period (see below).

active support for Rome was minimal at best. In fact, we hear of Rhodian ships being sent to a Roman commander only once, in spring 171, when, in response to a request for a fleet by C. Lucretius Gallus, the Roman naval commander, the Rhodians sent a mere six ships. Lucretius nonetheless received the Rhodians kindly (φιλάνθρωπος: Polyb. 27.7.16), and, in accordance with a pattern of Roman behavior we have seen before (above, pp. 180–87), simply dismissed them along with their ships, wishing either to spare them the burden of the war – or, perhaps, not wanting to appear beholden to them.⁵⁸

Political strife on the island may have lent continuing credence to the persistent rumors of Rhodian disloyalty to Rome (cf. Polyb. 28.2.4). According to Polybius, the anti-Roman Rhodian politicians, Deinon and Polyaratus, on one occasion publicly urged the Rhodian assembly to adopt a policy of “soft balancing,” similar to that advocated by some politicians in the Achaean League during the same period (see above, pp. 213–15): Rhodes “should never do anything readily to help the Romans, but rather to make difficulties for them in all things, and to furnish occasions for giving offense and causing displeasure.” Their purpose in doing this, in Polybius’ interpretation, was “to turn the people away from their goodwill towards Rome, and entangle them in a friendship with Perseus, so far as they were able.”⁵⁹ By 169 BC, however, the Deinon–Polyaratus group was evidently less influential,⁶⁰ for in that year an embassy of pro-Roman Rhodian politicians, led by the compliant Hagesilochus, appeared before the Roman senate in order to renew Rhodes’ *amicitia* with Rome, and to ask for permission to export corn. The envoys also used the occasion to protest Rhodian loyalty against some recent accusations by their enemies. The *amicitia* was probably renewed, and the senate allowed the Rhodians to export 100,000 *medimnoi* of corn from Sicily.⁶¹ According to Polybius, the envoys received from the

⁵⁸ Berthold 1984: 181 suggests that the small number of ships was a reflection of partisan politics on the island. The Roman request for Rhodian assistance had been delivered – insultingly, in the anti-Roman faction’s view – by a gymnastics trainer named Socrates (Polyb. 27.7.1), which may have squandered the political capital of the pro-Roman group to such an extent that they could muster only enough support from among their political opponents for a small deployment.

⁵⁹ μηδὲν ἐξ ἐτοίμου ποιεῖν Ῥωμαίοις, ἀλλ’ ἐν πᾶσι δυσχρηστεῖν καὶ διδόναι προσκοπῆς καὶ δυσαρρεστήσεως ἀφορμὰς. ἦν γὰρ τὸ προκείμενον αὐτοῖς ἀπὸ μὲν τῆς πρὸς Ῥωμαίους εὐνοίας ἀλλοτριῶν τὸν δῆμον, εἰς δὲ τὴν τοῦ Περσέως φιλίαν ἐμπλέκειν, καθ’ οἷοί τ’ ἦσαν (Polyb. 27.7.10–11). Deinon and Polyaratus: Polyb. 27.7; Livy 42.48.8, 56.6 (with Polybius’ harsh critique of their characters at 27.7.12, 30.8–9, on which see below).

⁶⁰ Berthold 1984: 184, 186–87, suggests that their influence was limited to the Rhodian assembly instead of the more powerful council and *prytanes* (neither Deinon nor Polyaratus are recorded as having held high office, for example).

⁶¹ Polyb. 28.2.1–5, 16.5–9. Livy’s account of an extremely hostile Rhodian embassy at this time (Livy 44.14.7–15.8) is an annalistic fabrication designed to apologize for Rome’s treatment of Rhodes after

senate “every possible kindness” (πάντων τῶν φιλανθρώπων τυχόντες: Polyb. 28.16.9), but the *patres* merely “pretended” (προσεποιήθη: 28.2.5) to be ignorant of the anti-Roman sentiments of some Rhodian politicians, and of the rumors of Rhodian double-dealing.

Polybius’ implication of senatorial deception on this occasion accords well with his construction of the infamous Rhodian embassy to the consul in Macedonia, Q. Marcius Philippus, at around the same time. When the Rhodian envoys, led by Hagepolis, met the consul and protested their state’s ongoing friendship with Rome, the latter responded that he paid no attention to hostile rumors against the island republic; he then took Hagepolis aside and suggested in private that the Rhodians should try to mediate “the present war.”⁶² As we have seen, Polybius adds an editorializing comment that by making his request Philippus “might give the Romans a sensible starting point for deciding about [the Rhodians] whatever seemed good to them” (καὶ τοῦτο πράξαντας δοῦναι τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις ἀφορμὰς εὐλόγους εἰς τὸ βουλευέσθαι περὶ αὐτῶν ὥς ἂν αὐτοῖς φαίνηται: Polyb. 28.17.8; above, Chapter 4 n. 70). But the historian’s interpretation of Roman motivation here is no more believable than his statements that the senate “pretended” to ignore rumors of pro-Macedonian activity on Rhodes, or that the Rhodians did not wish to appear to do anything against Rome (above, n. 57). All such statements conform to Polybius’ thesis – and that is all it is – that the senate in this period was determined to emasculate Rhodes at some future point. Polybius freely admits that there is no evidentiary basis for his thesis, but that it is mere *ex post facto* speculation: “the real reason [sc. for the mediation request] is not easy to say, but I think the last one I mentioned [sc. that the Romans might have a sensible starting point for doing with the Rhodians whatever they wished] is preferable and accords better with what later befell the Rhodians.” This is, as Erich Gruen points out,

the war – so the near-unanimity of modern scholarship: Walbank 1979: 327; Gruen 1975: 59; Gruen 1984: 565 n. 161; Berthold 1984: 191–92 n. 31; Eckstein 1988: 426, 434–36; Ager 1991: 33; 1996: 333 and n. 6; 2009: 35–36; others listed at Gruen 1975: 60 n. 1.

⁶² Polybius is ambiguous here: he fails to specify which “present war” (τὸν ἐνεστῶτα πόλεμον: Polyb. 28.17.4) Philippus asked the Rhodians to mediate – Rome’s war with Perseus, or the concurrent war between Antiochus IV and Ptolemy VI. Most scholars now agree that it is the former: Walbank 1979: 350–52; Berthold 1984: 240; Eckstein 1988: 429–30; Ager 1991: 34; Ager 1996: 333 n. 4, 340 n. 2. *Contra* Gruen 1975: 71–74; 1984: 118 n. 114; while Paton’s Loeb edition glosses τὸν ἐνεστῶτα πόλεμον as “the present war between Antiochus and Ptolemy,” and later on at Polyb. 28.17.13 adds to Polybius’ “the war” (τὸν πόλεμον) the gloss “(in Syria)” in the translation. It does Polybius too little credit as a critical historian to dismiss the consul’s request as an outright fabrication that Polybius unthinkingly gleaned from a pro-Rhodian source, as Berthold 1984: 189, 240–43; after all, “Polybius was no passive transmitter of information,” or a “mindless parrot” of Rhodian claims: Gruen 1975: 59, 62.

“questionable methodology” at best.⁶³ Moreover, Polybius could not possibly have had access to what was, evidently, a private conversation between Philippus and Hagepolis about mediation: the historian writes, “Quintus [sc. Philippus], taking Hagepolis in hand *privately* . . .” (λαβὼν κατ’ ἰδίαν εἰς τὰς χεῖρας ὁ Κόιντος . . . : 28.17.4 [emphasis added]).⁶⁴ In any case, the result of Philippus’ conversation with Hagepolis was overwhelmingly positive: Hagepolis took his leave of the consul “deeply touched” (τοῦ δὲ Ἀγεπόλιδος ἐψυχῶν γαγγημένου . . . ἰσχυρῶς; 28.17.4); he was also flattered by the even kinder treatment he received later on from C. Marcius Figulus, the commander of the Roman fleet. The Rhodians, however, soon made their fatal mistake: according to Polybius, the anti-Roman faction interpreted Roman kindness (φιλανθρωπία) as a sign of weakness, so when envoys arrived from Macedon with yet another request from Perseus for Rhodian mediation of his conflict with Rome, the policies of the pro- and anti-Roman factions on the island momentarily converged, and the Rhodians dispatched to Rome the embassy that confronted the *patres* after Pydna was fought and won in 168 BC.⁶⁵

The story of the subsequent encounter with the senate is well known: news of the Roman success at Pydna reached the senate immediately before the Rhodian envoys were admitted, but the latter gamely proceeded anyway, and forthrightly stated that the original purpose of their visit had been to mediate an end to a conflict that had proven extremely costly to both the Greeks and the Romans, but they were now in the happy position of being able to offer the senate their congratulations on the Roman victory. The senate grew angry, questioning the rationale for the Rhodian offer; the *patres* argued that mediation at this late stage in the war, when Rome was clearly winning, could only have benefited Perseus. The Rhodians were then summarily dismissed (Polyb. 29.19; Livy 45.3.3–8; Diod. Sic. 30.24). Rhodes was later stripped of her suzerainty over Lycia and Caria in Asia Minor, and the revenues she derived from harbor dues plummeted

⁶³ τό μὲν ἀκριβὲς οὐ ῥάδιον εἰπεῖν, δοκῶ δὲ μᾶλλον τὸ τελευταῖον εἰρημένον, ἐξ ὧν ἐμαρτύρησε τὰ μετ’ ὀλίγον συμβάντα τοῖς Ῥοδίοις (Polyb. 28.17.9), with Gruen 1975: 74.

⁶⁴ Criticism of Polybius’ thesis: Gruen 1975: 62–63, 73–74, 80; Berthold 1984: 242; Ager 1991: 34. Ager 1996: 333 rightly stresses the “clandestine atmosphere of Philippus’ advice.” Derow 2003: 69 takes Polybius’ speculation as established fact, arguing that Philippus “tricked” the Rhodians into offering mediation.

⁶⁵ Embassy to Philippus: Polyb. 28.17.1–9; Polybius’ view of his advice: Polyb. 28.17.7–9; embassy to Figulus: 28.17.10; report to Rhodians, reaction: 28.17.11–15; Rhodes agrees to mediate at Perseus’ request: Polyb. 29.4.7; Livy 44.23.9–10 (who state, incorrectly, that the Rhodians pledged to *fight* on Perseus’ behalf: Gruen 1975: 75; Walbank 1979: 365; Berthold 1984: 192 and n. 32; Ager 1996: 333 n. 6); dispatch of the embassy: Polyb. 29.10.1–3, 19.2.

drastically when the Romans declared Delos a free port and placed it under Athenian control.⁶⁶

How are we to explain the senate's reaction on this occasion? All the evidence discussed in this chapter thus far would point to a single, simple answer: the *patres* reacted as they did because, as they saw it, the Rhodians had been disloyal, that is, they violated the sacred bond of *fides* between *amici*. This would seem to be the implication of the *patres'* response to a later apologetic Rhodian embassy: they did not consider them enemies just yet, but neither did they consider them allies any longer (*Rhodiis responsum ita redditum est ut nec hostes fierent nec socii permanerent*: Livy 45.25.4). A complication arises, however: no ancient historical source ever explicitly constructs the behavior of the Rhodians in these years as disloyal, or labels their conduct as a violation of *fides*.⁶⁷ Moral criticism there certainly is, especially in Polybius' account, of individual anti-Roman Rhodian politicians (Deinon and Polyaratus), and of the anti-Roman faction generally. But, again, nowhere are even these men ever explicitly described as disloyal to Rome or lacking in *fides*; presumptuous, vain, burdened with debt, unscrupulous, greedy, time-serving, cowardly, offensive, unpardonable, unpitiable, ignorant, foolish, stupid, subversive, and malignant certainly – but never disloyal.⁶⁸ The Romans, evidently, did not believe that the Rhodians – even Deinon and Polyaratus – were guilty of gross disloyalty or lack of *fides* in their political deliberations or policy choices during the conflict with Perseus. They certainly never so charged the Rhodians, and, as we have seen, they were more than once satisfied with Rhodian expressions of goodwill. This makes sense given that they were free *amici*, enjoying the right of self-determination in their foreign-policy decision-making. The source of senatorial anger must be sought elsewhere.

It is perhaps best to start with Polybius' comment that the *patres* decided to punish Rhodes "in order to make an example of them" (βουλουμένη παραδειγματίσαι τοὺς Ῥοδίους: Polyb. 29.19.5). What does the historian mean by this, and for whose benefit was the example of Rhodes to be made? Loyalty was not the issue, on Polybius' own showing. Nor was it a problem that Rhodes' active assistance during the war was so minuscule; as we have seen, the Roman naval commander Lucretius reacted "kindly" (φιλανθρώπως: Polyb. 27.7.16) to the arrival of the Rhodian contingent of

⁶⁶ Polyb. 30.5.11–16, 20.1–7, 21.3–5, 31.4–12; Livy 44.15.1 (where the freeing of Lycia and Caria is spuriously backdated to 169 BC by Livy's annalistic source); 45.25.4–6, 11–13.

⁶⁷ Only Livy 44.15.4 mentions Rhodian *fraus*, but as we have seen (above, n. 61) this passage is an annalistic fabrication. Cf. Gruen 1984: 571: "there was no 'disloyalty.'"

⁶⁸ Polyb. 27.7.12, 17.12; 29.10.5, 19.2; 30.7.9–9.19.

six ships in spring 171 BC – and promptly dismissed them. Richard Berthold opts for a *Machtpolitik* explanation: the humbling of a second-tier power like Rhodes was designed to serve notice to other Mediterranean states that Roman might was now (that is, after Pydna) unchallengeable and that “Rome no longer needed the goodwill of such second-rank powers as Rhodes.”⁶⁹ Erich Gruen more or less concurs: “Rome had determined to make a display of her power and to administer a lesson to states which had grown too great since Apamea. The Republic . . . intended to remove the likelihood of [challenges to its power] in future.”⁷⁰ So, too, Sheila Ager: “an amicable Rhodes . . . was no longer of the same value [after Pydna, but was] a potential embarrassment in the future.”⁷¹

There can be no question, as we have seen in the case of Aetolia in particular (above, p. 278), that the dynamics of friendship interaction invariably changed in proportion to increasing asymmetries of status and power between Rome and her *amici*. In IR Realist terms, the Rhodian fiasco of 168 BC was “the result of an entirely new Mediterranean situation, one which no longer admitted the concept of the balance of power.”⁷² The Rhodian mediation-turned-congratulatory embassy to Rome in 168 captures the process perfectly: before Pydna, the Rhodians might have had more room for maneuver in offering their services as mediators to the Romans, but after news of the Roman victory arrived, there was no other course but to offer their congratulations. In case they missed the point about the changed dynamic, the senators spelled it out for them: it would have been more appropriate for the Rhodians to offer mediation “when Perseus was ravaging the lands and cities of the Greeks, and was encamped in Thessaly for almost two years,” rather than several years later “when our armies were encamped in Macedonia, and Perseus was surrounded and had very little hope of salvation.”⁷³ In other words, the Rhodian mediation offer would have been more suitable when the Greeks (and their Roman

⁶⁹ Berthold 1984: 205.

⁷⁰ Gruen 1984: 571; cf. 1975: 80: the Romans removed Rhodes “from the ranks of those who might be a source of trouble in the future. Such is the very likely connotation of Polybius’ statement: ‘the senate sought to make an example of Rhodes.’”

⁷¹ Ager 1991: 37; cf. 1996: 336: “Rhodes no longer had the same value as a Roman friend that it had once had.”

⁷² Ager 1991: 37.

⁷³ ἐκείνον οἰκειότερον εἶναι τὸν καιρόν, ὅτε Περσεύς τὴν τῶν Ἑλλήνων χώραν ἐπόρθει καὶ τὰς πόλεις, στρατοπεδεύων μὲν ἐν Θεσσαλίᾳ σχεδὸν ἐπὶ δὺ ἑνιαυτοὺς . . . νῦν παρεῖναι σπουδάζοντας διαλύειν τὸν πόλεμον, ὅτε παρεμβληκότων τῶν ἡμετέρων στρατοπέδων εἰς Μακεδονίαν συγκεκλεισμένος ὁ Περσεύς ὀλίγας παντάπασιν ἐλπίδας εἶχε τῆς σωτηρίας (Polyb. 29.19.7–8).

allies) were weak and insecure in the face of Perseus' successes;⁷⁴ but in the run-up to the Pydna victory, when Roman power was predominant almost everywhere in Greece and in Macedon itself, the obligation of Rome's friends and allies to defer to Roman power and wishes became more acute, and their room for maneuver – their arc of political possibility – became more closely circumscribed.

But this was not all. The Rhodians further miscalculated, according to Polybius, by actually owning up to the senate and revealing, even after the news of Pydna had been announced, the original purpose of their embassy. They probably expected to be respectfully heard by the senate as a status-equal, a proud *amicus* enjoying honor, dignity, the right of self-determination, and the ability to construe the dynamics of the relationship as they saw it, on a par with the Romans, even after the power dynamic had been so transformed by the Roman victory. The Rhodians probably also expected to be praised and rewarded by the *patres* for their honesty and candor – another prerogative, universally understood, of friends.⁷⁵ But, as Polybius says, “the (political) ignorance” (ἄγνοια: Polyb. 29.19.2) of the ambassadors, and of the anti-Roman faction more generally was their undoing. He means, I would suggest, that the Rhodians simply failed to understand that the status-asymmetry in the friendship had further shifted in Rome's favor following the outcome of the war against Perseus. This is not suprising, of course: the contrast in the senate's positive reaction to Rhodian candor in 189 BC (above, pp. 199–200) could not have been clearer. But the harshness of the Roman response in 168 was proportional, to the Roman mind at least, to the increase in Roman power that resulted from the battle of Pydna.

The *Machtpolitik* explanation has much to recommend it, then, but as the explanation in terms of friendship dynamics just detailed also suggests, a rigorously Realist interpretation merely scratches the surface. A contemporary Roman source amplifies a further, crucial dimension, intimately bound up with the explanation based on the practical logics of friendship. The sources reveal that the *patres'* anger towards the Rhodians after their appearance in the senate in 168 BC was so intense that M.' Iuventius Thalna, the peregrine praetor, even went so far as to try to have war declared on them through the dubious constitutional expedient of bypassing senatorial debate, and taking his war proposal directly to the Roman people (Polyb.

⁷⁴ On Rome's dismal performance in the opening rounds of the war with Perseus, see Berthold 1984: 187, 190–91.

⁷⁵ Cf. Ager 2009: 38: “operating within the Hellenistic tradition, the Rhodians might have thought they were behaving in a manner consistent with their friendship with Rome.”

30.3.4, 6; Livy 45.21; Diod. Sic. 31.5). Cato the Censor counseled caution, delivering his speech, famous in antiquity, the *Pro Rhodiensibus*, substantial fragments of which still survive (ORF³ Cato frs. 163–69 [= Gell. NA 6.3]).⁷⁶ In the speech, Cato argued that *Machtpolitik* was indeed important in these circumstances: it was in Rome's pragmatic interest to preserve its friendship with Rhodes (*[Rhodienses] quorum amicitiam retineri ex re publica fuit. . .*), since a show of Roman *clementia* can act as a deterrent to revolution and advertises Roman greatness (*metus in republica rerum nouarum. . . populi Romani magnitudinem*: Gell. NA. 6.3.47).⁷⁷ In addition to the pragmatic benefits of sparing Rhodes, however, Cato pointed to an even stronger set of moral obligations constraining Roman behavior: to punish the Rhodians for merely desiring Rome's defeat, and in the absence of any evidence that they took a single practical step toward achieving this goal, was fundamentally un-Roman: "so alien was it to Roman customary practice," in fact, "that the Republic often overlooked avenging injuries to itself" (*tantum aberat a populi Romani mansuetudine, ut saepe iam in sese factas iniurias ulcisci neglexerit*: Gell. NA 6.3.33). The Rhodians should not be punished, Cato argued, simply because they were afraid, as was natural, to "live in slavery to us under our sole power" (*metuere. . . ne sub solo imperio nostro in seruitute nostra essent*: ORF³ Cato fr. 164 [= Gell. NA 6.3.16]) – in modern IR Realist terms, under a system of unipolarity.

Cato also, however, apparently made much of the moral implications of Thalna's proposal: the powerful should not indulge in excessive *superbia*, *ferocia*, or *laetitia* in their success, but should rather continue to follow right counsel and right thinking, and when the celebrations of their victory were over, return to self-control (*recte consulendo atque intellegendo. . . potestatem nostrum redeamus*: ORF³ Cato fr. 163 [= Gell. NA 6.3.14]). Rome should furthermore treat the Rhodians as the most deserving close friends of the Republic (*optime meritis, necessarios reipublicae*: Gell. NA 6.3.52). There was no moral ground for the Romans either to deprecate the great benefits

⁷⁶ Discussion: Astin 1978: 273–83 (with older literature cited in n. 17, to which add Calboli 2003).

⁷⁷ As we will see below, pp. 326–27, this was precisely the sort of argument that critics of Popilius Laenas' breach of *fides* towards the Statellate Ligurians in 173 BC used against him: nobody would ever surrender to the Romans again if word got out how they treated their *dediticii*. Berthold 1984: 223 hints at another possible practical motivation for sparing the Rhodians: Rome needed the islanders to continue policing the eastern Mediterranean against pirates. Even in the appalling state of our sources for Rhodian activity after Pydna, we know that their navy continued to police the eastern seas, grappling with Cretan pirates in 155/154: Polyb. 33.13.2, 15.3–17.5; Diod. Sic. 31.45; Trogus *Prol.* 35. The reference to *res nouae* in the Cato passage quoted in the text is obscure: Astin 1978: 279–80 n. 27 suggests that it signals the moral-political effects for Rome of being unwilling to pardon Rhodes rather than any political innovation of the specifically Gracchan type (such as Thalna attempted on this occasion), much less political revolution in Rome's partner states.

given and received by the Rhodians, or to abandon such a great friendship (*tanta beneficia ultro citroque, tantam amicitiam*: ORF³ Cato fr. 165 [= Gell. NA 6.3.26]), especially because the Rhodians had in the past acquitted themselves, on Gellius' reading of Cato's speech, as Rome's greatest and most faithful allies (*optimos fidiissimosque socios*: Gell. NA 6.3.7).

Thus Cato's speech emphasized primarily the moral benefits of sparing the Rhodians, and only secondarily the pragmatic advantages – a conclusion that even the predominantly Realist analysis of Berthold cannot avoid.⁷⁸ But how does this help us determine the senate's primary motive for making an example of the Rhodians? The speech provides the answer: the Rhodians had been arrogant and proud. In one of the more striking statements in Cato's speech – especially in view of the vengeful and supremely self-confident post-Pydna Roman audience before whom it was delivered – the orator says, “so the Rhodians are arrogant. What's it to us? Should we be angry simply because someone is more arrogant than us?” (*Sint sane superbi. Quid id ad nos attinet? Idne irascimini, si quis superbior est quam nos?*: Gell. NA 6.3.50 = ORF³ Cato fr. 169). To impute to the Romans *superbia* – hardly a morally neutral term in the Roman political vocabulary – equivalent to the Rhodians' own was an extremely risky argument to make in the circumstances; indeed Gellius calls it “marvelous and almost divine” (*mirifica et prope diuina responsionis figura*: Gell. NA 6.3.48).⁷⁹ Cato was suggesting that even after Pydna, when, as his acquaintance Polybius believed, Roman power was unchallengeable in the Mediterranean system, it was still necessary for the Romans to conduct themselves towards their *amici* in the manner of friends rather than masters. Cato's point was, precisely, that even though the salience of Roman power in the eastern Mediterranean was not in question after Pydna, the Republic must, for both practical and moral reasons, continue to use that power wisely – which included continuing to treat friends as friends. Some members of the senate, Thalna included, wanted to treat the Rhodians like slaves (*in seruitute nostra*) – not clients, it should be noted⁸⁰ – whereas Cato and other right-thinking Romans wanted to preserve the great Roman–Rhodian friendship (*tantam amicitiam*) as it had always existed.

To the extent that the Rhodians deserved reproof for their conduct, then, it was due to their *superbia* – their “bad attitude,” in Berthold's formulation.⁸¹ In terms of the phenomenology of friendship, Cato's view

⁷⁸ Berthold 1984: 198: Cato's “motivations seemed to revolve about the moral aspects of the issue and the *utilitas publica* he believed would result from treating the Rhodians properly.”

⁷⁹ On Cato's argument here, see Yakobsen 2009: 67–68.

⁸⁰ *Contra*, e.g., Badian 1958a: 100–01; Errington 1971: 250–52; Berthold 1984: 201, 204, 211, etc.

⁸¹ Berthold 1984: 198.

was grounded in the twin drivers of the friendship process, utilitarian instrumentality and moral similarity (above, pp. 46–53). As Gellius says, Cato acted both for the state's best interests as well as for the salvation of the Rhodians (*pro utilitatibus publicis ac pro salute sociorum*: Gell. NA 6.3.18; cf. 6.3.44: [*Cato*] *non Rhodensibus magis quam rei publicae consultabat*).

From a Constructivist viewpoint, moreover, the most significant aspect of Cato's speech in 167 BC was its actual success in averting the Romans from declaring war on Rhodes. This was a real-world consequence of the first order: Roman actions and motivations were constructed almost exclusively as morally problematic, and even the utilitarian argument had a significant moral dimension (*clementia* is its own reward, in effect). In fact, as A.E. Astin has shown, the easiest way to read the surviving fragments of the speech and Gellius' commentary on it is to acknowledge that "Cato's arguments [were] overwhelmingly moral in character"; indeed, "it is even doubtful if there was any reference at all to considerations of *Realpolitik* – such as strategic interests, the policing role of the Rhodian navy, the balance between the Greek states, manpower resources, and practical objections to further Roman commitments in the East."⁸² Other scholars, however, are not so sure: "Rome," argues Sheila Ager, "acted primarily from considerations of expediency and advantage."⁸³ Some have also doubted whether Cato's arguments had any practical effects at all. Thus Erich Gruen dismisses Cato's "weighty objections" to Thalnia's war proposal with an assertion that the proposal "was no longer necessary anyway," and it is in any case uncertain how effective Cato's moral arguments were in turning aside Roman anger.⁸⁴ Berthold expresses similar doubts: "how much influence Cato's defense exerted on the minds of the *patres* is impossible to know. The senate in general must have realized that a war against Rhodes was not necessary to bring about its submission to Rome."⁸⁵ Even Astin, who does actually give due and appropriate weight to the moral aspects of Cato's case, wonders "just how decisive Cato's speech really was" in staying the hand of the senate against Rhodes.⁸⁶

All of this flies in the face of the verdict of Aulus Gellius, who was closer both in time and to the normative-cultural patterns of thought of the ancient world than we: Cato saved Rome's greatest and most faithful allies (*servatum socios, optimos fidissimosque socios*) from an unjust and impious war (*bellum iniustum atque impium*: Gell. NA 6.3.40) – evidently, *pace* Gruen and Berthold, war still was considered necessary among some

⁸² Astin 1978: 279.

⁸³ Ager 1991: 30.

⁸⁴ Gruen 1984: 571 and n. 5.

⁸⁵ Berthold 1984: 199.

⁸⁶ Astin 1978: 274.

senators – because they especially deserved to be esteemed and loved by the Roman people (*maxime essent acceptiores carioresque fieri populo Romano*: Gell. *NA* 6.3.25). These are, in the final analysis, once again predominantly moral arguments. Even the argument from *utilitas publica* cannot be cordoned off and disaggregated from moral concerns; after all, as we have seen, partly at issue here is Roman *magnitudo* – again, hardly a morally neutral term in the thought world of the Romans. As Astin argues, “there was no strong sense that these various considerations” – the moral and the expedient, the legal and the emotional – “were to be separated into different categories.”⁸⁷ We can go further, and suggest that if Cato’s arguments were mere rhetorical superstructure masking a Roman *Machtpolitik* motivation, and thus unconvincing to the vast majority of the senate, then the orator would not have wasted so much time in making such risky, morally charged arguments. As Astin has plausibly suggested, the centrality of the moral issue to Cato’s case strongly suggests that the moralizing language in his speech was designed, precisely, to resonate with the senators – a group that “did not habitually reach decisions on th[e] basis [of calculated expediency] alone, but was readily influenced by ‘moral,’ legalistic, and emotional considerations.”⁸⁸ That Cato evidently succeeded in turning aside Roman anger on such grounds is remarkable testimony to the power of language and the culturally specific normative sanctions in antiquity – even in the violent anarchy of the Mediterranean international system.

So how are we to assess the actual consequences of improper Rhodian behavior (*superbia*, “bad attitude”) as a status-inferior *amicus*? It should occasion no surprise by now that the issue of a friend’s demeanor played a role in all of this; after all, as was seen in [Chapter 2](#) (above, pp. 116–19), both Glabrio and the Aetolians criticized each other on precisely this point during the abortive Aetolian *deditio* in 191 BC. On that occasion, as we have seen, there was little question that Glabrio’s reaction to Aetolian complaints (sparing them the consequences of *deditio*) was “hard but fair” – as indeed was the Roman response to repeated displays of Aetolian bad faith throughout the 190s, and even after the Roman–Aetolian war. If we look closely at how the Rhodians were punished for their conduct, and apply the “hard but fair” test in their case, striking similarities emerge.

The Rhodians were initially overjoyed (*in gaudium*: Livy 45.25.6) that the Romans decided not to declare war on them after all, thanks to Cato, in 167 BC. But the measures eventually taken against them – depriving them of their suzerainty over Lycia and Caria, and having Delos declared a free

⁸⁷ Astin 1978: 280. ⁸⁸ Astin 1978: 279–83 (the quotation at 281).

port – soon became intolerable. The solution the Rhodians sought was a formal treaty with Rome. Several Rhodian embassies petitioning a *foedus* are recorded under the years 167 and 166, but the Romans turned them down every time. Polybius says that the Rhodians so earnestly pursued a treaty not because they needed it or because they feared any other states; it was Rome they feared, and they felt it necessary to free themselves from suspicions held by others.⁸⁹ Perhaps, once again, Polybius is being a little over-cynical here, in keeping with his thesis of a Roman determination to make the Rhodians suffer. Richard Berthold has made the more attractive suggestion that the state of limbo in which the Romans held the Rhodians between 167 and 164 – when the Republic considered them neither enemies nor allies (*nec hostes ferent nec socii*: Livy 45.25.4) – was extremely ruinous to Rhodian credit; they simply could not borrow enough from other states to finance their various commercial interests and enterprises.⁹⁰

However that may be, over the course of their various discussions before the senate, the Rhodians persistently argued that the entire Rhodian people should not be punished for the folly of the few: Astymedes apparently so argued in 167 (Livy 45.23.7), when he brought some anti-Roman Rhodian politicians to hand over to the senate (45.22.9), and furthermore assured the *patres* that many of the other responsible parties had fled into exile or killed themselves (45.24.6). There was apparently a faction in the Roman senate that was generally sympathetic to the view of Astymedes: Livy, following Polybius, reports that when the Roman legate, C. Decimus Gallus (pr. 169), visited Rhodes in 168, he assured the Rhodians that the Romans “blamed not the Rhodian people, but a few agitators of the mob,” and vowed that “everything would fall upon the heads of the guilty” (*culpam non penes populum, sed penes paucos concitatores uolgi esse dixit*. . . *omnia in capita noxiorum uersura*: 45.10.10–11; cf. Dio 20.68.1).⁹¹ When another Rhodian embassy headed up by Astymedes appeared in Rome in 164 seeking, yet again, a *foedus* with Rome, the lead ambassador reiterated his position that the entire Rhodian people did not deserve to be punished for the folly of a few (Polyb. 30.31.14). Shortly afterward, confirmation arrived from Sempronius Gracchus and other legates that the leading anti-Roman Rhodian politicians had been executed. The Rhodians were finally granted

⁸⁹ τότε δὲ μεγάλην ἐποιοῦντο φιλοτιμίαν, βουλόμενοι ταύτης τῆς τιμῆς τυχεῖν παρὰ Ῥωμαίων, οὐ κατεπειγόμενοι συμμαχίας οὐδ' ἀγωνιῶντες ἀπλῶς οὐδένα κατὰ τὸ παρὸν πλὴν αὐτῶν τῶν Ῥωμαίων, ἀλλὰ βουλόμενοι κατὰ τὴν ὑπέρθεσιν τῆς ἐπιβολῆς ἀφαιρεῖσθαι τὰς ὑπονοίας τῶν δυσχερές τι διανοουμένων περὶ τῆς πόλεως (Polyb. 30.5.9–10).

⁹⁰ Berthold 1984: 208.

⁹¹ Polybian derivation: Gruen 1975: 61 n. 3 (following Nissen 1863: 273).

their formal *foedus* – a great honor, as even the cynical Polybius cannot deny (μεγάλην . . . φιλοτιμίαν: Polyb. 30.5.9).⁹²

That the initial punishments in 167 BC fell on the Rhodian citizen body as a whole was beyond the senate's control, and perhaps even its immediate concern: Rhodes, like Rome, was a republic, and the *patres* probably satisfied themselves that the citizens should bear some responsibility for electing bad leaders to office in the first place. But the evidence also suggests that some Romans, such as Decimus Gallus as early as 168, were more concerned with singling out the culprits most responsible for anti-Roman behavior. The *patres* – or some of them, at least – responded positively to Rhodian arguments that only those most responsible should be punished. This is fully consistent with Roman behavior in other circumstances under scrutiny here: as in the Campanian and Ilergete cases discussed earlier, the Roman preference was to have the punishment for betraying Roman *fides* fall most heavily on those most responsible for transgressions. This was inevitably followed by the normalization of relations and the restoration of *amicitia*.

How harsh, finally, were the punishments the Romans inflicted on the Rhodians? As we have seen, Cato averted an all-out Roman war on the island republic, for which the Rhodians were duly grateful. Subsequent punishments (depriving Rhodes of Lycia and Caria, declaring Delos a free port, keeping the Rhodians in a state of limbo while their credit on international markets may have plummeted) were no doubt devastating to the Rhodian economy in the short term, but it was surely the Romans' prerogative to punish their arrogant Rhodian *amici* by depriving them of what the Romans had given them in the first place after the war with Antiochus – a territorial empire in Asia Minor, and a relatively free hand in the region. The Rhodian ambassador Astymedes argued as much before the senate in 164 BC.⁹³ Once the formal treaty was struck, however, Rhodes' credit rose, and prosperity soon returned. Although it is true that "Rhodes would not again be a major power," she was eventually able to recover as her confidence returned, and Roman interest in Asia Minor waned in subsequent decades. Diodorus remarks on how eastern kings beat a path

⁹² Rhodian requests for a *foedus*: Polyb. 30.5.4–10, 21.1, 23.2–3; Livy 45.25.7–10; Dio 20.68.2–3; Zonar. 9.24; *foedus* granted, 164 BC: Polyb. 30.31; Livy *Per.* 46; Zonar. 9.24.

⁹³ Polyb. 30.31.5: "ἀλλ' ἴσως" ἔφη "ταῦτα μὲν ἔχει λόγον· καὶ γὰρ ἐδώκαθ' ὑμεῖς αὐτὰ τῷ δήμῳ, μετὰ χάριτος <διὰ> τὴν εὐνοίαν, καὶ ἀφανίζοντες αὐτὰ κατὰ λόγον ἐδοκεῖτε τοῦτο πράττειν, ἐμπεισοῦσής τινός ὑποψίας καὶ διαφορᾶς ὑμῖν" ("but perhaps this makes sense," said Astymedes, "for you gave these lands to the Rhodian people as a reward for its goodwill, and by taking them away again you seem to have done so with justification, now that we have fallen under your suspicion and incurred your hostility").

to the Rhodians' door, and showered them with tribute (as well as marble theaters and gifts of grain), and Strabo can speak of Rhodian prosperity as late as his own day, the late first century BC/early first century AD.⁹⁴

The story of Roman–Rhodian relations between 172 and 164 BC is thus fully consistent with the cases discussed earlier in this section: the two parties in the friendship bilaterally interpreted the relationship's nature and obligations; these rather different interpretations, particularly as they concerned status-asymmetry, eventually came into conflict; the fault of the Rhodians – *superbia* – was primarily moral, and constructed as such; Roman restraint and discrimination in punishing their *amicus* for moral transgression was constructed in similarly moral terms; the punishments eventually meted out were proportional to the salience of Roman power in the area of Rhodian influence; and these punishments can be construed as “hard but fair” in terms of the individuals upon whose heads the harshest reprisals eventually fell. It is further significant, in this case at least, that the sudden breakdown of *amicitia* was not followed by dissolution, but by a repair of the relationship and a renegotiation of its parameters by the partners themselves.

The final case to be discussed in this section can be dealt with more briefly since it mirrors precisely many of the more significant aspects of the Rhodian case after Pydna. Eumenes II of Pergamum also came under Roman suspicion during the war against Perseus.⁹⁵ Polybius reports a rumor of ca. 168 BC that, after some tentative parleys between the two kings the year before, Perseus and Eumenes struck a deal whereby the latter would abandon the Roman cause for 500 talents, and for a further 1,500 talents would offer to mediate an end to the conflict. Through mutual mistrust, however, the deal ultimately fell through, with Eumenes trying to lure Perseus in by unsecured promises, and demanding payments in advance, and Perseus, not wanting to part with his money, insisting on hostages and a third party to broker the arrangement. The plan involved such folly (ἄγνοια, ἀλογιστία), and the chief protagonists were so avaricious and grasping (φιλαργυρώτατοι, μικρολόγοι) that Polybius could scarcely believe that it was true;⁹⁶ yet, he says, the facts were leaked out at the time they occurred, reaching Rome shortly thereafter, and were later confirmed

⁹⁴ Gruen 1984: 578 (whence the quotation), 579 (citing Diod. Sic. 31.36; Strabo 14.2.5 [652–653 C]).

⁹⁵ On what follows, see Badian 1958a: 102–05, 294–95; McShane 1964: 182–86; Will 1967: 245–46; Hansen 1971: 117–29; Errington 1971: 242–46; Cimma 1976: 163; Walbank 1979: 365–70; Gruen 1984: 559–63, 573–84; Sherwin-White 1984: 36–40; Eckstein 1988: 428–29, 432–33; Ferrary 1988: 183–84.

⁹⁶ On Polybius' moral outrage, see Eckstein 1995a: 73.

to him personally by some former associates of Perseus. Furthermore, the existence of a Pergamene–Macedonian deal satisfactorily explained, for Polybius, the senate's later shoddy treatment of Eumenes.⁹⁷

The existence of a pact between Perseus and Eumenes II to exchange mediation for money, as Polybius' commentary on it shows, was controversial already in antiquity. The Greek historian's own thesis – that the pact must have existed at some point since it explains Rome's later treatment of Eumenes – is no more believable than his similarly *ex post facto* theory that the senate had a long-standing plan to emasculate the Rhodians (see above).⁹⁸ The historian and his informants were in no position to know for sure whether the negotiations actually took place since, as he tells us, they were deliberately kept secret (Polyb. 29.5.1–3). Even Livy, who generally follows Polybius quite closely on eastern affairs for the early 160s BC, is circumspect when it comes to his main source's editorializing: in the passage that corresponds to Polyb. 29.9, where the Greek historian retails his thesis (29.9.3–5), all Livy has is: “what actually happened and was settled between the kings is not known” (*quid actum esset quidue inter reges convenisset, ignorabatur*: Livy 44.24.11).⁹⁹ The lack of hard evidence apparently so discomfited Diodorus (or his source) that he (or his source) invented a dossier of correspondence between Perseus and Eumenes proving the pact's existence; the documents, he says, only came to light after the war was over.¹⁰⁰

Modern historians are also fairly evenly divided on the question of the pact's authenticity.¹⁰¹ Ernst Badian, following H.H. Scullard, advocates “reluctant and cautious belief.”¹⁰² Erich Gruen is thoroughly skeptical, believing that Polybius was misled by his sources – the embittered partisans

⁹⁷ Parleys between Perseus and Eumenes: Polyb. 29.4.8, 6.1–2, 7.8; Livy 44.13.9, 24.9–10; cf. 44.20.7; the deal and its collapse: Polyb. 29.4.8–10, 6.2, 8.3–9; Livy 44.24.1–10, 25.5–12; App. *Mac.* 18.1; mistrust: Polyb. 29.7.2–3, 9.1–2, 7–9; folly and avarice of the kings: Polyb. 29.8.9–9.1, 12; cf. 29.8.2; Livy 44.24.8, 25.12–26.1; Polybius' disbelief: Polyb. 29.5.1; his sources: Polyb. 29.8.10; cf. 30.1.6; explains later treatment of Eumenes: Polyb. 29.9.3–5.

⁹⁸ Gruen 1984: 560, 581; *contra* Eckstein 1988: 429.

⁹⁹ On Livy's active critical engagement with Polybius' text, see Levene 2010: 126–63.

¹⁰⁰ Diod. Sic. 31.7.2; discussion: Gruen 1984: 561 n. 140. The source may be Valerius Antias, who also manufactured a story of Eumenes quarreling with the consul Philippus, refusing requests for assistance, and withdrawing from the war (Livy 44.13.12). Livy is rightly circumspect here (*si Valerio Antiati credas...*), and Gruen 1984: 562, cf. 576 dismisses the story as “malicious fiction” that Antias found “useful in justifying the senate's snub of Eumenes in the immediate postwar period.”

¹⁰¹ For a full list, *pro* and *contra*, see Gruen 1984: 560 n. 132.

¹⁰² Badian 1958a: 102 (following Scullard 1951: 286–87).

and former friends of Perseus, who were Polybius' coexiles in Italy following the war.¹⁰³ Arthur Eckstein reserves judgment: "whether the . . . story of Eumenes' proposed monetary arrangement with Macedon has a basis in reality is extremely difficult to say."¹⁰⁴ Fortunately, it makes no difference for the present purpose whether the Pergamene–Macedonian negotiations ever took place. For us what matters, as in the case of Rhodes, is that the rumors were believed at Rome.¹⁰⁵ What was Eumenes eventually accused of and punished for? There is a striking similarity to the Rhodian case here, in that the Pergamene king was never sanctioned for disloyalty or a lack of *fides*, but for an equally unforgivable moral transgression – greed.¹⁰⁶ The *patres* believed that Eumenes was guilty of "crooked" behavior (πλάγιον: 30.1.6) in attempting to make a deal with Perseus. The issue for the senate, in other words, was one of character. This is why the *patres* later agonized over how to receive Eumenes' request for a senatorial audience: they did not want to tell the king, whom they had greatly honored and advertised to the world as their "first and greatest friend" (πρῶτον καὶ μέγιστον φίλον . . . ἐξετίμησαν: 30.19.3), what they actually thought of him now; but if, on the other hand, they gave him a kind answer, they would then be overlooking their true feelings about him (παρόψεσθαι τὴν ἀλήθειαν: 30.19.4). Their solution was to ban all kings from setting foot in Italy, and Eumenes was unceremoniously sent packing at Brundisium (30.19.6–10).

Polybius adds another layer to the senate's motivation, however: the senate wished to avoid giving Eumenes a kind answer because it was not in "the state's interest" (τὸ τῇ πατρίδι συμφέρον: 30.19.4) to do so. A bit further on, the historian explains: the "yet more practical reason" (καὶ ἕτερον τι πραγματικόν: 30.19.11) for the snubbing of Eumenes was in order to encourage the Galatians of Asia Minor to continue their attacks on his kingdom. Perhaps not surprisingly, and in keeping with their interpretations of the Rhodian episode discussed earlier, Roman historians under the sway of IR Realism have opted for this explanation of Roman conduct rather than the one from morality outlined in the previous paragraph.

¹⁰³ Gruen 1984: 562. Polybius' sources: Polyb. 29.8.10; cf. 30.1.6.

¹⁰⁴ Eckstein 1988: 428; but given the faith Eckstein puts in Polybius' thesis (above), he may be said to incline towards acceptance.

¹⁰⁵ Gruen 1984: 560: the evidence of Polybius "indicates only that the *patres* believed the story, not that it is true."

¹⁰⁶ Cf. Gruen 1984: 563: "Eumenes, in fact, was never charged openly by the Roman senate for contemplating defection or consorting with the enemy"; Eckstein 1988: 429: "As Polybius conceives it, the reason for senatorial hostility toward Eumenes was the belief that he had been willing to drop out of the war, and attempt to mediate it, merely for the sake of *money* – a bribe [emphasis in the original]." For the definition of πλάγιον, see LSJ, s.v., II.

Badian, for example, applies a Cold-War style analysis of power balancing and *Realpolitik*, arguing that after Pydna Rome became more interventionist in the East in pursuit of a policy of “establishing a balance of power in Asia and making the kings and peoples composing it directly dependent upon herself.” Rome, furthermore, was “determined to forbid the growth of any power not wholly dependent on her favour within the geographical limits she [could] control.”¹⁰⁷ Gruen concurs: “Rome had grown suspicious of power concentrations in the East and would not promote the interests of states which had attained too much authority since Apamea.”¹⁰⁸

Badian admits, though, and Gruen's detailed analysis supports him in this, that “we do not hear of any decisive action on the part of Rome” to weaken Eumenes in the aftermath of Pydna.¹⁰⁹ As in the case of Rome's postwar treatment of Rhodes, perhaps it is best to keep the *Machtpolitik* explanation in its proper perspective, and accept as factual Polybius' picture of the senate being almost paralyzed by the moral dilemma in which Eumenes had entangled them. We have seen the *patres* agonizing over questions of precisely this type before, for example in the debate preceding the acceptance of the Mamertine *deditio* in 264 BC, and in the arguments over the proper course of action with respect to Rhodes in 167. Even Arthur Eckstein, the most rigorous proponent of the IR Realist interpretation of Roman international relations during the Republic, believes that “it was not unknown for the *patres* to be moved simply by sudden large changes in opinion and emotion, the result being radical changes in policy.” This too is familiar from the debate over whether to declare war on Rhodes in 167: there, as we have seen, A.E. Astin interpreted the famous debate between Cato and Iuventius Thalna over whether to declare war on Rhodes in similar terms. Eckstein is led to conclude that the *Machtpolitik* explanation “can find no support in the sources.”¹¹⁰ The Constructivist approach, on the other hand, makes perfect sense of what happened. As in the Rhodian case, the Romans once again found themselves caught in a discursive trap of their own and the Attalids' making (a “special relationship” in which Eumenes was the Romans' “first and greatest friend”), and the only way out was to adopt a different discursive strategy altogether, banning kings from Italian shores, and letting Eumenes get back to the business of Hellenistic kings – making war and generally adding to the violent anarchy of the eastern Mediterranean.

¹⁰⁷ Badian 1958a: 104. ¹⁰⁸ Gruen 1984: 574; others listed at Eckstein 1988: 432 n. 75.

¹⁰⁹ Badian 1958a: 105; cf. Gruen 1984: 577–78, 580–82, 584. ¹¹⁰ Eckstein 1988: 432.

So what does Polybius mean when he says that it was in Rome's practical best interest to snub Eumenes? Perhaps, as we have seen in the Rhodian case, the salience of Roman power in the East in the immediate postwar period had something to do with it, and in terms of the dynamics of *amicitia*, the Romans were serving notice that the asymmetry in the relationship had been drastically altered in their favor by the victory at Pydna. But, like the Rhodian case as well, where the senate chose to make an example of the island republic, the senate's pragmatic course had a moral focus: the point was to show to Eumenes and others that such morally questionable behavior by Rome's *amici* would no longer be tolerated. The special friendship between Eumenes and Rome apparently broke down for reasons similar to those that often enough cause breakdowns in interpersonal friendships: one partner's moral character changes, or is perceived to be changed; alternatively, what was once thought of as the person's true nature is revealed to be only subterfuge, masking a worse character. The latter explanation well suits what Polybius says greatly concerned the *patres* when agonizing over whether to grant Eumenes an audience: they worried that if they admitted publicly that they were done with their "first and greatest friend," they would "shame themselves" (ἐκθεατριεῖν αὐτούς; Polyb. 30.19.3) by telling him what they really thought of him; in other words, they would appear to the outside world to be faulty judges of their friends' characters. The alternative – to lie, "to be a slave to outward appearance" (δουλεύοντες τῇ τῶν ἐκτὸς φαντασίᾳ), and to receive Eumenes kindly (φιλανθρώπως; 30.19.4) – was of course just as bad, since it would be a denial of the truth – a clear violation of *fides*. This was not in the best interest of Rome in the sense that the *patres* would gain a bad reputation for overlooking the moral failings of their friends – something they were well known for not tolerating in their enemies. Thus the moral dilemma in which the *patres* found themselves as a result of Eumenes' immorality, and in spite of their past favors for him, compelled a robust diplomatic response, regardless of how specious or silly it must have seemed to many to issue a decree banning kings from Italy.

How harsh was the Roman response to Eumenes' bad behavior, in the end? As in the Rhodian case, the short-term consequences were devastating: Eumenes' reputation probably suffered immensely after he was turned away from Italy at Brundisium in the dead of winter by a mere quaestor, and the senate passed its decree banning kings from the *curia* – a move transparently and publicly aimed at Eumenes himself. The senate also began to show conspicuous favoritism towards the king's brother Attalus and, if Polybius is to be trusted, some of the most distinguished of its

members privately promised him a separate kingdom.¹¹¹ In the immediate aftermath of Pydna, the senate also liberated Aenus and Maronea from Pergamene control, which effectively deprived Eumenes of the rich mining revenues derived from these cities' territories. Such expressions of disfavor also encouraged the Galatians to increase their attacks on Pergamum, since they could feel confident that Rome would provide the king no protection. Although Eumenes managed to resist the Galatians, and indeed turn the tables on them and subdue them completely, when he was poised to strike the final blow against them, in 166 BC, the *patres* intervened with a decree proclaiming the Galatians free and autonomous.¹¹² A few years later the senate continued its vendetta against Eumenes, sending C. Sulpicius Gallus to the East to set up a tribunal in Antioch for the express purpose of inviting complaints against the king.¹¹³ Although this gave Eumenes' brother and successor, Attalus, all the justification he needed to express reluctance to help Attis, the high priest of the Great Mother at Pessinus, fight the Galatians without Roman consent, as we saw in the previous chapter, in the end this was no obstacle to him taking vigorous action and wreaking havoc in Anatolia and Syria in the 150s (above, pp. 222–23).

On the other hand, the very fact that Eumenes was able to hold his own against the Galatians – to say nothing of his brother's success in overturning Rome's eastern arrangements in the next decade – suggests that matters were not quite so simple. The short-term consequences for Pergamene power of the Roman snubbing of Eumenes were evidently minimal. Even after the senate declared the Galatians free and autonomous, Eumenes continued to make war on them (Polyb. 30.30.2) without any effective Roman response. Over the next few years, Pergamum's regional enemies, especially Prusias of Bithynia, made continuous complaints about Eumenes' defiance of senatorial decrees, his aggression against the Galatians and Bithynia, as well as his intrigues with Antiochus IV,¹¹⁴ but to no effect: senatorial embassies and fact-finding missions followed, but that headed by Ti. Sempronius Gracchus in 165 BC discovered nothing beyond what

¹¹¹ Polyb. 30.1.7–3.7; Gruen 1984: 574–75 expresses doubts. Livy, who, as we have seen (above, p. 293), tries to soften Polybius' *ex post facto* rationalization of Rome's treatment of Eumenes, does not include the story in his version at 45.19.4–7. But this cannot disprove the story outright since it was in Livy's (or his Roman source's) patriotic interest to exclude it.

¹¹² Measures taken against Eumenes: Polyb. 29.6.3–4, 22; 30.1–3, 19.5–14, 30.2–4; Livy 45.13.12, 19.1–20.3, 34.10–14; *Per.* 46; Just. *Epit.* 38.6.4; Diod. Sic. 31.12–13; Eumenes subdues the Galatians: Diod. Sic. 31.14; Roman declaration of Galatian freedom and autonomy: Polyb. 30.28.

¹¹³ Polyb. 31.1.6–8, 6; Paus. 7.11.1–3; Gruen 1984: 581 expresses doubt that this investigation was intended seriously.

¹¹⁴ Polyb. 30.30.2–4; Livy *Per.* 46 (165); Polyb. 31.1.3; Diod. Sic. 31.7.2 (164); Polyb. 31.32.1; 32.1.5–6 (160/159); discussion: Gruen 1984: 580.

Prusias had already reported, and two Pergamene embassies to Rome in 164 and 160/159 headed by Attalus succeeded in charming the *patres* into freeing Eumenes from any lingering suspicions, and returned to Pergamum covered with honors and gifts from the senate.¹¹⁵ As for Eumenes' reputation in his last years, Polybius cannot deny that he had the highest reputation of all the kings among the Greek states for physical strength, brilliance, greatness, resplendence, honor, intelligence, industry, and energy, as well as for his generosity in creating the personal fortunes of many men. Indeed, several extant inscriptions attest to Eumenes' munificence and the gratitude he earned in return.¹¹⁶ Thus despite Roman attempts to corral and control Eumenes and damage his reputation in the years immediately following Pydna, the Pergamene king continued to remake the region – and his image – in a way more congenial to his own power and security interests than to Rome's. The senate's encouragement of Attalus during this same period points to the real purpose behind senatorial policy towards Pergamum in these years: Rome had no interest in weakening the Pergamene kingdom *per se*, but only its current king. After Eumenes' death, ca. 158, the senate made "a greater friend" of the new king, Attalus, and "strengthened his kingdom" (ἐφιλοποιοῖτο καὶ συνηῦχε τὸν Ἀτταλον: Polyb. 32.1.7). Thus in the 160s the Romans wanted to reassign Pergamene authority to Attalus and extend his power in Asia – not their own.¹¹⁷ The primary issue for Rome, therefore, was Eumenes' moral character, not the power of the Pergamene kingdom.

Thus in terms of the "hard but fair" test kept in view throughout this section, we can see the senate pursuing its customary discretion in persecuting those most responsible for bad behavior. Harsh reprisals affecting Eumenes' ambitions as well as his reputation were implemented after Pydna; at the same time Attalus received favorable treatment from the *patres*. After Eumenes' death, relations with Pergamum were normalized, and the *amicitia* could proceed as it had always done on that basis – with, as we have seen, Roman interest in the region declining and, despite Attalus' protestations of caution to the high priest Attis at Pessinus, with the

¹¹⁵ Gracchus' report: Polyb. 30.30.6–7; Pergamene embassy, 164: Polyb. 31.1.4–5; Diod. Sic. 31.7.2; Pergamene embassy, 160/159: Polyb. 32.1.6; discussion: Gruen 1984: 580–81.

¹¹⁶ Eumenes' reputation: Polyb. 32.8.1–5; for a full list of inscriptions honoring Eumenes, see Gruen 1984: 197–98 nn. 251–53. Polybius, in a desperate attempt to salvage his thesis of a senatorial drive to emasculate Eumenes, suggests elsewhere that the king's popularity among the Greeks rose in proportion to his shabby treatment by Rome (Polyb. 31.6.6); Gruen 1984: 584 provides a salutary corrective.

¹¹⁷ The point is made by Eckstein 1988: 432–33.

Pergamene king exercising a free hand in shaping the geopolitical situation in the East to his own advantage.

A brief review is in order. In this section, I have argued that the best-documented cases of friendship breakdown between Rome and her international *amici* are described in the sources as arising primarily from perceived violations of *fides*, or similarly egregious moral failings by Rome's friends. In the course of making the argument, other significant patterns, arising from the practical logics of friendship, have been uncovered: that there was no distinction, in Roman thinking, between the obligations owed them by international friends who had established *amicitia* through *deditio* and those who had not; that disputes between Rome and her international *amici* often arose from misunderstandings about the nature of the friendship and its particular parameters, which in turn caused divergent interpretations by the partners of their obligations towards each other; that Rome's international *amici* expected the Romans to be "hard but fair" in punishing perceived breaches of loyalty and other moral transgressions – and that Rome, for the most part, strove to conform to these expectations; and finally, that the extent and nature of Roman reprisals against violators of *fides* were often constrained by the salience of Roman power in a particular region, which was then reflected, on the level of discourse, in renegotiations or attempted renegotiations of the terms and conditions of *amicitiae* in order to have these accurately reflect ongoing changes in status-asymmetries. The latter factor, as we have seen, does not completely undermine the usual *Machtpolitik* explanations for Roman behavior, but puts them in their proper perspective by adding a processual layer of analysis within a discursive framework dominated by moralizing language, and along a fairly elastic continuum of political possibility. Perhaps most importantly, the focus on the processual, relational, and moral aspects of international friendship breakdown restores the discourse and patterns of thought of the ancient diplomats, statesmen, and literary sources responsible for their construction to the center of the analysis, where it belongs.

CAUSATION: VIOLATIONS OF *FIDES* BY ROME

All too frequently this study has had the opportunity to ponder, either incidentally or as part of a larger theme, examples of Roman bad faith and sharp practice towards allies and friends. In [Chapter 3](#), we saw how the Romans failed to credit the Numidian Syphax with any moral equivalence, with Fabius Cunctator accusing him of *fraus* while he was still, technically,

a Roman *amicus* (28.42.7), how the Roman commander Glabrio's intemperate attitude and demands could be decried as "neither just nor Greek" by his Aetolian *dediticii* in 191 BC (Polyb. 20.10.6), and how Hiero II of Syracuse could excoriate the Romans for using their dedication to *fides* as moral cover for helping the impious, bloodthirsty, murderous Mamertines in 264 (Diod. Sic. 23.1.4). Chapter 4 revealed Aetolian criticisms of Rome's lukewarm support during its war against Philip between 211 and 206: it was a "useless alliance" in which the Romans only "pretended to take up arms against [Philip] for [the Aetolians'] sake and on [their] behalf" (*inutili societate Romana . . . propter uos et pro uobis arma sumpta aduersus eum simulabant*: Livy 31.29.3, 5). The same chapter showed how in 207, Sulpicius Galba may have tried covertly to derail negotiations to end the war between Aetolia and Macedon (App. *Mac.* 3). Also described in Chapter 4 were Quinticius Flamininus' acquiescence in the assassination of the anti-Roman Boeotian leader, Bracchyles (Polyb. 18.43; Livy 33.27–28), the Achaean Lycortas' confrontation with Ap. Claudius Pulcher in 184, accusing the Romans of hypocrisy and of treating their free allies as slaves (Livy 39.37.9–11), the senate's "unjust" confinement of the Seleucid, Demetrius, in Rome, and preference for a weak and pliable infant, Antiochus V, to occupy the Syrian throne (Polyb. 31.2.1, 7), the failure of the Romans to protect their Illyrian *amici* when Philip V attacked them in 213 and 212 (Livy 27.30.13–14), Hannibal's criticism of the Roman execution of pro-Carthaginian Saguntines as "unjust" (Polyb. 3.15.7), and Rome's callous abandonment of Saguntum in her hour of need (Polyb. 3.15.1–2). Perhaps not surprisingly, the present chapter has also abounded with instances, or what could be construed by their friends as instances, of Roman bad faith: above all, Flamininus' deceit and arrogance in his dealings with the Aetolians, and his refusal (as the Aetolians saw it) to credit their contributions to Rome's wars or to reward them properly; the injustice, as not only the Rhodians saw it but Cato as well, of declaring war on Rhodes and, as the Rhodian Astymedes asserted, of punishing all the Rhodians for the foolishness of the few; the deviousness of the senators in attempting to undermine the power and reputation of Eumenes II after Pydna; and their broken promise to Eumenes' brother Attalus that Aenus and Maronea would be handed back to the Pergamene king.

This is a sobering and depressing litany, to be sure, but perhaps not exceptional in the ancient Mediterranean, where security was precarious, and diplomatic disputes and misunderstandings were frequently seized upon as pretexts for aggressive behavior. In this section some further cases of Roman *fides*-violation will be explored in greater detail with a view

to establishing further the constitutive power of discursive frameworks in Roman interstate relations. Naturally the interpretative work of this section will not be nearly as complex as the previous one, primarily because we will be less concerned with the Roman perspective on friendship conflicts, and in most cases there is no question of Roman violations of *fides* being sanctioned or punished by other states, and the status-asymmetry between Rome and her *amici* is less a matter of dispute. As in the previous section, moreover, the concern here will be less with assessing whether Roman conduct demonstrated bad faith or sharp practice in some larger, objective sense than with determining how Rome's friends viewed Roman conduct. The voices of these "Others" are faint, at best, so the focus here will be above all on those cases where the authentic pronouncements of Rome's *amici* can be unambiguously disaggregated from the static of a Romanocentric historiography. Opposition voices in internal debates in Rome over how to manage their conflicts with friends (such as Cato's in 167 BC, discussed above) can occasionally and fruitfully amplify or substitute for the frequently suppressed voices of Rome's *amici*. We will perhaps be least concerned with the opinions of the ancient historians whose interpretations, as we have seen in the case of Polybius' commentary on the Rhodian and Pergamene situations after Pydna, sometimes blur the line between what actually happened and what should or may have happened, and indulge in *ex post facto* speculation.¹¹⁸

Exhibit A on the indictment list against Rome, beginning with Polybius himself, is the Republic's opportunistic seizure of Sardinia and Corsica in 238/237 BC.¹¹⁹ The Treaty of Lutatius, ending Rome's first war with Carthage in 241, reestablished their *amicitia*. Subsequently Carthage was forced to undertake a grueling war against her own mercenaries both in North Africa and on Sardinia. During this period, Carthage and Rome performed friendly services for each other, the former returning some 500 Italian traders who were caught supplying Carthage's enemies in Africa, and the latter returning thousands of Carthaginian prisoners of war, as well as refusing an invitation to occupy Sardinia by the mercenaries in revolt there in 240/239, and an offer by the citizens of Utica (who had revolted from Carthaginian rule) to surrender their city to Rome

¹¹⁸ See Griffin 2008: esp. 95–98 for further examples of critiques of Roman imperialism by ancient authors, most of which are beyond the chronological scope of this study.

¹¹⁹ Discussion: Walbank 1957: 148–50; Badian 1958a: 43; Errington 1971: 30–34; Dorey and Dudley 1972: 30, 37; Meloni 1975: 29–37; Lazenby 1978: 20–21; Harris 1979: 190–93; Scardigli 1991: 205–43; Twyman 1992: 104–05; Thiel 1994: 134–36; Eckstein 1995a: 101–02, 144; Lazenby 1996: 175; Carey 1996: 203–22; Feig Vishnia 1996: 16–17; Hoyos 1998: 132–43 (with full citation of the older literature); Eckstein 2006: 168–69.

(Polyb. 1.83.7–11). At some point, however, either late in 238 or early in 237,¹²⁰ some of the mercenaries, fleeing a revolt of native Sardinians, deserted to the Romans and invited them to take charge of the island; this time, the senate accepted their offer and sent out a garrison to occupy Sardinia. When the Carthaginians protested this move, the *patres* accused them of making preparations not against the Sardinians but against the Romans themselves, and a formal declaration of war on Carthage was hastened through the *comitia*. Carthage, chastened and still reeling from the defeat of 241, yielded to circumstances, relinquished control of Sardinia and Corsica, and had the indemnity imposed on them at the end of the First Punic War increased.¹²¹

How to explain the senate's extraordinarily aggressive behavior on this occasion? Unfortunately, no ancient source discloses a motive. Modern scholarship, not surprisingly, has rushed to fill the gap. The standard view is that the Romans acted aggressively for strategic security reasons:¹²² so J.F. Lazenby suggests that the seizure of the islands was a preemptive strike designed to prevent Sardinia playing the same trip-wire role that Sicilian Messina had played in triggering the First Punic War;¹²³ Piero Meloni accepts that the seizure was "dictated only by the need for security in the central Mediterranean; an episode symptomatic of 'defensive' imperialism";¹²⁴ Nigel Bagnall argues that "Sardinia was of strategic importance to Rome . . . and its occupation by a hostile power threatened her sea communications and coastal cities";¹²⁵ Rachel Feig Vishnia's view is that the Romans needed to neutralize the piratical Ligurians of Sardinia ahead of the planned Roman offensive against the Celts, the strategic key to which was control of the navigation routes between the islands and the Italian coast;¹²⁶ and Arthur Eckstein has most recently argued that the Romans regarded Sardinia and Corsica as "a barrier reef against Carthaginian naval attacks on Italy should there be hostilities again," as well as a potential hindrance to "possible Punic cooperation with the Celts of the Po Valley."¹²⁷

Unfortunately for all such *Machtpolitik* explanations, they cannot account for why the Romans rejected Sardinia when it was offered to them on a silver platter by the revolting mercenaries three years earlier, in

¹²⁰ Debate over the date (inconclusive): Carey 1996: 206 n. 16; Hoyos 1998: 138–40 and n. 15.

¹²¹ Sources for the seizure of Sardinia and the Roman declaration of war: Polyb. 1.88.8–12; cf. 3.10.1–3, 13.1, 15.10, 27.8, 28.1–2, 30.4; Fest. 430 L; Livy *Per.* 20; Zonar. 8.18.

¹²² Hoyos 1998: 140 n. 16 gathers the testimony.

¹²³ Lazenby 1996: 175; cf. Carey 1996: 215, 222 on the thesis of preemption by a resurgent Carthage.

¹²⁴ Meloni 1975: 37. ¹²⁵ Bagnall 1990: 123. ¹²⁶ Feig Vishnia 1996: 17.

¹²⁷ Eckstein 2006: 168; cf. Carey 1996: 215 on "Rome's long-standing desire to create 'bulwarks' of defense."

240/239 BC. If the Romans were so innately aggressive and concerned for their security, and perhaps for their maritime trade, why demand as late as 238/237 what they could have freely accepted in 240/239, with less damage to their reputations? Some scholars have exercised considerable ingenuity to get around the problem of the timing of the Roman seizure. An old explanation that has fallen out of favor suggests that the senate was divided between a “war party” and a “peace party,” and that the former was temporarily in the ascendant in 238/237.¹²⁸ J.H. Thiel argues that it would have been imprudent for the Romans to intervene in 240/239 because if they had done so, the rebels would have defeated Carthage, and thus Rome would have lost many installments of the Punic indemnity payments arising from the last war.¹²⁹ William Carey has resurrected and refined an idea that goes all the way back to Otto Gilbert in 1876, that Sardinia was technically “ownerless” from 240/239; Carey argues that because the island had been lost to the Carthaginians for around two years by the time the Romans took over in 238/237, the Punic state’s right of *usus* had been lost, the island “had reverted to a state of primitive vacancy,” and was thus in effect “up for grabs.” Legally, the Romans were well within their rights to seize control of Sardinia in 238/237, the argument goes, but no earlier than this because of the prevailing statute of limitations on *usus* in Roman law. Moralizing criticism by ancient authors, such as Polybius, and by many more modern scholars of Roman international relations is, therefore, inappropriate.¹³⁰

One may legitimately ask, however, why Polybius’ Roman sources did not so argue. Those such as Fabius Pictor or Cato the Elder surely would have been familiar with the technicalities of Roman legal thinking, and could have offered the legal argument as a more honorable pretext than the lie they apparently settled on – that the seizure of Sardinia was just compensation for the murder of some Italian traders by the Carthaginians during the Mercenary War.¹³¹ Polybius makes fairly short work of this fable: the Romans had, in fact, received the traders back unharmed and without ransom in a prisoner exchange with Carthage (Polyb. 1.83.8; 3.28.3). Carey anticipates criticism on this point, arguing that in the same manner in which Roman historians responded to the invention of the so-called “Treaty of Philinus,” which had the effect of faulting Rome for the outbreak of

¹²⁸ Cf. Frank 1914: 113; Badian 1958a: 43; Goldsworthy 2000: 136; others at Carey 1996: 207 n. 19. Critique: Hoyos 1998: 141.

¹²⁹ Thiel 1994: 135.

¹³⁰ Carey 1996 (quotation on 211); older sources: Carey 1996: 211 n. 34; Hoyos 1998: 137 n. 9.

¹³¹ On the possible sources for this and the other great annalistic fabrication, which made Sardinia part of the Carthaginian surrender in 241 BC, see Walbank 1957: 356; Carey 1996: 210; Hoyos 1998: 136–37; Eckstein 1995b: 102.

the First Punic War by inventing an earlier Carthaginian breach of that treaty instead of attempting to prove that it did not exist (above, p. 146), so in the Sardinia case, “the claim that Carthage had treacherously seized Roman shipping, or that Sardinia had been surrendered in 241, made for simpler and more effective propaganda than the complicated and – for non-Romans – over-technical [legal] argument” that the island was, in fact, *terra nullius*.¹³² Such an argument is difficult to sustain, however; it assumes that all Roman historians were mere mindless propagandists – and lazy ones at that. As we saw earlier, Livy, for one, was not above a critical approach to his source, Polybius. However that may be, the most jarring note sounded by Carey’s thesis is the idea that morality was not at issue, or at least, that the type of morality in question (i.e., legalistic) “was peculiarly Roman, foreign to both Polybius and ourselves.”¹³³

It is perhaps best to return to the ancient sources themselves, in particular Polybius, to discover how others saw Roman conduct in this episode.¹³⁴ The Greek historian is particularly “hot” on the issue of the seizure of Sardinia, and repeatedly condemns the Romans in his text for behaving “unjustly” (ἀδικῶς: Polyb. 3.15.10), and “contrary to all justice” (παρὰ πάντα τὰ δίκαια: 3.28.2). He also says that the Romans acted “contrary to sworn oaths” (παρὰ τοὺς ὅρκους: 3.28.1) by engaging in the “robbery” (ἄφαίρεσιν: 3.30.4) of Sardinia, and increasing the indemnity.¹³⁵

Polybius’ view, therefore, is unambiguous. But what of Rome’s Carthaginian antagonists? Polybius, famously, makes the seizure of Sardinia “the principal cause” (μεγίστην . . . αἰτίαν: Polyb. 3.10.4) of the subsequent war with Hannibal and a catalyst for widespread Carthaginian anger against Rome. The historian also excoriates Hannibal at one point for arguing over Saguntum with the Roman envoys who visited him at New Carthage in 220 BC – how much better it would have been for the Carthaginian leader to demand the restoration of Sardinia, and the refund of the extra tribute Rome imposed in 238/237 (3.15.10). Elsewhere, Polybius reports that the Carthaginians reacted to the seizure by arguing that the control over Sardinia belonged to them, not Rome (1.88.9). Finally, he asserts that the Carthaginians felt that they would win any negotiation with Rome on the issue since they believed they had justice on their side (ὑπολαμβάνοντες αὐτοὺς νικήσειν τοῖς δίκαισις: 3.10.1). The latter statement, coupled with Polybius’ criticism of Hannibal at 3.15.10, is the

¹³² Carey 1996: 221–22. ¹³³ Carey 1996: 204.

¹³⁴ Later, less reliable sources (listed at Carey 1996: 205 n. 9, 207 n. 19; Hoyos 1998: 134) add nothing of value.

¹³⁵ Discussion: Eckstein 1995b: 101.

only clear indication of how the Carthaginians themselves constructed the episode – and their judgment is cast in the familiar moral terms of justice and right.¹³⁶ Eckstein is fully justified in equating Polybius' view with that of the Carthaginians themselves.¹³⁷

How, then, did the Roman senate view its own behavior – as legally justified or morally justified? It must be significant that despite the scatter-shot treatment Polybius gives to the episode (five notices spread across two books), much of it bare summary, and despite the fact that much of what he says is *in propria persona* editorializing, the senate's view still manages to pierce through the fog. Roman conduct in 240 BC, when the *patres* happily undertook the exchange of prisoners with Carthage, agreed to allow Italian traders to supply only the Carthaginians instead of both sides in the conflict, and refused to accept Sardinia from the mercenaries or Utica from its citizens when they were offered them (Polyb. 1.83.6.11), is characterized by Polybius not just as “keeping their treaty obligations” (θροῦντες τὰ κατὰ τὰς συνθήκας δίκαια: 1.83.5, 11) but “prompt and friendly” (ἑτοιμῶς καὶ φιλανθρωπῶς: 1.83.9). Rome is also included in Polybius' list of “friends” (φίλων: 1.83.12) helping Carthage at this time. Such morally charged language may have passed between Roman and Carthaginian diplomats in Polybius' sources, but this cannot be known for sure.

On the other hand, when the breach came, the Romans apparently cast their own position in the language of *fides*-violation that has become quite familiar over the course of this chapter: “the Romans asserted,” says Polybius, “that the Carthaginians' preparations were being made not against the Sardinians but against themselves” (φάσκοντες αὐτοὺς οὐκ ἐπὶ Σαρδονίους, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ σφᾶς ποιεῖσθαι τὴν παρασκευήν: 1.88.10) – an accusation, in other words, of deception and bad faith. This was precisely the argument the *patres* would later use against the Rhodians in 167 BC: the islanders' mediation attempt was designed to favor Perseus, not Rome. Thus, despite the ingenious reconstruction by Carey, it appears that all those concerned in the Sardinian crisis of 238/237 – the Carthaginians, the Romans, and Polybius himself – were fully consistent in constructing the issue in terms of morality. This means, *pace* Carey, that the sort of morality in question was not “peculiarly Roman [that is, legalistic], foreign both to Polybius and to ourselves”; it was the same sort of moral construction of reality, arising from the practical logics of international *amicitia*, that we have seen repeatedly in this study.

¹³⁶ Carthaginian anger is clear from Polyb. 3.10.5, but the grounds for it are not stated.

¹³⁷ Eckstein 2006: 169.

Was the stated reason for Roman action on this occasion mere discursive superstructure designed to conceal a policy driven by sheer *Machtpolitik*? That certainly seems to lie behind the choice of verb Polybius uses to describe the Roman assertion that the Carthaginians were preparing to attack Rome rather than Sardinia; φάσκω, in addition to “to assert,” also carries implications of allegation or pretense.¹³⁸ But Roman deception, if that was what it was, was part of a broader self-deception shared by all participants in the drama. As Jon Lendon has shown, the ancient discourse of right, honor, obligation, and justice was a kind of shared mask or mirage, “one of the conspiracies of imagination” that the powerful used “to conceal sterner realities . . . permitting the efficient exercise of brute power under an unobjectionable veil.”¹³⁹ Rome’s stated pretext for seizing Sardinia had to be couched in terms that were believable – and acceptable – to a broader audience: there would have been no point in making an argument nobody could believe, or that would provoke hostility. That the language of *fides* – violation, right, and justice was deployed by all sides and at every turn in the Sardinia crisis indicates that we are dealing with a discursive construction of reality in which all were complicit. This collective self-deception is the discursive trap mentioned several times already in this chapter. The problem the Romans had was persuading enough people – including critical historians – that right and justice were on their side, especially because the Carthaginians were using the same language in making the case for their ownership of Sardinia and Corsica as well.

As for Rome’s true motivation for the seizure of Sardinia, once the correct discursive context is established, it seems to be not terribly different from the purpose behind the humbling of Rhodes and Pergamum after Pydna: to administer a lesson in the changed nature and dynamics of the Roman–Carthaginian *amicitia*. Another crucial, irrefutable detail that cuts through the static of our partisan evidence is that the Carthaginians were in a considerably better position in 238/237 BC than they had been in 240, when Rome provided all manner of friendly assistance to them in the Mercenary War. The rebellion was all but fully suppressed, Carthaginian territory in Africa had apparently increased, and within months of losing Sardinia (by summer 237), Hamilcar would launch his major expedition of conquest in Spain.¹⁴⁰ “Carthage [was] now resurgent,” as even Carey cannot deny.¹⁴¹ He is right to emphasize, however, that a *Machtpolitik* explanation still cannot adequately explain the timing of Rome’s seizure of Sardinia:

¹³⁸ LSJ, s.v. ¹³⁹ Lendon 2001: 24, 270. ¹⁴⁰ Carey 1996: 209 (with sources).

¹⁴¹ Carey 1996: 215 (cf. 209: “Carthage was in fact resurgent” in 237).

238/237 versus 240.¹⁴² What can explain it, I would suggest, is the growing realization at Rome that the Carthaginians, through their recent successes against the mercenaries – against all odds, and with Roman help – began to see themselves as an *amicus* once again enjoying status-equivalence with Rome. And as we have seen in the case of Rhodes and Pergamum, Rome's Carthaginian *amici* needed reminding that the asymmetry favoring Rome in the relationship that resulted from the terms of the Treaty of Lutatius in 241 had, in fact, grown greater, not less, as a result of Rome's assistance in 240/239. No amount of Carthaginian success could change that. The Romans seized Sardinia in 238/237 in order to remind the Carthaginians, flush with their recent successes, of their ongoing proper (subordinate) position within the Roman–Carthaginian *amicitia*. The passage of four years from the end of the First Punic War was evidently not enough time to erase the painful memory of a grueling twenty-four-year conflict that, as the Romans saw it, the Carthaginians had provoked in the first place.

We can now turn to a further notorious case of perceived Roman bad faith – the treatment of the Carthaginians during the escalation phase leading to the outbreak of the Third Punic War in 149 BC, and the destruction of Carthage at the end of that war.¹⁴³ It is an episode for which the ancient sources register no less than ten contemporary opinions – three at Carthage (associated with the “Romanizing,” “democratizing,” and pro-Masinissa parties in the city: App. *Pun.* 68); two at Rome, one clustered around Cato the Elder and his famous *Carthago delenda est* policy,¹⁴⁴ and one represented by the opposing view of Scipio Nasica Corculum (cos. 162); four contemporary Greek opinions, as reported by Polybius (Polyb. 36.9); and the opinion of Polybius himself. In what follows, due consideration will be given to each view (while privileging those of the Carthaginians), along with an analysis of the possible motivations behind Roman conduct towards Carthage.

A review of the ancient evidence is in order. At the end of the Hannibalic War, Carthage was forced to surrender her war elephants and all but ten

¹⁴² Carey 1996: 209–10.

¹⁴³ On what follows, see Gelzer 1930/1931; Heuss 1933: 70–71; Adcock 1944/1946; Scullard 1951: 240–45, 287–89; Kienast 1954: 125–33; Badian 1958a: 125–40; Hoffmann 1960; Pédech 1964: 194–202; Walsh 1965; Astin 1967a: 49–57, 270–81; Dahlheim 1968: 18–19; Astin 1978: 283–88; Burian 1978; Harris 1979: 234–40; Walbank 1979: 651–68; Maróti 1983; Meijer 1984; Huss 1985: 425–57; Bellen 1985: 32–34; Ferrary 1988: 321–24, 327–34; Vogel-Weidemann 1989; Welwei 1989; Nörr 1989: 92–93; Bagnall 1990: 300–20; Scardigli 1991: 297–345, esp. 327–31; Thiel 1994: 142–45; Purcell 1995; Eckstein 1995b: 103, 216–18; Goldsworthy 2000: 326–56; Hölkeskamp 2000: 246; O’Gorman 2004.

¹⁴⁴ Whether Cato ever used this phrase or a variant of it is unknown (unlikely: Maróti 1983: 228 n. 43; Huss 1985: 433 n. 63; Vogel-Weidemann 1989: 79, with sources), but matters little in the present context.

triremes in her fleet, and was forbidden to make war on anyone without express permission from Rome; the Punic *amicitia* with Rome was thus restored.¹⁴⁵ As was noted in the previous chapter (above, p. 232), from the 190s BC until the 150s the Numidian king, Masinissa, gradually extended his control over ever-greater amounts of territory in North Africa, usually at Carthaginian expense. Polybius, the main source for these activities, says that in Masinissa's conflicts with the Carthaginians, the latter always came off second best, not because theirs was the unjust cause, but because the Romans thought it in their best interest to decide against them.¹⁴⁶ As an example of this sort of sharp practice, Polybius says that after the Numidian king attacked the towns of the coast of the Lesser Syrtis region and the Punic-controlled valley of Emporia, both Masinissa and the Carthaginians sent embassies to Rome to request mediation; the senate rewarded the Numidian king with the towns he had taken in Emporia, and forced Carthage to pay an indemnity of 500 talents to cover the revenue lost to the territory since the dispute began. A Roman embassy appeared at Carthage, perhaps in 152, offering to arbitrate further disputes, but the Carthaginians, no doubt divining the likely outcome based on their past experience, refused the offer.¹⁴⁷ Masinissa apparently continued his attacks on Punic territory, and the Carthaginians, despairing of honest brokerage by the Romans, began fitting out an army and laying in ship timber. Some senators, including Cato the Elder, regarded this as an overt violation of the terms of the treaty of 201, but Scipio Nasica convinced a majority of senators not to be over-hasty in declaring war.¹⁴⁸

In winter 151/150 BC, however, some Carthaginian troops successfully repulsed a Numidian attack on Punic territory, and then pursued the fleeing

¹⁴⁵ Terms of peace: Polyb. 15.18.3–4; Livy 30.37.3–4; Roman *amicitia* reestablished: Dio fr. 57.85 (explicit; *contra* Badian 1958a: 125; Carthage was now a “client state”); cf. App. *Pun* 79, 83; φίλοι τε καὶ σύμμαχοι. The spurious clause referenced at Livy 42.23.3–4 that forbids Carthage from defending itself is rightly rejected by Scullard 1930: 256–57; Badian 1958a: 126 and n. 1; Walsh 1965: 156 n. 79; Scardigli 1991: 319. Not only is it a violation of international norms (*ius gentium*, according to Badian), it also seems at odds with the provision that Carthage be allowed to maintain ten warships. Walsh argues that the clause undoubtedly originated in a pro-Roman source concerned with apologizing for later Roman behavior (perhaps the same source that regarded Carthaginian possession of ship timber as a violation of the treaty: Livy *Per.* 48; Zonar. 9.26). Its absence from Polybius' account would seem to condemn the clause as a fabrication.

¹⁴⁶ αἰεὶ συνέβαινε τοὺς Καρχηδονίους ἑλαττοῦσθαι παρὰ τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις, οὐ τοῖς δίκαιοις, ἀλλὰ τῷ πεπεῖσθαι τοὺς κρίνοντας συμφέρειν σφίσι τὴν τοιαύτην γνώμην (Polyb. 31.21.6).

¹⁴⁷ The chronology is uncertain, but 152 BC is as good as any other date for this particular embassy: Kienast 1954: 127–28, 155–56 n. 150; Astin 1967a: 270; Huss 1985: 433; Vogel-Weidemann 1989: 80; *contra* Scullard 1951: 240, 287–88 (who opts for 153).

¹⁴⁸ Masinissa's dispute with Carthage over Emporia: Polyb. 31.21; App. *Pun.* 68; Roman offer to mediate, 152: Livy *Per.* 47; App. *Pun.* 69; cf. Zonar. 9.26; further attacks by Masinissa, Carthaginian army and ship timber: Livy *Per.* 48, 49; Zonar. 9.26.

Numidians beyond the Carthaginian frontier stipulated by the treaty of 201 (Livy *Per.* 49; Zonar. 9.26). Cato was now able to convince most of the senators to declare war. But the Carthaginians, having been defeated by Masinissa in the meantime, decided to send an embassy to Rome to put things right: they apologized for allowing some of their leaders to mislead them into making war on Masinissa and, apparently intuiting the Romans' preferred "hard but fair" policy in such circumstances (see above, pp. 254–56), insisted that those most responsible for the war had been condemned to death. The Romans answered that they wondered why the Carthaginians had not condemned their leaders earlier, before their army had been beaten. Punic bafflement at this question and a request for clarification on how they might make things right was met with a senatorial response that was positively oracular: the Carthaginians knew what they had to do (App. *Pun.* 75).

After the city of Utica surrendered to Roman *fides*, the Carthaginians decided to follow suit and sent another embassy to Rome. The Romans at first demanded only 300 aristocratic hostages, some weapons, and a pledge that the Carthaginians would obey all Roman instructions, but otherwise left them free to enjoy their own laws, territory, and possessions. The Punic ambassadors were pleased with these guarantees, but also disturbed since no mention was made of the city of Carthage itself. The other shoe dropped when the consuls arrived at Utica a short time later: the Carthaginians were now told not only to disarm completely, but also to abandon the city and transfer their population to a site eighty stades (ten miles) inland. The Carthaginians balked, despite having earlier performed *deditio* and promised to obey all Roman orders. The war began in earnest, and despite some surprisingly stout resistance on the part of the Carthaginians, the city eventually fell and was razed to the ground.¹⁴⁹

Polybius' moral outrage over what he regards as Rome's palpably unjust treatment of the Carthaginians is readily apparent: the Romans decided in Masinissa's favor not because his cause was just, but because it best served Roman interest to do so. Most modern scholars have accepted the Greek historian's judgment: F.E. Adcock labeled Roman behavior "odious," a "moral crime impossible not to condemn," and "frightful";¹⁵⁰ J.H. Thiel called it "utterly perfidious and treacherous";¹⁵¹ Ernst Badian called the story

¹⁴⁹ Surrender of Utica, second Carthaginian embassy, Carthaginian *deditio*: Polyb. 36.3–4; Livy *Per.* 49; Diod. Sic. 32.6.1; first set of Roman conditions: Polyb. 36.4.4–9; Diod. Sic. 32.6.1; order to disarm: Polyb. 36.6.5–7; Livy *Per.* 49; Zonar. 9.26; App. *Pun.* 79–80; Diod. Sic. 32.6.2; order to raze and move the city: Livy *Per.* 49; Zonar. 9.26; App. *Pun.* 80; Diod. Sic. 32.6.2.

¹⁵⁰ Adcock 1944/1946: 117, 123, 128. ¹⁵¹ Thiel 1994: 143 (originally published 1954).

of the run-up to the Third Punic War a “sorry recital of [Roman] perfidy and cruelty”;¹⁵² Roman conduct was “ruthless” and “cold blooded,” while the senate’s demand that the Carthaginians relocate was “murderous,” according to William Harris;¹⁵³ throughout the disputes with Masinissa, according to Nigel Bagnall, Roman conduct amounted to “ruthless duplicity”;¹⁵⁴ Adrian Goldsworthy has recently described Roman behavior as “shameless,” “deliberately ruthless,” and “cynical in the extreme.”¹⁵⁵

Lurking behind all such views, aside from wholehearted acceptance of what can be fairly regarded only as Polybius’ opinion, is an overarching assumption that a strictly *Machtpolitik* explanation can account for Roman conduct. William Harris, referring to one of the four Greek opinions Polybius reproduces, sees it as a simple case of power hunger (φιλαρχία: Polyb. 36.8.5) that requires no further explanation beyond the simple fact that the Romans were aggressive by nature.¹⁵⁶ The target of Harris’s remarks – those scholars who believe that Roman imperialism was fundamentally defensive in nature – have a harder time explaining Roman treatment of Carthage, but likewise opt for *Machtpolitik* explanations of one sort or another. A view going all the way back to Theodor Mommsen but no longer fashionable stresses the economic motive: Rome was anxious to eliminate a serious trade rival in Carthage, especially after the city’s last indemnity payment arising from the settlement of 201 BC was made in 151.¹⁵⁷ Some argue that the fear of Carthage that some sources attribute to the Romans (cf. App. *Pun.* 69: φόβου) was indeed genuine, since the Carthaginians were able to pay off their outstanding war debt to Rome, assemble an army of 25,000 infantry and 400 cavalry (which soon grew to 58,000 men), repulse Masinissa in at least one conflict, and produce armaments in massive quantities – all of this within a few short years, and in relatively quick succession.¹⁵⁸

¹⁵² Badian 1958a: 135.

¹⁵³ Harris 1979: 234 (“ruthless”), 237 (“murderous demand”), 240 (“cold blooded”).

¹⁵⁴ Bagnall 1990: 307.

¹⁵⁵ Goldsworthy 2000: 331 (“shameless,” “deliberately ruthless”), 339 (“cynical in the extreme”).

¹⁵⁶ Harris 1979: 240.

¹⁵⁷ Discussion and critiques: Scullard 1951: 243; Astin 1967a: 272–73; Badian 1968: 20–21; Harris 1979: 239 n. 4; Maróti 1983: 223–25; Huss 1985: 437; Vogel-Weidemann 1989: 81–82. On the discharge of the indemnity, see further below, pp. 315, 322.

¹⁵⁸ Badian 1958a: 128–30, 135–37; Astin 1978: 286; Goldsworthy 2000: 332–33; size of the army: App. *Pun.* 70, 73. Vogel-Weidemann 1989: 86–87 adds valuable archaeological evidence that suggests that “the acme of [Carthaginian prosperity] seems to have been reached in the years between 200 and 146 B.C.” See also Appian’s description of the double harbor of Carthage, which in this period could accommodate 220 vessels (App. *Pun.* 96). In light of the post-Second World War prosperity of disarmed West Germany and Japan until well into the 1980s, Carthaginian post-Hannibalic War prosperity is perhaps not so surprising; when national budget lines for defense spending disappear, surplus national income will find other, more profitable ways of being reinvested.

Two corollaries of the latter argument cluster around alleged balance-of-power issues in North Africa in this period, and a purported Roman “divide and conquer” policy. First, Ulrich Kahrstedt suggested in 1913 that it was fear of Numidia rather than Carthage that motivated the Romans to act in the late 150s BC: if Masinissa ever succeeded in pushing Rome’s favoritism of his kingdom to its logical conclusion, and successfully defeated and occupied Carthage and its possessions, he would become too powerful and thus a threat to Rome.¹⁵⁹ The second thesis, put forward by Dietmar Kienast and others, argues that by the late 150s the Romans grew more concerned that if the nonogenarian Masinissa should die any time soon, his kingdom might dissolve amidst dynastic squabbling among his three legitimate (and several illegitimate) surviving sons, thus upsetting the fragile balance of power in North Africa.¹⁶⁰ A possible logical consequence of this line of thinking is that Carthage might take advantage of Numidia’s internal problems, attack the kingdom, and wind up with a much larger share of the North African littoral than it had been reduced to as a result of the settlement ending the Second Punic War. Ernst Badian summarizes Rome’s policy of playing Carthage and Numidia off each other with an explanation inspired by the Cold War era: “Carthage was being protected [against Masinissa in the 170s] mainly to keep a balance of power in Africa.”¹⁶¹

Such theories, of course, have no explicit support in the ancient sources, which is not surprising, given how little literary evidence for this period actually survives. Surprisingly few scholars, however, are willing to grant much explanatory power to a factor that does pervade the few extant ancient accounts, and that appeared to be uppermost in the minds of most of the participants and observers of the events of the late 150s BC – that is, the moral issue. Cato, for example, did not in fact argue that Carthage had to be destroyed for *raisons d’état*, but apparently stressed what can only be regarded as moral concerns. Three fragments from a Catonian speech on the Carthaginian war emphasize Punic cruelty and atrocity (*ORF*³ Cato frs. 191–193), and the one fragment that survives as an unadulterated quotation suggests that the city is secretly preparing for war against Rome – Carthage, in other words, is guilty of deception and bad

¹⁵⁹ Discussion and critiques: Scullard 1951: 244, 289; Badian 1958a: 134–35; Astin 1967a: 273–74; Maróti 1983: 224; Huss 1985: 437; Vogel-Weidemann 1989: 82.

¹⁶⁰ Kienast 1954: 130, 132; cf. Astin 1967a: 275; Burian 1978: 174; Maróti 1983: 227; Welwei 1989: 319; others listed at Vogel-Weidemann 1989: 92 n. 70.

¹⁶¹ Badian 1958a: 128; Roman protection of Carthage: Livy 42.29.8–9.

faith, not Rome.¹⁶² The Livian epitomator summarizes Cato's speech (and thus the version of it he found in Livy – who certainly knew the original well enough) as follows: “M. Porcius Cato argued that [the Carthaginians] had an army gathered in their territory apparently against Masinissa, but in reality against the Romans” (*M. Porcius Cato suavit [ut Carthaginienses] exercitum specie contra Masinissam, re contra Romanos accitum in finibus*: Livy *Per.* 48). The latter argument is perfectly consistent with the senate's response to the Rhodians in 168 BC and the Carthaginians during the Sardinia crisis of 238/237: on the former occasion, the *patres* said that the Rhodian offer of mediation was designed to benefit Perseus rather than Rome, and on the latter, they said that the Carthaginians were preparing for war not against their rebel mercenaries, but against Rome itself (Polyb. 1.88.10).

A close reading of the sources for the preliminaries to the Third Punic War uncovers a further moral layer to the Roman arguments for war in 150 BC. We have it on the authority of Polybius that “the Carthaginians had grown soft during the long period of peace” ([οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι] τελέως ἐκτεθηλύνθαι διὰ τὴν πολυχρόνιον εἰρήνην: Polyb. 31.21.3) – hardly a morally neutral statement in any ancient Greek source after the Persian wars, and perfectly consistent with what the same historian and Livy say about the Campanians in the 210s (see above, p. 252). Not only was the long period of peace to blame for Carthaginian enervation, their city's proximity to the sea was a factor as well. So Appian, who puts the following arguments into the mouth of the Roman consul L. Marcus Censorinus: the Roman demand that the Carthaginians resettle ten miles inland was for their own good, for the sea inspires greed in a coastal people; thus the Athenians could not restrain their greed for mercantile profits, lost their empire, and were forced to trade their seafaring lifestyle for the peaceful, quiet joys of agriculture; a maritime city is too often subject to political

¹⁶² “The Carthaginians are already our enemies: for he who is preparing everything against me, so that he might make war on me whenever he wishes, is already my enemy even though he has not yet done anything with weapons” (*Carthaginienses nobis iam hostes sunt: nam qui omnia parat contra me ut quo tempore uelit bellum possit inferre, hic iam mihi hostis est, tametsi nondum armis agit*: *ORF*³ fr. 195; note that this argument is precisely opposite to what Cato said on behalf of the Rhodians in 167 BC: above, p. 286). See the sensible discussion of Astin 1978: 284. The appearance of the famous Carthaginian figs during this or another of Cato's speeches during the crisis was apparently designed to stress the proximity of the perfidious Carthaginian state rather than the economic threat it posed to Rome: Adcock 1944/1946: 125; Scullard 1951: 240; Maróti 1983: 225, 228; Vogel-Weidemann 1989: 82; O'Gorman 2004: 103. Meijer 1984 doubts whether the figs came from Carthage at all. Other sources for Cato's anti-Carthaginian policy: Livy *Per.* 48, 49; App. *Pun.* 69; Plut. *Cat. Mai.* 27.2; Diod. Sic. 34/5.33.3; Flor. 1.31.4; cf. Plin. *HN* 15.74; Vell. Pat. 1.13.1; *De Vir. Ill.* 47.8.

instability, whereas an agricultural city gains stability from its implantation on solid earth; so anaesthetize the memory of your past greatness by turning away from the source of your former power and prosperity, and fixing your gaze inland.¹⁶³ It may or may not be coincidental that Censorinus' advice echoes Plato's, that a city must be located more than eighty stades from the coast in order to avoid the moral decadence associated with maritime trade.¹⁶⁴ Polybius may indeed have connected the decline in the political life of the city – the rise of murderous factionalism and demagogues like the fatuous and vain Hasdrubal (Polyb. 38.7–8) – with the prosperity that came from its splendid location on the African coast.

The Roman opposition to Cato apparently also saw the central issue in the crisis in terms of morality.¹⁶⁵ It seems rather unlikely that over the course of these debates the thesis of *metus hostilis* – that the preservation of an external counterweight of fear would ensure internal discipline and concord at Rome – emerged fully formed, Athena-like, from Scipio Nasica's head,¹⁶⁶ but Nasica certainly stressed the moral hazard to Rome for failing to promulgate a just pretext for declaring war on Carthage. The issue of a fair pretext has, of course, dominated the modern debate, largely because of Polybius' unambiguous statement that the Romans had long been seeking a suitable opportunity and a reasonable pretext for attacking Carthage that would be acceptable to other states.¹⁶⁷ But the historian had no more credible and specific evidence at his disposal for this opinion than he had for the notion that the Romans always found in favor of Masinissa in his disputes with Carthage since it suited their purpose to do so (Polyb. 31.21.6). Polybius' interpretation here, as in his judgments on Rome's treatment of Rhodes discussed in the previous section, had as its basis mere hindsight

¹⁶³ App. *Pun.* 86–88. On the historicity of the speeches in this section of Appian's narrative, see below, pp. 317–18.

¹⁶⁴ Pl. *Leg.* 704b–5b (cf. Cic. *Rep.* 2.5–8, where the same point is made about maritime decadence, with the examples of Carthage and Corinth cited); discussion: Harris 1979: 239 n. 1 (missing the moral point entirely: "the Senate aimed quite specifically at destroying Punic commerce"); Huss 1985: 442 n. 45 (doubting that Censorinus knew the Plato passage); Purcell 1995: 134–35; O'Gorman 2004: 112–13 (reminding us that Plato's *mot* prescribes a distance *greater than* eighty stades from the sea).

¹⁶⁵ Badian 1958a: 132 against Gelzer 1930/1931, who sees Nasica's opposition to Cato as strictly a matter of political principle.

¹⁶⁶ *Metus hostilis* argument: App. *Pun.* 69; Diod. Sic. 34.33.4/6; Plut. *Cat. Mai.* 27.1–2; Zonar. 9.30. Gelzer 1930/1931 argues strongly in favor, followed by Adcock 1944/1946: 126; Burian 1978: 173; *contra*, e.g., Hoffmann 1960: 337–38, 340 n. 80; Huss 1985: 438; Welwei 1989: 315; others cited in Vogel-Weidemann 1989: 91–92 nn. 53–55. Scullard 1951: 242 and Astin 1967a: 277–80 advocate a middle ground between Gelzer's thesis and the extreme skepticism of Hoffmann: the *metus hostilis* theory represents, if only in rudimentary form, what Nasica actually said.

¹⁶⁷ πάλαι δὲ τούτου κεκυρωμένου βεβαίως ἐν ταῖς ἐκάστων γνώμαις καιρὸν ἐξήτουν ἐπὶ τήδειον καὶ πρόφασιν εὐσχήμονα πρὸς τοὺς ἐκτός (Polyb. 36.2.1).

and *ex post facto* rationalization of Roman behavior; it did not come from privileged access to any reliable insider information.¹⁶⁸ Thus Appian, who is probably following Polybius fairly closely here, tells us that senatorial instructions to Roman ambassadors mediating the conflicts to decide in Masinissa's favor were given "secretly" (ἀδήλως: *Pun.* 68; ἐν ἀπορρήτῳ: *Pun.* 76), and "in private" (ἰδίῃ: *Pun.* 76) – the historians' opinions, clearly, were "developed *ex post facto*."¹⁶⁹

It is nonetheless fairly likely that in his political battle with Cato, Nasica was indeed concerned as much with foreign opinion as with the state of Roman morality: hence his insistence, in one of the two reliably attested opinions attributed to him, that in 151 BC "there did not yet seem to him to be a just cause for war."¹⁷⁰ Such concerns will be familiar enough by now: recall that Cato worried that if Rome punished the Rhodians in 167, their reputation in the eyes of others would suffer. As in those cases, the point to stress here is that the Romans worried about such things at all. Their reputation and the opinion of the outside world on specifically moral issues mattered to them, as did the constraints imposed by the Mediterranean-wide normative sanctions on international practices. Indeed, if Appian is to be believed, some Romans were prompted to introspection and self-criticism on this basis as late as 147, after the war on Carthage had ground on for two full years: "the Roman people," says Appian, "were convinced that they had been the first to break faith" with the Punic state (ὁ δῆμος . . . ἄπιστα πρότεροι κελεύσαντες: App. *Pun.* 112).

But what is perhaps most significant for the purpose of this chapter is that Nasica's arguments from morality succeeded in staying the senate's hand against Carthage for more than two years,¹⁷¹ and on at least two occasions (and probably more): on the first, Nasica urged that nothing should be done in haste (*P. Cornelio Nasica dicente nihil temere faciundum*), and instead of war being declared, an embassy of ten was sent to Carthage to investigate

¹⁶⁸ Cf. Welwei 1989: 316 – the clearest statement I have found to this effect. *Contra* Harris 1979: 235, who argues that "Polybius was of course in a position to know the views of at least some leading senators," but fails to suggest why these senators would have been willing to leak such damning information to someone like Polybius. Besides, the historian was in Achaea ca. 150 BC, and "would hardly have had reported to him internal Roman war plans" even after his return (Welwei 1989: 316).

¹⁶⁹ Badian 1958a: 132 n. 5.

¹⁷⁰ *nondum sibi iustam causam belli uideri* (Livy *Per.* 48). Astin 1978: 283 (cf. 1967a: 52, 277) argues that "how the destruction of Carthage would be viewed by foreign opinion . . . was possibly the heart of Nasica's continued opposition even after the Carthaginians' invasion of Numidia, openly violating the treaty with Rome, had formally settled the question of a *iusta causa*." It is possible that herein lay the origin of Polybius' thesis of the Romans hunting for a suitable pretext, which it certainly echoes: Vogel-Weidemann 1989: 84.

¹⁷¹ Between 152 and 150 BC: see Astin 1967a: 52.

(*placuit decem legatos mitti exploratum*); on the second occasion, Nasica convinced enough of the senators, against the view of Cato, to abstain from war on the condition that Carthage burn its fleet and demobilize its army.¹⁷² Even the cynical Polybius rightly points out that concern for foreign opinion nearly compelled the Romans to desist from war.¹⁷³ As in the case of Cato's successful bid to spare the Rhodians a Roman war discussed earlier, here Nasica's arguments from morality deployed against Cato – ironically, some of the same arguments Cato had made in defense of the Rhodians sixteen years before¹⁷⁴ – had real-world consequences, at least temporarily, in constructing the conflict and guiding its course.

In stressing the moral dimension to the Roman–Carthaginian dispute thus far, I do not mean to suggest that other factors more congenial to a *Machtpolitik* explanation were entirely absent from consideration. Roman fear, anger, and hatred also played significant roles, but as Richard Ned Lebow has demonstrated, these emotions were a manifestation of the ancient aristocratic “spirit,” and were not necessarily reducible to, or even consistent with the pursuit of rational self-interest and security that a strict IR Realist reading of the evidence would seem to require.¹⁷⁵ As we have already seen, Rome probably had good reason to fear that Carthage was indeed resurgent by the late 150s BC: before Rome declared war, the city had paid off its war indemnity, fielded an army of 58,000 men, and repulsed Masinissa in at least one conflict; later on, after the Carthaginian *deditio* had taken place, the Roman consul Censorinus grew visibly angry (σκυθρ-ωπάσας: App. *Pun.* 80) as a lengthy parade of Punic wagons passed by loaded with armor for 200,000 men, in addition to innumerable light arms and 2,000 catapults ready for action (Polyb. 36.6.7; App. *Pun.* 80). Appian further suggests that an element in Cato's anti-Carthaginian speeches was the notion that Roman freedom was not secure as long as Carthage stood, while Cato's delegation to Africa reported back to the senate ca. 152 that Carthaginian prosperity was not so much a source of jealousy as of fear.¹⁷⁶ Polybius reports that one strand of Greek public opinion believed that the

¹⁷² *placuit, ut bello abstinerent, si Carthaginenses classem excussissent et exercitum dimisissent* (Livy *Per.* 48; cf. Zonar. 9.26). Huss 1985: 433 n. 65 doubts the historicity of these details.

¹⁷³ διὸ καὶ τότε περὶ τῆς τῶν ἐκτὸς διαλήψεως πρὸς ἀλλήλους διαφερόμενοι παρ' ὀλίγον ἀπέστησαν τοῦ πολέμου (Polyb. 36.2.4; cf. Diod. Sic. 32.5).

¹⁷⁴ Such as the problem of intentionality, and the dangers of taking decisions in haste in a moment of euphoria, for which compare *ORF*³ Cato fr. 163 with Nasica's advice, *nihil temere faciendum* at Livy *Per.* 48; discussion: Astin 1978: 283.

¹⁷⁵ Lebow 2008: 89; cf. Burton 2010: 88 (a review of Lebow).

¹⁷⁶ [οἱ πρέσβεις] ἔφραζον οὐ ζήλου μᾶλλον ἢ φόβου γέμειν αὐτοῖς τὰ Καρχηδονίων, πόλεως δυσμενοῦς τοσσηδὲ καὶ γείτονος εὐχερῶς οὕτως αὐξανομένης. καὶ ὁ Κάτων μάλιστα ἔλεγεν οὐ ποτε Ρωμαίοις βέβαιοι οὐδὲ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν ἔσεσθαι πρὶν ἐξελεῖν Καρχηδόνα (App. *Pun.* 69).

Romans had to destroy Carthage for fear of their empire's survival (τῆς δυναστείας . . . φόβον: Polyb. 36.9.3–4). Some modern scholars follow suit: Adcock argues that memories of the darkest days of the Second Punic War, especially in elderly senators like Cato, caused real fears – “ghosts mistaken for realities” – and that Rome's “irrational impatience” with a resurgent Carthage must be taken seriously as a causal factor.¹⁷⁷ Badian argued, on the basis of the Carthaginians' refusal of the Roman embassy's offer in 152 to fix a boundary between Punic territory and the kingdom of Masinissa (App. *Pun.* 69) – something the Carthaginians had repeatedly begged the Romans to do until then (cf. Livy 42.23.6) – that “Carthage had begun to show some independence of spirit.”¹⁷⁸ The refusal was “a most unwelcome manifestation of independence and self-confidence,” in Astin's view, a sign of “restive self-assertion” and “militancy” in the growing Carthaginian opposition to Rome.¹⁷⁹ Fear of and hatred for the old enemy, with some irrational anger thrown in courtesy of Cato, Censorinus, and no doubt others, were thus partly responsible for how events unfolded in the late 150s. But nowhere in the ancient sources, it should be noted, appear the corollaries of the modern emphasis on *Machtpolitik*: that the Romans were concerned primarily with maintaining a “balance of power” between “client states” in North Africa, or that they deployed a “divide and conquer” policy consistently to peripheral areas of their *imperium*.

To test this notion, it will be salutary to look more closely at the four Greek opinions Polybius outlines in his text. Amidst such *Machtpolitik* assertions by the first group that Rome rightly destroyed a source of fear, and by the second that “lust for power” (φιλαρχία: Polyb. 36.9.5) replaced the old Roman practice of moderation towards defeated enemies, and by the fourth that the Punic *deditio* gave the Romans the right to treat the Carthaginians any way they chose (36.9.13, 17), the debate took place, overwhelmingly, on the moral level. The second group argued that the Romans had abandoned the precepts upon which they built their power, including moderation, and punished Carthage “cruelly and harshly” (ἀνηκέστως καὶ βάρεως: 36.9.8); the third group accused the Romans of deceit, fraud, impiety, and treachery (διὰ ἀπάτης καὶ δόλου . . . καὶ προσεικὸς ἄσεβήματι καὶ παρασπονδήματι: 36.9.10–11); while the fourth group disputed charges of Roman impiety, treachery, and injustice (ἄδικήματι: 36.9.13),

¹⁷⁷ Adcock 1944/1946: 124, 128; cf. Scullard 1951: 242, 289; Astin 1967a: 52, 274; Huss 1985: 437–38; Vogel-Weidemann 1989: 87; Goldsworthy 2000: 332–33.

¹⁷⁸ Badian 1958a: 135 (the quotation), 129–30 (the implication of the Carthaginian refusal of Roman arbitration in 152).

¹⁷⁹ Astin 1967a: 50; 1978: 284–86.

and further asserted that the Romans had broken no laws, violated no customs, nor did they violate their personal good faith either (καὶ μὴν οὐδέ νόμους οὐδ' ἔθισμούς οὐδὲ τὴν κατὰ ἰδίαν πίστιν ἄθετεῖν: 36.9.17). Now which of these four opinions (if any) represents in some degree Polybius' own is controversial, but given his generally negative opinion of Rome's treatment of Carthage in its disputes with Masinissa, one might be tempted to attribute to him some of the moral outrage associated with the third group that accused the Romans of deceit, fraud, impiety, and treachery.¹⁸⁰ However that may be, what matters here is that although the Greek debate of Polybius' report in part revolved around the pragmatic issue of eliminating a serious rival to Rome, the moral issues of Roman faithlessness and injustice could not be separated from it, and indeed formed an independent and strong argument for those opposed to Roman conduct. The debate between Cato and Scipio Nasica, discussed earlier, indicates that the Romans were well aware that the debate would take place along these lines, which is why some senators, at least, strenuously urged that any war on Carthage must appear to be *iustum* – not only for the sake of the *pax deorum*, but also for the sake of appearances before the rest of the international community.

We can now turn, finally, to the most important issue: what did the Carthaginians themselves think of the Romans' – and their own – conduct in the crisis? In keeping with the methodological concerns of this section, the Carthaginian view should receive priority, but the absence of Punic voices from the analysis thus far is a function of the nature of the surviving evidence. In fact, the only source that alleges it reproduces genuine opinions of the Carthaginians themselves is the late and sometimes unreliable Appian, whose account of the Third Punic War and the escalation phase leading to it (App. *Pun.* 67–135) is our most complete extant source for these events. His sources are, unfortunately, unknown, although most scholars now suggest that his narrative of the Third Punic War is largely dependent on Polybius, whom Appian once cites by name (App. *Pun.* 132), and whose account Appian's agrees with in several respects.¹⁸¹ On the other hand, as

¹⁸⁰ Cf. Petzold 1969: 62–63; *contra* Walbank 1965: 8–11; 1972: 178–81; 1974: 14–18; 1977: 157–59; 1979: 663–68; Ferrary 1988: 330 (who think the fourth view belongs to Polybius). Eckstein 1995b: 217–18 reserves judgment, but appears to agree with Walbank and Ferrary since he notes that the fourth view resembles Polybius' own highly critical opinion, expressed elsewhere (e.g. Polyb. 36.5), of individual Carthaginian politicians' handling of the crisis.

¹⁸¹ Badian 1958a: 131, followed by Walbank 1979: 659; Pédech 1964: 195. Compare, for example, Polyb. 36.7.3–5 with App. *Pun.* 92 (the treatment of the Punic envoys and Italian merchants by the Carthaginian populace after the Romans issued their demand that the Carthaginians resetttle eighty stades inland).

Paul Pédech and others have pointed out, Appian “must be used with caution” because at other points there exist significant differences between his full account and the extant portions of Polybius. Pédech posits the presence of “an intermediary source . . . an annalist desiring to soften the brutality of Rome.”¹⁸² Unfortunately, the ultimate source for the most important sections of Appian’s narrative for the present purposes – the interchanges between Carthaginian plenipotentiary ambassadors and the Roman consuls at Utica in 149 BC, and in particular, the speech of a certain “Banno Tigillas” (App. *Pun.* 82–86) – cannot be known. F.W. Walbank believes that Banno’s speech “must have appeared in some form in P[olybius].”¹⁸³ Ernst Badian, on the other hand, while confident that the “factual correspondence” between the accounts of Appian and Polybius shows that “Appian’s account is based on Polybius,” argues that “the judgments on [the facts] Appian has put into rhetorical [read: wholly invented] speeches.”¹⁸⁴ One overlooked piece of evidence may lend support to Badian’s view: at the start of his account of the Third Punic War, Polybius asserts that it would be otiose and vain to reproduce or artfully recompose all the speeches that were made on the subject on all sides, so he has chosen to report only those statements that were most important and had the most practical results.¹⁸⁵ Appian must be used with a certain amount of caution.

It is perhaps best to begin the investigation of Carthaginian views with Appian’s description of the internal political situation in Carthage in the 150s BC. The historian identifies three rival political factions – the “Romanizing” group (οἱ ῥωμάϊοι), led by Hanno the Great, the “democratizing” group (οἱ ἐδημοκράτιζον), led by Hamilcar the Samnite and Carthalo, and those who favored Masinissa (οἱς δ’ ἤρεσκε Μασσανάσσης; App. *Pun.* 68), led by Hannibal the Starling.¹⁸⁶ Unfortunately, very few specifics of their various positions on the war are known, though it is probably safe to assume that the “Romanizing” group opposed war on any grounds. The position of the pro-Masinissa group was probably similar, given that all forty of their number were driven out of the city and banished forever after a surge of anti-Roman sentiment swept through the city in 152 (App. *Pun.* 70). The chief instigators of this anti-Roman feeling were the leaders of the “democratizing” faction, which undoubtedly included, in addition to Hamilcar the Samnite and Carthalo, whom Appian names,

¹⁸² Pédech 1964: 195, with earlier sources there cited.

¹⁸³ Walbank 1979: 659.

¹⁸⁴ Badian 1958a: 131 and n. 4.

¹⁸⁵ Polyb. 36.1. Walbank 1979: 651–52 seems to think this applies only to the speeches delivered by Cato and Nasica during the crisis.

¹⁸⁶ Or “the Leader”; cf. Huss 1985: 432 n. 53.

Mago the Bruttian, whom Polybius praises for his “pragmatic and manly policy” of advocating resistance to Rome (λόγοις ἀνδρώδεσι καὶ πραγματικοῖς: Polyb. 36.5.1–5), Gisco the son of Hamilcar, according to Livy a *homo seditiosus* who stirred up the people against Rome (Livy *Per.* 48), and Hasdrubal, whom Polybius excoriates as a cowardly buffoon (Polyb. 38.7–8). This latter figure led the Carthaginian military on its fateful campaign against Masinissa (App. *Pun.* 70–73), and was then condemned to death and banished (along with Carthalo, another democratic leader) after the Carthaginians regretted their decision to attack the king (App. *Pun.* 74); he was then restored to citizenship and returned to power after the Carthaginians ultimately chose to resist Rome (App. *Pun.* 93; Zonar. 9.26).

Anti-Roman sentiment was therefore concentrated in the “democratizing” faction. But how did its leadership characterize the Romans? According to Appian, the democratic faction was able to expel and banish the pro-Masinissa group after the Carthaginians became convinced that they would not receive justice from Rome (οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι δ’ ὑπώπτευνον, ἐπεὶ καὶ τοὺς πρότερον ἤδεσαν οὐκ εὖ δικάσαντας: App. *Pun.* 69), and thus refused the Roman offer to arbitrate their conflict with the Numidian king. In the final crisis, when the Romans issued their demand that the Carthaginians relocate so their city could be destroyed, and the Carthaginians decided to stand and fight, recalling the democratic leader Hasdrubal from exile, we are told that the people regarded the Romans as “untrustworthy men” (ἀπίστοις ἀνδράσιν: App. *Pun.* 92). The Carthaginian view – or at least the view of a particular segment of the Carthaginian populace – was that the Romans were guilty of injustice and bad faith.

Further support for this construction of Roman behavior is available, but it comes only in the form of lengthy speeches Appian puts into the mouths of the Carthaginian ambassadors at Utica in 149 BC (App. *Pun.* 82–86). As we have seen, even though the speeches may reproduce factual content from the lost account of Polybius, they may be sheer invention on the part of Appian or his source. Fortunately, for the present purposes, the historicity of the speeches matters less than what Appian’s readers would have expected to be said on these occasions, and the thrust of the speeches reflects, as indeed we would expect by now, the view of the Carthaginian democratizing faction – that Roman conduct was faithless and unjust. When the first set of Punic ambassadors arrived at Utica, they begged the consuls to have pity on them when deciding the final terms of their surrender; it was worthy of the Romans’ reputation for piety (εὐσεβείας: App. *Pun.* 78), they argued, to respect Carthage’s former greatness and antiquity, as well as their mutual agreement, made at the end of the last

war, to be “friends and allies” (φίλοις τε καὶ συμμάχοις); they further argued that the Carthaginians had thus far obeyed every order, and had been faithful and trustworthy (πιστοί) throughout, and contrasted the Romans’ present conduct toward themselves with that of their trustworthy (πιστοί) fathers toward their own fathers; as for the war against Masinissa, the Carthaginians argued that they fought him because of his “lawless, unjust” treatment of themselves (ἀθεμίστως: App. *Pun.* 79) – treatment, of course, to which the Romans had turned a blind eye for years.

Despite their pleas, the Roman consuls issued their famous demand that the Carthaginians abandon their city and withdraw ten miles inland. The Carthaginians stretched their hands towards the heavens and “called on the gods to witness that they had been deceived” (τοὺς θεοὺς ὡς ἡπατημένοι κατεκάλουν: App. *Pun.* 83). When they regained their composure, an ambassador identified as Banno, the son of Tigillas, rose to address the Romans again: he repeated the arguments of the previous Carthaginian speech, emphasizing once again that the Romans should spare them in the name of the gods who had witnessed the oaths sworn by Scipio that the Romans and Carthaginians should be friends and allies (συμμάχους καὶ φίλους: *Pun.* 83), and that they themselves had violated no treaty but had done everything they had been told to do. Then he added a plea for the Romans to spare their temples, their religious rituals, and the tombs of their families, and not to force men who made their living off the sea to migrate inland; for how can Rome’s demand that Carthage be destroyed be reconciled with the senate’s promise to leave its citizens free and autonomous? This implicit accusation of Roman bad faith was followed by yet another plea that the Romans should not tarnish their international reputation for virtue, piety, and moderation in success (δόξης δ’ ἀγαθῆς καὶ εὐσεβοῦς . . . καὶ μετριοπάθειαν ἐν τοῖς εὐτυχήμασιν: *Pun.* 85) by treating the Carthaginians so badly.

Thus the Carthaginians constructed Roman behavior using the familiar moral benchmarks of good faith and justice. In addition, they played on the same concerns for Rome’s reputation for virtue, piety, moderation, and trustworthiness that domestic political leaders, such as Scipio Nasica, asserted before Cato and the pro-war faction in Rome.

There were, of course, plenty of accusations of bad faith and injustice to go around throughout the whole sorry saga: Cato asserted that the Carthaginians were preparing for war against Rome rather than Masinissa (Livy *Per.* 48; cf. *ORF*³ Cato fr. 195); the Carthaginians allegedly “pretended” that they would abide by their agreements (ἐπλάττοντο: Zonar. 9.26); the Roman senate may have falsely claimed that its military

preparations in 150 BC were not intended for a Carthaginian war, but for whatever emergencies happened to come along (App. *Pun.* 74); and, of course, Masinissa, as the Carthaginians pointed out, behaved lawlessly and unjustly. It is perhaps not surprising, given the toxic atmosphere of mutual suspicion and fear that had built up over the course of the 150s, that there was little chance at any point for compromise or a lasting peaceful settlement (although Scipio Nasica's moral arguments, it should be recalled, stayed the Romans' hands against Carthage for more than two years). There would be little point in trying to assign blame here: the Romans may have genuinely feared Carthage's potential for becoming a military power again, while the Carthaginians may have been guilty of concealing a nascent weapons program;¹⁸⁷ the Carthaginians may have gone too far by attacking Masinissa in 151/150, thus blatantly violating the terms of their treaty with Rome, but the Roman response – to force a *deditio* whose harsh terms may have been beyond what normative practice conditioned the Carthaginians to expect – could be construed as disproportionate, and a violation of the spirit of the *deditio* ritual with its emphasis on *fides*.¹⁸⁸

Assigning blame is less important than trying to explain the Roman response and its timing. As we saw earlier, strictly *Machtpolitik* or rationalizing explanations cannot on their own account for this extraordinarily (and tragically) complex situation, and as the sources' emphasis on the moral dimension to the crisis indicates, intangibles such as fear, anger, prestige, standing, and pride – Lebow's "spirit," in sum – all had important roles to play. But as Ellen O'Gorman notes, even a richer explanation, based on both rational and emotional criteria, is bound to fail.¹⁸⁹ The missing motivating factors, I would suggest, are the same practical logics of friendship breakdown that we have seen operating in Rome's disputes with Rhodes, Eumenes II, and Carthage during the Sardinia crisis of 238/237 BC. As in those cases, what seems to have happened in the late 150s was a dawning conviction among a significant portion of the Roman leadership that the Carthaginians were developing a slightly different interpretation of their

¹⁸⁷ Cf. Zonar. 9.26: "the Carthaginians had a great deal of other equipment hidden away" (οἱ γὰρ Καρχηδόνιοι πολλὴν ἑτέραν προσσκευὴν κεκρυμμένην εἶχον); this is the "opacity of states" problem, once again: above, p. 192.

¹⁸⁸ Recall that Mago the Bruttian pointed out that those who surrendered to Roman *fides* must obey all orders, "unless they are completely outrageous and beyond expectation" (εἰ μὴ τελέως ὑπερήφανον ἢ καὶ παρὰ τὴν προσδοκίαν; Polyb. 36.5.4) – in other words, beyond normative expectations. In this case, the ultimate condition – that Carthaginians relocate so their city could be destroyed – must have seemed irreconcilable with *deditio*, since the latter virtually guaranteed a city's survival. If the Romans' intention was to destroy the city, the Carthaginians must have wondered, then why did they bother agreeing to their offer of *deditio* in the first place?

¹⁸⁹ O'Gorman 2004: 102.

relationship with Rome, one that did not fit with and was uncongenial to the way the Romans saw it. As we have seen, there were significant signs of rising prosperity and self-confidence in the Punic state in the later years of the 150s; that in itself, coupled with an unruly, demagogic politics in the city, must have appeared disturbing to some senators at least.¹⁹⁰ Moreover Carthage, like Rhodes and Eumenes II after Pydna, and indeed like Carthage herself after the successful suppression of the mercenary revolt in 238/237, behaved as though its status in the relationship with Rome was becoming less unequal than the Romans themselves regarded it, and ultimately failed to recognize that the power dynamics had changed irrevocably. On this occasion at least, Zonaras intuitively grasps the nature of the problem precisely: “the Carthaginians could not endure being in an inferior position” any longer (οἱ [Καρχηδόνιοι] οὐκ ἔφερον ἐλαττούμενοι: Zonar. 9.26). Perhaps in 151, after they paid off the final installment of their War indemnity arising from the Second Punic War, and the last Carthaginian of the hostages had been returned from Rome, the Carthaginians believed that they had somehow been restored to their pre-Hannibalic War status. The removal of these tangible signs of their subordination to their superior *amicus* could not have failed to produce a surge in self-confidence, and perhaps even a bit of swagger, especially among the “democratizing” faction in the city.¹⁹¹ If some or all of the Carthaginians so believed, then they were sadly mistaken; like the Aetolians who had been forced to agree to a *maiestas* clause in 189, like the Rhodians who had been deprived of their lucrative harbor dues and some of their land empire after 168, like the Carthaginians themselves when they had been stripped of Sardinia and Corsica in 238/237, the Carthaginians in 149 had to be reissued a firm, tangible reminder that their status in the relationship with Rome would remain unchanged: *deditio*, followed by the securing of more high-value Carthaginian hostages, and the obliteration of the Punic state as the Carthaginians knew it.

To sum up: the payment of the final installment of their indemnity and the return of the last of the Second Punic War-era Carthaginian hostages by Rome triggered a perception among some Carthaginians that their status

¹⁹⁰ Cf. Purcell 1995: “such scenes of popular frenzy are more likely to have served to justify the mission of Rome in propagating stability in the face of social violence.”

¹⁹¹ On the significance of paying off the war indemnity for Carthage’s self-confidence – and as a cause of Roman concern, see Badian 1958a: 136; Hoffman 1960: 335; Harris 1979: 238; Maróti 1983: 227; Huss 1985: 432–34; Vogel-Weidemann 1989: 86; Goldsworthy 2000: 332. For the general principle that “indemnities . . . underlined the power of the victor and the submission of the vanquished,” see Gruen 1984: 292. Roman anxiety on this score may be detected in the senate’s rejection of the Carthaginian offer in 191 BC to pay off the entire indemnity in one lump sum: Livy 36.4, with Gruen 1984: 293.

in their *amicitia* with Rome was now rising, perhaps to pre-Hannibalic War levels, since the symbols of their defeat in that war (the hostages, the indemnity) had now been eliminated. The Romans, disturbed by this internal, unilateral adjustment in status-perception, sought some means of responding that the asymmetry within the relationship would remain at its present level, with Carthage as subordinate as the settlement of 201 BC had rendered her. This misfit of perceptions and expectations gave rise to clashes in the political and diplomatic arenas, where renegotiations of the relationship were attempted, but ultimately failed amidst mutual accusations of bad faith and injustice. Regardless of which party was the first to break faith, or at whose door the lion's share of the responsibility for causing the war should be laid, the internal dynamics of *amicitia*, and its closely related processes of breakdown and dissolution can adequately account for the Roman attitude towards Carthage in the late 150s, as well as the timing of the increasing tensions between the two states. The *amicitia* explanation offered here, along with its attendant moralizing discourse, which has been seen to be constitutive of events rather than superfluous rhetorical superstructure, forms a useful supplement to a strictly *Machtpolitik* explanation that stresses Rome's fear of Carthage's increased potential as a threat in the late 150s.¹⁹²

Some final examples of perceived Roman breaches of *fides* need not detain us long, now that the proper interpretative template for friendship breakdown and dissolution scenarios has been established in detail. We begin with a notorious episode – the massacre by the Roman praetor, C. Sulpicius Galba, of 8,000 Spanish Lusitanians after they had surrendered to Roman *fides* in 150 BC.¹⁹³ When envoys came from the Lusitani to Galba asking for renewal of their treaty with Rome, the commander received them kindly, made a truce, and offered to settle them on fertile lands, feigning sympathy for their poverty, and addressing them as the Romans' "poor friends" (πενουμένοις φίλοις: App. *Hisp.* 59). On the following day, Galba asked them to come down into a plain in open country, and lay down their arms "as befitting friends" (ὡς φίλοι: *Hisp.* 60) – and then proceeded to massacre all 8,000 of them, perhaps in revenge for their

¹⁹² Cf. Purcell 1995: 137–38: Rome's motive for destroying Carthage "is to be sought in the rhetoric of war rather than in any practical considerations."

¹⁹³ Ancient sources are plentiful, but see especially App. *Ib.* 59–61; Livy *Oxy. Per.* 49; *Per.* 49; Val. Max. 8.1.abs.2; 9.6.2; cf. Nep. *Cato* 3.4; Suet. *Galba* 3.2; Ps.-Ascon. 203 Stangl; Oros. 4.21.10; Cic. *Brut.* 80, 89–90; Cic. *De or.* 1.227–228; 2.263; discussion: Scullard 1951: 234–36; Kienast 1954: 97–98; Astin 1967a: 58–60, 318–19; Dahlheim 1968: 41; Astin 1967a: 111–13, 155–56; Richardson 1986: 137–40; Nörr 1989: 122–35; Eckstein 1994b: 83–84; Richardson 1996: 61; Hölkeskamp 2000: 246; Burton 2009: 249–50; Eckstein 2009: 266.

slaughter five years earlier of M. Terentius Varro, a Roman quaestor, along with 15,000 of his troops (cf. *Hisp.* 56), and 7,000 of Galba's own soldiers shortly before. As they were being cut down, the Lusitanians called upon the gods to witness the Romans' broken promises (ὀδυρομένους τε καὶ θεῶν ὀνόματα καὶ πίστεις ἀνακαλοῦντας: *Hisp.* 60). "Thus," Appian concludes, "Galba pursued vengeance for bad faith with bad faith in a way unworthy of Romans and more imitative of barbarians" (ἀπιστίᾳ μὲν ἄρα ἀπιστίᾳ μετιών, οὐκ ἀξίως δὲ Ῥωμαίων μιμούμενος βαρβάρους: *Hisp.* 60). Later on, one of the survivors of the massacre, Viriathus, would lead a major revolt against the Romans, enticing the Turditanians to his side by reminding them of the transgression of Galba, the bad faith of the Romans, and oath-violating Roman commanders Galba and Lucullus.¹⁹⁴

The Roman experience in Spain in these years, during what Polybius calls "the Fiery War" (Polyb. 35.1.1, 6) when the fighting was so hard and brutal that it was difficult even to find recruits for the legions (Polyb. 35.4.3–14; cf. Livy *Per.* 48; App. *Hisp.* 49), was marked by hideous slaughter, treachery, and obscene body counts on both sides; Galba's predecessor in the Spanish command, L. Licinius Lucullus (cos. 151), for instance, attacked the innocent Vaccaeii without senatorial authorization, and slaughtered 20,000 men in their city of Cauca after they surrendered and admitted a Roman garrison; these men went to their deaths decrying Roman ἀπιστία.¹⁹⁵ Unlike the cases of Rhodes after 168 BC and Carthage in 238/237 and the late 150s, which allowed for at least some ambiguity as to which party was guilty of *fides*-violation first, both Lucullus' and Galba's actions left little room for doubt in the minds of their victims and opponents that it was these representatives of the Roman state alone who were guilty of bad faith. Thus Cato, in the last foreign-policy fight of his life, could claim in a speech against Galba that the latter's defense of his actions – that he made a preemptive strike against the Lusitanians, who were actually plotting to attack the Romans under cover of a truce – was wholly inadequate, and that it was as absurd to punish intentionality on the Lusitanians' part as it would be to make Cato a pontifex simply because he desired a thorough knowledge of pontifical law, or an augur simply because he desired a thorough knowledge of augury.¹⁹⁶ The irony here of course is that on this

¹⁹⁴ Οὐρίαθος δ' ὁ ἐκ τῆς Γάλβα παρανομίας ἐκφυγών, τότε συνὼν αὐτοῖς, ὑπεμίμησε τῆς Ῥωμαίων ἀπιστίας, ὅσakis τε αὐτοῖς ὁμόσαντες ἐπιθοῖντο, καὶ ὡς ὅδε πᾶς ὁ στρατὸς ἐκ τοιῶνδε ἐπιτορκίων Γάλβα καὶ Λευκόλλου διαφύγοιμεν (App. *Pun.* 61).

¹⁹⁵ App. *Hisp.* 52 (App. *Hisp.* 51–55; cf. 89 for his narrative of Lucullus' campaign); cf. Livy *Per.* 48; Flor. 1.33.11; *De Vir Ill.* 58.2–3; Oros. 4.21.1–2.

¹⁹⁶ Galba's defense: Livy *Per.* 49 = ORF³ Galba fr. 12; Cato's response: ORF³ Cato fr. 197.

occasion, Cato returned to the sort of argument he had advanced in favor of the Rhodians in 167, after having argued precisely the opposite regarding Carthage just a few years before. But as Scullard and Astin recognized long ago, it was less a matter of Cato being inconsistent or unprincipled than of Galba being completely unconvincing in his attempt to defend the indefensible.¹⁹⁷ Galba's defense, which was itself remarkably similar to Cato's argument only the year before, that Carthage was in fact making preparations for war against Rome rather than Masinissa, in the end simply did not wash with a majority of the senators, and it was only through a last, desperate, theatrical gambit by Galba – he brought forth his children, and committed these future orphans to the care of the Roman people – that he escaped prosecution.¹⁹⁸

This was a lamentable result, as was the sequel: Galba went on to be elected consul for 144 BC (though not, it should be noted, *in suo anno*, 148).¹⁹⁹ For the IR Realist, this is perhaps not surprising: in this case normative expectations that *fides* would bring a practical, morally satisfying result were defied, and the pressures of the Mediterranean anarchy and sheer *Machtpolitik* carried the day.²⁰⁰ On the other hand, that the Romans – or at least a significant portion of Roman senators, including Cato and the tribune, L. Scribonius Libo, who attempted to launch the prosecution of Galba in an extraordinary *quaestio*, and argued that the surviving Lusitanians enslaved by Galba should be set free²⁰¹ – had moral qualms about Galba's conduct at all is surely important. As we have seen many times before, such soul-searching is not at all what might be expected of amoral pragmatists, as the Romans are often made out to be.²⁰² Moreover, that all parties in the debate – the Lusitanians, Cato and Libo, and even Galba himself – chose to frame the central question primarily in terms of *fides* and *fides*-violation, rather than (or, in the case of Galba's "preemptive war" defense, in addition to) a *Machtpolitik* justification, is surely also

¹⁹⁷ Scullard 1951: 235; Astin 1978: 112.

¹⁹⁸ *ORF*³ Cato fr. 199; Livy *Oxy. Per.* 49; *Per.* 49; Cic. *Brut.* 90, *De or.* 1.228; Val. Max. 8.1.abs.2. Appian claims that Galba escaped punishment by means of his wealth (App. *Hisp.* 60). L. Scribonius Libo, one of the tribunes of 149 BC, initiated a special *rogatio* to try Galba and demand that he restore the enslaved survivors of the Lusitanian massacre to freedom, but a formal trial may never have actually taken place since Libo's bill failed to pass after Galba's theatrics with his children; it was thus perhaps during the controversy surrounding Libo's bill, rather than in a court of law, that Cato and Galba delivered their speeches: Richardson 1986: 138–39; cf. Scullard 1951: 235; Astin 1967a: 58. Whether a trial took place matters little for the present purposes.

¹⁹⁹ Astin 1967a: 59 believes the taint of scandal that clung to Galba was responsible for the delay.

²⁰⁰ So Eckstein 2009: 266.

²⁰¹ For a full list of sources, see Astin 1967a: 58 n. 3; 1978: 112 n. 26.

²⁰² Factional politics of course played a role as well: Scullard 1951: 235; Astin 1967a: 58.

significant. Not even Galba deployed a “might makes right,” “power is as power does” argument at any point in the proceedings, probably because he knew it would not work before an audience of men dominated by the “spirit,” and who apparently did not think exclusively, if at all, in such terms.

In any case, there were indeed several practical consequences arising from the Lusitanian incident both internally, and in the international sphere. A most likely result of the Galba scandal was the establishment of the first permanent court in Rome charged with trying cases of provincial extortion, the *quaestio repetundarum*.²⁰³ Also, as we have noted, Viriathus was able to use the example of the Roman violation of their oaths and *fides* to incite a major revolt against Rome – a rebellion that would last for eight full years (App. *Hisp.* 62). Finally, the afterlife of the terrible, albeit extraordinary *exemplum* of Galba’s conduct would linger on in the historiography of Rome for six full centuries, and remain a cautionary tale for the moral hazards associated with imperial arrogance. Thus even in this extreme instance of Roman *mala fides* – and it must be emphasized once again just how extraordinary it was in the unambiguous allocation of blame to the Romans – the issues at stake were predominantly moral, and the playing out of the conflict within a moral framework had real-world, constitutive effects not only on the shape of Roman internal politics, but also on the nature of the Roman imperial project in Spain.

A somewhat similar incident occurred in 173 BC – the post-*deditio* destruction of a Statellate Ligurian settlement and the mass enslavement of its inhabitants by the consul, M. Popilius Laenas.²⁰⁴ Criticism by the senate was couched in the familiar discourse of the immorality of *fides*-violation:

atrox res uisa senatui, Statellates, qui uni ex Ligurum gente non tulissent arma aduersus Romanos, tum quoque oppugnatos, non ultro inferentis bellum, deditos in fidem populi Romani omni ultimae crudelitatis exemplo laceratos ac deletos esse, tot milia capitum innoxiorum, fidem inplorantia populi Romani, ne quis umquam se postea dedere auderet, pessumo exemplo uenisse, et distractos passim iustis quondam hostibus populi Romani pacatos seruire.

It seemed atrocious to the senate that the Statellates, the one Ligurian people that had not taken up arms against the Romans, should have then been attacked without ever having made war on Rome, and having surrendered themselves to the

²⁰³ Cic. *Brut.* 106; additional references at *MRR* 1: 459. Most scholars agree on this: Richardson 1986: 138, with others listed at n. 52; Nörr 1989: 134 is more cautious.

²⁰⁴ Livy 42.7.3–9.6; discussion: Scullard 1951: 194–96; Merten 1965: 30, 45, 90; Dahlheim 1968: 40–41; Nörr 1989: 129–35; Eckstein 1994b: 83–84; Hölkeskamp 2000: 245–47; Burton 2009: 249–51; Eckstein 2009: 266–67.

good faith of the Roman people, then been abused and destroyed with every kind of extreme cruelty; that so many thousands of freeborn innocent men should have been enslaved while imploring the good faith of the Roman people is a terrible example, such that nobody in the future would ever dare surrender themselves. Carried off into slavery all over the place, the Statellites like defeated enemies now serve those who were once actual enemies of the Roman people. (Livy 42.8.5–6)

The senate then decreed that Popilius should restore to the Statellites their freedom, their property, their arms, and their homeland; Popilius should not leave his province until this was done, and was to remember that great victories arise from conquering enemies, not from savagery against the defenseless (*claram uictoriam uincendo oppugnantes, non saeuendo in afflictos fieri*: Livy 42.8.8).

The senate and the Statellites themselves, therefore, constructed Popilius' behavior in strictly moral terms. Although there was a pragmatic purpose to the senate's attempt to chastise the commander – the *patres* feared for Rome's reputation for *fides*, and their ability to gain further international *amici* – this does not negate the strictly moral judgment being passed here. As we know from the discussion of trust in interpersonal friendship in Chapter 2, the semantic range of *fides* encompasses both the pragmatic “guarantee” as well as the moral-religious “trust.” Popilius' view of the issue was broadly similar: rather than deploying a “might makes right,” “power is as power does” justification for his actions, he accused the senate and the Statellites of unfairness and injustice. “The consul,” says Livy “reacted disobediently towards the senate with the same savage anger that he used against the Ligurians.” He marched to Rome in fury, convened the senate in the Temple of Bellona, fined A. Atilius, the praetor who had presided over the meeting that issued the decree against him, and issued a sharp rebuke to the *patres*: their decree had been made against himself and in favor of their enemies, whereby they handed his victory to the Ligurians; a praetor's order in effect demanded that the consul be surrendered to the enemies of Rome.²⁰⁵ Even Popilius, therefore, chose to frame the dispute in terms of morality rather than *Machtpolitik*.

The result, however, is disheartening in the extreme. Popilius returned to his province, continued to make war on the Statellites (rather than making restitution), secured his brother's election to the consulship for the

²⁰⁵ *consul, qua ferocia animi usus erat in Liguribus, eandem ad non parendum senatui habuit . . . iratus patribus, infestus praetori Romam rediit; senatuque extemplo ad aedem Bellonae uocato, multis uerbis inuictis in praetorem qui, cum ob rem bello bene gestam uti diis immortalibus honos haberetur referre ad senatum debuisset aduersus se pro hostibus senatus consultum fecisset, quo uictoriam suam ad Ligures transferret dedique iis prope consulem praetor iuberet* (Livy 42.9.1–3)

following year, and himself went on to hold the censorship in 159 BC – a triumph, it appears, for an IR Realist reading of the episode.²⁰⁶ But what is truly striking about the whole sorry tale is how exceptional Popilius' behavior was. As we have remarked before in the case of Sulpicius Galba in the First Macedonian War and Acilius Glabrio in his confrontation with the Aetolians, it was the individual temperament of the commanders that periodically made the Roman state appear to ride roughshod over its international commitments and acceptable international practice. And as two final cases will demonstrate, these were isolated episodes and remarkable precisely for their exceptionalism.

In 280 BC,²⁰⁷ the people of Rhegium asked for Roman aid and a garrison (φυλακὴν ἄμα καὶ βοήθειαν: Polyb. 1.7.6), because they feared attacks either by Pyrrhus and the Carthaginians (so Polybius and Diodorus), or by the Lucanians and Bruttians (so Dionysius of Halicarnassus);²⁰⁸ although the sources are not explicit on the point, the Rhegians probably secured Roman help by performing *deditio*.²⁰⁹ The Romans sent a garrison of 4,000 men under Decius, a Campanian, who preserved the city and Rome's "good faith" for a while (πίστιν: Polyb. 1.7.7), but then the garrison "broke faith" with the Rhegians (παρεσπόνδησαν: 1.7.8), and took possession of their city by force, slaughtering many of the inhabitants and raping the women. The Romans took the news of the garrison's treachery very badly, but, according to Polybius, could do nothing for the moment because they were preoccupied by the war with Pyrrhus.²¹⁰ When they were freed of this last constraint, however, they laid siege to the garrison inside Rhegium, and took the city ca. 270 with heavy losses to Decius and his men. Just over 300 survivors of the original garrison of 4,000 were brought back to

²⁰⁶ Cf. Eckstein 2009: 266–67 with references.

²⁰⁷ Or, perhaps less likely, 282 BC: cf. Walbank 1957: 52; Hoyos 1998: 14; Cassola 1962: 171 and n. 106; Toynbee 1965: 101 and n. 2; Bleckmann 1999: 132–39. As Scullard 1989: 539 points out, if Polybius is correct that the Rhegians were afraid of Pyrrhus and the Carthaginians (the view adopted here), then 282 is impossible (too early for Pyrrhus). The 282 date thus also depends on Cassola's dubious thesis that the variant tradition in Dionysius of Halicarnassus and Dio Cassius (but absent from Polybius) is trustworthy; see below.

²⁰⁸ Hoyos 1998: 14 argues that Polybius' summary account falsely ties the threat from Pyrrhus to the Rhegian request, which was actually made, as Dionysius says, because of local threats by Lucanians and Bruttians.

²⁰⁹ This may be implied by Polybius' statement that the Roman garrison troops "kept their faith for a time" (χρόνον τινα . . . τὴν αὐτῶν πίστιν: Polyb. 1.7.7). Besides, it is difficult to imagine how else an appeal for aid and a garrison could have been answered since, as we have seen (above, Chapter 3), *deditio* was the standard Roman means for accomplishing this in this period (cf. the Mamertines in 264 BC).

²¹⁰ Bleckmann 1999: 144 argues that the garrison was more of a Campanian warrior band than a Roman legionary force. The Romans were unable to exert much control over them, and in fact it was in Rome's interest not to control their activities against Pyrrhus.

Rome, where they were publicly scourged and beheaded in the forum. The Romans then restored to the Rhegians their city and its territory.²¹¹

Dionysius of Halicarnassus and Cassius Dio preserve a variant tradition that alleges that Decius' motive for attacking the Rhegians was because he discovered a plot by the townspeople to betray the Roman garrison and the town to Pyrrhus (Dion. Hal. 20.4.4–5; Dio fr. 40.9–10); Dionysius further suggests that Decius was informed of the plot, and received his instructions to expose it and begin reprisals by letter, written either by himself or by C. Fabricius, the Roman consul (Dion. Hal. 20.4.6). Both of these reports, the historian concludes, are “reasonable” (ἔχει δὲ λόγον ἀμφοτέρω). But the absence of any hint of this story in Polybius – summary though his account may be – tells against its historicity. Besides, Dionysius does not vouch for the truth of the contents of the letter, whoever wrote it, merely that such a letter was written. By contrast, the only hint of criticism of Roman behavior in Polybius' account – besides that of Decius himself, of course – is that the Romans were too preoccupied with the war with Pyrrhus to avenge the Rhegians straightaway (Polyb. 1.7.9). The amplification and elaboration of this statement in Dio – that the Romans were criticized for their delay in avenging the Rhegians since they created the impression that they considered the plight of Rhegium of little concern (Dio fr. 40.12) – would seem to condemn as fabrication the story of Roman intrigue *tout court*, since Dio's account is a transparent attempt to reconcile two disparate traditions, one obviously anti-Roman (Philinus?), and the other perhaps pro-Roman (Fabius Pictor?). Given Polybius' criticisms of patriotic historiography, and in particular the works of Philinus and Fabius, in precisely this section of his work (Polyb. 1.14–15), it is best to follow Polybius' account of the Rhegium episode as the most accurate, and accept that he read his sources for it carefully and critically. The variant tradition found in Dionysius and Dio is probably to be jettisoned.²¹²

In terms of the main concerns of this section, the Rhegium episode supports a number of conclusions drawn so far from other cases: that the issue of Decius' betrayal was framed in terms of *fides* and *fides*-violation; that, just as concerned the senate after Popilius Laenas' slaughter of the

²¹¹ The Rhegian situation in the 270s BC: Polyb. 1.7.6–13; cf. Dio fr. 40.7–12; Zonar. 8.6; App. *Sam.* fr. 9.1–3; Dion. Hal. 19.4–5; Diod. Sic. 22.1.1–3; discussion at Walbank 1957: 52–53; Cassola 1962: 171–79; Toynbee 1965: 101–02; Frederiksen 1984: 222–23; Scullard 1989: 539; Lazenby 1996: 35–36; Hoyos 1998: 14, 17, 28, 31, 35, 37, 42; Bleckmann 1999.

²¹² *Contra* Cassola 1962: 176–77, who bases his argument on the faulty premise of a party around the consul, Fabricius, that favored hostility and aggression towards the Greek cities of southern Italy, which was opposed by a group around P. Cornelius Rufus that favored engagement. Cassola is followed by Toynbee 1965: 101–02; Frederiksen 1984: 222–23; Dench 1995: 78–79.

Statellate Ligurians in 173 BC, Cato in the case of the Rhodians in 167, and Scipio Nasica in the case of Carthage in 151, “the Romans were concerned to recover, as far as they were able, their reputation for good faith among their allies through their punishment of Decius’ soldiers” (Polyb. 1.7.12); and that moral (rather than strictly strategic or *Machtpolitik*) imperatives played a part in compelling the Romans to act against their own fellow citizens. Once again, I do not mean to minimize the role played here by Roman self-interest – it explains Polybius’ emphasis on the pragmatic aspect of the senate’s concern to recover the Roman reputation for *fides*, and the Roman acceptance of the Rhegian *deditio* in the first place in 280 (or 282), which gave them a valuable foothold in southern Italy. But it should be stressed again that Roman concern to be seen to be doing the right thing, and agonizing over how to do it (as indeed they would shortly do again over whether to accept the Mamertine *deditio*, knowing how hypocritical such behavior would make them look, given their harsh response to the perfidious Rhegian garrison: above, pp. 128–32) is not the sign of an exceptionally amoral and aggressive state – quite the contrary. Moreover, the contrast between this and the cases of Galba and Laenas in terms of its result lends credence to the suggestion made earlier, that the latter cases were exceptions rather than the rule. Not only did the senate order the harshest punishment imaginable for Decius’ men, the *patres* also went to great lengths to restore Rhegium and its territory to its citizens, as indeed they would do later on for the Saguntines while the Hannibalic War raged.

Finally, there is the curious case of the pro-Roman Chalcidian politician, Micythio. In 170 BC, he appeared before the senate reclining on a litter (he was extremely ill at the time), and in the accepted diplomatic fashion, proceeded to recall all the various *beneficia* that his city of Chalcis had performed for the Romans over the years, and especially in the ongoing war against Perseus. Micythio then seemed to grow angry; he laid harsh accusations against the former praetor of the fleet, C. Lucretius Gallus, as well as the current admiral, L. Hortensius: these men, Micythio revealed, behaved “arrogantly, greedily, and cruelly” (*superbe, auare, crudeliter*: Livy 43.7.8) towards the Chalcidians, stripping their temples of their adornments and transporting them back to Italy, enslaving the citizens and plundering their property, as well as billeting Roman sailors in private dwellings, which gave rise to unspeakable crimes against the town’s women and children. Despite this, Micythio continued, the Chalcidians thought it best, above all else, to preserve their own loyalty to Rome (*fide*: Livy 43.7.9), and to endure this harsh treatment. But, he warned, their patience was quickly running

out. The senate called upon Lucretius Gallus to respond to Micythio's charges, and the tribunes joined in as well, bringing him before the people and setting a day for his trial. To Micythio, the *patres* replied that they knew well and appreciated the Chalcidians' past and present *beneficia*, but that the sorts of actions that the Roman commanders took, which should never be inflicted on friends and allies (*socii atque amici*: Livy 43.8.6), had been done without their authorization. The senators would further send a letter to the Roman admiral, Hortensius, informing him of the senate's displeasure, ordering him to recover from slavery any Chalcidians who had been sold, and to allow only officers of the fleet to be quartered in Chalcidian homes. Micythio was borne at public expense by carriage to Brundisium, while Lucretius was found guilty by all thirty-five tribes, and fined one million *asses* for his actions (Livy 43.7.5–8.10).²¹³

This last case illustrates innumerable themes that have arisen in the course of this study: the candor of the representative of a friendly state in recalling all the benefits Rome's *amicus* has performed, and rebuking – even subtly threatening – the Romans if they refuse to right the wrongs done to them; the senatorial concern for making restitution to those who had suffered Roman injustices; the punishment of those most responsible for breaking faith (in this case, a former magistrate of the Republic); and the ostentatious honoring of an individual who had suffered at Rome's hands – a payment of symbolic capital that reduced the status-gap separating the great power from a mere citizen of a Greek *polis*, which in turn would benefit from the honors paid to one of its own.²¹⁴

In this section, as in the previous one, I have been less concerned with allocating blame than with trying to account for the causes and timing of friendship breakdown and dissolution in cases where it is primarily the Romans who are regarded (by the sources, by internal and external critics, by modern scholars) as having broken *fides*. Along the way the analysis has uncovered significant discursive and behavioral patterns that mesh well with the findings of the previous section: thus friendship breakdown between Rome and her international *amici* is often constructed by the

²¹³ For more on this episode, see Merten 1965: 23–24.

²¹⁴ Cf. the honor that accrued to Hegesias of Lampsacus for his strenuous efforts in late 197 or early 196 BC to have his city included in the final peace settlement between Rome and Philip V; the expensive public inscription set up in his home town recording his perilous and exhausting journey was, of course, honorific in itself – a significant payment of symbolic capital; discussion: above, p. 231. In this context also belong the Greek naval captains enrolled in the *formula amicorum* in 78 for their services to Rome (above, pp. 82–83), and Menippus and Polemaeus, honored by the Colophonians for preserving their city's autonomy against the attempted encroachments by Roman governors (above, p. 224).

sources in the moralizing terminology of justice and injustice, *fides* and *fides*-violation; and the erosion of *amicitia* often grew out of a clash of interpretation over the nature of the relationship as it was transformed by the changing realities of power. We have also seen that the Roman practice of administering lessons and making examples of others, even when the grounds for doing so were shaky, and the justifications and pretexts thin and unconvincing, was a means of demonstrating and reinforcing Rome's interpretation of *amicitia*. As in the case of Carthage in 238/237 BC and the late 150s, Rome sometimes had to take steps to adjust upward the status-asymmetry in the relationship, usually at times when Rome's *amici* were taking steps to adjust the status-asymmetry downward. As in the previous section, moreover, I have tried to show that elucidating the practical logics of the *amicitia* interpretation does not so much undermine *Machtpolitik* explanations for Roman behavior, but provides an additional, processual layer of analysis which, as we have seen here, may explain better than exclusively *Machtpolitik* interpretations some episodes in which Roman behavior has traditionally been regarded as bafflingly callous and appallingly aggressive. The *amicitia* reading of these episodes restores authentic patterns of discourse and thought to the study of Roman imperialism, and in particular recovers the voices of the internal and external critics of Roman policy, which are too often left out of the story of Rome's international relations and imperial expansion. Finally, this section has attempted to confirm Chapter 2's contention that the Romans were very concerned – perhaps exceptionally so – with not only protecting their reputation for *fides* but also acting according to its mandates. The few exceptional cases where the Romans were unable to punish bad faith in their own representatives say less about the Romans in general or as a people than about the senate's inability to control individual personalities, or the behavior of the commander on the spot.

PROCESS: ABRUPT OR GRADUAL BREAKDOWN AND/OR DISSOLUTION?

We have left to consider in detail the rate of the interrelated and intersecting processes of international friendship breakdown and dissolution using the framework and typologies developed in Chapter 2. The analysis in Chapter 2 also discovered that whereas modern interpersonal friendships conform to a pattern of abrupt breakdown followed by gradual dissolution and disengagement, the bulk of the ancient evidence suggests that

the breakdown and dissolution of Roman interpersonal friendships were equally abrupt and almost simultaneous, which was a function of the honor and shame cultures that the ancient Mediterranean peoples inhabited.

The bulk of the evidence for Roman foreign relations that this study has thus far examined would seem to suggest that in the sphere of international relations, the process of friendship breakdown was as abrupt as it was among individuals, but that the process of dissolution and disengagement was more attenuated. This is perhaps because the stakes of friendship dissolution were so much higher at the level of states, in that the process often ultimately issued in declarations of war, expensive military operations, ravaging and neglect of precious agricultural land, and massive amounts of bloodshed and loss of life. A host of examples examined thus far would seem to follow this pattern: the sudden transformation (in a matter of minutes) of Rhodes from friend to enemy in 168 BC was followed by four or five years of diplomacy, leading to a negotiated *rapprochement* in 164 or 163; Eumenes II similarly and as suddenly went from being friend to enemy in 168, and endured Roman slights to his honor, damage to his reputation, meddling in the internal politics of his household and in his foreign policy in Asia Minor until his death from natural causes, ca. 158; the Romans attempted to negotiate with the Campanians in 341 and the Illyrgetes in 206 before declaring war; and, of course, three major wars with Carthage and one with Philip V were preceded by years of diplomacy.

There is perhaps another reason for Roman international friendship breakdown and dissolution following this pattern: as I have tried to show elsewhere, the internal mechanisms of the native Italic fetial and surrender rituals mandated deliberation and delay – a “cooling-off period” – before sanctions for perceived transgressions of *fides* and the duties of friendship were put into operation.²¹⁵ Even after the fetial ritual had fallen into disuse by the Middle Republic, the “cooling-off period” (30 or 33 days, or perhaps 30–33 days) required for *rerum repetitio* (the provision of satisfactory reparations by the perceived transgressor), seemed to have become hardwired into Roman diplomatic practice. Thus, as we saw in [Chapter 2](#), Ap. Claudius Pulcher may have tried negotiations with the Carthaginians on three separate occasions in 264 – the final time occurring even after Carthaginian ships had attacked the Roman fleet in the Straits of Messina – before starting a war with them. Even minor powers that Rome could have easily brought to heel – one thinks of the increasingly

²¹⁵ Burton 2009: 241.

obstreperous Aetolian League after 206 – were allowed to go their own way, ignore Roman advice and demands, and in some cases, like Pergamum in the late 180s, or the Achaean League in the 190s and 180s, expand their own power to such an extent that they transformed and upset fragile regional power distributions that were most congenial to Roman security interests, and sometimes even became significant threats to Roman security (so Perseus' diplomatic and military offensives in the 170s, the aggressions of Demetrius of Pharos in the late 220s, the chaos wrought in Asia Minor by Demetrius of Syria in the 160s and 150s, and by Attalus II in the 150s, or indeed Philip V's and Antiochus III's attacks on Ptolemaic holdings from 204 onwards).

On the other hand, in some cases – but not all – the salience of Roman power in a particular region or periods of “imperial overstretch” may account for Roman delays. Thus Rome's preoccupation with the Celtic and Illyrian Wars in the late 220s/early 210s BC may have prevented a robust response to the Saguntine crisis in Spain, and the Roman people's initial refusal to declare war on Philip V in 200 was due to war fatigue. But often enough – in the “quiet 180s” after Apamea, for example – the Romans did not intervene militarily against the increasingly bellicose Achaean League or Eumenes II.

We should also beware of thinking that the Roman negotiations that took place during “cooling-off periods” were always and everywhere open ended, well intentioned, or even honest; as Arthur Eckstein has recently shown (above, p. 14 n. 45), Roman diplomatic practices, as indeed the *rerum repetitiones* of the old fetial ritual, which by their very formulae absolved Rome of all guilt, and placed the onus of making things right on Rome's enemies, were in fact a species of “compellence” diplomacy. The latter consisted of spirited, manly demands for honor-satisfaction that left very little room for peaceful resolution, since the parties of whom the demands were made were similarly honor-bound to avoid losing face or bringing shame upon their states. But it is surely also significant that the Romans made such attempts at all – sometimes even at the risk of eroding their own military-strategic position. This happened, for example, during ongoing negotiations with Carthage between 220 BC and 218, when Rome's precarious foothold in Spain – the city of Saguntum – was lost, and, as will be seen shortly, during the slowly deteriorating Roman–Seleucid relationship during the 190s.

The patterns in the evidence across time and place, then, are not entirely self-consistent, but are nevertheless clear in their general outlines. The

results of a selection of the thirteen most clear-cut cases surveyed across this study so far may be tabulated as follows:

Case	Breakdown		Dissolution		Result	
	Sudden	Eroded	Rapid	Gradual	No War	War
Capua (341)	x			x		x
Carthage (264)	x			x		x
Carthage (238/237)	x		x		x	
Demetrius of Pharos (late 220s)		x		x		x
Carthage (218)		x		x		x
Syphax (206–203)		x		x		x
Ilergetes (206)	x		x			x
Ilergetes (205)	x			x		x
Aetolia (206–193)	x			x		x
Philip V (204–200)		x		x		x
Pergamum (168–ca. 158)	x			x	x	
Rhodes (168–164/163)	x			x	x	
Carthage (150s)		x		x		x

Of course these categories and the criteria according to which the cases are sorted are by no means scientific or objective measures, but depend, to some degree, on the particular interpretations of events I have offered in this study. It is nonetheless revealing that international friendship breakdowns tended to be sudden following perceived violations (consonant with the pressures of ancient honor- and shame-based cultures); dissolution and disengagement were overwhelmingly gradual (consonant with aversion to the consequences of war, towards which dissolution almost inevitably careened, the ingrained Roman patterns of thought mandating “cooling-off periods” and just wars, and constraints on resources); and war almost inevitably followed attempts at negotiation (consonant with the nature of ancient “compellence” diplomacy).

These findings may be tested by discussion of some further cases. As we saw in [Chapter 2](#), in summer 215 BC, as King Hiero II lay dying, he imparted his final wish to his grandson and successor, Hieronymus, that he maintain his *fides* towards the Roman people, which Hiero had cultivated assiduously for almost fifty years (Livy 24.4.5).²¹⁶ Once his grandfather was safely dead, Hieronymus had Thraso, a pro-Roman Syracusan politician, executed, and

²¹⁶ For what follows, see Walbank 1967: 31–36; Eckstein 1985: 273–76; 1987a: 135–55, 345–49 (on the chronology of events); Green 1990: 227–28.

on the advice of his uncle Adranodorus, sent an embassy to Hannibal seeking an alliance with Carthage. Hannibal responded by sending Hippocrates and Epicydes, half-Carthaginian and half-Syracusan brothers, to negotiate a preliminary treaty of alliance. At this point the Roman praetor in charge of the Sicilian command, Ap. Claudius Pulcher, sent an embassy to renew Rome's *amicitia* with Syracuse, and to warn the king not to do anything rash, but Hieronymus informed the Roman envoys of his imminent treaty with Carthage. Henceforth, says Polybius, the Romans were on their guard against the king as an enemy (παρεφύλλατον ὡς πολέμιον: Polyb. 7.3).²¹⁷

After the treaty between Carthage and Syracuse had been struck, Claudius sent a second embassy to Hieronymus. The king, under the influence of Adranodorus, Epicydes, and Hippocrates, made excessive demands of the Romans, insisting on the remission of his grandfather's tribute, compensation for all the gifts and grain Hiero had given the Romans over the years, as well as the cession of eastern Sicily to Syracuse. The negotiations foundered on these outrageous demands ("compellence" diplomacy in action), and Hieronymus prepared for war. An advance force under Epicydes and Hippocrates was sent to raid the towns in the Roman province, and Hieronymus himself soon followed with the bulk of the Syracusan army. War with Rome seemed inevitable, but at this point fate took a hand: Hieronymus was murdered by an unknown assailant at Leontini.²¹⁸

At this point, Ap. Claudius wrote to the senate informing the *patres* that the situation was deteriorating (to which they responded by dispatching M. Claudius Marcellus, one of the consuls of 214 BC, with some reinforcements), and began to mass his forces on the Syracusan frontier. After a significant period of turmoil in Syracuse in the wake of Hieronymus' death, the new republican government there asked Claudius for a truce so that they could negotiate the renewal of Hiero's treaty, and the propraetor readily agreed. But the city was still torn internally between warring pro- and anti-Roman factions, and Claudius' attempt at one point to shore up the pro-Roman faction by making a show of force in the harbor touched off an anti-Roman riot. This was perhaps stage-managed by the new governing board of generals, which was staffed by men such as Theodotus, who had been connected with the earlier execution of the pro-Roman politician

²¹⁷ Hieronymus' accession: Livy 24.4.7; cf. Polyb. 7.7.3; execution of Thraso and embassy to Hannibal: Polyb. 7.2; Livy 24.5.9–6.2; Claudius' first embassy: Polyb. 7.3; Livy 24.6.4–6; Syracusan treaty with Carthage: Polyb. 7.4; Livy 24.6.7–9.

²¹⁸ Claudius' second embassy sent: Polyb. 7.5.1; influence of Adranodorus, Epicydes and Hippocrates: Polyb. 7.5.4–5; Hieronymus' demands and preparations for war: Polyb. 7.5.6–8; attacks on the Roman province: Livy 24.7.1–2; assassination of Hieronymus: Polyb. 7.7; Livy 24.7.3–7, 21.2.

Thraso, Sosis, a flatterer of Hieronymus (and thus a supporter of the king's pro-Carthaginian policy), Adranodorus, the architect of Hieronymus' anti-Roman policy, and Themistus, Hieronymus' brother-in-law. After a failed attempt to overthrow the anti-Roman generals, moreover, Epicydes and Hippocrates were elected to replace Adranodorus and Themistus. During all this time, the Syracusan army remained at Leontini, threatening the Roman province.²¹⁹

When Ap. Claudius' successor, Claudius Marcellus, arrived, affairs were still very uncertain, but the new commander decided nevertheless to continue Appius' negotiations, impressed by the Syracusans' proposed peace terms. He sent an embassy to Syracuse, which was successful in getting suitable terms for the renewal of the peace and friendship. The governing Syracusan generals in return sent envoys to Marcellus to finalize the arrangements. The new *foedus pacis*, along with the renewal of *amicitia* with Rome, contained lenient terms for the Syracusans: they kept all the cities and territories they held under the previous two kings, and Marcellus passed on the usual Roman demand that deserters and anti-Roman elements in the city be handed over. The negotiations with Marcellus seemed to end successfully for all parties concerned.²²⁰

Appearances deceived, however, for shortly afterward, a request of the people of Leontini for Syracusan protection against pillaging Roman soldiers resulted in the anti-Roman faction in Syracuse sending out Hippocrates and Epicydes with an army of foreign mercenaries and Roman deserters to provide protection. Subsequent clashes between these forces and the Roman troops culminated in the slaughter of a detachment of Roman soldiers. Here Marcellus' reaction is noteworthy: the commander sent another embassy to Syracuse to warn the government that its actions could result in war. In the end, however, all Marcellus demanded was the expulsion of Hippocrates and Epicydes from Sicily (the "hard but fair" practice so familiar from earlier in this chapter). Epicydes then fled Syracuse to join his brother at Leontini. When a Syracusan embassy arrived there demanding the brothers' exile from Sicily (in accordance with Marcellus' instructions), they stirred up a revolt of the Leontines, who threw off their subjection to Syracuse on the grounds that they had not agreed

²¹⁹ Claudius' letter and troop deployments: Livy 24.7.8–9; cf. 24.21.1; Syracusan government's request for renewal of Hiero's *foedus* and negotiations: Livy 24.23.11, 27.4–6; Ap. Claudius' show of force and anti-Roman riot: Livy 24.27.8–9; Adranodorus, Theodotus, and Sosis: Livy 24.23.2, cf. 26.16 (Adranodorus); Themistus: Livy 24.24.2, 26.16; Hippocrates and Epicydes: Livy 24.26.16–27.3 (coup: Livy 24.23.11–26.15); army at Leontini: Livy 24.21.4, 23.3.

²²⁰ Marcellus' decision to continue negotiations: Livy 24.7.6; Syracusan embassy to Marcellus: Livy 24.28.9; *status quo* for Syracusan territory: Livy 24.29.7.

to the new Roman treaty. The Syracusan ambassadors returned to the city, regretfully informed Marcellus of their failure, and urged him to attack Leontini. Marcellus agreed to a joint Roman–Syracusan campaign against Leontini, but the Romans alone took the city at the first assault before the arrival of the Syracusans, and Marcellus scourged and beheaded 2,000 Roman deserters. By contrast, he treated the Leontines mildly, allowing them to hold on to their property. Hippocrates and Epicydes escaped, however, returned to Syracuse, and, by playing on Syracusan fears of Roman reprisals, were elevated to power. Marcellus marched quickly up to the walls of Syracuse, threatening war, but tried one last time to negotiate a solution, demanding as the price of peace the return of the pro-Roman government to power. After Hippocrates and Epicydes refused to acquiesce, the time for negotiation and *rapprochement* was finally at an end: only now did Marcellus take serious military action to drive Syracuse into submission by throwing the full weight of his legions against its walls.²²¹

This extended narrative of Roman–Syracusan relations between 215 and 213 BC is designed to make a short point: despite the suddenness of the breakdown in friendship between Rome and Syracuse in 215, a robust Roman response took more than two years, during which time a Syracusan treaty with Carthage was struck, Roman provincial territory was attacked and threatened by Syracusan troops, a battle was fought by Roman legions against Syracusan mercenaries and Roman deserters, and there occurred repeated displays of Syracusan political instability and bad leadership directed against Rome. Contingent and unpredictable political variables – the mood of the Syracusan populace, the murder of Hieronymus – often intervened, but even the forceful and brutal Marcellus (who scourged and beheaded 2,000 Roman deserters at Leontini) seemed like a man of infinite patience during all the unpredictable vacillations at Syracuse, avoiding war and choosing diplomacy even after Roman troops had been killed in battle with Syracusan forces. Also significant are the unusually mild demands Marcellus made throughout: the mere expulsion of Hippocrates and Epicydes from Sicily (as opposed to the usual Roman demand for the turning over of anti-Roman elements for a worse fate); before this, when the Roman commander negotiated the *foedus* with the new Syracusan government after Hieronymus' murder, he passed over the usual Roman demand

²²¹ Leontine request and dispatch of anti-Romans: Livy 24.29.1–2; slaughter of Roman soldiers: Livy 24.29.4; Marcellus' demand: Livy 24.29.5; Epicydes flees: Livy 24.29.6; Leontine revolt: Livy 24.29.5–11; Syracusan ambassadors urge Marcellus to attack Leontini: Livy 24.29.12; successful Roman attack on Leontini: Livy 24.30.1, 3; execution of Roman deserters: Livy 24.30.6; lenient treatment of Leontines: Livy 24.30.7; escape of Hippocrates and Epicydes: Livy 24.30.2; elevation of Hippocrates and Epicydes to power: Livy 24.30.2–32.9; Marcellus' march to Syracuse: Livy 24.33.1, 3; ultimatum: Livy 24.33.5–6; rejection: Livy 24.33.8; Roman attack: Livy 24.33.9.

for the surrender of anti-Roman elements in the city – even though the internal political situation in Syracuse was still extremely volatile, and the board of generals included a significant number of anti-Roman politicians.

Roman willingness to negotiate a solution is in itself significant as well. Ap. Claudius attempted negotiations three times, once after hearing a rumor of a Syracusan peace treaty with Carthage, a second time after hearing that the treaty had been finalized, and again after Hieronymus had been executed. Marcellus, for his part, continued his predecessor's third negotiation and granted extremely lenient terms to the Syracusans, then tried negotiation even after the slaughter of Roman troops, and finally issued a last-minute ultimatum to the Syracusan government before attacking the city. Despite the twists and turns brought about by contingent factors in the story, what stands out above all is the Romans' persistent attempts to negotiate a solution to the Syracusan problem, despite persistent demonstrations of Syracusan *mala fides*, as well as their willingness to grant extremely lenient conditions to the Syracusans, despite the Syracusans' own outrageous demands, such as the one insisting on repayment for Hiero's *beneficia* to Rome – a particularly egregious violation of the moral code of *amicitia*. No doubt Roman behavior is to be explained by the fact that Roman resources were already stretched fairly thin at this stage of the Hannibalic War, and a peaceful accommodation with Syracuse would have obviated the need to commit significant troop numbers to the Sicilian theater of war for the long term. Be that as it may, what matters here is that the same pattern of deliberate slowness in Rome's attempt to manage a breakdown in friendship and to negotiate a solution short of war mesh well with numerous other cases examined in this study.

Perhaps the most famous instance of a deliberately slowly and carefully managed breakdown and dissolution of *amicitia* is the lengthy diplomatic history of Rome's relations with the Seleucid kingdom in the 190s BC.²²² Since an entire book has now been published on the negotiations leading up to Rome's war with Antiochus and the war itself,²²³ only the briefest recapitulation is necessary here. The Romans and Antiochus had been in a state of *amicitia* since 200, when a Roman delegation visited the Great King to try to settle his differences with Ptolemy V. In 198 BC, Attalus of Pergamum complained to the Romans of Antiochus' attacks on Pergamene territory,

²²² On what follows, see Holleaux 1935: 320–30; Badian 1958a: 75–81; 1959; Will 1967: 152–73; Dahlheim 1968: 104–06; Errington 1971: 156–69; Rawlings 1976; Cimma 1976: 73–79; Harris 1979: 219–23; Gruen 1984: 620–36; Eckstein 1987a: 299–314; Ferrary 1988: 141–47; Ma 1999: 29, 31, 50, 94–102; Grainger 2002: 31–34, 76–97, 101–07, 127–40, 155–208; Derow 2003: 60, 62–65; Pfeilschifter 2005: 111–18; Eckstein 2006: 292–306; 2008: 306–41.

²²³ Grainger 2002.

but the senate responded that their hands were effectively tied since Antiochus too was a *socius et amicus populi Romani*,²²⁴ and the most they could do was to send envoys to Antiochus to convince him that Rome's allies and friends should not fight each other. Antiochus evidently acceded to Rome's request regarding Pergamene territory, for in the following year, Attalus deposited a gold crown on the Capitol in thanks for Roman assistance. In the same year, however, the Syrian king began encroaching on Rhodian territory. The Rhodians warned him not to link up with Philip against Rome, and began to mobilize their fleet, but Antiochus countered with an embassy renewing the Seleucids' ancestral relations with the Rhodians, and informing them that he would not violate his *amicitia* with Rome.²²⁵

Following T. Quinctius Flamininus' Isthmian Declaration of Greek freedom in 196 BC, Antiochus sent envoys to seek an interview with the Roman commander, who told the king to leave the autonomous cities of Asia alone and to relinquish those places he had captured from Rome's *amici* Ptolemy and Philip. Meanwhile, the senate sent a special envoy, L. Cornelius Lentulus, to join three members of the senatorial commission of ten responsible for settling Greek affairs (P. Villius Tappulus, L. Terentius Massiliota, and P. Cornelius) for a conference with Antiochus at Lysimacheia, which was convened in late September, 196.²²⁶ The Roman delegates were tasked with trying to reconcile the Great King to Ptolemy (with whom he was at war), to convince him to remove his army from European Thrace, and to respect the autonomy of the free cities of Asia. The king responded that the Romans had no business interfering in Asia since he did not interfere in Italian affairs; that his European expedition was a reassertion of traditional Seleucid sovereignty over those areas;²²⁷ that the gift of freedom to the Asian cities was his prerogative; and perhaps most surprising to the Roman delegation, that he had already reconciled with Ptolemy and that a marriage alliance with his house would soon follow. Antiochus also pledged to submit his differences with Rome over the free status of the cities of Lampsacus and Smyrna to the arbitration of their mutual friend Rhodes.²²⁸

²²⁴ There was no formal Roman–Syrian *foedus*, of course; on Livy's "terminological inexactitudes," see above, p. 80.

²²⁵ Diplomacy in 200 BC: Polyb. 16.27.5 (above, p. 106); embassy to Antiochus in 198: Livy 32.8.9–16; Antiochus' response: Livy 32.27.1; 33.20.8–9; cf. 33.34.2–3; Attalus' gratitude: Livy 32.27.1 (authenticity of the episode: above, p. 105 n. 59); Antiochus' dealings with the Rhodians: Livy 33.20.1–8.

²²⁶ The date: Grainger 2002: 78–79 n. 12, as against, e.g., Walbank 1940: 325; 1967: 621 (October).

²²⁷ On Antiochus' rhetoric concerning the recovery of ancestral Seleucid property, see Ma 1999: 26–105.

²²⁸ Antiochus' embassy to Flamininus in 196 BC: Polyb. 18.47.1–2; Livy 33.34.2–4; Lysimacheia conference: Polyb. 18.50–51; Livy 33.39–40; App. *Syr.* 3; Diod. Sic. 28.12; Rhodian arbitration: Polyb.

The next recorded diplomatic interaction between Antiochus and Rome occurred shortly after the conference broke up and was directed towards Flamininus, who was still in Greece. The Great King's purpose was to assure the Roman commander of his *bona fides* as an *amicus* of Rome, and to request a formal alliance (Livy 33.41.5).²²⁹ As John Grainger argues, a second embassy from Antiochus to Flamininus recorded for spring 195 (Livy 34.25.2) must have been in response to one that was sent to Asia Minor by the Roman commander in response to the first embassy the king sent to him in late 196, but Livy has failed to record it.²³⁰ The upshot of these exchanges was that Flamininus instructed the king to send envoys to the senate in Rome to discuss his request for an alliance.

When Antiochus' envoys Hegesianax and Menippus arrived in Rome, probably in October–November 194,²³¹ they apparently raised the issues that had been the topic of the king's parleys with Flamininus during the previous year – the relative status of Rome and Antiochus, and the treaty.²³² The senate referred the king's request back to Flamininus and the ten commissioners, who were now back in Rome. The king's envoys were told that Antiochus would remain an *amicus* if he stayed out of Europe, in which case he could have his way with the Asian cities, but if he chose to remain in Thrace, Rome would defend her Asian *amici*.²³³ At this point Sulpicius Galba (cos. 200) broke in and demanded that the envoys make a choice between the two options Flamininus laid out before them. The choice was a difficult one, since it would leave the Great King with very little to show for all his previous negotiations, while Rome would gain either the evacuation of Thrace while still maintaining an interest in Asia Minor (via her *amici* Pergamum and Rhodes), or control of the Greek cities

18.52.1–5. Grainger 2002: 91–97 argues that the list of the Romans' demands are "so illogical, offensive or irrelevant," that they could only derive from an unreliable tradition – either annalistic *apologia* or Seleucid propaganda – and that only the final item Polybius reports – the king's agreement to have Rhodes arbitrate the dispute over Smyrna and Lampsacus – has a grain of truth to it.

²²⁹ Perhaps, as Grainger 2002: 105 argues, "a full alliance of equals between himself and the Roman Republic."

²³⁰ Grainger 2002: 101–04. ²³¹ The date: Grainger 2002: 128 n. 21.

²³² According to Grainger 2002: 134, the lesson Menippus saw fit to teach the senate on this occasion – that there are three types of treaty: that imposed by a victor on a defeated enemy; that which is struck between equally matched combatants; and that between friends who have never made war on each other (Livy 34.57.6–10) – is a clumsy and tendentious annalistic fabrication, designed to cast the envoys in the worst possible light. S. Mitchell 2005: 185 rightly argues that the categories do not depend on legal distinctions, and in any case are not reflective of the sheer variety of treaties Rome struck in the period. On the technical aspects of Menippus' argument generally, see Baronowski 1990: 358–59.

²³³ As has already been noted (above, p. 227), the ease with which Flamininus was willing to gamble away the Greeks' freedom could be construed as a violation of his own and Rome's *fides*.

of Ionia. Quite the opposite to what Antiochus had been seeking for over a year now – formal acknowledgment, via a treaty, of his equal status as an *amicus* of Rome – what his envoys were told amounted to a rejection of his interpretation of the balance within the relationship, perhaps even a denial that the friendship existed any longer.²³⁴ The objection Appian puts in the mouth of Menippus is thus rather on the nose: “you exhort us not like friends but as the superiors of those who have been defeated” (οὐ τοῖς φίλοις ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἡττημένοις τοὺς κεκρατηκότας ἐπικελεύειν: App. *Pun.* 6). The envoys sought leave to consult the king about Flaminius’ ultimatum, and the Romans dispatched their own envoys to Antiochus as well.²³⁵

A member of the Roman delegation, P. Villius Tappulus, arrived at Apamea Celaenae for discussions with the king in mid- to late 193; unfortunately nothing is known about what was discussed there, for news of the death of the king’s son, Antiochus, arrived, breaking up the meeting. It was agreed to continue discussions at Ephesus, which would be begun by Antiochus’ minister, Minnio. At that meeting, the old arguments over Syrian sovereignty and the Romans’ right to protect the freedom of certain Greek cities in Asia Minor were once again rehearsed by both sides. Discussions ground on but no solution was forthcoming. Meanwhile Antiochus, rather than returning to the negotiating table after his son’s funeral, restarted his conquest of Thrace, taking control of the cities of Aenus and Maronea in the process. Soon a new diplomatic channel opened up for the king when the disgruntled Aetolians made him *strategos* of the Aetolian League for 192/191. Antiochus crossed to mainland Greece in autumn of that year.²³⁶

Polybius calls this “the beginning of the war” (ἀρχὴν . . . τοῦ πολέμου: Polyb. 3.7.3) between the Romans and Antiochus, although, from the small number of troops he brought with him (10,000), the king certainly did not expect full-scale war, nor evidently did the *patres*, who – amazingly enough – continued to sit on their hands. They evidently thought that there was “nothing which furnished a sufficiently pressing cause for war” (*cum nihil quod satis maturam causam belli haberet* . . . : Livy 35.22.2), and assigned the province of Italy to both incoming consuls. In fact, it was not until six months after Antiochus’ crossing to mainland Greece that war was declared, after the king’s army slaughtered a detachment of Roman soldiers at Delium.²³⁷

²³⁴ So Grainger 2002: 137.

²³⁵ The discussions of 194 BC: Livy 34.57–59; App. *Syr.* 6–7; Diod. Sic. 28.15.2–3.

²³⁶ Embassy of 193 BC: Livy 34.59.8; 35.15.1–2, 16.1–13, 17.1–2; Antiochus’ crossing: Polyb. 3.7.3; Livy 36.3.12.

²³⁷ Consular assignment: Livy 35.20.1–2; slaughter at Delium: Livy 35.50.7–51.5; Diod. Sic. 29.1; App. *Syr.* 15; declaration of war: Livy 36.1.1–6, 2.1–2.

How are the foregoing events to be interpreted? A “Cold War” scenario of containment and avoidance caused by fear of a monumental clash between two superpowers?²³⁸ An attempt to resist the pressures of an anarchic system that drove the adversaries towards hegemonic war by working out “an acceptable balance of power . . . that would allow peaceful coexistence”?²³⁹ A clear-cut case of Roman aggressive diplomacy designed to provoke Antiochus into providing Rome with a pretext to declare war?²⁴⁰ A failure by both parties to control their own fractious peripheries and subjects, which were more interested in provoking war than either Rome or Antiochus?²⁴¹ A legal dispute in which two competing interpretations of property law came into conflict?²⁴² A situation in which “rival sloganeering” about Greek freedom “drove the two great powers to become victims of their own propaganda”?²⁴³ Or was this a clash of competing discourses of conceptual geography, whereby Rome’s “discursive interference” by proclaiming Greek freedom in Asia Minor ran up against Antiochus’ rival ancestral claims to sovereignty in the region?²⁴⁴

None of these explanations is without flaws. Badian’s “Cold War” reading ignores the significant differences between Roman–Seleucid interactions in the 190s and the twentieth-century Cold War between the United States of America and the Soviet Union, in particular the presence of nuclear weapons and more careful diplomacy in the latter, and the fact that war ultimately resulted in the ancient case.²⁴⁵ Eckstein’s systemic anarchy explanation relies too heavily on an anachronistic “balance of power” thesis: both sides in the debate were merely trying to get “the better of the balance” before an acceptable balance of power was worked out between them.²⁴⁶ Harris’s thesis of Roman aggressive intrusion into Antiochus’ sphere deliberately downplays Rome’s fear of Antiochus; one should be wary of doing so, given the king’s world-conquering ambitions, and the fact that by now he “had become the most powerful ruler on the planet (except perhaps for the emperor of China).”²⁴⁷ The pericentric explanation also falls down since Grainger’s reading of the diplomatic exchanges between 196 and 193 makes Antiochus appear far too conciliatory, and Rome far too sanguine about the Syrian king’s moves.²⁴⁸

²³⁸ So Badian 1959; cf. Derow 2003: 64. ²³⁹ So Eckstein 2008 (313 for the quotation).

²⁴⁰ So Harris 1979: 222. ²⁴¹ So Grainger 2002: 163. ²⁴² So Ma 1999: 31.

²⁴³ So Gruen 1984: 636.

²⁴⁴ So Ma 1999: 98 (“competing discourses”), 100 (“discursive interference”).

²⁴⁵ Eckstein 2008: 315–16 esp. n. 33; cf. Ma 1999: 98; Grainger 2002: 2. ²⁴⁶ Eckstein 2008: 313.

²⁴⁷ On Antiochus “the Great’s” enormous ambitions – and capabilities at this stage – see Ma 1999: 31; Grainger 2002: 111; Eckstein 2008: 145, 179, 314 and n. 26, 338 (whence the quotation).

²⁴⁸ Eckstein 2008: 321.

The “discursive” interpretations of Gruen and Ma, on the other hand, have more to recommend them, but tend to downplay the truly dangerous game that was being played, and the very real security dilemma faced by both sides. These interpretations also sidestep what was clearly the most pressing issue for Antiochus after Philip V’s defeat at Cynoscephelae: the need for some sort of guarantee of his equal status with Rome in their *amicitia*. This was precisely what the Great King sought from Flamininus in 196 and 195, and that his envoys stressed before the senate in 194; on the latter occasion, as we have seen, Antiochus’ envoy Menippus was dismayed that although the royal ambassadors had come to Rome to discuss the king’s friendship and the possibility of alliance, they had been addressed as conquered men rather than friends. In other words, as has been seen repeatedly in this study, the *locus* of conflict was, precisely, a misfit between two competing interpretations of the relative status of the partners in the relationship: the Great King claimed at least equivalence, but the Romans refused to acknowledge this. For the Romans, the proof of their own superiority was the fact that during the entire diplomatic history of their relations with Antiochus III, only the king had made any concessions, allowing the Rhodians to arbitrate his dispute with Rome over the status of Smyrna and Lampsacus.²⁴⁹ The discursive construction of the dispute in terms of status-rivalry within *amicitia* set the terms of the debate, and was in part constitutive of how it played out. Thus, once again, the construction of a diplomatic disagreement primarily in moral terms laid a discursive trap that had real-world consequences – the significant delay of a “hegemonic war.” The Constructivist interpretation is thus a necessary adjunct to *Machtpolitik* explanations, whether systemic, metrocentric, or pericentric.

Finally, how does the history of Roman–Seleucid relations in the 190s fit into the pattern of international friendship breakdown and dissolution outlined earlier? Interpretation is complicated by John Grainger’s attempt to argue that there was no real hostility or mistrust on either side until quite late in the piece. We can perhaps agree with him that after the Lysimacheia conference in 196, there was only wariness, tension, disagreements, and apprehensions rather than any suggestion that war was imminent.²⁵⁰ Grainger’s interpretation of cordial relations between Flamininus and Antiochus between autumn 196 and spring 195 – “a period of cooperation,” in which both sides kept each other informed of their activities and future

²⁴⁹ Grainger 2002: 96–97; *contra* Ma 1999: 97 n. 163; Eckstein 2008: 313: “what was missing – on both sides – was a willingness to compromise.”

²⁵⁰ Grainger 2002: 87.

plans” – may also be deemed reasonable.²⁵¹ Such a sunny view of the situation, however, clashes with the hostile reception the king’s envoys were treated to in 194 by the senate, Flamininus, and Galba. What had happened in the meantime to cause such an about-face by the Romans? According to Grainger, many of the *patres*, including Scipio Africanus, were paranoid about Roman security, and openly disapproved of Flamininus’ evacuation of Greece; Flamininus’ tougher public attitude reflects a politic adjustment to those concerns.²⁵² Antiochus’ ambassadors, who had dealt with Flamininus before, were right to be surprised. Even after this, however, Grainger suggests that relations were still amicable: so the meeting at Ephesus as late as 193 was “a process of bargaining . . . neither side showing any sense of crisis or urgency, and each side making sensible efforts to understand the other’s position.” But given that neither side had budged on any issue since 196, and the open hostility towards and dishonoring of Antiochus’ ambassadors in 193 – to say nothing of the king’s decision to continue campaigning in Thrace rather than return to the negotiating table after the talks were interrupted by the death of his son – Grainger’s thesis is simply not sustainable.²⁵³ The break in friendly (but wary) relations came in 194 over, precisely, the nature of the Roman–Seleucid *amicitia*.

Even if the date of the breakdown of the Roman *amicitia* with Antiochus is pushed this late, the decisive break and declaration of war did not occur for another two years. In the meantime, the practical logics of friendship dissolution and disengagement gradually unfolded – for instance, the Roman embassy to Asia Minor in 193 BC, and a six-month delay, even after Antiochus had crossed to Greece, while the Romans sought a reasonable pretext to declare war. It seems, then, that if Grainger’s reinterpretation of the diplomacy of 196 and 195 is accepted, the story of Roman–Seleucid relations in the 190s follows the sudden breakdown–gradual dissolution typology described above; if the traditional interpretation of these same events is followed, then the breakdown in friendship gradually unfolded beginning in 198, and dissolution followed between 196 and 193. On either reading, then, the decline in Roman–Seleucid relations in the 190s followed the predominant paradigm of sudden or gradual breakdown followed by gradual dissolution of international *amicitia*.

Before any definitive conclusions to this effect may be drawn, however, it will be useful to consider a further case that raises an interesting

²⁵¹ Grainger 2002: 106, 118 (whence the quotation), 129. ²⁵² Grainger 2002: 131–33.

²⁵³ Cf. Ma 1999: 97: each side “spoke from a position which its interlocutor was unwilling to acknowledge; utterances were issued in a loop which could have carried on indefinitely, but for precipitating events in Greece in 192” – “compellence” diplomacy, simply put.

historiographical problem – the breakdown of the Roman–Achaean *amicitia* that resulted in the Achaean War and the destruction of Corinth in 146 BC. The most important (albeit fragmentary) source for these events is the former Achaean League politician-turned-historian Polybius, and he seems to construct the League's war with Rome as a real περιπέτεια, a sudden and unexpected reversal of fortune for the League's political leadership. In Polybius' view, the "disaster" (τὸ συμφέρον . . . μέγιστος συμφοράς; Polyb. 38.1.8–9) of the tragic change in the political orientation of League politicians towards Rome in the 140s was so inexplicable that only the happenstance of "misfortune" (ἄτυχίς; 38.1.2, 6) could explain it. The element of the "unexpected" or the "unexplainable" (cf. Polyb. 38.3.7: τοὺς παραλόγοις συμφοραῖς) clearly dominated Polybius' interpretation of events; at one point he even goes so far as to dispense with rational, historical explanations entirely: "the whole land was afflicted by an evil spell" (πάντα δ' ἦν πλήρη παρηλλαγμένης φαρμακείας; 38.16.7). Of course, Polybius also regards Achaean decision-making in this period as human "folly" (ἄβουλίαν; 38.3.7), stemming from "faithlessness and cowardice" (ἄπιστίαν, ἀνανδρίαν; 38.3.10).

As a former Achaean League politician himself who, as we have seen (above, pp. 183–85, 215–16), attempted in his year as League hipparch to walk the fine line of "soft balancing," and paid for it with exile from his homeland and the end of his career, Polybius was closely invested, perhaps excessively so, in the tragedy of the League's fate in 146 BC. At one point he even protests that although historians may be forgiven for doing so, he himself will not try to cover up the mistakes of Greek politicians in his historical work (Polyb. 38.4), even though his historical role in these events was overtly political: he was appointed by the Roman commission of ten after the war as a sort of νομοθέτης for the Greek cities (39.5).

So how far is his interpretation of these events as a tragic περιπέτεια to be followed? A brief review of the evidence is in order.²⁵⁴ Although, as we have seen (above, pp. 269–78), the League's relationship with Rome was never smooth or lacking in controversy (for example, Rome's repeated objections to Achaean aggression in the Peloponnese from the late 190s onward, the deportation of "unreliable" Achaean politicians to Italy following the war with Perseus, the persistent refusal by the senate to allow them to

²⁵⁴ On what follows, see Badian 1958a: 113–14; Larsen 1968: 483–98; Errington 1971: 236–41; Deininger 1971: 220–41; Gruen 1976a: 46–69; Walbank 1979: 525–26, 649–50, 685–89, 698–718; Gruen 1984: 519–27; Ferrary 1988: 324–26; Eckstein 1995a: 14, 132, 135–36, 219–21, 267; Kallet-Marx 1995b; Champion 2007 (the latter two discussing *Syll.*³ 684, which details a case of Roman interference in the internal affairs of the League city of Dyme, ca. 144 BC).

return, the equally persistent refusal by the Achaeans to restore Spartan independence and the Spartan exiles), relations seem to have been fairly normal and amicable from the early 150s on. Although this must be in part a function of the extremely fragmentary nature of the sources for this period – Polybius' final books are in tatters, and Livy's account for the years after 167 is missing entirely – an incident of ca. 159 shows ongoing friendly relations; around this time, the senate explicitly endorsed the Achaean position in a dispute with Athens over the treatment of some Delian exiles living in Achaea (Polyb. 32.7.1–5; cf. 30.20.8–9). Friendly relations may have persisted throughout the 150s, for in the final year of that decade, the Romans finally allowed the exiles in detention in Italy to return.²⁵⁵

In precisely the same year, however, the old controversy over the Spartan exiles and the emancipation of Sparta from the League's control – which the senate effectively washed its hands of over three decades earlier, in winter 183/182 (Polyb. 23.9.11, discussed above, pp. 212–13) – suddenly became a live issue again, when a Spartan embassy appeared in Rome to discuss a territorial dispute. The senate's response was as flaccid and disappointing to them as had been their responses to the issues of Spartan freedom raised thirty years before: the Achaeans have jurisdiction in all matters concerning Sparta, except in capital cases. The Achaean politician, Diaeus of Athens, was so emboldened by the response that he declared that the senate had, in fact, given the Achaeans jurisdiction over Sparta in all things, including capital cases, and forced the frightened Spartan senate to sentence twenty-four men, chosen by Diaeus himself, to death; these men went into exile, joining the Spartan exile community at Rome. Diaeus and Callicrates of Leontium went on an embassy to Rome to respond to the exiles' fresh complaints against the League, and the senate told them to expect soon a return embassy to Achaea carrying Rome's instructions (Paus. 7.12.2–9).

In the event, the promised Roman embassy was not dispatched until over a year later. In the meantime, Sparta detached itself from the Achaean League, and when Q. Caecilius Metellus, the consul then operating in Macedonia, requested that the Greeks remain at peace, the Achaeans simply ignored him. They crushed the Spartan rebellion and forced the city back into the confederacy. When Metellus sent another message requesting that the Achaeans end the war and await the arrival of ambassadors from Rome, the League leadership complied, after a fashion: they ostentatiously

²⁵⁵ Polyb. 35.6.1–2 = Plut. *Cat. Mai.* 9.2–3; Paus. 7.10.12; Zonar. 9.31. The story at Paus. 7.11.1–3 that C. Sulpicius Gallus tried to dismember the League as early as 164 BC is tendentious, and anticipates later events: Gruen 1976a: 50–51.

declared a truce, but only after garrisoning some places in Laconia. When the Spartan rebels violated the truce by attacking and sacking the city of Iasus, a member of the League, the Achaeans responded with force (Polyb. 38.12.1–3; Paus. 7.13.1–8).

Metellus' promised embassy from Rome, headed by L. Aurelius Orestes (cos. 157), arrived at Corinth in summer 147. Aurelius mandated that Sparta, as well as Corinth, Argos, Heraclea, and Orchomenus were to be detached from the League. Given how uninterested in the Spartan cause the senate had been for thirty-five years by now, the Roman envoy's message must have been a shock; in fact, the announcement touched off a riot, in which Aurelius and his fellow ambassadors barely escaped with their lives. The Roman response to this, however, which could have easily been construed as an egregious violation of the *ius gentium*, to say nothing of the *fides* governing the Roman–Achaean *amicitia*, was merely to send out a new embassy under Sex. Julius Caesar (cos. 157) to chastise the Achaeans for their riotous behavior. The Achaeans promised Sextus that they would send an embassy to Rome to apologize officially. In the event, however, the anti-Roman Critolaus of Athens was elected League *strategos* for 147/146 on a platform of social reform in Achaea; he now informed Sextus that a final settlement with Sparta would have to await the regularly scheduled meeting of the League six months hence. The Roman envoys stormed off in anger and denounced Critolaus to the senate, while Critolaus went around the Peloponnese bragging of his diplomatic victory and stirring up hatred against the Romans.²⁵⁶

At the beginning of the following campaigning season, Metellus dispatched another embassy to the League, which was holding its general assembly meeting at Corinth. The ambassadors addressed the meeting with “the same kindly words” earlier used by Sex. Caesar and his colleagues (φιλανθρώπους λόγους παραπλησίους), so that the Achaeans would not fall into “a more widespread hatred” (δλοσχερεστέραν ἀπέχθειαν) of the Romans either because of the dispute over Sparta, or from “their own estrangement from the Romans themselves” (διὰ τῆς πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἐκείνων ἀλλοτριότητος; Polyb. 38.12.2–3). But the ambassadors were shouted down and driven from the meeting. Critolaus harangued his political opponents and declared that he was willing to be a friend of the Romans, but had no intention of being the subject of tyrants ([ὁ Κριτόλαος] φάσκων

²⁵⁶ Aurelius' embassy: Polyb. 38.9.1–2, 6–8; Paus. 7.14.1–3; Livy *Per.* 51; Livy *Oxy. Per.* 51; Cic. *Leg. Man.* 11; Strabo 8.6.23 (381C); Flor. 1.32.3; Dio fr. 72.2; Just. *Epit.* 34.1.9; Eutrop. 4.14; Zonar. 9.31; embassies of Sex. Caesar and the Achaeans: Polyb. 38.9.3–5, 10.1–5; Dio fr. 72.2; Paus. 7.14.3; Critolaus' election and rebuff to Sex. Caesar: Polyb. 38.10.8–11.6; Paus. 7.14.3–5.

βούλεσθαι μὲν Ῥωμαίων φίλος ὑπάρχειν, δεσπότης δ' οὐκ ἂν εὐδοκῆσαι κτησάμενος: 38.12.8). In the end the *strategos* convinced the assembly to vote for war – nominally against Sparta, says Polybius, but really against Rome (λόγῳ μὲν τὸν πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους πόλεμον, ἔργῳ δὲ τὸν πρὸς Ῥωμαίους: 38.13.6). The Roman legates dispersed to Athens, Sparta, and Naupactus to await Metellus, and “to wait on events” (προσεδρεύσων τοῖς καιροῖς: 38.13.9). The consul L. Mummius was told to mobilize his forces, but in the meantime Metellus sent one more embassy to the League, requesting that the Achaeans obey the decree brought to them by Aurelius in 147, mandating the detachment of Sparta and other cities from the League; if they did so, promised Metellus, their earlier disobedience would be forgiven. Critolaus refused to listen and the war was on, culminating in the destruction of Corinth later that summer.²⁵⁷

From Polybius' contemporary vantage point and his witnessing of events as the situation in Achaea rapidly degenerated, to say nothing of his transparently emotional and political investment in matters in his native Achaea (including a blind hatred for Critolaus and other Achaean demagogues: Polyb. 38.10.8, 13.8, etc.), the Roman decision to attack the Achaeans in 146 BC must have resembled a bolt from the blue. Hindsight, and a careful reading of the surviving accounts, however, allow for perspective and a more clear-headed analysis. A precise point at which the Roman–Achaean *amicitia* broke down is, in fact, hard to determine: was it the Achaeans' original defiance of Metellus' request that they keep the peace, their near-violation of Aurelius and his colleagues, and defiance of his mandate in 147, their insult to Sex. Caesar later on that year, or indeed their final refusal to comply with Metellus' requests at Corinth in 146?

The convergence of two events in particular in the single year 150 – the return of the Achaean exiles, and the Spartan–Achaean disputes over Achaean jurisdiction – may point us in the right direction, but requires in addition the application of some of the findings from analogous situations documented thus far in this chapter. Achaean behavior in 150 conformed to a pattern that the Romans had witnessed only the year before. In 151 the Carthaginians paid off the last installment of their war indemnity, received back the last of their hostages, and became so confident that their status-equivalence with Rome had been restored that they could even

²⁵⁷ League assembly meeting at Corinth: Polyb. 38.12.1–13.3; Paus. 7.15.1; war declared against Sparta: Polyb. 38.13.6; Metellus wages war: Paus. 7.15.2–11; Zonar. 9.31; Flor. 1.32.3–4; Oros. 5.3.3; Val. Max. 7.5.4; *De Vir. Ill.* 60.2; 61.2; Livy *Per.* 52; cf. Polyb. 38.16.4–12; 39.1.11; Mummius' destruction of Corinth: Paus. 7.15.1, 16; Zonar. 9.31; cf. Polyb. 39.2; Livy *Per.* 52; *Oxy. Per.* 52; Flor. 1.32.4–7; *De Vir. Ill.* 60.1–3; Oros. 5.3.5–7.

dare to attack Masinissa in winter 151/150 in strict contravention of their treaty with Rome. In 150 it must have appeared to the Roman senate that history was already repeating itself: no sooner had the surviving anti-Roman Achaean exiles been restored than the demagogic Diaeus seemingly deliberately antagonized the Romans by condemning twenty-four Spartans to death, thus guaranteeing – as indeed the Spartan senator Agasisthenes had promised the condemned men – that they could simply escape to Rome as exiles and be restored by the senate (Paus. 7.12.7). Between the appearance of the rival embassies of the Spartan exiles and Diaeus before the senate, and the dispatch of the embassy ordering the emancipation of Sparta and other cities from the Achaean League, the *patres* had clearly decided to administer a lesson to the Achaeans about the nature of their ongoing *amicitia* with Rome: the restoration of the Achaean exiles did not give the Achaeans a free hand – as the latter evidently thought it did – to start throwing their weight around in the Peloponnese again; nor did the return of these hostages mean – as the Achaeans evidently thought it did, and indeed, as the Carthaginians thought when the last of their hostages were returned in 151 – that all was squared away between the League and Rome, and that status-parity in their *amicitia* had been restored. A timely reminder to Achaea that the status-asymmetry in Rome's favor remained the same in their *amicitia* was thus deemed necessary, and the Romans delivered it in substantially the same terms in which they had issued a similar reminder to Carthage back in 238/237 – by demanding that their *amicus* give up some of its valuable territory.

It follows from this that the breakdown of Roman–Achaean relations was sudden, but that its dissolution proceeded, in typical Roman fashion, slowly and deliberately over the next three to four years. Once again, what is truly remarkable about the dissolution phase is how careful the Romans were, at every turn, to avoid provoking the Achaeans into precipitate acts. High-level Roman envoys and senior ex-consuls repeatedly endured insults, slights to their honor, and defiance at the hands of the Achaeans and their leading politicians. In response they issued requests, pleaded for calm, and adopted a kindly demeanor – all to prevent the Achaeans from doing anything hostile, as Polybius says. Polybius seems to imply that the Romans did not want to be given a pretext that would warrant a more robust Roman response to League activities. This indeed seems to be the implication of his statement that the Achaeans were to be prevented from doing anything hostile, even if it was motivated by hatred for the Romans: let them hate us, provided they don't do anything for which we might have to punish them. The deliberate, careful management of the breakdown is

of course best seen in Metellus' last-minute attempt, in mid-146, when a consular army and navy had already been mobilized, to bring the Achaeans around.

Thus Roman–Achaean relations deteriorated during this period for much the same reasons as had Rome's relationship with Antiochus III: the two *amici* were competing for status, and disputes over their respective duties and obligations, and over their relative position in the relationship, led to the erosion of the *fides* that bound them together. The significant points to make here are that the breach came when the different views of relative status in their *amicitia* clashed, and that the Romans managed the disintegration of their *amicitia* with the Achaean League in their typically slow and deliberate fashion.

There is one final issue to address: what to make of those rather exceptional cases where the breakdown and dissolution of international *amicitia* were equally abrupt, almost simultaneous, as happened for the Illyrgetes in 206 BC and Carthage in 238/237? A few more examples may be added before drawing any firm conclusions. In 353 the citizens of the Etruscan city of Caere threw off their Roman alliance and joined in a wider Etruscan war against Rome. When the Caerites attacked Roman territory, the Romans apparently dispensed with the formalities of the fetial ritual and demanded no redress, but promptly declared war on them and sent their legions against the city (Livy 7.20). Similarly the town of Henna in central Sicily, having perhaps become a Roman *amicus* in 263,²⁵⁸ at some point in 260/259 defected to Carthage, and Rome immediately responded by attacking the city and slaughtering part of the Carthaginian garrison there.²⁵⁹ In 213, during the next war with Carthage, the Romans grew suspicious that Henna was again planning to throw off its allegiance to Rome, which gave the Roman commander in Sicily, M. Claudius Marcellus, sufficient cause to attack the city, massacre its citizens, and plunder it thoroughly (Livy 24.39.7). Finally, the defection to Carthage in 211 of Morgantina, Hergetium, Hybla, Macella, and other towns in Sicily (26.21.14) was met with a swift and harsh response: M. Cornelius Cethegus, the Roman praetor in Sicily, apparently reduced these places to subjection straightaway (26.21.17; cf. Zonar. 9.6), and Morgantina was given over to Cornelius' allied soldiers from Spain for plundering, a decision taken in accordance with an earlier senatorial decree that stipulated the granting of a town to these troops as a reward for the crucial role they played in the Roman recapture of Syracuse

²⁵⁸ Eckstein 1987a: III and n. 31.

²⁵⁹ Diod. Sic. 23.9.4–5; cf. Polyb. 1.24.12; Zonar. 8.11; there is no evidence that any Hennans were killed, but we can assume some were.

(Livy 26.21.12–13). The citizens of Morgantina were probably dispossessed, or even enslaved *en masse*.²⁶⁰

Whether the impression given by the sources of quick and sudden friendship breakdown and dissolution, followed by the equally quick and robust response by the Romans is an illusion created by the brevity of the notices themselves cannot, of course, be known for certain. On the other hand, by analogy with the similar Ilergete case discussed earlier, all these actions are in the manner of sideshows to the main event – minor irritations and defections in a theater of war where the Romans are already active. In other words, the salience of Roman power is certainly a factor here. But it is perhaps more than this: the violence and anger of the swift Roman response are perhaps a function of the sense of betrayal the Romans felt when supposedly reliable allies in a theater of war joined the other side, or asserted their independence at the worst possible moment. The Roman response may also be conditioned by the need to avoid a domino effect among Roman allies in these same areas; in other words, a swift and brutal response was perhaps intended as an example to other Roman *amici* contemplating similar acts of betrayal. The only anomaly in this analysis is Carthage in 238/237, but this may be the exception that proves the rule. What sets the Punic state apart from the others here may simply be a matter of it being a great power, recently defeated, rather than a small-time defector in an active Roman theater of war. Thus the relative capabilities of the two rival powers at this stage – in other words, the salience of Roman power – may also play a role, as indeed it does in all the other cases.

From these few examples it is apparent that Rome was occasionally enveloped by the same rapid process of the breakdown and dissolution of friendship in the international sphere as individual Romans often were in their interpersonal friendships. Comparison of the number of these examples, however, with the sheer bulk of evidence presented earlier in this section – and indeed throughout this chapter – demonstrates that in international relations, the Romans and their *amici* preferred to negotiate their way out of friendship and into enmity, following sometimes sudden, sometimes gradual breakdowns, with almost invariably slow and deliberate dissolution and disengagement. This may simply be the result of an atavism – a holdover from the early Italic *fetial* and *deditio* rituals that somehow became hardwired into Roman diplomatic practice; or it may be a natural human psychological response to the appalling costs, in blood and treasure, of ancient warfare. Whatever the case, Roman methods of

²⁶⁰ On Morgantina, see Mattioli 1995.

managing international friendship breakdown suggest an inclination on the part of the Romans – exceptional in their international environment – to avoid war rather than to pursue it aggressively, as scholars have often argued.

CONCLUSION

All friendships are subject to breakdown, and even complete dissolution at some stage; Roman international *amicitia* in the third and second centuries BC was no exception to this. Breakdown usually occurred when some perceived breach of *fides* or some other immoral action was committed by one of the partners. The purpose of this final chapter has not been to assign blame for breaking faith, to judge the relative moral righteousness of Rome and her international partners, or to decide questions of war-guilt. As we have seen, the bulk of examples allow for competing interpretations of behavior on all sides, and there are very few cases where the blame for breaching the obligations of *amicitia* is completely unambiguous. This is one of the tragic aspects of the practical logics of friendship: interpretations of the nature of the friendship and relative standing within it are unregulated, and therefore open to (sometimes deliberate) misinterpretation and misunderstandings arising from a clash of different expectations and disparate constructions of the relationship. What is truly remarkable is that all parties concerned thought about these disputes and misunderstandings in terms of friendship, constructed them discursively in precisely the same terms, and these psychological and discursive phenomena had a constitutive impact and real-world effects on the international system. It is not just the case that wars sometimes broke out on the basis of such discursive clashes (although that happened often enough); wars were sometimes avoided, reprisals sometimes mitigated, and expectations readjusted in terms of *amicitia* and its attendant obligations all along the line. A processual reading of discursive phenomena of Roman international relations such as *fides*, justice, honor, pride, anger, and shame – the “spirit” world of antiquity, in Richard Ned Lebow’s formulation – thus amplifies and supplements *Machtpolitik* explanations based primarily on the psychological imperatives of fear, aggression, self-interest, and self-preservation.

Conclusion

After the dust and ash settled over the smoking ruins of what were once the flourishing cities of Carthage and Corinth in 146 BC, outside observers could have been forgiven for suspecting that a new era of Roman imperialism had begun, and that the golden age of Roman friendship diplomacy was well and truly over. Whether this is true or not will have to await further detailed study of the processes and practices of Roman international *amicitia* in the Late Republican and Imperial periods. It should be noted, however, that no source for these periods ever refers to Rome's partner states as *clientes*, or reduces *amicitia* to a polite euphemism for *clientela*.¹ Times changed, the realities of power shifted, but discourse endured. As Jon Lendon has exhaustively documented, the language of Roman diplomats and the representatives of foreign states, kingdoms, and peoples throughout the succeeding centuries of Roman civilization and beyond stubbornly retained the language of honor, status, prestige, shame, emotion, morality, and friendship.² The content of that discourse was constitutive of how the Romans and others saw themselves and their world. It also contributed to the construction of the international system itself.

Over the course of the preceding chapters, I have tried to show that international friendship discourse was especially important in the first great era of Roman transmarine expansion in the Middle Republic, since it contributed to the development, expansion, and consolidation of Roman power across the period. Between roughly 264 and 146 BC, the Romans somehow managed to refashion the entire Mediterranean system, a dangerous, war-prone, and violently anarchic environment, into a shape and substance that was more congenial to themselves and their own most pressing national security concerns. Whether by design or accident, the effect

¹ Cf. Burton 2003: 342 n. 54. ² Lendon 2001.

of this activity was more security for more states, gradually tilting the nature of the system away from violent anarchy to a more stable collective-security regime. The native ability of Italian troops, the style of training they underwent, the Roman Republican constitution, the enormous resources and favorable position of Italy, and perhaps even an unusually stubborn and determined Roman national character may go some way towards answering why and how it was the Romans, and no other ancient imperializing state, that achieved this (cf. Polybius' sixth book). The peculiar rituals of Italian warfare and peacemaking, the inclusive nature of Roman citizenship statuses, and, as this study has shown, the language and habits of mind the Romans used to discuss and describe their world, as well as to engage with it, must surely also have played a significant role as well.

The Roman imperial achievement, as I have tried to demonstrate, required maximum diplomatic and operational response-flexibility – the option to choose robust intervention in the system when it was deemed crucial to Roman security, or to avoid it when foreign entanglements were thought inopportune, overly dangerous, or simply not worth the effort. *Amicitia*, therefore, with its flexible and fluid processes and practical logics, has emerged from this study as the more suitable socio-cultural analogue for Roman engagement with the outside world than the comparatively more rigid *clientela* model advocated by Ernst Badian over fifty years ago. A deep, processual understanding of the evidence for the practical logics of international *amicitia* – the different methods of initiating friendship; the myriad ways of not only expressing and publicizing the relationship through exchanges, but also of managing those exchanges through, among other methods, manipulating the types of *beneficia* conferred, and the timing and tempo of *beneficia* reciprocity; the various situational strategies chosen by the partners to manage temporal and structural asymmetries in the relationship; and the many different methods available to friends for managing the separate but overlapping processes of friendship breakdown and dissolution – all of this proves, if proof beyond the dominant discourse of *amicitia* in the ancient testimony for Roman international relations is needed, that the Romans, and their international partners, of course, bilaterally regarded these relationships as friendships, and managed them according to the set of behaviors, assumptions, and practices – a *habitus*, in other words – typical of friendship.

An IR Constructivist reading of the evidence, as I have also tried to show, is more compatible than a strictly Realist interpretation with the practical

logics and discourses of international *amicitia*. Constructivism privileges the process, language, and ideology of international relations over the positivist-Realist motives of self-interest and security-seeking – “ideas all the way down,” in other words. The Constructivist-inspired reading of the evidence that I have tried to argue for here – a “modified” Constructivism – acknowledges that unlike IR Constructivism in its purest form, and unlike the dismissive, “other” constructing discourse applied to this and other Idealist theories by the Realists, the realm of IR theorizing is rich and broad enough to allow for multiple viewpoints and complex layers of interpretation. No single IR theory is so unanswerably accurate in its view of the world or so airtight in its propositions that it collapses utterly when alternative epistemologies are folded into it. Throughout I have maintained that an IR Constructivist reading of the evidence for Middle-Republican Roman imperial expansion does not subvert or replace the practical logics of IR Realist views of the same body of evidence (after all, some of our ancient sources occasionally speak like IR Realists *avant la lettre*), but can supplement and enrich our understanding of what that evidence is trying to tell us. Hitherto underappreciated or completely ignored aspects of our sources – the moral imperatives and discourse guiding foreign-policy decision-making to name but one – have been restored to our relatively thin knowledge base for Roman expansion in the crucial period of the third and second centuries BC.

Finally, what has been learned about Roman friendship diplomacy has opened up new and alternative avenues of inquiry for the endless (and probably insoluble) debate over the true nature of Roman imperialism. The old Manichean division of Roman imperial behavior into defensive and aggressive categories, depending on time and circumstance, should now properly be regarded as an intellectual dead end, and therefore jettisoned. The fact is that Roman behavior was both defensive and aggressive, at different times and for different purposes, during the period under consideration here. The search for pattern and consistency so crucial to the Political Science project is in this regard doomed to frustration. On the other hand, a processual reading of the practical logics of the international *amicitia* relationship can replace those longed-for certainties with a different one, and thus contribute to a better understanding of Roman imperial conduct that has appeared so confusing for so many, for so long (hence the debate itself). Rome’s responses to the unique stresses and strains of the violently anarchic Mediterranean international environment were improvisations within the broad boundaries set by the international *habitus* of diplomatic conduct among Mediterranean peoples. The patterns of

Roman international behavior that to us may seem quixotic, arbitrary, or downright paradoxical are, in fact, perfectly consistent and coherent within the distinct, peculiar logics of *amicitia*, the ultimate non-institutionalized institution, a stabilizing yet precarious foundation of ancient Mediterranean international relations, and flexible diplomatic instrument *par excellence*.

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